

MODERN PROBLEMS II PSYCHIATRY



BY

ERNESTO LUGARO

*Professor Extraordinary of Neuropathology and Psychiatry in the
University of Modena*



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SURVIVALS AND TENDENCIES IN THE
UNIVERSITY.¹

IN a survey of the institutions of higher education, it is easier to recognize archaic survivals than to discern evolutionary tendencies. From Salamanca to Oxford, and from Oxford to the latest American University, examples of the former abound. But this has also to be remarked of the universities, that there too are evident, and at many points, the marks of transition and the signs of renewing life. There is, to be sure, no record of any university having offered a chair to Darwin; yet against this, nearly two generations later, may in a measure be set the crop of evolutionary philosophy which M. Bergson, from the Collège de France, is sowing throughout the universities of the world. The jibe which Landor put into the mouth of the youthful Milton in conversing with the aged Galileo in Vallambrosa, was also meant for his own time, one not wholly out of sight of ours:—"An academician, a dung-hill cock, and a worm are three sides of an equilateral triangle." There are in the tradition of universities, things deadening and things quickening, things dignifying and degrading. The very word 'academic' has come to be a synonym for fossilised learning and futile logical canvassing of unrealities—the products of cloistered inaction. But the products of the *cloister in action* are sometimes world-shaping. For illustration there is no need to go back to the Abbeys of Clairvaux and Monte Casino. The spiritual re-making of Germany after Jena, and of France after Sedan, largely by their respective universities, are well-known instances occurring in the most recent past, the latter really in our own time. There are evidences of a similar process of regeneration at work in Russia to-day, though there the Government is as yet too ignorant and too impenitent to accept, much less to seek, the moral and intellectual aid of the universities.

The survival-value of a doctrine launched from the academic cloister into a world fitted to receive and use it, may be exemplified by the persistence and prevalence of Hegelianism. Not only in Germany, but in all other countries of the West, Hegelian conceptions are still dominant in contemporary politics. Liberals and Conservatives, Democrats and Republicans, Socialists and Feminists, do their political thinking in terms of the familiar

1. Part of a chapter from a forthcoming book entitled "Interpretations and Forecasts: a study of survivals and tendencies in contemporary society," by Victor Branford.

dialectic. They are all Hegelians, knowing it or no. Their political categories—and by implication their social ideals—culminate in the contrasted pair, Individual and State. These they reconcile in a higher synthesis which combines both in a larger unity. For some—the Hegelians of the extreme Left—this unification is Socialism. For others—the Hegelians of the extreme Right—it is Imperialism. For others again, it is a blend of both, peculiar to themselves or their group. An intellectual cult, with a resulting world-politics, has thus arisen out of the unifying, inspiring message which an ageing Berlin professor addressed to the youths of Germany, eager for a doctrine which would concentrate their minds and kindle their hearts to the renovation of a disintegrated Fatherland.

An ardent disciple acclaimed the Hegelian categories as new gods at the memorable festival in 1826, which thus appropriately recognized their author as more than a philosopher—as, indeed, a demiurgic creator of “Powers and Dominions, Deities of”—earth. The historian of mythologies may see in the resultant growth and extension of the Hegelian cult, a justification of this extravagant imputation. But for the historian of universities, the rise of the Hegelian cult holds a different meaning and conveys another message. It illustrates the essential rôle of the university in the transmission of culture and in the evolution of ideals. That rôle is not merely the passive one of conserving the heritage of culture and transmitting it from generation to generation. It is above all active and creative. As supreme guardian of the social heritage, the university is concerned to use this for awakening the latent idealism of youth, and for directing it to the definite and special needs of the oncoming generation. Now those who combine experience of the past with vision of the future, are manifestly the sages of the passing generation. Like all other human products, the sage’s wisdom ripens and his vision clarifies just in proportion as such wisdom and vision find the proper field and scope for their expression. Their natural seed-bed is the mind of awakening youth, which, without this selective sowing, is wont to lie fallow, or prove fertile in weeds.

The essential function of the university is to bring together, for the transmission of experience and impulse, the sages of the passing and the picked youths of the coming generation. By the extent and fulness with which they establish these social contacts, and thus transmit the wave of cumulative experience and idealist impulse—the real sources of moral and intellectual progress—the universities are to be judged. In all walks of life, in every social grade and class, in the whole circle of the legitimate occupations, manual, mental and moral, there are mature men and women—sages and sibyls—of moral purpose and specialized knowledge,

who can generalize their unique personal experience, so that it fits into the mosaic, and contributes an enrichment to the pattern, of human culture. Each of these is a potential tutor or professor in the university of their city or region. How can he or she become a real one? Every youth and maiden awakening to the issues of life is heir of all the ages, and therefore a potential student of the university. How, again, can he or she become a real one? These are the essential problems which University Extension sees and seeks to deal with. Their full and effectual solution implies our learning to conceive the university as the whole community in its culture aspect. It implies that the prevalent academic or cloistral conception of the university be supplemented by the addition of civic functions. And this, to be sure, would be no new departure, but a return to earlier usage. Happily there are many indications of reviving contacts and interpenetrations of University and City. But before examining the drift and meaning of these, it may fortify our faith in the civic functions of the university, and clarify our interpretation of contemporary survivals and tendencies, to digress briefly into historic data. It is at once the method of organic and social evolution—*reculer pour mieux sauter*.

Like its predecessor, the mediæval monastery, the early university was an aristo-democratic institution. It sought to provide a common culture—and that the best of its age—for persons of all classes, independently of wealth or social status. But as the monastery was of more rustic, so the university was of more urban character, and, indeed, expressed the adjustment of the monastic type to the more complex conditions of city life, as this was re-awakening after an age-long winter sleep. Between the decay of ancient and the rise of mediæval cities the monasteries kept alive, in the West, the civic ideal of creating a milieu for the life of the spirit. With the growing acceptance of this ideal, there reappeared an era of comparative peace, a time of security and democratic culture—the conditions necessary for the co-operation of classes and nations in the supreme art of city-building. The instinct of the peasant is to build sooner or later (unawares becoming a citizen in doing so), for it is his way of storing wealth, and at the same time using it to express his mastery of nature and to symbolize his communion with her inner mysteries. Under the protection and inspiration of priest, monk (and also of friar), the mediæval peasant, turning craftsman, began to recover and in many ways transcend, the specialized skill of his ancient and classical predecessors. The vision of the heavenly city uniting all good souls after death, began to translate itself into the city beautiful on earth, needing their co-operation in life.

But how initiate and maintain the concert of thought and action?—how continuously renew the emotional urge?—how keep

in sight the common goal?—these are vital questions in labours so vast and complex as the making and maintenance of every true city. What the mediæval city—at its best a marvel of beauty—was we now know, thanks to the research of recent archæology. No fortuitous assemblage of architectural masterpieces like the palaces and temples of an Oriental despot; no mere perfected effort of instinctive creation like the bee's hive. Still less was it a confused medley of conflicting resultants of human passion and inhuman labour, like the modern town misconceiving itself a city because it herds a multitude. The mediæval city in its growth and expansion, has now been revealed to us, by careful and informed research into its definite origins as, in its main features, the planned execution of spaciouly conceived designs.¹

With the architectural aspects and economic particulars of that design, we are not for the moment concerned, but with the moral pre-suppositions, the social condition, the æsthetic and intellectual preparation—in a word, the educational or cultural system, once an actuality and a power—which made possible its realization.

Examining the remnants of mediæval architecture, of craftsmanship and of learning, as evidence of the environment in which they originated, we constantly discover that, amongst workers and scholars alike, the normal flowering of personality was effected and matured through the expression of ideals, social, civic or moral. To a less, though to a considerable extent, the same is true of the feudal aristocracy, as is evidenced by the rules of chivalry, too infrequently though these may have been observed in practice. From the first interpretative examination of mediæval culture—Joseph de Maistre's *Le Pape*—down to the latest sociological analysis,² the material grows for a picture of mediæval society, as continuously dominated by a great purpose. This purpose was the endeavour so to combine moral, æsthetic and intellectual resources as to inspire the various classes and communities of Christendom with a set of ideals relevant to their particular functions, and yet uniting them in a common culture. Three institutions—the Church Militant, the Popular Theatre, and the University—developed as the specialized organs of this Higher Education for life, and for the life of all. The voluntary partnership of the Church and the Guilds created the Popular Theatre and maintained it as at once the playground of the people and a school of civic and social culture. Training in the free atmosphere of dramatic representation, the people there spontaneously absorbed and again transmitted the heritage of culture and ideals, adapting it, in each generation, even in each locality, to its particular needs of time and place; and so the people were able to re-express it with more

1. Camillo Sitte, *Der-Städtebau*. (Vienna, 1901).

2. Chatterton Hill, *The Sociological Value of Christianity*. (Black, 1912).

abiding visible splendour and beauty in the building of Cathedrals and the making of Cities. Thus there arose a system, in which the education of the individual was effected largely through the making of cities and the co-operative maintenance of their institutions.

That the design of the mediæval city was so largely a spontaneous resultant of the citizen's mode of life, was in itself the crown and confirmation of profound planning and far-reaching systematization operating from above. A remarkable succession of moral and intellectual leaders devoted themselves to the grand problems of unifying the whole culture resources of Christendom for the guidance and uplift of life. In the division of labour requisite for so immense an undertaking, the Cloister specialized on the moral approach to the problem, and the University on the intellectual approach—each thus following the bent of its respective rustic or urban origin. So far from the monastic and academic methods of the middle ages being purely dialectical and abstract, as the eighteenth century historians thought, we are beginning to see that they were, at their best and in reference to their time, concrete and experimental, *i.e.*, evolutionary. This is indeed, in a degree, now generally recognized as regards the monastery and friary, but less so as regards the universities. Otherwise historians of philosophy would make more use (for example) of the significant fact that Thomas Aquinas failed to complete his systematization, because of the too frequent calls to leave his chair in the University of Paris, and take his seat at the Council Boards of Christendom.

The most generalized lesson which the student of the middle ages spells out is perhaps this : that in the specialization of spiritual services to the community, the University arose alongside of the Cloister, and that both functioned usefully so long as they retained their sense of interconnection with each other, and of practical relationship to the community, both directly and through the Secular Church ; but that all three organs withered as they fell apart from each other and from the everyday life of the city and the community. The cities themselves thus becoming isolated from their proper spiritual organs, entered on that process of random expansion and contraction which has fitfully continued through the centuries, and is only now beginning to be regulated in these days of reviving Town Planning. Forbidding though the accumulated burden of evil may be, yet the future is brightened by the prospect of a newer and higher art of City Design, in which resources, moral and intellectual, as well as material, may be made available for the life on earth, beyond the dreams of the mediæval cloister. Eutopia, the modern successor of the Renaissance Utopia, is no vague vision in the clouds, but an image of increasing clearness on every horizon.

But to complete our historic diagnosis. The mediæval univer-

sity had its period of flowering in the recovery of remnants of ancient learning, and in the synthesis of these with the knowledge and thought of its own age. It thus contributed to the enrichment and uplift of the civic and social life of its day. From its withering fruit, its dying scholastic philosophy, dropped and germinated the seeds of modern science. Then after an evanescent reflowering at the Renaissance, came the academic pedants of classical scholarship. These surrounded themselves with a high wall of sterile formalities, by which they fenced out the city from the germinating seeds and from all save the withered husks of academic learning. The not infrequent breaches made in that wall during succeeding centuries, sometimes by the student from within, and sometimes by the citizen from without, the university authorities have generally done their best to repair. The resulting isolation of the University and the City has been effectively maintained for centuries; hence citizens starved of culture, and students deprived of social purpose; and thus have they familiarized the world with an infinite variety of deteriorate types of both. The city has been quickening to a sense of its need of nurture, earlier than the university has repented of its deed of deprivation, or recognized this as its Great Refusal in many senses. The spontaneous rise everywhere of extra-mural culture-institutions of every kind, from the older European academies and learned societies to the municipal libraries and museums, the Technical Institutes and Art Galleries of yesterday and to-day—all these may be held to mark the independent effort of cities to take up the university rôle; and to organize for the body of citizens a full culture inheritance in which all might share. But these fragmentary institutes of a partial culture have lacked the creative urge of a unified vision. In a word, they have been insufficiently inspired by the true spirit of the university at its best. They are, as it were, bastard faculties awaiting legitimation by the reunion of their parents—the City and the University.

Of various movements aiming to bring together academic and civic life into closer union, there are three which, though not commonly associated in men's minds, have yet each and all a deep underlying interconnection. Of this trio, first in time came Eugenics, an unfamiliar and unaccompanied pilgrim; then in unrelated and unconscious succession, the University or Social Settlement; and finally came Civics to complete the triad and unite all three into a working Faith and Practice.

Emerging from their birth-place in the cloisters of science, Eugenics and Civics have, as synthetic studies, sought the aid of the university, in the general sense at least, for investigation and research. As doctrines of life and conduct, they have appealed

alike to students and citizens with a set of evolutionary ideals, which imply the closest union between studies and citizenship. For long a solitary study and concern of Galton—himself always a solitary worker—Eugenics is assuredly a fruit of the hermit's cell. Civics, on the other hand, has been for over a quarter of a century the main pre-occupation of at least one school of workers, and indeed a school which without undue violation of the historic sense may be called a variant of the cloister. Its initiator was the founder of the Edinburgh School of Sociology, and simultaneously of the University Halls of Residence in Edinburgh. Now this group has one of its many roots in the University or Social Settlement movement, with which it is linked by the interpenetrations of a whole generation of common effort.

Promulgated first in the universities as an impulse of civic emotion, the social settlement idea had only to find lodgment in the youthful minds of a group of evolutionary naturalists to act as a ferment of sociological with biological synthesis. That, broadly, was really the psychology of the situation, out of which this revival of social studies in Edinburgh, some twenty-five years ago, took the form of a little School of Civics, uniting the sciences and the humanities in the common conception of Civic Evolution.

It will be evident that this conjunction of evolutionary naturalist, sociologist, and student-citizen must have invented Eugenics, if it had not already existed. But with a difference: this doctrine, born and developed in isolation, has carried into its worldly career the defects as well as the qualities of its original solitude. True, as Carlyle said, "No Thebaid eremites, no melodious Dante." But many refinements have to be wrought on the ideas of St. Anthony and on the practices of his pig before the former will compose into a *Divine Comedy*. The man Galton, by virtue of the simplicity of his life, his rigorous self-discipline, and life-long devotion to an ideal, would, under a dispensation that truly fitted titles to deeds, have ended his days not as Sir Francis but as Saint Francis. So the lustre of the initiator is not to be held as dimmed by the eugenic crudities of some of his nominal disciples. Still, if one would penetrate to the truly evolutionary spirit of eugenics, a surer guide than Galton may be found in the veteran pioneer of the evolution doctrine—Alfred Russel Wallace himself.

In his own life a more socialized type than Galton, Wallace naturally emphasized that aspect of eugenics. His counsel to those who would make experimental application of the doctrine of evolution to the human race is briefly this: give your women economic freedom, assure them access to the sources of culture, and you can safely leave eugenic experimentation in their hands. Here are a method and an ideal of eugenics which, while not in the least limiting the sociologist, appeal to him because of the

assurance given that social reform and education are not counter-strokes to evolutionary progress (as too many unregenerate biologists still fear) but are indeed among the very instruments of its natural realization. In that faith, strengthened by his own parallel reading of human progress, the sociologist is compelled to the generalization that selection in the transmission of social ideals is the necessary prerequisite and preparation alike to a theory and an art of eugenic selection in man. In short, the civic sociologist has now to persuade his biological brother that his hopes and aims of a theory and art of eugenic selection in man must be preceded by a clearer vision and choice of social ideals. The university must guide and control the Eugenics Laboratory; not *vice versa*.

But the university of to-day is far from awake to its trust as guardian and moral assessor of the social heritage of experience and ideals; and this, without doubt, is one of the chief reasons why the city is so seldom a "fount of the good life." That vision of the civic ideal, so clear and well-expressed, came to Aristotle, let us remember, by his discerning and generalizing, from the vantage-ground of his own academic cloister, the best tendencies of the actual city. It expressed a truly evolutionary ideal which might justly be crystallized and commemorated by a new coinage, for universal use. The hard-shelled eugenicist, whose biological materialism is recalcitrant to civics, might still yield something to sociology and idealism, if the bitterness of retreat were softened by the poetic thought that euzenic¹ rhymes well with eugenic. Eugenia is the proud and haughty Beauty, queening it in her own circle of devotees, exacting of service, scornful of rivals, indifferent to the outer court. But Aristotle's Euzenia is the wise and gentle, yet beautiful and witty Hostess, eager to welcome the highest and purest to her salon, yet giving her best freely to all.

In other words, Civics should and must come before Eugenics, and assign it its limited sphere and subordinate rôle; even as, for both alike, the life of the citizen comes before that of class, family, or even nation. For if there is no bias more distorting than national chauvinism, there is no discipline more moralizing than that of good citizenship. The practical summary is that the eugenicist's gospel of a Good Race must be inspired by the vision of the City Beautiful as fount and field of the Good Life. Each civic school as it arises, each school of sociology which stresses and centres upon Civics, while reaffirming the emotional impulse of the social settlement, will thus assert, with a yet fuller emphasis, the intellectual value and the practical necessity of linking the University with the City, in the life of student and citizen.

VICTOR BRANFORD.

1. ἡ πόλις . . . οὕσα (εὐεκα) τοῦ εὖ ζῆν. (The city exists for the good life.) Aristotle, *Politics*. I., 2—8.

SOME CURRENTS OF MODERN FRENCH THOUGHT AS REFLECTED IN THE NOVEL.¹

To a society of sociologists no apology is necessary for the introduction of such a subject as the French novel. For in no country is the novel so full of sociology as in France. Neither need one apologise for discussing a literature other than that of one's native land. Precedents enough may be found from the days of Herodotus down to those of Bodley.

The various currents of thought influencing present-day French fiction are manifold. Those only which are most social I propose to consider here. But even among these the limits of this paper require a selection to be made. I invite you therefore to consider a group of tendencies which have only appeared within recent years. They date roughly from the end of the last century. They are the reactionary tendencies at present evident in French life and in French literature, especially in the novel. With other forms of prose literature and with poetry I do not propose to deal.

Among reactionary tendencies I include a tendency to return to authority, a preference for instinctive over rational methods, an insistence that man is after all only a little bit reasonable, that reason plays a very minor part in his life, and a tendency even to minimise that minor part. "What a little thing upon the surface of ourselves is intelligence!" exclaims the novelist, M. Maurice Barrès, whose works are full of these tendencies. Those who are in any degree acquainted with the elder generation of contemporary French writers and thinkers will readily perceive that the appearance of such tendencies constitutes a veritable revolution, a complete *volte-face*. They involve the rejection of those eighteenth century ideas still held by the elder writers of modern France—by the prince of intellectuals, M. Anatole France, by M. J. H. Rosny, by M. Remy de Gourmont, and many others. The appearance of these reactionary tendencies means that Young France is stiffening her neck against the gospel of Voltaire and bowing it to receive the yoke of Bossuet. It means that she is revolting against the scepticism of her fathers and returning to the dogmatism of her great-grandfathers. It means, in a word, that while the elder generation doubted everything, the younger generation believes everything. Young France to-day with all her soul rejects *der Geist der stets verneint*.

1. A paper read before the Sociological Society, December 9, 1913.

This complete change which has recently come over the French mind strikes us when we compare the chief characters in famous novels to day—of *Jean Christophe*, for example—with those of equally famous novels even only twenty years ago, such novels as *une Cruelle Enigme* or *les Mensonges* of Bourget. Take the young Hubert Liauran in *Cruelle Enigme*, take the young René Vinci in *Mensonges* and compare their sad philosophy of life with the unquestioning optimism of young Georges Jeannin in *La Nouvelle Journée*, the last volume of *Jean Christophe*. Or compare the elder and the younger generation as they are represented in the pages of *Jean Christophe*. Compare the optimism of Georges Jeannin with the pessimism of his father Olivier, Christophe's bosom friend. Olivier is typical of the elder generation; he is a sceptic, an ironist, a psychologist, and so analytical as to be frequently morbid. Olivier's son, Georges, is totally unlike his father. "I can't think whom you resemble," his mother used to say. "Certainly neither me nor your father." From the teachers who had inspired Olivier, Georges turned away with disgust. Tolstoy he condemned as a mere nihilist, Ibsen as a proud destroyer, Nietzsche as a raving madman, Renan and Anatole France as dilettanti whose irony lacks distinction and whose laughter is empty of merriment. While Olivier was content to leave certain problems unsolved, Georges pined for certainty in all things; and in order to obtain it he was prepared to accord to authority that submission which his father had ever proudly denied. *Malheur au vague, mieux vaut le faux* might have been his motto. Consumed with his longing for certitude, desiring discipline, respecting authority, Georges and his young friends are perpetually forming themselves into societies and laying down rules and principles. Georges fails to understand why his father's old friend, Christophe, has never felt the need of joining some camp.

"A camp!" cried Christophe, "why should one shut oneself up in a camp. Isn't it much better outside. I am surprised that you, an out-of-doors man, should want to shut yourself up!"

"Ah, it is not the same thing for the body as for the soul," replied Georges. "The mind needs certitude. It needs to think with others, it needs to adopt principles admitted by the mass of mankind at a given period. How I envy those who lived in classic times. My friends are right when they want to restore those good old days."

"Poor fool," cried Christophe, "what has made you so chicken-hearted?"

"I am not chicken-hearted," Georges indignantly protested. "Neither are any of us."

"You must be," said Christophe, "if you are so afraid of yourselves. What! you need an order, a rule, and yet you are so incapable of finding one for yourselves that you must needs hang on to your great grandmother's apron strings! Good heavens! Can't you walk alone?"

"We must take root, *s'enraciner*," said Georges, proud to repeat one of the catchwords of the day.

"But do trees need to be in pots in order to take root? The earth's there, free to everyone. Strike your roots deep into it. Find your own laws. Look within you."

"I haven't the time," said Georges.

Here is one of the reasons for the young Frenchman's reversion to authority, for his passion for herding together in societies. In the rush of modern existence he has no time to discover for himself the certainty for which he craves. In the turmoil of this mechanical age, Young France is in no danger of suffering from the malady of too much thinking. Hurrying to football, whirling in a motor car, soaring in an aeroplane, what time has she for that systematic thought which was the basis of French rationalism—what time has she for "those deliberate formulae, syllogisms and classifications which were the basis of French thought and out of which were evolved ideals, the attempted realisation whereof sometimes altered the history of the world?"

In the hurry and scurry of modern life, in the present mania for sport, we may find some explanation of the reactionary tendencies now revealing themselves in Young France. Never was the physical activity of France so great as it is to-day—the gospel of Energy preached by M. Barrès in his novels grouped under the title of *Energie Nationale* has indeed fallen upon fruitful ground. "Intoxicated with the sense of his muscular vigour, he would have set out to conquer the stars," writes another present-day novelist of his hero. The same remark might apply to the majority of young Frenchmen in *lycées* and universities to-day. To quote M. Romain Rolland again: "it is the muscular strength and the intellectual indolence of Young France that are carrying her into the arms of reaction."

In three distinct, though closely interrelated, departments of thought this reaction declares itself: in political speculation, in religion and in more abstract philosophy. In political speculation these tendencies are either monarchist or nationalist, and close upon their heels run anti-Semitism, militarism and a kind of aggressive imperialism, which is new in the France of to-day although its prototype might be discovered during the Revolution. Monarchism and nationalism are respectively associated with the work of an eminent writer: monarchism with Charles Maurras, nationalism with Maurice Barrès, both household names in France though in England hitherto little known.

These two reactionary writers exercise a profound influence over French youth largely through their command of a masterly style. Maurras in his literary criticisms and political writings, also in his novels, wields a fine classic phrase—Barrès too is a

stylist of great charm and power. It is difficult to attach to him any one literary label. Some have called him "the imperturbable romantic," yet in his recent novel, *Colette Baudoche*, he has produced a treasure of classicism. As a novelist he ranks very high, next indeed to Anatole France.

This is an age of hero-worship in France. Maurice Barrès inaugurated it with a glorification of Taine and Napoleon in his novel *les Déracinés*, published in 1897, and of Renan in an earlier work (*Huit Jours chez Monsieur Renan*, 1888). Romain Rolland in the new century has followed suit in his three masterpieces of biography—his *Beethoven*, his *Michael Angelo* and his *Tolstoy*. For a large number of young Frenchmen to-day Charles Maurras is almost as great a hero as Taine was for Barrès thirty years ago, or as Tolstoy was for Romain Rolland twenty years ago. The personal charm of M. Maurras, his scholarship, his disinterestedness, the simplicity almost amounting to asceticism of his private life, make a strong appeal to young Frenchmen to-day and cause them to excuse too easily the violence of his hatreds and the truculence of his attacks on his opponents. M. Maurras, like Brunetière, is a devout admirer of the classic age of French literature and French history. He is indeed a Frenchman of *le Grand Siècle* born out of due time. His views on society, on the Republic and on the Church he has expressed in numerous works, which are all widely read. The chief perhaps are—*Trois Idées Politiques*, *Chateaubriand*, *Michelet*, *Sainte-Beuve*; *l'Enquête sur la Monarchie*; *Kief et Tanger* and *la Politique Religieuse*.

It was Maurras who, in 1905, founded the Royalist Society known as *l'Action Française*. Every member of this society is required to sign a declaration closing with the words: *je m'associe à l'œuvre de la restauration monarchique, je m'engage à la servir par tous les moyens. Par tous les moyens* includes violence when necessary. The members of *l'Action Française*, which is not ostensibly a catholic society, for it includes many free thinkers, among whom is Maurras himself, unblushingly encouraged and justified the violence which attended the taking of the inventories of church property, those stormy scenes reproduced with such vividness in the pages of M. Bourget's *l'Emigré*. Maurras is also the dominating spirit of the newspaper *l'Action Française*. To its columns he subscribes, side by side with articles of the most finished and accomplished literary criticism, attacks on the French Republic and all its works. These attacks are too often expressed in scurrilous language interlarded with invective of the most vitriolic order. Maurras as well as an anti-republican is an anti-democrat and an anti-romanticist. He prides himself on taking large views of life. His conception of the universe he proudly asserts to be that of Aristotle, Dante and Bossuet. This was the

grand conception, he maintains, which dominated before those miserable Romanticists Rousseau and his school came to give undue prominence to the individual and to glorify under the name of Justice or Liberty or Progress one single aspiration. Those Romanticists, says Maurras, were blinded by passion; they misread the face of the Universe. It remains for Maurras to read it aright and to reinstate reason in her sovereign sway.

Maurras would sacrifice everything to what he calls the integrity of society and to the harmonious working of the social order. For him this integrity, this harmony, are more important than the rights of any single individual—we presume even than the rights of M. Maurras himself—certainly than the rights of a persecuted Jew, Alfred Dreyfus. Maurras, as we might expect, has always been bitterly anti-Dreyfusard. It was during the crisis of l'Affaire Dreyfus that Maurras founded the newspaper *l'Action Française*, which to-day keeps l'Affaire alive. Largely owing to Maurras and *l'Action Française* l'Affaire is still a living force in French society. Were the fire of the national hatred and suspicion it kindled ever to show signs of dying down we might depend on M. Maurras to stoke it up. It would be difficult to exaggerate the importance of the part played by l'Affaire in the history of modern French literature. Nearly all the leading French writers passionately espoused either one side or the other. Zola did not live to introduce l'Affaire into his novels. But his *Letters* on l'Affaire rank among his masterpieces. Anatole France in *l'Histoire Contemporaine* and in *Crainquebille* produced some of his most significant work, so also on the other side did M. Barrès in his *Scènes et Doctrines du Nationalisme*.

L'Affaire Dreyfus in the movement of French thought represents much more than the question of the guilt or innocence of an officer in the French army accused of selling military information to the foreigner. L'Affaire represents the conflict between two ideas, neither of them contemptible. The real question at issue during the great national crisis was this: is it right at all times and under all circumstances to proclaim the truth? The anti-Dreyfusards asserted that it is not. They maintained that if the proclamation of the truth endangers the security of society, then the truth should not be told. The Dreyfusards asserted that in all times, under all circumstances, whatever the cost, the truth should be told.

This problem is an old one and a difficult. The pardon and rehabilitation of Dreyfus have not solved it. And so the conflict between Dreyfusards and anti-Dreyfusards still rages. You have only to take up any issue of *l'Action Française* to see that it continues. Constantly there appears in this paper a calendar recalling from the anti-Dreyfus point of view the chief events of

l'Affaire. On the other side M. Charles Péguy¹ keeps l'Affaire alive in the interesting pages of the periodical, *Les Cahiers de la Quinzaine*, which he founded and which he edits.

But to return to M. Maurras. His anti-Dreyfusism is but a phase of his anti-Semitism and his anti-Semitism is but a symptom of that scathing contempt and fierce suspicion with which he regards all foreigners in France, *métèques* he calls them. "Hebraising," writes Maurras, "has for years been the bane of England and Germany. Those who supported Dreyfus in France were also guilty of Hebraising; they were barbarians and traitors to their country." Not even the complete classicism of Anatole France, to whom by the way Maurras was once private secretary, could save him from inclusion among the barbarian hordes. But M. France has had his revenge; for in *M. Bergeret à Paris*,² in the person of Jean Coq, he has immortalised his sometime secretary by pinning him onto the point of his irony.

Only a little less than Jews and all foreigners, M. Maurras hates Protestants—Jews, Protestants, Freemasons and *Métèques* (foreigners) form what he calls the four confederate states which are hurrying France to destruction. From this destruction Maurras would save his country by restoring the rule of King and Pope. For in M. Maurras and in M. Barrès also, as we shall see later, the two tides of political and catholic reaction meet. Yet the droll part of it is that neither Maurras nor Barrès is a catholic. Far from it, Maurras is an avowed atheist, Barrès is an agnostic. To an English mind it seems almost inconceivable that an avowed atheist should so strenuously advocate catholicism as M. Maurras has done in his book *La Politique Religieuse*. Here we find his hatred of Jerusalem and Geneva inducing him, as he expresses it, to kneel reverently before "the ancient and holy maternal figure of historical Catholicism." He is apparently oblivious of the fact that even Catholicism owes its existence to a Jew. With curious inconsistency he hails the Church as the ark of salvation of society, and the Noah of that ark he declares to be "the sovereign pontiff who, clothed in white raiment, sits upon the summit of the catholic system" as "the demiurgus of universal civilisation." While the works of M. Maurras are widely read and while they contribute all along the line to strengthen reaction, there appears little danger of his monarchical views being widely accepted. Although his ideas are implicit in much French fiction produced nowadays there is, as far as I know, only one novel, M. Bourget's *l'Emigré*, which definitely advocates the restoration of *l'Ancien Régime*.

More practical and more dangerous from the progressive point

1. See article on C. P. in the *Nineteenth Century* (November), by Dr. G. Chatterton Hill.

2. p. 290, etc.

of view than the monarchicism of M. Maurras are the nationalist ideas of the Republican, M. Maurice Barrès. In view of the fact that for more than forty years France has been a Republic, M. Barrès, who is a traditionalist, cannot help being a republican. However he may admire monarchy—and he does admire it—M. Barrès realises that any attempt to restore that form of government in France must end in failure. *Cultivez vos morts* is his doctrine. In other words continue in the footsteps of your ancestors, but in this case of your immediate ancestors only. The nationalism of M. Barrès has evolved out of regionism and traditionism. Did space permit, it would be interesting to trace these two closely interrelated theories as they gradually took form in the novels of M. Barrès from *l'Œil des Barbares*, published in 1888, down to *la Colline Inspirée*, which appeared only the other day. In *l'Œil des Barbares*, M. Barrès, like Pater in the famous conclusion of his *Renaissance*, entrenched himself in the isolation of perfect egoism, which he calls *le culte du moi*. In his second novel, *l'Homme Libre*, and in *le Jardin de Bérénice*, the most artistic of his works, he teaches—all M. Barrès' works are didactic—that *le culte du moi* is not enough, that no man can be healthy without a certain *sociabilité*. It is this vague idea of *sociabilité* which materialises into regionism and traditionism. "Every region," writes Barrès, "presents an idea, and that idea one must allow to soak into one's being." His own native region is Lorraine. The spirit of Lorraine pervades all his books. In *Les Déracinées* four youths of Lorraine, who leave their native province to settle in Paris, come to no good, three of them at least, because they have isolated themselves from their native atmosphere, because they have been false to the principle of regionism. Traditionism is harmony with the spirit of one's ancestors. "A Catholic," writes M. Barrès, "founds his patriotism on his religion." But he who cannot accept the supernatural must bring his piety down from heaven to earth, to the earth wherein repose his dead. If we would attain to the full measure of our being, if we would accept in its fulness the Gospel of Energy which M. Barrès preaches, then we must cultivate all that is racial within us. In us all, he continues, "are survivals, *il y a des survivances, qui, bien dégagés nous donneraient du style*." Thus M. Barrès, when he visits Brittany, makes pilgrimages to certain sites which are most in accord with the spirit of his Lotharingian origin. He avoids the Forest of Broceliande as being too Celtic. But he takes care that his due feet do not fail to tread the hallowed ground of *Les Rochers*, once the abode of that typical Frenchwoman, Madame de Sévigné, and Combourg, where in boyhood dwelt Chateaubriand, the apostle of that romanticism which M. Barrès believes to be the dominant feature in the spirit of his native Lorraine.

Regionism and traditionism lead to nationalism. What is the nationalism of M. Barrès? The novelist explains it at length in a book entitled *Scènes et Doctrines du Nationalisme* (1902). It is significant that this book was the outcome of l'Affaire Dreyfus; for the events of that great national crisis caused the ideas M. Barrès calls nationalism to materialise in his mind. Nationalism is in brief the carrying of racialism to its extreme limit, the raising high of the barriers of race and nationality against all foreign influence, whether it come from within the nation, from Jews and others settled in the country, or from without, from foreigners, especially Germans on the frontier. Nationalism therefore involves anti-Semitism (especially in its present French form of anti-Dreyfusism). It involves also uncompromising Germanophobia. *La Revanche* is one of the root principles of Barrès' nationalism. How bitter is his hatred of Germany he reveals in his novel *Les Amitiés Françaises*, where he describes the education of a little French boy, Philip, in the principles of nationalism. Philip's father takes his son to the battlefields of Lorraine where the French suffered defeat during the war of 1870. He conducts Philip to the battlefield of Worth and there he presents him with the humiliating picture of a Prussian officer spitting in the face of his French prisoner. "Philip," says his father, "I give you this tradition. Here more plainly than in any book you will see the barrier that separates France from Germany." The eternal incompatibility of the German and French temperaments is a favourite theme with M. Barrès as it is with many other French novelists of to-day. M. Barrès has developed it again in *Colette Baudouche*. M. Paul Margueritte has developed it in *Les Frontières du Cœur*, and M. René Bazin in *Les Oberlé*.

The mistrust, not merely of German but of all foreign influence, which is one of the root principles of nationalism, finds expression in a book which has been much discussed outside France, although in France itself it has caused little stir. This novel is *Les Anges Gardiens*. As a novel it is a mere piece of lurid melodrama and of no account. But as a manifestation of truculent nationalism it cannot be ignored. The title, *Les Anges Gardiens*, is the sarcastic epithet applied to the four foreign governesses, three of whom are monsters of iniquity, who figure in this book. Each member of the quartette brings disaster to the French family she enters, and the novel is written to warn French parents against admitting these foreign "she devils" into their family circle.

A less virulent and more wholesome form of nationalism declares itself in the numerous colonial and maritime novels now being written in France. Pierre Loti has an imitator and a very able one in Claude Farrère, the author of *l'Homme qui assassina* and *Thomas l'Agnélet*. *Gentilhomme de Fortune*. But there is a

difference between Farrère and his model which is characteristic of the new spirit in France, for the younger writer has none of that melancholy which sheds a poetic charm like the mist of an autumn day over the pages of *Mon Frère Yves*, *Pêcheurs d'Islande* and *Madame Chrysanthème*. The novels of Farrère glow with the bright hopefulness of springtime, with the glad confidence of youth. The energy of the new spirit has also given rise to a whole crop of colonial novels—those of Henry Daguerche for example—and to a great appreciation of Rudyard Kipling in France. Mr. Kipling has an able imitator in M. Pierre Mille, who was once London correspondent of *Le Temps*. Despite the very pronounced Gallicism of M. Mille, his stories are being translated into English.

It is in keeping with the militarism of the new spirit that at least two well-known novelists are soldiers, M. Emile Nolly and M. Ernest Psichari. The case of M. Psichari, anti-intellectualist, militarist and catholic, affords a striking example of the change which has lately come over the mentality of Young France. Who is M. Psichari? None other than the grandson of Renan, the apostle of intellectualism. M. Psichari was writing a thesis for the Sorbonne on the decay of idealism, when apparently it occurred to him to demonstrate that decay by his own career. So, shaking the dust of the Sorbonne from his feet, crossing to North Africa, he donned the uniform of a lieutenant of colonial artillery, and, during the ample leisure of a military life, he wrote his militarist novel, which he calls *l'Appel des Armes*. As a novel this book has no great merit. But as an illustration of the reactionary tendencies now rampant in France it is full of interest. In these pages, as is frequently the case elsewhere, militarism and catholicism go hand in hand. The Catholics' God seems to be the God of Battles. Renan's grandson turns away from progress. He loathes it as "vulgar and American." He prefers to prostrate himself in adoration before two institutions which have never progressed, the Church and the Army. For him "war is divine," and the finest type of hero is *la belle brute* who prays to God to make him strong that he may slaughter many enemies.

This novel brings in the full tide of the Catholic reaction. It is a reaction the existence of which cannot be denied although its extent may easily be exaggerated. Hitherto it has affected mainly the cultured classes. Among them, as a contributor to the *Mercure de France* wrote recently, with deplorable levity, *Dieu est furieusement à la mode en ce moment*. But among the people, rationalism still reigns. Even a Catholic has admitted that the workshop continues closed against the Church. Those who return to the rites and sacraments of Catholicism are the scholars at lycées and the students at universities and at l'Ecole Normale. The Frenchman of the professional class a generation ago never entered a

church from his first Communion to his funeral, except perhaps on his wedding day and at the baptism of his children. Among the cultured youths of modern France this is far from being the case now. Young Frenchmen go to church. L'Association Catholique de la Jeune France, which is only one of many societies for French youths, numbers one hundred and twenty thousand members, all between the ages of fifteen and thirty, and most of them weekly communicants.

In family life the French are always intensely conservative. Even rationalist Frenchmen have often been pleased for their women folk to continue Catholic. A certain catholic atmosphere has never vanished from many rationalist homes. Only the other day a French agnostic of the Quartier Latin told me that at the fête of St. Geneviève he always places a candle on the altar of St. Etienne-du-Mont. It was his parents' church, he had been baptised there, and this act of his seemed a deed of filial piety. An Englishwoman of my acquaintance, who went as paying guest into a Parisian family, told me her hostess met her on the threshold with the words uttered rather nervously: "I think I ought to tell you that we are all freethinkers here: I am a freethinker, my husband is a freethinker, and my son is a freethinker." My friend received this announcement with an equanimity which was somewhat disturbed when, on entering her room, she found a crucifix hanging over her bed.

Into a soil wherein still linger so many superstitions of the past have fallen the seeds of new influences—Barrèsian traditionism, a weakness for mysticism and an anti-rationalist philosophy. In such a soil these tendencies have easily taken root and readily sprung up to bear the fruit of a Catholic revival. In the history of this revival from its beginning at the verge of the nineties down to the present day, the novel has played a significant part. Two eminent novelists, Huysmanns and Bourget, were among the earliest *Grands Convertis*. Indeed the rise of the psychological novel, of which Bourget was such a distinguished exponent, may be regarded as the prelude to the Catholic Revival.

In the appearance of Zola's *La Terre* in 1887, realism reached its high-water mark. Then almost immediately the tide of realism began to ebb. *La Terre*, the most completely realistic of all Zola's novels, turned even his ardent admirers against him. Five of them drew up a manifesto accusing him of having in this novel descended *au fond de l'immondice*. From a work like Zola's, from which the soul of man was excluded, Young France of the late eighties turned with disgust. Among Zola's most faithful disciples had been the young novelist, Edouard Rod. Yet even he, in his preface to *Les Trois Cœurs*, a novel which appeared in 1890, three years after *La Terre*, wrote of himself and his fellow disciples that in convic-

tion they might be realists, in temperament they never were. "We had aspirations," he wrote, "that could never be satisfied by realism, which was essentially self-satisfied, narrow and materialist, more curious about manners than about character, about things than about souls: we were, and we were becoming more and more restless, idealist, in love with the infinite, caring little for manners, in everything always seeking man." M. Bourget was not then an idealist like Rod. But in his early novels, *Une Cruelle Enigme*, *un Crime d'Amour* and *Mensonges* it was essentially with the mental and moral aspect of man's nature that he was concerned. These novels mark the beginning of a new movement in literature, a revolt against realism. This literary revolt was being encouraged in philosophy by the anti-materialistic movement led by Guyau, Boutroux and Bergson. Renan had written in *l'Avenir de la Science*: "*je jouerais cent fois ma vie et par conséquent mon salut éternel pour la vérité scientifique de la thèse rationaliste.*" But already when that book appeared, in 1890, philosophers were beginning to lose faith in science. They were ceasing to look to science for the solution of ultimate problems. Science herself was assuming a more modest position than of old. She was no longer claiming to explain phenomena themselves so much as to state their relations to one another. Philosophers, like Guyau, Boutroux, Bergson and William James, whose influence in France has been considerable, were attaching less importance to the part played by intelligence in the scheme of things, they were assigning more prominence than their predecessors had given to instinct and to intuition; they were beginning to show sympathy with all forms of religion; they were beginning to revel in those mysteries of the Unknowable and the Inexplicable from which their predecessors had stood aloof.

This growing dissatisfaction with rationalism Paul Bourget powerfully exposed in his *Essais de Psychologie Contemporaine*, which appeared in 1883. Against this philosophy, six years later in his novel *Le Disciple*, he brought a serious indictment; for here he represented the philosophy as responsible for the vicious experiment committed by the hero of the novel. The book is indeed the manifesto of the new school, the school of mysticism as opposed to that of rationalism. In his preface Bourget called upon the youth of France to believe in the existence of a soul and of a future life. Bourget was not then a Catholic, but that he was rapidly moving in that direction was proved by his next novel of note *La Terre Promise*, while *l'Etape*, published ten years after *Le Disciple*, proved that Bourget had definitely committed himself heart and soul to the cause of reaction. In *l'Etape* he appears as traditionist, a Catholic and a monarchist. Bourget is only one of many examples that might be cited to prove that the new anti-

rationalist philosophy is but a stepping-stone to Catholicism. M. Charles Péguy, the author of *Les Mystères de Jeanne d'Arc*, is another case in point. M. Barrès will furnish yet another example when at length he decides to enter that Church, whither his anti-rationalism and his traditionist principles are rapidly impelling him.

Writing in the *Mercur de France* not long ago (on the 1st November 1910) M. Remy de Gourmont pointed out how James and Professor Bergson have been unconsciously working for Christianity. Indeed M. Bergson's philosophy has been said to have done more to open church doors than any movement of thought since Aristotelianism. In an inquiry which two French writers, M. Henri Massis and M. Alfred de Tarde, have recently been conducting into the opinions of Young France,¹ they discover that most young French Catholic converts ascribe their conversion either to the influence of M. Bergson or to that of M. Barrès, or sometimes to the influence of both. "I should have been absolutely irreligious if I had never studied philosophy," writes one of Bergson's disciples. "All the most vital principles of Bergson's philosophy may be discovered in theological teaching of all ages," writes another. While a third confesses that in *l'Evolution Créatrice* he felt God on every page.

The stream of the modern Catholic Revival, like that of all French Catholic thought for at least three centuries, flows in two main currents, one dogmatic, constructive, classical, the other mystic, liberal, romantic. The former to-day is dominated by the traditionism of Barrès, the latter by the Vitalism—as we in England call it—of Bergson. Of the first M. Bourget is the typical representative, uncompromisingly reactionary and ultramontane, descending from Bossuet, through Bonald and de Maistre. Of the latter, M. Charles Péguy is typical. He derives from St. François de Sales through Fénelon and Lamennais. In religion M. Péguy is a mystic, in ecclesiastical sympathies a Gallican, in politics a socialist and a Dreyfusard.²

In the realm of fiction the first of the Catholic tendencies is represented by M. Bourget's three Catholic novels, *l'Etape*, *un Divorce*, and *l'Emigré*, the second by those numerous mystic novels which are now enjoying a great vogue in France. Figuring first among novels of Catholic mysticism one may be surprised to find a work by the agnostic Barrès, *La Colline Inspirée*, which is perhaps the most profound and subtly psychological study M. Barrès has yet given us. Another beautifully written mystical

1. See their book, *Les Jeunes Gens d'Aujourd'hui*.

2. Two minor currents of catholicism are the liberalism of M. Max Sangnier, whose society *le Sillon* has recently been dissolved by the Pope, and Modernism.

novel is *La Cité des Lampes* by Mlle. de Lévis, who writes under the pseudonym of Claude Silve, while yet another is *Laure* by Emile Clerment, a novel which only failed by two votes to win this year's Prix de l'Académie assigned to *Jean Christophe*. *Jean Christophe* itself within its ten volumes includes pages impregnated with mysticism, though not Catholic mysticism. Another instance of the influence of the mystic wave outside Catholic literature is a very remarkable novel, *La Porte Etroite* by M. André Gide. It is perhaps somewhat surprising to find an author who ranks decidedly among the intellectuals treating such a subject. For there are some intellectuals left in France. Though, after the numerous anti-intellectuals who have defiled before us this evening, after the battle we have witnessed between the black France and the red, we might doubt it. But yes, there are still a few who have not yet bowed the knee to the Baal of positive affirmation. There are still some who, with that sad but strong patience, which characterised the great thinkers of the last generation, are content to wait for a solution of life's problems, who are even strong enough to admit that the solution may never appear, that the finite may ever be incapable of grasping the infinite. Over this little band of intellectualists the subtle irony, the tender pity, the clear, august, classic style of Anatole France raise him supreme. M. Jean Rosny and M. Remi de Gourmot are other elder writers who nobly maintain the tradition of Voltaire and of Renan. Among the younger men are M. André Gide, whom we have already mentioned, and the ardent adversary of Bergson, M. Julien Benda, whose recent novel *l'Ordination* has been much discussed. Much might be said of the intellectuals in France. They are still a great power. In the opinion of many they still represent the main current of French thought. But it is not a new current. It is a current which has long vivified that old France which we love, not the black France or the red, but the golden France, shedding its rays of sunlight on the whole world of thought, representing all that is noblest, healthiest and most sane in the genius of a people who have so long been the intellectual leaders of the world. It is a current which makes for peace and unity. Over against the narrow racialism of Maurras, of Barrès and Bourget, we may put the noble internationalism of M. Anatole France and the heroic attempt which M. Romain Rolland has made in *Jean Christophe* to unite in brotherly love and mutual respect France and Germany.

There is a word which has occurred over and over again in this paper. It is the word reaction. For this word there are those who would substitute another, Renaissance. And far be it from me to deny that in some respects even those tendencies of modern France, which to me seem reactionary, may bear within them the seeds of a new life. Romain Rolland has picturesquely described

Young France as falling asleep, tired out by the intellectual efforts of her fathers, and before falling asleep, saying her prayers. M. Rolland believes that she will awake refreshed and reinvigorated in the morning. "That which seems to be dying is only beginning to be re-born" are words written upon the tombstone of the philosopher Guyau far away on the Mediterranean shore. "The history of survival," writes Tylor,¹ "has for the most part been a history of dwindling and decay But this is so far from being a law without exception that a narrow view of history may often seem to make it no law at all. For the stream of civilisation winds and turns upon itself We may now and then trace on from the very turning point the change from passive survival into active revival." Of France it has ever been true and never truer than to-day that she has been the

"First to follow Truth and last to leave old Truths behind—
France beloved of every soul that loves its fellow-kind."

WINIFRED STEPHENS.

1. *Primitive Culture*, 4th ed., 1903, I, 136.



THE UNIT OF SOCIAL ORGANIZATION IN A LARGE TOWN.¹

A FACT obvious at the commencement of any study of the Social Organization of the town is that the large town is not a single social unit—that is to say, a social group possessing a single set of social institutions. As a person travels from one end of a large town to the other, or makes a circle round the outskirts of the town, he finds himself passing through a series of districts having much the same characteristics and possessing more or less similar institutions—*e.g.*, churches, schools, swimming baths, post offices, clubs, and their consequent activities—debating societies, athletic clubs, social evenings, etc., etc. When he pursues the matter a little he finds that these districts or units are not distinct or separate, but are an involved tangle with only here and there apparent nuclei. The further he pursues his investigations, the more involved does this tangle become. In a consideration of this subject three points may be mentioned at the outset.

In the first place, the unit of the town's progression has not consisted of a complete social group with houses, streets, shopping thoroughfares, institutions, and open spaces complete and in an ordered relation. Instead the unit has been that of an individual house or a row of houses. These have been put up, generally speaking, without any relation to a district as a whole, and frequently without any definite intention of their ever being an integral part of any district. Further, this general spread of the town by individual houses has destroyed the unity and definiteness of the already existing village on the outskirts, which the town encounters, absorbs, transforms and strangles in its amorphous growth.

The second point is that there is at present no recognized standard of social organization for any district. We are only feeling our way in this direction. Some such list of institutions as *e.g.*, school, church, public hall, library, post office, swimming bath, playing field, gymnasium, debating society, etc., are beginning to be recognized as essential and their provision attempted; but the recognition is not yet substantial. The desire for social organization is strong, but urban social development is still young and the inhabitants are in the experimental stage of working out what are the sort of institutions required to best meet the need of the citizens.

1. A paper read before the Sociological Society, November 25, 1913.

The third preliminary point is the absence of definite districts which will serve as natural foundations upon which to build social institutions or to which social institutions can be related. In their stead we find these institutions attached like barnacles to almost any existing foundation that can afford facilities, however meagre, for their organization. This, of course, is not the case with the new garden suburbs which form natural, self-contained districts in themselves. Ordinary suburbs on the outskirts also are more definite in character, because there is a certain expanse of unbuilt-up land between suburb and suburb, or at any rate, between suburb and open country, and they have, therefore, distinct advantages as compared with those acres and acres of densely populated districts that one hurries through on the train en route.

I.—THE HAPHAZARD GROWTH OF DISTRICT SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS.

The haphazard growth of the town is responsible for much of the tangle. Let us examine this a little. As soon as a house is erected it is put into a postal district. In Liverpool, for instance, no postal-district map of the town has ever been compiled, nor indeed could be. Postal districts consist of lists of streets which are allotted to various district offices, which lists are continually being added to. As a patch of fields becomes covered with houses new school accommodation is necessary, and the education authority secures a suitable site in relation, more or less, to its previously existing schools, and a new school is built. At the same time with a new growth of 1,000 or 2,000 houses a parish church finds added to it a congregation sufficient to fill it twice over (were it to attend). The ecclesiastical authorities, therefore, readjust areas and mark out a new daughter parish and, when they can, raise the funds to build a new church. Along the main road shops are erected and shopping thoroughfares formed. So a district comes into being and certain institutions are introduced. When the district is more or less fully built up, the land on the new outskirts is attacked and the same process repeated.

Gradually throughout this new large patch of streets societies are formed in connection with the various institutions which have arisen. Tradesmen in the shopping thoroughfare may form a football club. A group of young fellows travelling from the same local railway station or tram terminus may form a dramatic society. As the congregation gathers round the church or the various chapels which have also sprung up, athletic and social organizations are formed; the new school develops a care committee, athletic teams, happy evenings and so forth. The individual in a district realises through notices of rates served on him and through voting lists posted about the place, that he is in one or other municipal

ward of some urban district, and in time, perhaps, a ward political club is formed. A local branch of the Fabian Society is started. Some works are in the neighbourhood, and the firm starts a Welfare Secretary and organises athletic and social activities for some of their employees. Several women, as a result of various afternoon calls, ask a local organist to start a musical society or a glee party. By this haphazard method and after some considerable lapse of time if an area of a town be marked off with a ruler and examined, within it will be found the headquarters of a number of varied social institutions. The members attending these institutions will be drawn only partly from the area marked off. Many of them will come from outside. On the other hand the residents within the area will be found to belong to many institutions which are in the neighbourhood, but which are outside the area.

The haphazard method of the town's growth thus roughly outlined has certain important results which need to be borne in mind.

(1) The absence of any well-defined local district. A row of houses is added to the edge of a previous district, and at first the new inhabitants attach themselves to the old district. Then as the district becomes built up they find that they are much more closely allied to the new district which has just come into existence, or they may find themselves on a nebulous area with no particular claims on them to belong to any place or institution. The district itself loses its edges and boundaries, and becomes just a part of acres and acres of streets and houses—a vast indeterminate mass. The effect of this is that the residents possess no sense of locality or of relation to a locality. They do not live in a place with a claim, with a history, with a charm, with an appeal. Compare for a moment the inhabitant of Worcester or Todmorden with the inhabitant of 192 Bow Road, East; for large centres of population like London, Liverpool, Manchester, are not places at all, so far as the simple resident is concerned.

(2) There is an absence of any general common ground which will bring together all the residents as such. Periodically those who have the franchise are asked to select public representatives for Parliament or for the local authorities, but these they select through the conflict of party votes rather than by amity of common interests; and in voting they vote singly as individuals. Occasionally a town-hall meeting of citizens of the whole town is held, but on these occasions the simple citizen in a district or suburb rarely attends, nor would there be room for him were he to do so, indeed he may often never hear of such a gathering, unless perhaps through the report of a local paper. But the district as such never meets.

(3) The responsibility to the district on the part of the individuals

is lost sight of. There is no machinery for bringing this responsibility home to the resident. The subject for responsibility is there, for the town's affairs are urgent and there are many things to be done. Also an inherent sense of responsibility exists in the individual. For lack of bringing the two together, however, the sense of personal responsibility dies.

(4) It rests with the individuals whether they belong to an institution or no. If they drift and belong to nothing, nothing happens. There is no general body in the district possessing the functions, on the one hand, of seeing that individuals have their interests satisfied and of encouraging their interests, and on the other of seeing that the necessary district institutions are brought into being and are co-ordinated.

(5) In a large town individuals tend to be lost sight of. This has two bad effects. There is less public incentive to an individual to keep himself steady, law-abiding and dignified. There is also less possibility of an individual's personal qualities being fully used. It is therefore necessary to make special efforts to counteract this tendency, by increasing the occasions on which the persons in the same district may meet each other, or at any rate by making use of any such occasions as already exist. This is not done because the institutions in a district are not confined to the resident of the district. As has already been mentioned, persons within the district belong to institutions outside the district, and persons from outside the district belong to institutions within the district. Persons in the same district, therefore, not only miss actual opportunities of making or deepening their acquaintance with fellow-residents, but instead use such opportunities to form quite unnecessary additional acquaintanceships with persons in other districts. This point is of considerable importance, and has not at present received the attention it deserves. It is a serious barrier to the development of fellowship and citizenship.

(6) A special district feature arises in the case of the absorbed village which by the invasion of the town loses its unity, its continuity of institutions and its peculiar character. Only by an extraordinary display of ability is such a village able to readjust itself and reorganise itself to meet the needs of its army of new citizens. Frequently the not unnatural cliquiness of the old residents renders the social organization of the newcomers more nebulous than ever.

(7) So far as the town as a whole is concerned, it suffers considerably from this haphazard district social life. The town does not form a related whole. The town's affairs are inadequately understood in the district; the town's appeal is indifferently heard; the sense of corporate responsibility to the town as a whole is practically non-existent; the need for social service meets with but

a feeble response. The town becomes like a tree whose roots are thwarted from reaching the rich soil which awaits them and whose boughs produce in consequence but an enfeebled crop of fruit.

(8) The central institutions of a town are also affected in two interesting ways as individuals in the outlying districts join district institutions instead of central ones. Either the membership of the town's societies such, for instance, as its Literary and Philosophical Society, tend to be supported by a group of members neither representative of the town as a whole nor any particular district. They become, in fact, a district society without a district, weakening by this means the support of real district societies. Or they are supported by the leading and more well-to-do citizens, and thus become institutions of a particular class. The well-to-do and educated classes in a town form but a small proportion of the citizens, and the town exists as a single social unit for them much longer than it does for the simpler citizens. A further feature of importance is the ineffective way in which important new movements, *e.g.*, branches of the W.E.A., when introduced in a town, fail to permeate its various districts.

II.—THE BASES UPON WHICH DISTRICT SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS ARE FORMED.

This haphazard method of growth and the indeterminate character of the district has led to the adoption of different bases for the formation of local social¹ institutions. What are these?

(a) *The Churches.* The most widely adopted basis round which district social institutions are formed is the religious institution. Clergy and ministers are to be found in every locality throughout the country, and so far as the Church of England is concerned, every individual definitely lives within the jurisdiction (if such a term may be used) of a definite clergyman. When the democratic desire for social institutions began to express itself, the clergy and ministers conscious of its importance endeavoured to meet the need by grouping the new social organisations round their own religious institutions. In connection with these there have sprung up such activities as bands of hope, girls' friendly societies, boys' and girls' clubs, men's clubs, mothers' meetings, debating societies, athletic clubs, social evenings, etc., etc. Two points need to be noted with regard to this development. (i) This action is not confined by any means to the institutions of the Church of England. The religious institutions of all the religious bodies take part in it. (ii) Town churches draw their congregations largely from outside their parish boundaries, and as this practice is general, so far as social organisation

1. Social is here used in a narrower sense and excludes religious, educational, &c., institutions.

is concerned, parish boundaries can scarcely be said to exist. Further, probably in not a single case does the church provide all the necessary social institutions, and generally speaking it only provides one or two. There is very great variation in this matter. Thus one church may have a boys' club, another a debating society and a third neither, a fourth both, a fifth something quite different, etc.

In no case does a religious institution, however numerous its activities, cater for all its congregation. Thus, to quote a known instance, a well-organised church with a parish of ten thousand, had a number of social organisations running, but these embraced in all a membership of only some five hundred. Even assuming that a considerable proportion of the congregation were not in need of any particular social institution, there was a considerable shortage of provision which it was impossible for the church to supply. It must also be remembered that there are many individuals who are not attached to any of the religious institutions. For such, on this basis, there is no provision made.

(b) *The Elementary Schools.* These institutions touch only the school-age period of the individual's life (broadly from 5 to 14), but they are an institution through which practically all normal children pass and thus afford a valuable basis for social organisation. In addition to the elementary school system itself, which is very valuable, and the personal contact involved between scholar and teacher, the teachers have developed in many towns a general body of athletic effort. In addition, within recent years, there have sprung up in connection with the school, care committees, happy evening associations, and several other movements. The school is thus becoming increasingly a basis for the social organisation of child-life. The school caters for no particular area though in the main each school serves for a definite number of streets.

(c) The third basis is that of the large *industrial works*. These apply, of course, only to persons of working age, and the extent of their operation is comparatively small. The social institutions provided by such industrial enterprise are varied, consisting perhaps chiefly of athletics. The employees affected are by no means drawn from the same locality.

(d) The fourth basis is that of the little personal group of friends or acquaintances. They are attached to no definite institution though often hiring a room from some organisation for their meetings. This method is fairly common and is adopted frequently for the formation of dramatic societies, debating societies, musical societies and athletic clubs. It is also found, as might be expected, to flourish more extensively among those individuals who are able to pay for their organizations. In such organizations

there is, of course, no question of local area at all. The basis of membership is comradeship in an individual group of persons, though probably the members all live, more or less, within the same locality.

(e) In a number of municipal wards, ward political clubs are formed by the various political parties, according to the organizing ability and funds of the respective parties. In order to render these groups more attractive, a social element is often introduced, such as a billiard table, social evenings, day outings, etc., etc. Some political clubs have undertaken (*e.g.*, in Liverpool) to commence giving children's entertainments in their ward. The total number of persons affected by these organizations is comparatively small.

(f) The Friendly Society movement also provides a certain amount of social organization. Many of the friendly societies have their branch lodges in various parts of the town and have fortnightly meetings at which papers are read, musical evenings are given and there are occasional day outings.

(g) There are the vague local societies. Sometimes a society formed by a group of friends is called by the name of the district and in a vague form it seems to be a local society. There is, for instance, in Liverpool the Wavertree Men's Society, which is a literary and debating society, or again the South Liverpool Parliamentary debating society. The extent of these is not very numerous.

This survey of the various bases of district social organizations reveals one or two important considerations.

(1) The first point to notice is that the total extent of social organization on all seven bases when added together does not nearly meet the need of the district. The only figures I have with regard to the actual extent of the shortage are taken from a survey in 1911 of one of the municipal wards in Liverpool (Netherfield Ward). This is, practically speaking, an industrial ward whose residents are either artisan or labouring class. In one corner of the ward there is a considerable patch of slums. There are also a fair number of shopkeepers with a doctor or two and one or two clergy and ministers. With regard to the ward the following figures were obtained: Boys, school age (5 to 14) population 3,025; numbers affected by social organizations, excluding attendance at day school and Sunday School, not more than 600; Girls, school period (5 to 14), population 3,223; number affected approximately 330; Boys, juvenile adult period (14 to 18) population 1,276; some 500 are affected; Girls, juvenile adult period (14 to 18) population 1,427; number affected 400; Adults (18 and upwards), males 9,825; number affected 800, exclusive of the Territorials and members of thrift societies and trade unions; females, population 10,097; mothers' meetings 600, other agencies 150. These figures may, I

think, be taken as fairly average figures for an industrial neighbourhood. The shortage is considerable, even recognising that many persons would not, under perfect organization, join institutions.

(2) Secondly, there is the absence of any real district basis for organization. Of the above-mentioned forms three would seem to be possibly local, the Church of England parish, the municipal ward political club, and the local institution. Of these the last mentioned, the local institution, is local only in name and does not need serious attention. The political club is local and confined to the ward, but on the other hand, it is party and breaks the ward into three or more factions; also its degree of social organization is extremely slight. The other district basis to be considered is that of the ecclesiastical parish. This would seem to be at first sight a real district, but it is weakened as such, owing to the fact that in the town the parish church is congregational rather than parochial. Also the parish is a district only to members of the Church of England, but these do not form one third of the population.

The absence of this district basis of organization is a serious loss. Let me illustrate. A village, for instance, has its village institutions, its village school, its village hall, its village band, its village athletic clubs, all bearing upon the name of the village. There is thus ever present a village loyalty, a village spirit of comradeship, a village spirit of friendly rivalry with neighbouring villages. There is consequently within the village one single, uniting force towards the development of village loyalty and village fellowship. All the villagers have a common sentiment which acts as a bond between them. They may differ in politics, they may differ in creeds, they may differ in some of their social customs, but behind them all there is, for the many departments of life that are common to all, this common uniting force inspiring them to action. It is this force which, so far as district social organization is concerned, is absent in the town. It is this force, moreover, which must be introduced if the district's social organization is to be adequately undertaken and successfully carried out.

(3) Nor, again, are the institutions definitely related to the district. Children attending the same elementary school do not naturally attend the same church or chapel, swim in the same swimming bath, or pay in their savings at the same post-office. I am speaking generally, of course. Much less are all these institutions known by the same name—that of their district. Contrast this again with the village.

(4) The fourth point arises from the fact that social institutions are found attached to other institutions which exist for other purposes, *e.g.*, religious, educational, political, etc. This has three results.

First, social organization is treated as a lesser end and not a main end. Now, social organization is a main end, and should be treated as such. A valuable social force is thus lost. Secondly, the social institution is frequently used by the main institution to strengthen and support itself. This is bad. If the institution has not sufficient inherent vitality to live unsupported it should not be bolstered up. Further it is bad for the social institution to be thus attached to a decaying organization. There is yet a third difficulty in this matter. The institution most widely used as a basis round which to group social organizations is the religious institution. These are of different denominations and are thus essentially rival institutions. When social organizations are grouped round these rival religious institutions there is introduced a disintegrating force in social organization. Now the main feature of social organization is its uniting force. In social organization every piece of common ground or common sentiment is a potential link in drawing persons together. Yet in the above circumstance we find persons, for instance, with a common interest which, had it been given opportunity, would have drawn them together, sundered because in spite of these uniting bonds their organization for the encouragement of this common interest was an opposing force. There is also this added feature that in many cases forces oppose each other because they misunderstand each other. This opposition is prolonged because the first step to understanding, which could be made through the use of existing common interests, is unavailed of.

(5) The fifth point arises from the existence of option of choice as to the basis round which district social institutions should be grouped. Where the respective institutions used as bases are integral institutions of the ward and non-rivals, they ought not to be in rival opposition so far as their lesser object of social organization is concerned. On the contrary the social organization of the district should be so arranged that each integral institution mutually supports the others, if so far as their main objects are concerned they are needed. At the present time, in certain cases, we have rivalry. The most serious is that of the religious institution and the elementary school. Should the social organization with reference to the child of school age be based round the church or round the school? At present the child has on the one hand his school teacher urging loyalty to the school and the support of its athletic undertakings, on the other he has his religious teacher encouraging him or her to join a social institution at the church. This unsatisfactory attitude should yield to some understanding between the two institutions.

As has been pointed out, this apparent rival loyalty is only rival so far as the social organization is concerned. At present

this rivalry does not create a serious difficulty because social organization is very incomplete, but as it becomes more complete the struggle will become quite acute, and it is important that in these earlier days some general plan should be settled which will prevent this unnecessary rivalry. The rival relation of the religious institution to the political ward club or to the Friendly Society is somewhat similar, except that the social organization is so slight in connection with the two latter that the matter is not very substantial. This is the case also with regard to social organization in connection with large industrial organizations. With regard to these, however, it is a question whether as social organization develops, their continuation will be advisable. Their existence weakens district social organization because it forces some of the active residents in the district, through loyalty to their firm's organization, to cut themselves adrift from the organizations of the district. Moreover, such a method of social organization at best, as stated earlier, is only partial, and can never be capable of general adoption, as it is only adaptable to a few business enterprises.

III.—SUGGESTED UNIT OF SOCIAL ORGANIZATION.

As will be gathered from the foregoing, there seems to be need for some general district unit—some locality which shall itself be the basis of certain social organization, and which shall also serve as the matrix for the various district institutions. The question then arises: What is the district which will serve as such a unit? This matter now needs our consideration. If a large town were to fall into natural, obvious, separate divisions easily distinguishable from one another and marked off by natural boundaries, such districts would obviously be the basis. This, however, is practically never the case. Occasionally, as has been mentioned before, on the outskirts of the town, Garden Suburbs are springing up which will serve, but these are only rare exceptions. The more one studies the plan of any single large town, the more impossible does it become for human ingenuity to puzzle out the miles and miles of solid streets and buildings into easily recognisable districts. Even were it to be done apparently satisfactorily, a study of these districts then marked out, would reveal that they were lacking in internal plan and arrangement. In the absence then of any natural divisions, the question arises, whether one should form new divisions by a study of the ground plan of the town, or whether one should adopt any of the divisions of the town already existing. What are these?

Towns are divided into districts in the main for four general objects. (a) For purposes of public administration, (b) into ecclesiastical parishes, (c) by various voluntary agencies for their special

purposes, and (d) there are the old local divisions. Something needs to be said about each of these.

(a) *Public Administration*.—The question of local areas for the purposes of public administration is intricate, and it is not within the scope of the present paper to go fully into the matter. The situation can only be briefly summarised and those points drawn out which bear upon the matter in hand. Towns are divided for public purposes in no fewer than six ways:—

- (1) Into postal districts. This has already been alluded to above.
- (2) Into Poor Law areas.
- (3) Into Municipal Wards.
- (4) Into Parliamentary constituencies.
- (5) Into Police districts, and
- (6) Into Registration districts.

Of these the postal district and the police district are alike in agreeing neither with each other nor with any of the other divisions. With regard to these other four—the Poor Law, the Municipal, the Parliamentary and the Registration districts—they can all be expressed in terms of Municipal Wards, with very occasional exceptions. The municipal ward is, therefore, nearly always, and its polling districts always, definitely in one or other of these four divisions. Much confusion, however, exists with regard to local administration units, for two reasons. Partly because they are divided up in six ways instead of one, and partly because the nomenclature of the various districts thus created is so confusing. The same name may be used for a municipal ward, for a postal district, for a police district, for a parliamentary constituency, for a poor-law parish, and in each case the name means quite a different area. Some of the districts may be even quite outside any of the others. This is very confusing, and a person living in one of these districts has, therefore, not the slightest idea where he lives or to what he belongs. The name is meaningless. Contrast this once more with all that the name of a village implies.

(b) *The Ecclesiastical Parishes*.—This division has been already alluded to, but the following points about it need to be taken into account. It is not more obvious in its character than the wards or any of the other divisions. It only concerns the Church of England, and the Church of England does not constitute one third of the population. As mentioned earlier churches in towns tend to become congregational and disregard their parishes.

(c) *Divisions by Voluntary Agencies*.—The town is divided up by voluntary agencies for a variety of purposes, perhaps the most important being the divisions of the Charity Organisation Society or the Guild of Help, and the Queen Victoria District Nursing Association. The division by charitable bodies is done on no

general plan, but in each case to suit the particular needs of the Society. Their divisions therefore do not help much in a consideration of the matter, except with regard to that of the Guild of Help. In Manchester, which is one of the best organised Guilds of Help, and in one or two other towns, the municipal ward is adopted as the unit, and when it is necessary to subdivide them, the polling districts are taken.

(d) *The Old Local Divisions*.—Some different parts of the town have attached to them old local names arising from the fact that there were the villages which have since been absorbed by the growth of the town. The name lingers on, but the boundaries are quite indeterminate. These old place names have also been in nearly all cases adopted as names of one or other of the areas for public administration, and they add to the general confusion already mentioned.

From this survey of the existing district divisions, the most generally used seems to be that of the municipal ward. It now only remains to discuss how far this is possible to be adopted as the district unit for social organization.

IV.—THE MUNICIPAL WARD AS THE DISTRICT UNIT FOR SOCIAL ORGANIZATION.

In considering how far a ward is the suitable district unit the following points come up for consideration.

(1) *The Size of the Ward*. What is the most suitable number of people which could be grouped for a single social unit? The most convenient size of the unit varies with the particular need of social organization. Thus, for instance, an average town church holds about 700 people, and supposing that one in ten come to church, such accommodation would provide for a district of 7,000. On the other hand with a population of this size there would be about 250 boys between the ages of 14 and 18, and even supposing half of these did not play, it would not be possible to get all the others into, e.g., a single football team.

The only feasible course is to take a suitable unit for general purposes, duplicating institutions in some cases and sharing a joint institution with a group of wards in others; in some cases one institution would do for the whole town, e.g., geological society. An ideal size for the unit would probably be from 5,000 to 10,000. The size of a municipal ward varies considerably, e.g., in Liverpool from 2,000 to 40,000. The average population of a Liverpool ward being about 20,000. In large towns the unit of the district will probably need to be larger than in smaller towns because the relation of the district unit to the town as a whole must be taken into account. There are, for instance, in Liverpool thirty-four wards. It would probably be better to organize thirty-four wards

of 20,000 people than sixty-eight wards of 10,000. We need a series of experiments to work out the ideal size for a social unit; and the varying size and character of the wards would thus furnish a useful variation in experimenting.

(2) The second point is the relation of the particular institution to the ward. It will not be possible, even were it desirable, at any rate for some years, to ignore the institution as a basis of organization. The change of basis from that of the institution to that of the locality will be slow, and can only take place as the sense of locality ripens. An immediate step which might be taken at any time is the relating of the institutions in the ward to the ward. The institutions should be considered as integral parts of the ward's organization and should stand in a mutual relation to each other.

With some institutions there would not be much difficulty, *e.g.*, Friendly Societies. The difficulties would probably be in relating (a) the churches, (b) the schools, to the ward. In both these cases the institutions are not movable and may be situated on the verge of a ward, drawing their clientèle, therefore, in the main from a neighbouring ward. In such cases the institutions would probably be placed in the ward in which they were situated and at first membership of the institution would involve membership of the ward. Gradually, however, as the ward idea became realised, these border cases would tend to diminish; a little more easily, perhaps, in the case of schools than churches, but in the latter case only the church's social institutions need to be considered. In Liverpool Roman Catholics have an interesting plan of filling the houses next their churches with Catholics; opportunity being taken of filling empty houses as they occur.

In such relating the name of the ward might play a proper part. For instance the elementary school in a ward might be known by the name of the ward. The child attending the school will thus become conscious that it is not only a member of the school but it is a member of the ward. The child attending school, moreover, will, once the ward institutions are related, be aware of the political institutions in the ward when its inclinations turn that way; it will be aware too, of the religious institutions in the ward; it will also be aware of the new organizations for juvenile adults, and thus on leaving school it will know already the particular institution in the ward which it will naturally join.

(3) The ward would need to develop its sense of locality. At present its boundaries are not obvious and are artificial. It is impossible to tell as one walks along the street where one ward ends and where the next begins. It will be necessary to render these boundaries as obvious as possible. For instance, the old practice of beating the bounds might be revived; some system might be adopted of painting the lamp-posts in the wards a

different colour, and marking quite obviously the ward boundaries on the walls of the houses where the dividing lines occur, etc. It would also be possible in time, as the ward idea develops, to alter the existing boundaries of the wards, to readjust them gradually where obvious inconveniences exist, using where possible natural boundaries such as railway lines, open spaces, etc., as boundaries. The Local Government Board has power to authorise this.

(4) Fourthly, there would be needed a general organization in the ward to promote its social welfare—something broadly on the lines of the representative Tenants' Council of the garden suburbs. This body would be generally responsible for seeing that in one way or another the various social institutions necessary in a ward were provided. This body would also summon ward meetings in matters of public interest. Such a body might also undertake the personal visitation of all newcomers to the ward, the idea being that every newcomer to the ward is a citizen of that ward and should be definitely welcomed as such. This body would also possibly undertake the friendly visiting of persons in difficulty or distress, etc. It is of interest to note that bodies of this kind are already being formed, *e.g.*, at the Wavertree Garden Suburb Tenants' Representative Council; at Hightown, etc.

The ward would also be the local centre when generally organizing a movement in the town. The W.E.A., for instance, might have its local ward committee to work up matters in each particular ward. The organization, too, of good musical concerts could be done on this basis, there being a general body in the town and local committees in each ward for the organization of the district concerts and so on. One need not go into detail upon the matter, but it is clear that some general body in the ward is necessary for two broad purposes, the internal organization of the institutions of the ward, and for organizing the district effort in relation to the town as a whole.

These considerations seem to indicate that there are no essential difficulties to the adoption of the ward as a basis of social organization and that it appears on the whole the most suitable basis. I may perhaps add in conclusion that I have laid these proposals and suggestions before a series of audiences in Liverpool, *e.g.*, Adult School Members, Workers' Educational Association, District Teachers' Association, Men's Societies in connection with churches, Women's Co-operative Guild, etc., etc. On every occasion members of the audience have come up afterwards to express their sense of the need for and the value of some such development.

F. G. D'AETH.

ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY.¹

THE sphere of abnormal psychology is not identical with that of mental diseases in general. The connotation of the term has been conventionally limited to one large class of mental diseases known as functional diseases. Our task in the following paper will be to show how these may be explained in psychological terms, and how, on the other hand, facts derived from this field of psychopathology throw new light upon the laws of working of the normal mind.

It is sometimes stated that functional diseases are those in which the brain suffers from no organic injury but, for some reason or other, is working wrongly. The mechanism of the brain and of the mind is intact but it is now functioning abnormally, *i.e.*, in such a way as to be injurious to the individual and to throw him out of harmony with his environment. For my own part, I cannot accept such a view of the divorce of structure from function, and although in these cases no gross lesions of the brain can be demonstrated, it seems almost axiomatic to hold that some material alteration, however recondite and however far transcending the powers of our strongest microscopes to detect, must be present. When the mind begins to show an abnormal working, of whatever kind, the chemical and physical changes in the brain must necessarily be different from what they previously were, unless we abandon the general view held by all reputable psychologists of a detailed correlation of brain change and mental activity. And what are we to understand by matter, if not chemical and physical *changes*? Matter is not something inert. Its essence is its molecular, atomic and intra-atomic activity. In other words, matter is itself "functional."

A better way of drawing the distinction is to say that functional diseases are such as are produced by mental causes and can be cured by mental means. Into this class would fall at the present day cases of psychasthenia, hysteria, anxiety psychosis, alternating and multiple personality, etc., examples of which will be given in the course of our discussion, but there is no *à priori* reason why the class should be permanently limited to just these cases. With improvement of our means of psycho-therapeutics and with deeper insight into the general relation of mind to body, the class may undergo extension. The dividing line is not a fixed one.

In connection with our investigation of these abnormal forms of mental activity it will be necessary for us to consider, however

1. A paper read before the Social Psychology Group of the Sociological Society on June 17, 1913.

briefly, the problems of hypnosis, the hypnoidal state, psycho-analysis, and dreams, and our ultimate aim will be to bring into line the somewhat conflicting views of authorities like Pierre Janet, Morton Prince and Sigmund Freud, and to suggest a form of compromise which may serve as a ground of explanation for all forms of mental activity, normal and abnormal alike.

The work of Pierre Janet in the field of abnormal psychology during the last thirty or more years is well known to everybody. For this reason, despite its great importance, we may content ourselves by the briefest of references to it. The general theory which Janet formed on the basis of his researches was that the personality is a synthesis of mental elements, and that disease of the personality is an interference with this synthesis. The disease or derangement may take one or other of two general forms. There may be, on the one hand, a widespread weakening of the synthesis, which alters the individual's idea of his own personality. This is *psychasthenia*. While the simpler activities of the personality, such as perception and memory, are unimpaired, the individual's judgments on these activities, recognition, reflective thought and volition, may be seriously affected. The psychasthenic says: "It is not I who feel, it is not I who eat, it is not I who speak, it is not I who suffer, it is not I who sleep; I am dead, and it is not I who see clearly," etc. Janet writes: "This incomplete character of the disturbances of the personality is found in all the accidents of these psychasthenic patients; they have obsessions but are not completely insane and always recognise the absurdity of their obsessing ideas; they have impulses but do not carry them out; they have phobias concerning acts but never real inability to perform acts, or real paralyses; they have interminable doubts but no true amnesias. It is the striking trait of their character that they never have any symptom in its completeness, and this incomplete character of the disturbances of their personality falls within a general law."¹ On the other hand, these symptoms may be carried to their completeness, the synthesis of the personality may be not merely weakened but actually destroyed for certain of the mental elements. This is *hysteria*. Sensation from certain areas of the skin, power over certain voluntary muscles, memory for certain ideas or for a certain period of the individual's life, may be completely lost to the personality itself, although by indirect methods they may be proved still to exist. Where the symptom is an anæsthesia, it may occur over an area which corresponds with the uneducated patient's views of anatomical divisions and not with the much more irregular area supplied by definite cutaneous nerves.

1. "A Symposium on the Subconscious," iv, by Pierre Janet. *Journal of Abnormal Psychology*, vol. ii, 1907-8, p. 60.

Thus it may be a "bracelet" or "sleeve-anæsthesia," affecting only the wrist or only the forearm. This fact alone is sufficient to indicate that the loss is psychical and not physiological, in the broader sense. But a good method of demonstrating the actual psychical existence of these apparently lost sensations is to distract the patient by getting an assistant to engage him in close conversation and, while his field of attention is limited in this way, to place a pencil in his right hand (hidden from his view by a screen) and whisper in his ear certain questions the answers to which he is asked to write on paper. From these answers it becomes clear that some sensation is aroused when the anæsthetic area is stimulated, even though unnoticed by the personal consciousness. In a similar way, by this method of automatic writing, memories completely lost to the main consciousness may be proved to exist. The hand may, for instance, write a detailed account of the events which accompanied the first onset of the disease, and which the main consciousness has completely forgotten.

Ideas like these which can be shown to exist in independence of the main personality and contemporaneously with it were called by Janet "subconscious," and this is the original meaning of the much misused term "subconsciousness" in the literature of the subject. It would perhaps be less ambiguous and therefore better to call such ideas "co-conscious," as Morton Prince has suggested, but if the original term is preserved at all it should always be used in its original sense. There are of course other senses in which the word has been employed, the most extreme being that in which it is identical with the "subliminal self" of F. W. H. Myers. As everyone knows, Myers regarded the normal waking consciousness with its memories as but a small fraction of the entire personality. Below the threshold of consciousness and the activities of everyday life is a much larger portion, the subliminal self, which comprises aspects of the personality undeveloped in this mundane life though conceivably capable of development under other conditions of existence. This subliminal portion is separated from the supraliminal self (the everyday self) by a semi-permeable "psychical diaphragm," through which ideas and mental powers may pass in either direction. In the anæsthesias and paralyses of hysteria the sensations and powers fall from the supraliminal into the subliminal, while in the inspirations of genius and other super-normal activities of the soul there is a "subliminal uprush of faculty" into the supraliminal. Through the subliminal we may come into closer mental relations with one another and with the spiritual universe. This theory has been subjected to much undeserved criticism at the hands of psychologists. Its main weakness is that it furnishes an over-elaborate explanation of the well-attested facts of abnormal, *i.e.*, supernormal and subnormal, psychology, while

allowing undue weight to the less certain and inadequately-verified facts of telepathy, mediumships, and spirit apparitions. Nevertheless it is not in conflict with known fact, and further insight into the nature of so-called supernormal phenomena may yet give it that compelling force which it at present lacks. The prefix sub- in "subliminal" is unfortunate since there is nothing essentially inferior about it. A more non-committal term is the "Unconscious," which is coming into favour at the present day, especially among German psychologists. Memories, impulses, and motives when not actually before the mind, *i.e.*, conscious, may still retain all their other mental characteristics, and from their place outside of consciousness may continue to exert influences upon consciousness. They form part of the unconscious, but are still psychical in nature. It is not a contradiction in terms to speak of "unconscious psychical processes," unless we identify the psychical with the conscious, for which there is really no justification. Of course there is the alternative view that these processes, when out of consciousness, are merely physiological changes in the brain. Apart from the metaphysical difficulties involved in such a view, difficulties which we cannot go into here, there are scientific reasons which make it more satisfactory to think of the unconscious in mental rather than in physical terms, in most cases. It need hardly be added that these unconscious mental processes have in all probability their own physiological correlates or counterparts in the workings of the brain, but our knowledge of the nature of these brain changes must be even more speculative than that of the unconscious processes themselves.

In extreme cases of hysteria, loss of memory and disintegration of personality may go so far as to produce either an alternation or a doubling of personality. Instances of this are a matter of common knowledge, and do not need detailed explanation and illustration here. Suffice it to say that they show all degrees of mental disaggregation, from mere alternation of mood and conflict of motive compatible with mental health to extreme cases where two souls seem to share the tenancy of one body. The best known recent example of the latter case is that of Miss Beauchamp, which Dr. Morton Prince has described with such a wealth of detail in his book *The Dissociation of a Personality*. This individual was at a certain stage of her life possessed of three distinct personalities or centres of consciousness. Two of these alternated with one another, each retaining her own series of memories but amnesic for the experiences of the other, while the third, the now notorious "Sally Beauchamp," not only had a separate consciousness of her own with a cheerful and irresponsible temperament quite alien to those of the others, but claimed that even when not alternating with them she had direct knowledge of the thoughts, feelings and

even the dreams of one of them. Morton Prince eventually cured Miss Beauchamp by hypnotism (the method and significance of which we shall consider presently), suppressing "Sally" entirely and re-synthesising the other two personalities with their separate memories and experiences into a normal individual similar to the original personality as she had been before the emotional epoch which was the cause of all the trouble.

More recently Dr. Morton Prince has met with another case of dissociated personality quite as remarkable as that of Miss Beauchamp, and closely similar in several respects. He calls her B.C.A.¹ C is the normal personality as she was before and after her mental illness, and B and A are the two dissociated personalities into which she disintegrated as the eventual result of several years of severe nervous and emotional strain. B and A alternated with one another, but whereas A had no direct knowledge of B's existence, B was immediately aware of A's thoughts and memories even when herself in abeyance. B and C also shared each other's memories as well as those of A, but A was entirely shut up within her own circle of memories and experiences. Neither C nor A remembered her own dreams, but β , the hypnotic personality corresponding to B, was able to recall the dreams of both. A was neurasthenic and represented the ethical and religious aspects of the original personality. She lived in a continual mental atmosphere of gloomy and apprehensive conscientiousness, and was appalled by the freakish and irresponsible behaviour of B, who lived only for pleasure, was completely egoistic and "emancipated," and during her periods of alternation enjoyed the most robust health. B thus showed a close resemblance to "Sally" in the Beauchamp case, and the importance of this resemblance will perhaps be clearer when we come to consider Freud's theory of hysteria. For the present we may note that B was co-conscious with A, or existed simultaneously as a subconsciousness, in Janet's sense of that term. Morton Prince was able to prove this in various ways, apart from the statements of B herself and of her hypnotic personality β . One illustration will suffice. It was arranged with β (unknown to A) that she should add together certain figures while A was present, and should show that she really had carried out the operation co-consciously by giving the answer immediately upon A being changed to β . She of course was not told what actual figures would be given. A was then brought and was asked to write out some lines of poetry in the middle of a large sheet of paper ($8\frac{1}{2}'' \times 11''$) in the left-hand upper corner of which was written the number 53, and in the right-hand lower corner the number 61. A repeated aloud what she was

1. See *Journal of Abnormal Psychology*, vol. iii, 1908-9, *passim*.

writing and commented upon her mistakes of memory, showing that she was alert and not in a somnambulistic state. On being questioned afterwards she averred that she had noticed no other writing, such as numbers, on the paper. It had appeared quite blank. Even if she had noticed the numbers she would not have known what was to be done with them, since she is amnesic for B and β . A was changed to β . "Immediately on appearing β exclaimed, almost shouted: '114,' which is correct." More complicated arithmetical calculations were carried out under similar circumstances with equal success.

Certain memories of the patient's earlier years, which were lost to all the personalities even in hypnosis, were recovered by automatic writing. In this way it was discovered that her irrational fear of cats took origin from an incident of her childhood, when she was intensely frightened by a white cat she was holding having a fit. Her dreams were frequently of cats, accompanied by a feeling of intense horror.

This case is of especial interest, in that Morton Prince prevailed upon both C (or, rather, B.C.A.) and B to write full introspective records of their experiences during and after the disease.¹ The documents are of the greatest importance, especially as their authenticity and objective accuracy is vouched for by two other distinguished American neurologists besides Morton Prince himself. We learn from B's account how this co-conscious self commenced first as a definite emotionally-tinged complex or system of ideas clearly known by C or B.C.A. She writes: "A very long time ago (she was 20 at the time) C received an emotional shock which it seems to me, as I look at it now, resulted in the first little cleavage of personality. This emotion was one of fright and led to *rebellion* against the conditions of her life, and formed a small vague complex which persisted in the sense that it recurred from time to time, though it was always immediately suppressed. This complex, it seems to me, was the same, though only slightly developed, as that which appeared later and is described as complex B." Twenty years later the sudden and prolonged illness of her husband emphasized the feelings of fright and rebellion, which now showed as "a longing for happiness, a disinclination to give up the pleasures of life which the conditions required; and there was a certain determination to have those pleasures in spite of everything, and this resulted in a constant struggle between C and this complex." After her husband's death, C became thoroughly neurasthenic and the B complex grew stronger. She would find herself doing and enjoying "things that she disapproved of and knew that she disapproved of." Finally, a year after her husband's

1. *Op. cit.* pp. 240-260, 311-334.

death, "a third shock of a strongly emotional nature" produced a sudden change. C disappeared and the B complex became a personality, with the general characteristics we have already recorded. But a month later a fourth emotional shock (felt of course by B) brought back C as the dominant personality, in the neurasthenic and psychasthenic form which we have called A. B subsequently alternated with A and at the same time became also a co-consciousness, and the conflicts between the two now took the form of antagonism between two distinct personalities. C's autobiography gives vivid descriptions of these conflicts. She writes: "I would often wake in the morning, as A, to find a note on my pillow or on the table—usually of a jeering tone—telling me to 'cheer up' or to 'weep no more,' etc.; sometimes these notes would be in rhyme and nearly all advised me not to trouble Dr. Prince so much. These notes were written by B when I 'changed' in the night, but as A, I supposed, when I first found them, that I had written them in my sleep. If my condition had been one of remorse, it was now one of despair. After a time, as A, I destroyed all the notes I found without reading them, hoping in this way to discourage B's fondness for writing. As a result I found one morning a sheet of paper pasted directly in the middle of my mirror. It was fastened at each corner with large red seals and bore the inscription 'READ THIS' and contained information which it was quite necessary A should have. As B my attitude towards myself as A was something like that of a gay, irresponsible, pleasure-loving girl toward an older, more serious-minded sister. I, as B, had no patience with A's scruples and morbid ideas and actually enjoyed doing things which I knew would shock or annoy myself as A, though occasionally as B I felt a little sorry for A." The following are extracts from the joint diary which this curiously assorted pair kept at Morton Prince's request: Under the date July 23, 190-, B writes: "I am here again to-night, B, I am. I may as well tell all I have done, I suppose. For one thing I had a facial massage—there is no need of being a mass of wrinkles. I know A doesn't care how she looks, but I do. The Q's spent the evening here and—if I don't tell, S will, I suppose—I smoked a cigarette. S was *terribly* shocked and angry with me. Now, A, don't go and tell Dr. Prince, you don't have to tell him everything—you do it, though. I *must* have a little fun." The following day A writes: "I have struggled through another day. B has told what she did. How *can* I bear it? How explain? I am so humiliated, so ashamed. Why should I do things which so mortify my pride? Quite ill all day,—I am, as usual, paying for B's 'fun.' It is not to be borne." August 20: "Terrible day—one of the worst for a long time. I *cannot* live this way, it is not to be expected. I am so confused—I have lost so much time

now that I can't seem to catch up. What is the end to be? What will become of me?" August 21, B writes: "Good gracious! how we fly around. A has been ill all day—could not sleep last night. I hope he (Dr. Prince) won't send for us for he will put a quietus on me and as things are now I am gaining on A. Had a gay evening—no discussions of religion or psychology, no dissecting of hearts and souls while I am in the flesh." August 25: "I wonder if A is really dead—for good and all? It seems like it. The thought rather frightens me somehow, as if I had lost my balance-wheel. She wants to die, she really does, for she thinks it to herself all the time. I wish I were myself alone, and neither A nor B; I cannot bear to hear A groan, she cannot bear my glee." August 26th: "Such a day! A got away from me for a little while and tried to write a letter to Dr. Prince. It was a funny looking letter, for I kept saying to her 'you cannot write, you cannot move your hand,' but she had enough will power to write some and directed it. The effort used her up, however, and I came and the letter was not mailed." August 27th, A writes: "I am too much bewildered to write. I have succeeded in writing Dr. Prince, if I can only mail it. Oh, but I am tired! Such an awful struggle!"

C was eventually resynthesised by means of hypnosis. After many fruitless attempts, the corresponding hypnotic personality γ was obtained, and, as Morton Prince says, "on being waked up, a personality was found which possessed the combined memories of A and B and was free from the pathological stigmata which respectively characterised each."

We may now conveniently consider the general nature of hypnosis and allied therapeutic methods. A typical way of inducing hypnosis is as follows: The patient is first disabused of certain misconceptions of the nature of the process which are so commonly held even by educated people. He is told that the hypnotic state need not, and as a rule does not, involve actual loss of consciousness, and that one essential condition of success is that he should be willing and anxious to be hypnotized. No one can be hypnotized against his will, and even when hypnotized he cannot be made to do anything in violation of his ethical principles. Finally the patient is told that he must not be discouraged by a failure at the first attempt, and that when the novelty of the experience wears off, success is more likely to come. Dr. F. H. Gerrish¹ has given an admirable and concise description of the method of producing hypnosis which I here quote: "The patient, thus instructed, then lies down on a couch, or seats himself in a lounging chair, in which

1. "The Therapeutic Value of Hypnotic Suggestion," by F. H. Gerrish. *Journal of Abnormal Psychology*, vol. iv, p. 103, 1909.

he has a comfortable rest for his head. He is told to concentrate his attention upon sleep, to try to go to sleep; and to assist him in this effort by preventing his taking in distracting ideas through his eyes, as they wander around the room . . . he is asked to fix his gaze upon some indifferent object, as, for example, the finger of the physician, which is held a foot or so from the face of the patient. He is instructed not to try to keep his eyes open, and not to close them voluntarily, but merely to let the lids go as they will. The physician places his free hand upon the forehead of the patient, and, by a continuous stream of quiet, monotonous talk, encourages the patient in his effort to go to sleep. For example, he says, 'Try to sleep, think of nothing but sleep, keep your thoughts fixed upon going to sleep. Your lids are heavy, they are drooping, you are going to sleep. Every moment you are getting more drowsy; you feel the sleep stealing over you. The lids are closing; you are almost asleep. Now the eyes have closed; you have gone to sleep.' Meantime a little pressure has been made upon the brows; and, when the lids slip down and cover the eyes, they are gently stroked. The hand is kept upon the forehead, and the physician enforces his assurances by some such words as these: 'You are asleep, though you have not lost consciousness. You hear my voice, the sounds in the house, the noises in the street—and yet you are asleep. You feel the sleep all through you—head, body, and limbs are all heavy with sleep. Your nerves are all relaxed, there is no tension anywhere, you are perfectly tranquilized. You will not move a muscle, except to breathe, until I bid you wake.' " This is the method of hypnotisation employed by a very successful hypnotist, but of course there are other methods equally effective, and each operator tends to adopt an individual style suitable to himself. By questioning the patient while in hypnosis, the physician may penetrate to memories and strata of personality unknown to the patient in his waking life. Statements or suggestions made to him are accepted with unquestioning belief. The critical faculty is in abeyance, primitive credulity holds undisputed sway, and the inculcated ideas therefore gain an unwonted power both psychical and physiological. The analogy of "persuasion" in normal life helps us to comprehend these results in some degree, but the more extreme effects, especially those of a physiological order, still await explanation at the hands of science. To say that they are due to "suggestion" is to make a mere word do duty for a theory.

A state closely allied to that of hypnosis is the "hypnoidal state," first described by Dr. Boris Sidis. It is a kind of sub-waking condition similar to, if not identical with, that of light hypnosis, and has been found to be of great therapeutic value in the cases of patients who cannot be hypnotised or who object to hypnosis. The patient reclines in as comfortable a position as

possible, with all muscles relaxed, and is asked to close his eyes and listen to the rhythmic beating of a metronome or the buzzing of an inductorium. "When respiration and pulse become reduced, sensory-motor reaction diminished, sensory hypoesthesia becoming occasionally hyperesthesia, with occasional disturbances of pulse and respiration, with sudden apparently unaccountable starts, with tendencies of retention of position of limbs, and now and then with a slight tendency to resist actively any change of posture of limbs or of body without the actual presence of catalepsy, the whole feeling-tone becoming one of acquiescence and indifference, while memory with amnesic gaps begins to find the lost links and even to become hypermnesic,—when," says Boris Sidis, "we observe all these symptoms we know we have before us the subconscious hypnoidal state."¹ It is a state of greatly increased suggestibility and exalted memory, and to these two features it partly owes its therapeutic value; for the patient is able (and is invited by the physician) to live over again in memory the incident in his past life which occasioned his mental disease and obsession, and by being encouraged to scrutinize closely the exact course of development of the pathological complex of ideas learns to see it in its true relations with the rest of his mental life. In this he is helped by the arguments and exhortations of the physician. But the most important factor of the cure, in Boris Sidis' view, remains still to be mentioned. As the result of a long series of experiments on the induction of sleep in animals, children, and adults, Sidis came to the conclusion that in sleep and the sub-waking state we obtain access to a reserve fund of stored-up energy which is unavailable under ordinary circumstances in the waking life. Natural selection seems to have been instrumental in developing this reserve fund since, like nations possessed of a large reserve capital, individuals possessing the power of storing up reserve energy must have competed at an advantage with their less fortunate neighbours. We shall see presently that Freud holds a somewhat similar view of a reserve of energy in the unconscious upon which the conscious, or rather the preconscious, can draw on certain occasions. It is from this reserve store that the additional energy is derived which is requisite in the re-synthesis of the dissociating personality carried out by hypnoidization. Some remarkable cures by this method are on record. Dr. J. E. Donley² reports the case of a young American undergraduate, very intelligent but of a high-strung temperament, who, after reading a magazine article on comets, was suddenly obsessed with the fear that a comet might strike the earth,

1. Boris Sidis, "The Psychotherapeutic Value of the Hypnoidal State." *Journal of Abnormal Psychology*, vol. iv, pp. 161, 162, 1909.

2. J. E. Donley, "The Clinical Use of Hypnoidization." *Journal of Abnormal Psychology*, vol. iii, 1908.

with dire results. In the hope of calming this fear, he worked out the mathematical chances of such a mishap for himself and also got a friend who was an eminent mathematician to calculate them for him. The results he obtained calmed him somewhat, but only for a time. Although realizing the absolute absurdity of his fear, he could not shake himself free of it. He dreamt of comets constantly, feared to read his morning paper lest it might contain the news that a comet had struck the earth, and began to fear also that his obsession might set up a diseased condition of the brain. Two seances of hypnoidization, carried out according to the method just described, sufficed to produce a complete cure. The method has also been used with success in the case of a broken engagement where the man could not free himself from obsessing thoughts of his one-time fiancée, lost the power of attending to his work, and was brought to the brink of suicide. A fortnight's daily hypnoidization, in which he was encouraged to recall in detail the exact circumstances of the jilting, with all its depressing emotions, sufficed to make him "his own man" again.

The time has now come to keep our promise and give a brief sketch of Professor Sigmund Freud's views, in terms of which many of the phenomena above described seem capable of a fair degree of explanation.¹ Freud's theory is of course founded on his own observations and those of his disciples, but our confidence in the truth of its main outlines is increased when we find that cases reported by scientists who are not followers of Freud and have their own theories on the nature of hysteria and other mental diseases, fall into line with it. Freud distinguishes two forms of the unconscious (or the out-of-consciousness), viz., the unconscious proper and the preconscious. The distinction is, put briefly, one between repressed and unrepressed memories and mental activities, and does not exist in the early years of childhood, but gradually takes shape as the child passes through the various stages of ethical, social and conventional education. This course of education, together with the natural development of the mental life, involves the repeated process of repression. Primitive tendencies are held in check and driven out of consciousness by the activity of the ethical ideas of later development.

The distinction is also one between two different forms of mental activity, a primary process and a secondary process, as Freud calls them. The primary process is characteristic of the mental activity of early childhood. The young child turns away from pain instead of facing it, and tends to cling to the memories of earlier pleasurable experiences, and to seek the satisfaction of its clamouring desires or wishes in the form of intensified memories of previous

1. For a more detailed account of Freud's theory of dreams, see two papers by me in *The Lancet*, April 19 and 26, 1913.

satisfactions. This is what Freud means when he says that the unconscious can do nothing but *wish*. So soon as the power of freeing oneself from the exclusive influence of the memories of previous satisfactions and of turning to seek means of bringing about a new and objectively-satisfying experience by changes in the external world arises, the secondary process has set in. The secondary process, which is the characteristic form of activity of the preconscious, can face painful experiences and memories and make use of them in bringing about desirable changes in the outer world instead of merely turning away from them. It is this "turning away" in early life which is the beginning of repression and the pre-condition of all later repressions. The abandoned memories and desires in the unconscious persist in all their pristine vigour and serve as a nucleus of attraction for later suppressed tendencies of the preconscious that happen to be at all analogous to themselves. These are thus drawn into the unconscious and fall under the sway of the primary process. The repressing force of the secondary process is known metaphorically as the *endopsychic censor*, and constitutes a *resistance* placed "like a screen" between the unconscious and the preconscious. The repressed tendencies and ideas of the unconscious can only reach consciousness after first overcoming this resistance, undergoing certain changes in the process, whereas the tendencies and memories of the preconscious can pass unchanged into consciousness so soon as an appropriate distribution of the mental function known as attention is secured.

There is thus a species of "dissociation" present even in the normal mind, and mental disease instead of producing this dissociation merely emphasizes it in certain cases by disturbing the equilibrium of psychic forces interacting between the two systems of the unconscious and the preconscious. The proof of this is to be found in the phenomenon of *dreaming*, which is a normal function of the mind. Freud has shown that in dreams the wishes of the unconscious succeed in reaching consciousness in a disguised form owing to the diminished efficiency of the censor during sleep. The manifest dream content consists of a patchwork of memories, some of them in every case coming from the previous day, showing peculiarities known as condensation, displacement, dramatisation, and secondary elaboration, the exact nature of which we cannot go into here. The meaning of the dream, or the system of latent dream thoughts, is very different from this, and is, in Freud's view, invariably the fulfilment of a repressed wish from the unconscious. The method employed to discover the latent dream thoughts is the now famous method of *psychoanalysis*. The dreamer directs his attention to the different parts of the manifest content, in succession, and follows the train of associated ideas that arise in his mind from each, carefully avoiding any criticism of them, but recording

them faithfully as they appear in consciousness, however objectionable or painful some of them may be. He will then find that all these trains of "free" associations converge to one system of ideas which originates from the unconscious and consists of repressed wishes. In every dream there is also fulfilled the wish of the preconscious to sleep, so that every dream is a compromise between the wish to sleep of the preconscious and one or more wishes emanating from the unconscious. Both wishes are fulfilled by the dream. Now, in Freud's theory, the symptoms of hysteria are exactly analogous to the dreams of normal persons. They, too, are the disguised fulfilment of repressed wishes in the unconscious, but so chosen that they also fulfil a counter-wish from the preconscious, generally of the nature of a self-punishment. By means of psychoanalysis, these wishes may be brought to consciousness in their true form. Success in this means the cure of the patient, since he is now able to deal with these repressed tendencies more rationally, and either "sublimate" them, *i.e.*, direct them to higher and more social ends, or give them moderate satisfaction. His personality is stronger and more completely developed now than it was when the repressions first took place, and is therefore better able to deal with them.

If the repressed tendencies are sufficiently strong they may, by gathering appropriate ideas around them, form a secondary personality and reach consciousness independently of the repressing factors of the mind. The cases of Miss Beauchamp and B.C.A. seem intelligible in terms of this hypothesis. Moreover, the hypnoidal state, which seems to be almost identical with the state of the patient's mind during psychoanalysis, in all probability produces its beneficial effect by liberating mental energy which had previously been "fixed" to the repressed tendencies. So that the essential elements in the views of both Morton Prince and Boris Sidis seem capable of being harmonised with Freud's general theory. In C. G. Jung's recent modification of this theory,¹ where justice is done not only to the repressed tendencies of earlier life but also to the failure of adaptation to present requirements owing to mental weakness, we have probably the most complete general theory of functional disease which it is possible to give up-to-date.

WILLIAM BROWN.

1. See *Proceedings of International Congress of Medicine*, London, 1913, section xii, pp. 65-71.

GIAMBATTISTA VICO.

THE *Nuova Scienza* of Vico has never been translated into English, but an exhaustive account of his philosophy by the eminent Italian philosopher, Benedetto Croce, has just appeared in an excellent English version.¹ Croce's interests are, indeed, more philosophical than sociological, and his book is a discriminating tribute to a great philosopher and a great Italian. But it is Vico's sociology that has had the more lasting effect, and it is as a sociologist that he should be treated in this REVIEW. This side of his work is not neglected by Croce—indeed it is impossible to keep it separate from his philosophy; and Croce throws a welcome light both on the *Nuova Scienza* itself and on its effects in later times.

Giambattista Vico was born in Naples in 1668. He published the first edition of his great work in 1725, and the second—in which his thought reached its maturity—in 1731. The final edition of 1744, the year of his death, contained only trifling additions. He passed his life in poverty and obscurity. Not only an Italian in an age when his country had declined from its former position in the intellectual world, he was even a Neapolitan. Those around him could form no estimate of his greatness; the thought of the world outside, England, France, Germany, was tending in other directions. He was, in fact, at once too far behind and too far in advance of his age. While his generation was occupied with the revolt against the past, and the pursuit of individual liberty, he was still a fervent Catholic, and he had already attained to that organic conception of society, to that recognition of historic continuity, which was to be the characteristic of a later time. In fact, it was not till the nineteenth century that his true greatness was acknowledged.

In his youth, the Cartesian philosophy was still in the ascendant, but on him it produced no effect save one of repulsion. He did not consider the geometric method suitable to all investigations. Method, indeed, must be employed "but a method different according to the nature of the subject"—a phrase which seems to foreshadow the theory, put forward a century later, that each science introduces a characteristic method, and that it is impossible to study the more complex sciences solely by the methods appropriate to the simpler. Nor could he accept, and this was still more fundamental, the individual judgment as the test of truth. "Among the Cartesians themselves the idea which is clear and distinct for

1. *The Philosophy of Giambattista Vico*. By Benedetto Croce. Translated by R. G. Collingwood. London: Howard Latimer, Ltd. 10/6 net.

one is often, for another, obscure and confused." The criterion of truth must be sought, not so much in the effect on the individual mind, as in the general consensus of opinion. Here was a link between Vico and another school of thought, that of Grotius and the founders of international law. But there were some serious differences. The mind of Vico, at bottom scientific, soon found itself at issue with the metaphysical conceptions of this school: it represented the revolt of the middle classes against the aristocracy, and Vico was not revolutionary; it was utilitarian in ethics; it was unhistorical; it was intellectualist, while Vico, a pioneer in this as in so much else, had affinities with Pragmatism. Philosophers, in his view, arrive at their conceptions thanks to experience of social institutions: Socrates and Plato presupposed the Athenian democracy and law-courts. Grotius, Selden and Puffendorf

"begin by nations already formed and composing, when taken together, the society of the human race, while humanity began among all the primitive peoples at the epoch in which families were the only societies and adored the *dii majorum gentium*."

They erred in thinking the law of nations eternal and always the same. The laws of each state are earlier than international law, and the latter has only been recognised in consequence of the former. The laws of nations are founded on the usages of nations, while the natural rights of which philosophers talk are founded on reasoning. Society begins, not with philosophers, but "with the simpletons of Grotius, with primitive peoples like the Patagonians of the Straits of Magellan." The general consensus of mankind, as it appeared to Grotius, was something antecedent to civilisation and independent of experience. To Vico it was something which had grown up step by step with the slow development of human society.

There was an earlier thinker with whom Vico was more in agreement.

"Thenceforward," *i.e.* after Aristotle and Zeno, "philosophy produced no fruit remarkable for its utility to the human race. It is, therefore, with reason that Bacon, the philosopher-statesman, recommends induction in his *organum*. The English who follow this precept, draw from induction the greatest advantage in experimental philosophy."

But Vico was not the slave of Bacon's method. He did not profess—with Newton—to form no hypotheses. He rather followed Newton's practice or went beyond it. Indeed, his devotion to Bacon was combined with the idealism that he had learnt from Plato. Moreover, whatever his admiration for the method of Bacon, the subjects to which that method had been applied were not those which most interested him. He complains that the Moderns seek the nature of things rather than the nature of Man,

and cultivate natural at the expense of moral science. He did not recognise, as Bacon had implicitly done when he foreshadowed a *scala intellectus* or ladder of the sciences, that these had to develop in a certain order, and that sociology and ethic required a basis in physics and biology. He only saw a fruitful method ready, as he thought, for application to the studies which appeared to him of the greatest interest, and the *Nuova Scienza* was the result.

When, however, we consider the resources at his disposal, either for the formation or the verification of hypotheses on social evolution, it is easy to see how inadequate they were for his task. Passing over the difficulty already noticed—the backward state of Biology—even the more purely social means of investigation were wanting. As we have seen, he looked on civilisation as issuing from humble beginnings, from savage peoples like the Patagonians of his own time; but he had not the wealth of anthropological investigation which is now at the service of social science, and has come perhaps to hold even too great a place in the thoughts of sociologists. Travellers' tales, the narratives of traders, missionaries, or shipwrecked sailors, often made with no purpose and recording the marvellous rather than the important, were a very insecure foundation on which to base scientific theories. Vico had a short way with them when they gave evidence which conflicted with the views he had reached by other means. Voyagers having reported that some Kaffir and Brazilian tribes had no knowledge of a God, he discounted the information by suggesting that travellers were notoriously fond of relating marvels in order to sell their books.

Scarcely more was to be gained from the historical record. This, indeed, was of the first consequence in a system based on the filiation of the ages and the continuity and natural growth of civilisation. But up to his time, history had suffered from two hindrances, the treatment of the course of human affairs as due to divine arbitrament, as examples of the favours or chastisements of the Deity, or the restriction of the historian in Croce's words, "to the personal aspect of events," and failing by these means to reach full historical truth, the attempt "to gain warmth and life by means of political and moral instruction." The first of these errors, the theological conception of history, had been falling into decay since the beginning of the Renaissance, but the second was then and long after in the ascendant. Contrasting Vico's method with that followed in Pietro Giannone's *Civil History of the Kingdom of Naples*, Croce writes:—

"The author was a man of his own district and age, and wrote a great work in the sphere of polemic, and even in certain respects of history: but such that all its greatness only serves to emphasise the greatness of Vico's book. If Vico had had to describe the origins of

ecclesiastical property and power in the Middle Ages, he would have been able to write of something very different from the guile of popes, bishops and abbots, and the simplicity of dukes and emperors. And as we shall see, whenever he undertook to investigate any part of history, he actually did discover in it something very different from these things."

Thus, in approaching Sociology from the historical side, he had first to reform the study of history, and this effort did not bear its full fruition till long after his time. If to this we add the limitation of the historic field, confined for him almost entirely to Greece and Rome, we shall be able to understand his difficulties in the use of the historical method.

There were, however, two resources of sociological investigation which Vico was perhaps the first to suggest. In his search for social origins and the institutions of primitive man, he examines, somewhat cursorily it is true, the conduct, beliefs, and language of children, assuming that what is true of the youth of the individual is true also of the youth of the race. Later thinkers have insisted on this correspondence in a converse sense, and Herbart, Comte and Spencer have found in the successions of the early stages of civilisation valuable suggestions for the education of the young. The view that the youthful mind, if left to form its own conclusions, would spontaneously reproduce the successive stages of the beliefs of the human race has been strengthened by the analogy of the biologic theory of *recapitulation*, it being now recognised that the embryo, and indeed the whole early life-history, represents in rough outline the course of ancestral development. It was by this method that he reached a theory which contained the germ of what was long afterwards known under slightly different forms as Fetichism or Animism, and this in the opinion of so great an authority as Dr. Westermarck still holds the field. Vico writes:—

"The first men gave to the objects of their admiration an existence analogous to their own. That is precisely what children do, when, in their play, they speak to inanimate things as to living persons."

But there was another resource of greater immediate value. He sought for a knowledge of primitive times in the origin of words, the etymologies of primitive languages giving the history of that which is expressed. "An old language ought, if considered before its maturity, to be a great monument of the first ages of the world." In all languages the attributes of the soul are drawn from bodies and the properties of bodies. The order of ideas follows the order of events; and the human order beginning in the forests, extends from huts to villages, thence to cities or unions of citizens, and afterwards to academies or unions of the learned. So it is that in Latin the origin of all words is savage and rural. So, too, literature changes its form. Fables are earlier than maxims, since to

prove by example requires only one fact, to prove by induction needs many. The poetry of a primitive people is a storehouse of information on primitive ideas. "Achilles is the idea of valour common to all the valiant; Ulysses, the idea of prudence common to all the wise."

Vico not only sought light on the course of civilisation in early poetry. He reversed the process and obtained a new light on ancient poetry from his knowledge of early civilisation. The great interest of the Western world in the Bible had already led to its critical study, and Simon had essayed to separate the Elohist and the Jahvist narratives in the Book of Genesis. For such an investigation Vico, as a faithful member of the Catholic Church, had little inclination. But among the learned, the Homeric poems were held in scarcely less reverence, and Vico did not scruple to lay a sacrilegious hand on the sacred personality of Homer. He found in these poems, a mixture of delicacy and savagery, the habits and ideas of barbarism and of refinement, combined in ever varying complexity; and he came to the conclusion that the poems were the work of many bards during many ages. This was the true Homer. When we remember the outcry raised a century later by Wolf's *Prolegomena* denying the common authorship of the Iliad and the Odyssey, we may well wonder at the audacity of such a theory in such an age.

It was, however, in his general conception of the new science, that Vico's power and originality are best shown. Now what were these general conceptions? The first and greatest was that of the social movement as a gradual unfolding, each stage resulting from the preceding, and giving rise to the succeeding in due order and filiation. This is the doctrine which later received the name of historical necessity, a process which does not exist apart from and independent of human ideals, since those ideals themselves arise in the course of the social evolution, and like the whole process spring from the nature of Man and his environment. Thus he swept aside the old theory that the institution of society was due to the wisdom of some great lawgiver, or the new theory of the social contract, which sought the origin of government in the desire of the people to escape the evils of anarchy. As little did he find the origin of religion in the imposture of its first professors—a doctrine that was soon after to be accepted by many who prided themselves on their enlightenment. To Vico, society and religion sprang from the very nature of Man. The first social contacts were not due to foresight. They were not planned for their utility. They resulted from men's common needs. A community of waters, the common resort to tank or river, was probably the beginning of the larger social unions. Men were brutes who only gradually became human, and society owed its origin not to the reflection of the wise,

but to the human feeling arising among the brutish. Stated with the confusion which is to be expected in a new thought, this is in its essentials the doctrine that was ultimately to prevail.

But from this evolutionary theory of society, another consequence followed. Hitherto sociology had been almost purely statical. It had been concerned with the classification of states of society, or a survey of relations and institutions. At most, it had taken account of the succession of forms of government each considered as a consequence of the preceding, or of the contrast between a state of nature and a state of civilisation, the transition to which depended on the volition of the legislator or the people. It was in the conception of the gradual unfolding of civilisation that we have the beginning of social dynamics in the meaning attached to the word by Comte. Though Vico, for reasons that will appear later, did not consider progress as continuous and unbroken, though he looked to periodic returns of barbarism, yet his sketch of the upward course of civilisation due to Man's nature in Man's environment was the first attempt at a scientific treatment of the social movement.

From the common nature of Man Vico drew an inference of even greater importance to social science. However much the special circumstances of each separate nation might obscure it, there was a general course which civilisation must run. The nature of Man must give the general direction of the evolution of civilisation, which peculiarities of environment or contacts with peoples higher or lower in the scale of development could only modify. Mankind had long sought to trace the sequence of events in national history. The great scientific discoveries of the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, the victory of the new Astronomy and the first beginnings of Physics, had suggested to Pascal that the intellectual life of the race transcended the rise and fall of nations. "All the generations of men," said he, "should be considered as one man ever living and continually learning."¹ Towards the end of the seventeenth century, Bossuet in his sketch of Universal History, traced the *social* ancestry of the West from the Hebrews, through the Greco-Roman world to the middle ages and the rise of modern nations. Thus, while making Universal History his subject, he selected one thread as constituting the main line of social descent. Vico went a step further. He traced a general course of evolution, due to the nature of Man, an *Ideal History*² as he called it, in which particular histories would take their place. Thus, he proposed to trace the natural order of the stages of civilisation, as they would be evolved under the influence of the common nature and the general environment of mankind—

1. Pascal, *Essai sur la Vide*.

2. Croce takes a somewhat different view of the Ideal History.

as, in fact, they had been evolved in the earlier periods by many distinct peoples. A closer examination will show that two separate thoughts are involved. The first is that a common human nature and its environment gives rise to a common civilisation which in essentials might arise in many different centres, and follow a similar course in each case. The second is that the torch of civilisation may pass from one people to another each in turn the leader of the race, the social descent not necessarily coinciding with the biologic. Vico treated the whole course as though it had been the history of a single people. When Herder followed the progress of Man from the hunting to the pastoral stage and from that to the stage of settled agriculture, when Cordorcet attempted to sketch the development of the human mind, when Comte discovered the Law of the Three States, when Geddes, in the footsteps of Le Play, traces the various layers of civilisation represented in the course of a river—an ideal river—from source to sea, they all, explicitly or implicitly construct an Ideal History of which the first conception is due to Giambattista Vico.

It is scarcely necessary to say that the actual course of development will never coincide exactly with this Ideal History. It had once been usual to account for all similarities by supposing contacts at however great a distance or in however rude an age. Vico found the explanation of similarities in the similarity of men's natures. Still, he admitted the possibility of contacts. So, too, the environment would differ, and Vico did not recognise that it was in the earliest ages, before the growth of social tradition, that differences of environment would have most effect. Yet in his neglect of these modifying influences, in his concentration on the main course he followed the proper scientific method. Kepler, to use Comte's illustration, would never have mapped the general orbit of the planets if he had not left the permutations out of account. When the orbit had been found, allowance could then be made for the modifying forces. On the justification for this disregard of modifying circumstances Croce is excellent. Vico's "concern was with uniformities and not with divergences, or rather with certain uniformities and not with certain others which compared with the former were negligible divergences." In tracing the general characteristics of different periods of life the rapidity or slowness of development due to difference of climate, race or accidental circumstances is ignored.

As to the construction of his Ideal History, that in the state of anthropological and historical knowledge, presented almost insuperable difficulties. In his three stages, the Divine, represented to us by myths, the Heroic, best seen in the Homeric poems, and the Human, the first two answered roughly to Comte's Theocratic and Military civilisations, the former of which was best represented

by Egypt, the latter by Greece and Rome. But this classification found no place for the middle ages. His explanation of that period was beset with difficulties, and has done much to deprive him of the reputation due to his achievements. Struck by certain superficial likenesses between the early civilisation of Greece and Rome and that of Europe in the age of Feudal Chivalry, he suggested that progress was circular, that the ages would continually recur, and that with the victory of the barbarians over Rome the whole upward struggle had to recommence. In reality, however, he saw that mediæval civilisation did not start afresh, that Europe did not at the fall of the Empire descend to the level of the Patagonians, that the new time began with a great heritage from the old, including the Universal Church of which he was a devoted adherent. A spiral, or better still, a helix, the thread of a screw, in which the axis represented the forward movement, and the curve, now on one side of it, now on another, represented the course actually followed, would have better expressed his thought, and have been more easily harmonised with the views of subsequent thinkers.

But if Vico made mistakes, and he made many, it is not by these he should be judged, but by his contributions to Sociology and the historic spirit. Croce well says of his view of Heroic society, that whatever may be the value of the details, the whole is rich with a truth that transcends the single propositions. "This truth is the mighty effort to recall a form of humanity and society still doubtless living in surviving records and monuments, still recognisable here and there in a fragmentary form in various parts of the modern world; but for centuries, even in Vico's days, buried beneath a mass of irrelevant fancies, conventional types, and prejudices of every kind, which prevented its true characteristics from appearing." It has been objected to Vico, that in history he classifies rather than narrates; but "the historical side of the New Science is one great substitution of profound for superficial classifications." "He is neither more nor less than the nineteenth century in germ."

S. H. SWINNY.

SOCIETY AND "THE INDIVIDUAL."

I.

THE failure to understand the true distinction and the creation of false distinctions between "individual" and "social" is a main source of sociological error. There are no individuals who are not social individuals, and society is nothing more than individuals associated and organised. Society has no life but the life of its members, no ends that are not their ends, and no fulfilment beyond theirs. There is no conflict between society and "the" individual, between the welfare of society and the welfare of "the" individual. The quality of a society is the quality of its members. There is no social morality that is not individual morality, and no social mind that is not individual mind.

A recognition of these simple truths is a first step in the understanding of society. Yet they are often denied and more often ignored. And the reason, strange though it may seem, is the hold which bad metaphysics has upon us, even—or especially—on those who abjure metaphysics altogether. Many of those who regard a society as other and more than the members who compose it might be surprised to learn that their doctrine rests on one or other or both of the two oldest metaphysical delusions known to the history of thought, the delusion that relations are in some way independent or outside of the things related in them, and the delusion that the type exists somehow by itself, "transcendental" to its members!

A society consists of beings *like* to one another in various ways, in some ways like-minded, in some ways like-bodied also. Thus one can conceive a type of which each is an instance or embodiment. All "share" a common nature. Now the one metaphysical delusion is to regard this common nature, this abstract type, as somehow substantial and real in itself. We first substantiate it, and then empty into it the whole worth and value of the mere individuals who "embody" or "exemplify" it. We make flesh and blood and soul that which the sculptor *symbolises* in stone and the artist caricatures on paper. The sculptor embodies in stone his *conception* of Britannia, the artist draws on paper his *conception* of John Bull, but many of us, quite unreflectingly, regard our conceptions not as abstract or symbolic or representative, but as real. It is not possible here to explain the metaphysical character of this fallacy; it must suffice to point out its existence and the misunderstanding which it creates. It is an error that pervades both popular and systematic thinking on society, and it

is as common as it is rarely noted. One acute social observer has recently commented upon it. Speaking of certain people whom he supposes guilty of this fallacy he says :—

"They were, in the scholastic sense—which so oddly contradicts the modern use of the word—"Realists." They believed classes were *real* and independent of their individuals. This is the common habit of all so-called educated people who have no metaphysical aptitude and no metaphysical training. It leads them to a progressive misunderstanding of the world."¹ (H. G. Wells, *The New Machiavelli*.)

Again, a society consists of beings *related* to one another in various ways, some superficial, some deep and vital. In social relations men are born, in them they live and develop. None lives or dies to himself, and all are bound up in one unity by reason of their social relationships. It is when men reflect on this essential fact that they fall, so often, into the second metaphysical delusion. They come to think of these social relations as literally *ties* between man and man, somehow outside the beings they bind together, as railway-couplings are outside the carriage they connect. It is extraordinarily difficult, owing to the poverty of language, to talk of relations without making this false implication. The result is, as we shall see presently, that men come to think of society as "greater than the sum of its parts," as in some way independent of its parts. This false conception of society disappears in a true estimate of the meaning of relations. Consider for instance the bond of kinship, say as between father and son. Here fatherhood as a relationship is an element in the personality of the being we call "father," just as a sonship is an element in the personality of the being we call "son." Or take the relationship of friendship. We speak of the *ties* of friendship, but the ties are the reciprocal sentiments felt by each towards the other of the beings so related. The ties exist *in* the personality of each, and there alone. Or take a political relationship, that of governor and governed. There can be no governor where there is no governed, and *vice-versa*, but governorship is an activity *of* the one, and subjection to government a corresponding passivity and activity *of* the other. Social relations, in a word, are simply those elements and functions of personality in each which are dependent on the elements and functions of personality in others. Society is therefore not relations but beings in their relationships. It follows that there is no social function which is other than the functions of personalities. Society is in us, in each of us, in some degree in all, in the highest degree in the greatest of us.

1. I fear the author is too optimistic as to the effect of metaphysical training, since many of our metaphysicians have fallen into the same error.

II.

Many erroneous ways of interpreting society take their rise in these confusions—including, as I believe, the doctrine that society is a kind of organism and the doctrine that society is a kind of soul. These are definite misunderstandings, but some writers who seem to avoid them still use expressions which lead back to the same original source of error. It is often said, for instance, that society is "greater than the sum or resultant of its parts." As this looser interpretation falsifies our perspective of some practical problems of community, it may be well to devote to it a little consideration.

When we speak of a community as greater than the sum of its parts, we are still thinking in terms of some analogy, since the expressions "sum" and "parts" are not directly appropriate to society. Of what other things can we properly say that they are more than "the sum of their parts"? If we turn to those who apply the expression to society, we find that they make use of such similes as this:—Bronze has a hardness which belongs to neither tin nor copper nor lead, its constituents; in like manner the character of a society differs from the characters of its components, the individual men and women. Or again they say:—A body consists of parts, of organs, but the whole body is something more than the sum of its organs. Here we have the two types of instance which suggest the statement that a society is "greater than the sum of its parts."

Let us look at the first type. The analogy is that of the chemical transformation of elements when they enter into composition. But the "parts" here are not the parts of the compound, they are the elements, yet uncompounded, which unite to form it. We are asked to distinguish such a chemical unity from a mere mechanical one, which presumably is not "more than the sum of its parts." Thus M. Durkheim, in his advocacy of the society-greater-than-the-sum-of-its-parts doctrine says:—"I do not at all deny that the individual natures are the components of the social fact. The question is whether, in uniting to give birth to the social fact, they are not transformed by the very fact of their combination. Is the synthesis purely mechanical or chemical? There lies the whole question."

Shall we ever learn to study society directly in itself, and not in the distorting mirror of analogy? The "whole question," as asked by M. Durkheim, is mere confusion. In the case of chemical composition we are first given the elements uncompounded. They enter into combination, passing through a process of modification, and a new unity results. Here not only is there no analogy whatever to social process, but it is not even true that we have found a whole which, in the required sense, is "greater than the sum of its parts." For all that M. Durkheim and those who use similar

expressions mean is that the character and properties of the whole resulting from the chemical process are different from the character and properties of any of the several constituents *as they existed before entering into the combination*. But the constituents so understood are in no sense *parts* of the resulting unity, the copper and tin and lead are not parts of the bronze. It is a still greater confusion to say that community is greater than "the resultant of its parts." Further it is easy to show that there is no analogy between the chemical process, or any other process which gives resultants properly so-called, and the social process. We can find one only if we fall back on some obsolete "social contract" doctrine of society which discovers men existing in some void out of society, and brings them in. If individuals never exist out of society where shall we find the non-social lead and copper and tin which make the social bronze? In truth men are constantly being changed in the social process, but the social process was there from the first, and it is continuous and endless.

The second type is based on the organic analogy, that fruitful mother of social misconceptions. Here one may be brief. Organs are essentially relative to the unity and function of the organism, and to speak of "the sum of its organs" is mere nonsense. An organism cannot be greater or less or in any other relation whatever to the pure figment, "the sum of its parts." Any argument resting on such an analogy is worthless. There is no "sum of individuals," no "sum of the parts" of a community. The social relationships of every individual are not outside him, they are aspects of his individuality. How can you sum things if part of their being consists in their relationships to other things? To talk of a "sum of individuals" is to think of individuals as abstract, relationless, desocialisable beings. Understand individuals as concrete beings whose relations to one another constitute factors of their individuality, and you realise that these *are* society, these and these alone—and the metaphysical delusion which leads you to look for something beyond that, something beyond these unsummable social individuals, passes away.

III.

We may show in conclusion how the doctrine of *essential* opposition between "the individual" and society distorts our practical philosophies.

It leads to one of two extremes, equally false though not equally dangerous. One is the common doctrine emphasised by Comte and by Fichte that right conduct is that in which the individual utterly forgets himself and remembers only his community. "There is but a single virtue," said Fichte, "to forget oneself as individual. There is but a single vice, to look to oneself." Noble

as this ideal sounds, it is open to serious criticism. We must insist, in the face of misinterpretation, that the service of one's fellows or one's country or one's race is not the complete end of life, nor fitness for such service, "fitness for citizenship," the complete end of education. To make such fitness or service *the* ethical ideal is to reason in a circle, and is to darken the very meaning of that vital fitness or service. It is to reason in a circle, for if the fulfilment of each lies in the service of all, each becomes a means to the ends of others who yet are themselves but means. All serve an end which is no one's end, and therefore not the end of the whole. Each man may find his welfare through social service, but his end is not therefore social service. It is not what he is *for*. Nothing extrinsic can be a man's fulfilment—or a people's. If we serve the welfare of "the race," yet the race consists of successive generations and the successive generations are also individuals. If a social ideal be not fulfilled in the lives of individuals present or to come, where is it fulfilled? And again, it is to darken the meaning of service, for to serve others as individuals or as an association or community is to strive for the well-being of one's fellows: that well-being consists in definite conditions and activities of life, and these ends for others, if they are true, are ends for each. Speaking generally, it is only because they are ends for me, because they are good things I have already attained or am on the way to attaining, that I can seek to help others to attain them also. In seeking others' good we can find our own, but we can seek for others only what we have already in some measure attained for ourselves. The level of the individual gives the worth of his social interests. The service of the unworthy is unworthy service, and the love of the unworthy is unworthy love.


As individuality develops the more within society, the more do we need a right understanding of individuality. The social person is the only pure unit we *know*, others are only relative. Sum up his social relationships, he is more than these. Understand his environment, he may not be there, he goes in and he goes out. Explain him by heredity, you are explaining him by himself. All values are finally personal, values of personality, and in the service of personality alone are laws and institutions justified.

As the one extreme doctrine sinks the person in his social relationships, so the other and more dangerous extreme elevates him beyond social relationships altogether. This is the "amoralism" of Thrasymachus and of Nietzsche, which regards the laws and institutions of society as the cunning of the weak to bind the strong, advantageous to the weak but prejudicial to the strong. The doctrine is contradictory and suicidal, and is perhaps best accounted for as a reaction against the other extreme view just considered. The complete refutation of it was given long ago by Plato, who

showed that the social virtues are not merely "another's good" but one's own. (*Republic*, Books I.—IV.) In other words social relationships are not external things, not nets in which personality is enmeshed, but functions of the personality of each, the fulfilment of which is the fulfilment of personality. Once let us understand that social relations do not lie somehow *between* men but only *within* them, and we can never be guilty of so fatal a confusion as that of Nietzsche and his Greek forerunner. We must not indeed suppose that the interest of every individual will always coincide with the interest of his society. There may be genuine conflicts of interests in which an individual has to choose between his own greater good and the good of his society. We cannot go so far as to say with Fouillée:—"Tout ce que je vous dois, je me le dois; ce que je fais pour vous, je le fais pour moi, ce que je fais contre vous, je le fais contre moi . . . Mon suprême désintéressement est mon suprême intérêt, le parfait amour d'autrui est le parfait amour de moi-même." (*Les Elements Sociologiques de la Morale*, p. 282.) These are noble words, and bear witness to the profound inwardness of social relations. Yet there remain social disharmonies, social sacrifices, and social tragedies.

This much at least we can say without fear of exception or contradiction. As all individuality comes to fruition in society, so all individuality must in some way give itself up to society. To find itself it must lose itself. A profound sense of final failure accompanies all individuality which detaches itself from social service. One of the most essentially gloomy novels of the age—more essentially pessimistic than many which merely preach pessimism—is Mr. Arnold Bennett's *The Old Wives' Tale*. A sense of frustration, of the mere inevitable process of individual life through wanton experience on to the ludicrous conclusion of old age and death, of the meaninglessness of a world which breaks down what it builds, pervades its pages. It is because none of its characters give themselves up to a cause larger than themselves, social or ultra-social. In this the novelist reads more truly—whether he sees the alternative or not—the destiny of detached individuality than do the swarm of quasi-optimistic writers who also seem to find nothing in life but individual motives. This truth is notably stated by Mr. Bernard Shaw in the following passage:—

"Put your Shakespearean hero or coward, Henry V. and Pistol or Parolles, beside Mr. Valiant and Mr. Fearing, and you have a sudden revelation of the abyss that lies between the fashionable author who sees nothing in the world but personal aims and the tragedy of their disappointment or the comedy of their incongruity, and the field-preacher who achieved virtue and courage by identifying himself with the purpose of the world as he understood it. . . . Bunyan's coward stirs your blood



more than Shakespeare's hero who actually leaves you cold and secretly hostile. . . . This is the true joy of life, the being used for a purpose recognised by yourself as a mighty one." (*Man and Superman*.)

Only in society is personality at home. Only in a highly developed society can the social initiates, the children of society, develop their potentiality; only in serving society can the developed member attain the further fulfilment of life; and it is only the finely developed personality, with the self-determination, initiative, and sense of responsibility which characterise such development, who can create and maintain fine and deep social relations. Society is nowhere but in its members, and it is most in the greatest of them.

R. M. MACIVER.



ALFRED RUSSEL WALLACE.

MORE than half a century has passed since Darwin and Wallace put before the world their great discovery, and yet one of them has only just died. It is true he lived to be ninety, but he continued to take an active part in the controversies of our time almost to the end—the last, or almost the last survivor of a great period in the history of human enlightenment. The public, indeed, were right in giving the chief credit for the discovery of Natural Selection to Darwin; since it was he who not only furnished the great mass of evidence on which it rests, but who best saw its full scope and consequences; but Wallace had no reason to complain of want of recognition. The simultaneous discovery will surprise no one who recognises that the sciences develop in a natural order, and that the work of one generation suggests and controls the problems to be solved by the next. The case of the Infinitesimal Calculus, reached almost simultaneously by Newton and Leibnitz, offers a close parallel. It is pleasant to remember that the conflicting claims of these two biologists of the nineteenth century produced no such outburst of temper as marred the dignity of the two mathematicians to whom we owe the Calculus. Though Wallace and Darwin were not strictly sociologists, their work in Biology profoundly influenced Sociology—in fact, for a time it seemed that their great success threatened to reduce the latter science to a mere province of the former. No one, however, was less inclined to fall into this error than Wallace himself. He had wide social interests, and in his later years these occupied a large part of his time. He never claimed to settle social questions by “natural selection” alone; and if he ignored Sociology, it was not because he failed to recognise the importance of many problems that lie within the field of that science.

S.H.S.

REVIEWS.

DEVELOPMENT AND PURPOSE.

DEVELOPMENT AND PURPOSE: AN ESSAY TOWARDS A PHILOSOPHY OF EVOLUTION. By L. T. Hobhouse, Martin White Professor of Sociology in the University of London. London: Macmillan, 1913. 10/- net.

THE appearance of *Development and Purpose* marks the completion of a scheme which has occupied Professor Hobhouse for twenty-six years. In an interesting and valuable Introduction the author describes the conditions under which the present work was conceived. The theory of biological evolution was prevalent and predominant at the time when Professor Hobhouse began his philosophical studies, but its tendency to materialism led to a reaction under the influence of T. H. Green and Edward Caird. Their absolute idealism, however, was not satisfactory to Professor Hobhouse, who felt that it blurred the difficulties of the problem of evil and, moreover, "when everything is spiritual the spiritual loses all distinctive significance." (p. xvii.) Two points, then, must be kept in mind—the necessity of building from experience, and the recognition of a positive principle of evil.

In pursuance of his scheme Professor Hobhouse has already published three important works. The first, entitled *The Theory of Knowledge* (1896), dealt with the problem of scientific method and concluded with a summary treatment of "Reality as a System" in which it was suggested that neither mechanism nor teleology were categories applicable to the world-whole which might, however, be conceived in the light of the organic relation of whole and parts. The principle of evolution appeared to be valid if due account were taken of the mental factor, and in preparation for a due estimate of this Professor Hobhouse undertook an empirical enquiry into the evolution of mind in its lower forms, which resulted in the publication of *Mind in Evolution* (1901). The human side of this evolution was then approached from the ethical side and was worked out in *Morals in Evolution* (1906). The way was now cleared for a final estimation of the nature and function of mind. This is given to us in the present work.

Part I, "The Lines of Development," contains an historical survey of the empirical facts of the evolution of mind from its earliest to its latest phases. The keynote of this evolution is found in "correlation" which is the measure of intelligence and is evoked by the struggle for existence although not created by it. Consciousness is not essential to correlation but is a chief means by which new correlations are developed. Mind as the permanent unity of which an act of consciousness is the temporary state or condition is to be distinguished from consciousness. Nor can mind be identified with body or brain. The self is to be regarded as a psycho-physical whole and to determine the nature of its action the question of the ultimate nature of causation must be raised.

The result of the empirical investigation thus undertaken is to give us "a picture of Mind neither as the Lord of all, nor as the casual by-product

of the clash of forces, but as an impulse towards organic harmony working under limiting conditions which it gradually subdues." (p. 17.)

Part II, "The Conditions of Development," is a philosophical consideration of the principle of "conditioned purpose" which has been found to be involved in the working out of the evolutionary process. This is the most important part of the work; it is an attempt to justify the view that "the evolutionary process can be best understood as the effect of a purpose slowly working itself out under limiting conditions which it brings successively under control," (p. xxvi), and in which is implied "a spiritual element integral to the structure and movement of Reality." As a first step the validity of the experiential reconstruction is established and reason is defended as "the impulse towards interconnection." The world-process is conceived as an advance towards system and harmony, achieved through development. Harmony, which is both a product and a condition of development, is defined as "mutual support between two or more elements of a whole" (p. 284), which will be not the equilibrium of death but a self-sustained development. An optimistic view of the future is obviously implied, and Professor Hobhouse goes so far as to suggest that human mind may control external nature to the extent of controlling the movements of the earth or of migrating to another planet! The discord that at present exists between man and his environment must ultimately cease. The ground for this belief is to be found in the fact that reality contains two principles, the mechanical and the teleological or purposive. The purposive appears to be identified with the organic, and as such is fundamentally opposed to the mechanical. Reality must, then, be conceived as a self-explaining whole. Reason attempts to weave experiences into a systematic whole, every element of which has its reason ultimately in the nature of the whole. But the reason of a whole must be an inherent reason, and this can be only a *value* which must itself be conditioned by the structure of Reality. Further, the world purpose implies a central Mind of which it is the object, but any attempt to define its relation to reality in general will result in difficulties. It is impossible to force the result of abstract reasoning into concrete images. The central Mind cannot be the whole for mechanism runs through the whole; nor can it be an Omnipotent Providence or Creator because evil is more than the privation of good. Nevertheless, evil and discord are "proof of the limitation of purpose, not of its non-existence."

Professor Hobhouse claims, then, that both his historical investigation and his philosophical analysis converge to the same conclusion, viz., to the conception of "the world-process as a development of organic harmony through the extension of control by Mind operating under mechanical conditions which it comes by degrees to master," (p. 372), and this view is offered finally, "not as something which is to satisfy all emotional cravings or end all intellectual doubts, not because it is artistically complete or even because it is proved with demonstrative certainty, but merely on the humble and prosaic ground that, on a complete and impartial review of a vast mass of evidence, it is shown to be probably true."

The attempt to build from experience has, then, been carried out. The second point, the establishment of a positive principle of evil seems to be less successful. Purposive mind is thwarted and obstructed by the mechanical principle in which Professor Hobhouse seems to find a more satisfactory explanation of the problem of evil than is afforded by the principle of finiteness in "Idealistic" systems. But this involves either that the mechanical principle is wholly external, hence cannot go deep

enough to be the ultimate cause of evil; or that the mechanical and purposive principles are not *fundamentally* opposed, so that ultimately reality is wholly spiritual.

Professor Hobhouse's decided criticism and rejection of irrationalism, at present so much in fashion amongst philosophers, is most welcome and stimulating. The whole work is a most valuable contribution to English philosophical thought.

L. S. STEBBING.

THE SOCIOLOGICAL VALUE OF CHRISTIANITY.

THE SOCIOLOGICAL VALUE OF CHRISTIANITY. By Dr. G. Chatterton-Hill. Black, 1912. 7/6 net.

DR. CHATTERTON-HILL is already known to sociologists by his "Heredity and Selection in Sociology," and his treatment of his present, yet wider and more controversial theme, will confirm his reputation and also extend his influence in new quarters. The strenuous exposition of his present chapters is carefully limited from the outset to sociological values only, leaving aside all theological and exegetical questions as entirely for their own specialists; and his argument thus starts with religion in its most general and social aspect, as the one great means of subordinating and adjusting the individual to the claims of his society, for which the subdual of his own selfishness—in thought no less than in deed—is a prime necessity of continuous existence. Religion is the one and only effective method of equilibrating the social sub-divisions with the whole, and thus of ensuring social integration. This clearly laid down, our author enters upon the theory and practice of Christianity, urges the eminent sociological insight of Jesus no less than his personal appeal, and appreciates the success of his teaching and of the subsequent development of the Church in terms of the success—so much higher than that of earlier faiths—with which "individual salvation is made to depend on the very conditions on which depends social salvation." Such a mode of expression may seem somewhat to savour of Protestant rather than earlier modes of expression, but Dr. Chatterton-Hill soon leaves no doubt as to his general sympathies, but vigorously re-states the criticisms to which Protestantism is so open—its individualism leading through sectarianism to self-seeking and this to bourgeois mammonolatry, to proletarian revolt and anarchy, as well as its ritual baldness, moral dryness, and the like. Beyond these criticisms on which Catholic and sociologist writers seem so generally to agree, he vigorously defends the Catholic order, as for instance the celibacy of the clergy, not only as outlined by the well-known historical situation which gave it form, but as permanently needed by the essential continuance of that situation—since without this safeguard other churches tend to become dominated by the ever-encroaching state, or otherwise overpowered by material interests. The whole argument, though not in itself containing anything entirely new, will be of value as reaching a class of readers generally too little familiar with it. Criticisms of the dissenting and revolutionary world in many of its expressions—from Tolstoi, Ibsen, and Nietzsche to its minor prophets—abound, and are always forcibly expressed, but not with equal success. There is, for example, too great a contrast between the respectful and appreciative criticism of Comte and the reference to the Dreyfus case, which is little but an echo of the partisan feelings of its acutest strife. The approval of the Pope's condemnation of the "Sillon" movement also gives us too little light. The criticism of the faults and failings of

bourgeois individualism, of proletarian strikes and trades unionism, syndicalism and anarchy are each a vigorous indictment and remind us, in their vigour and directness, but also in their lack of appreciation of their constructive elements and possibilities, of the criticism of M. de Pobenostzeff, and in fact of the Russian as well as of the western Counter-Revolution, and not without a tinge of economic and governmental as well as of Orthodox and Catholic conservatism. So far well, so synthetic a presentment is of all the more value; yet all the more demands its counterpoise. Dr. Chatterton-Hill, like Mr. Wells, is one of these wise men, who, when he has reached a clear and definite stage and view-point in his thinking, can and does state it clearly for others in a volume, and thence moves onwards. We would press him then to elaborate for one of his next studies, the important conclusion of his chapter on "The Future of Christianity," in which he relieves the apprehensions which the sociological reader may have been forming, and correspondingly weakens the hopes of those who will seek in his volume a fresh argument for re-action, by recognising that "we by no means imply that western society if it is to survive must needs go back to the Middle Ages, and re-establish completely religious homogeneity under the authority of the Papal See. . . . What we mean is, that every effort made with a view to securing the greater integration and cohesion of western society, to placing efficient restraints on an individualism which threatens to undermine the fabric of our civilisation, must needs be based on the same principles as those which represent the Catholic Church in the work of building up and consolidating European Society." In these generalisations then the sociologists may well agree, though differences must arise in detail. For Dr. Hill the social hierarchy must be maintained, of course with selective recruitings; but here we cannot but ask—in what form and with what powers? On the independence of the spiritual of the temporal power, and the superiority of moral law to political contingencies, sociologists will probably be at one; but how are they to apply this amid that flux of business contingencies and interests which so largely determine political ones? Again, that the individual life must be dominated and disciplined by a *supra* individual ideal and towards social ends is an admirable statement; but after all, is it not the inadequacy of this religious tradition and organisation to meet these needs in the complex modern world, which has set so many of us to search out and walk towards such better future as we can, with but too little light and leading from the historic system for which Dr. Hill pleads so ably?

His varied and Europe-wide experience of many universities, cities, languages and nations gives him a grasp and his arguments a force which will be readily appreciated: let us plead with him, however, to complete his surveys by a more varied participation in the life and work of the parties whom he criticises so severely. We hold M. Sabatier's appreciation of France as far nearer the truth than Dr. Hill's, and we are confident that he will yet come to a constructive interpretation of the revolutionary elements as, despite their faults, working out their "transition" from the past to the future. More definitely still, we regard Dr. Hill's conclusions with real respect, since we admit their foundation in experience: we only plead with him that the future is not so dark and indefinite as he leaves it, the various revolutionary struggles so blindly anarchic; and that he has now but to place himself as clearly and sympathetically alongside of as many as may be of the constructive thinkers and workers and movements in the cities in which he has been hitherto simply a wandering scholar, to realise that this transition, with all its confusions and errors, is not moving

newly into darkness nor without new and renewing lights as well as ancient ones. To have passed beyond the sterile clerical and anti-clerical controversies is much : to state, as in this book, the elements of the needed synthesis and re-organisation so largely from the current counter-revolutionary points of view, is also of service : but we repeat that Dr. Hill's brother sociologists will not be satisfied until he makes a step farther, and sees and states, with no less clearness and vigour, the case for that re-constructive transition.

P. GEDDES.

PROFESSOR LLOYD MORGAN'S SPENCER LECTURE.

SPENCER'S PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE : the Herbert Spencer lecture delivered at the Museum, November 7, 1913; by C. Lloyd Morgan, F.R.S. Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1913. 2/- net.

THIS is the ninth of the Spencer Lectures, established in 1904 by a Hindoo gentleman, once responsible for the government of a native Indian State. The first lecturer was Mr. Frederic Harrison; the second the Hon. Auberon Herbert ("The Voluntarist Creed"); then came Sir Francis Galton ("Probability, the foundation of Eugenics"); Mr. Benjamin Kidd ("Individualism and after"); Mr. G. C. Bourne ("Herbert Spencer and animal evolution"); Prof. R. Meldola ("Evolution, Darwinian and Spencerian"); Mr. W. Bateson ("Biological Fact and the Structure of Society"); and Prof. D'Arcy Thompson ("On Aristotle as a Biologist, with a Proemion on Herbert Spencer").

While some of the lecturers seem to have used Spencer merely as a peg on which to suspend their own opinions on subjects apart from his philosophy, the three last named presented carefully thought out reviews of various aspects of Spencer's work, and the same method has been followed by Prof. C. Lloyd Morgan, who begins his interesting discourse with a quotation from Spencer's famous "Essay on Progress," the first reading of which quickened in him "the imperative craving to seek and, if it may be, to find the one in the many." (p. 4.) Professor Morgan says that the first part of the Essay, in which the general doctrine of evolution made its original appearance (1857), shows that every kind of progress is from the simple to the complex, the second part shows why this is so, and in the third part we are bidden to remember that the ultimate mystery remains just as it was. "There is, I think, a growing consensus of opinion that the first of these three parts, subsequently expanded and illustrated with astonishing wealth of detail in the volumes of the *Synthetic Philosophy*, contains the germ of all that is best in the teaching of Herbert Spencer." (p. 6.) Darwin spoke in enthusiastic terms of the *Principles of Biology* and William James of the originality shown in the *Psychology* and *Ethics*. Many of Spencer's generalizations have long been incorporated in current scientific doctrine. In his earliest politico-philosophical writings in the *Nonconformist* (1842) Spencer expressed a belief in the universality of law in the realm of mind as in that of matter; so, too, is it with the correlative idea of universal causation. Subsequently in *First Principles* he propounded the "sweeping and sonorous formula, which every disciple knows by heart, embodying the fundamental traits of that unceasing redistribution of matter and motion which characterizes evolution as contrasted with dissolution." (p. 9.) *First Principles* is in two parts, one dealing with the Unknowable and the other with the Knowable, but "with Spencer we have never done

with the Unknowable, the Unconditioned Reality and the other aliases by which it goes. His persistence of force in the persistence of Unknowable Force." (p. 10.) "In how many senses he uses the word 'force' I am not prepared to say," but "persistence of force is Spencer's favourite expression for uniform determinism at or near its Source." (p. 11). Science however has nothing to do with the Source or Sources of phenomena. The question: "But what evolves the evolved?" is unanswerable in scientific terms. "The man of science, speaking for his order, simply replies: We do not know." Prof. Morgan however contends that Spencer's answer is otherwise, for his "Unknowable, notwithstanding its negative prefix, is the Ultimate Reality, and does all that is in any way done . . . it is the Power which lies at the back of such wit as man has to interpret it, and in some measure, to utilize its mechanism." (pp. 12-13.) M. Bergson complains that the Spencerian method consists in reconstructing evolution with the fragments of the evolved, but Spencer never pretended to have discovered the source of evolution. M. Bergson agrees with him that the source is unknowable through the intellect, but claims that it can be reached by what he calls intuition. There were perhaps Bergsonian thinkers in the Red Lion at Milby, when, as told in *Janet's Repentance*, one of Lawyer Dempster's supporters "was apparently of opinion that history was a process of ingenious guessing."

One of the fundamental truths in his philosophy of science is for Spencer the universality of connexion between cause and effect. "Now let us eliminate Source as the Ultimate Cause (so far as that is possible in Spencer); let us restrict our attention to cause and effect in the realm of the knowable" (pp. 15-16), but Prof. Morgan finds his statements concerning them scarcely less puzzling than those which refer to force. In passing to cause and conditions, "when Spencer distinguishes between those conspicuous antecedents which we call the conditions, he invites the question: What, then, is the essential difference between them?" (pp. 21-22.) After remarking that one could wish that Spencer "had devoted his great powers of thought to a searching discussion of the different types of relatedness which are found in nature, and to a fuller consideration of a synthetic scheme of their inter-relatedness. It is imperative that our thought of relations should have a concrete backing—" Prof. Morgan complains that "in *First Principles*, which must be regarded as his general survey of the philosophy of science, there is no searching analysis of the salient types of relationship which enter into the texture of this very complex world." (p. 25.) We must regard all modes of relatedness which are disclosed by scientific research as part of the constitution of nature. They may be roughly reduced to three main types, the physico-chemical, the vital, and the cognitive. Denoting them by the letters A, B and C, we find progressively ascending modes of relatedness and evolution within each type. "Spencer's method of treatment reduces all modes of relatedness to the A type, the laws of which are, for him, the primary 'causes' of all kinds of differentiation and integration. Hence the laws of biology and psychology can ultimately be expressed and explained, he thinks, in mechanical or mechanistic terms." (p. 31.) "As we ascend the evolutionary plane from A to AB and thence to ABC—from the physico-chemical to the vital and thence to the cognitive—we find new modes of relatedness, new forms of more complex integration and synthesis, new properties successively appearing in serial order," and the new "properties are not merely additive of preceding properties; they are constitutive, and characterize the higher evolutionary products as such. Why they are thus constitutive,

science is unable to say. Spencer of course calls in the Unknowable to supply the required nexus." (p. 32.) In the last edition of the *Biology* he allows for the presence of specific vital characters: "We are obliged to confess that Life in its essence cannot be conceived in physico-chemical terms." This "frank admission," says Prof. Morgan, "does honour to the man," but it knocks a big hole "in the bottom of the purely mechanical interpretation of nature he had for so long championed." (p. 33.) It is perhaps questionable whether it is quite just to Spencer to call his interpretation of nature "purely mechanical."

There remains the place of the cognitive relation in Spencer's philosophy of Science: while no adequate analysis of cognitive relatedness on scientific lines is discoverable in Spencer's works, "I am not sure that it is yet to be found in the works of any other philosopher." (p. 36.) Prof. Lloyd Morgan says, "I cannot but think that Spencer failed to bring cognition and the conscious awareness it involves into really close touch with the rest of his philosophy of science. No such double-aspect theory as he accepted affords a satisfactory avenue of scientific approach." (p. 46.) The lecturer however remarks, "but where Spencer failed, who has come within measurable sight of success?"

Professor Morgan concludes his brilliant and not unsympathetic investigation with these generous words: "Surveying his work as a whole, we may confidently assert that Spencer brought to a conclusion a great task, and was himself great in its execution. The present generation can, perhaps, hardly realize how potent his influence was on the thought of the latter half of the last century."

HENRY R. TEDDER.

A GENERAL EXPOSITION OF SOCIOLOGY.

SOCIOLOGIE GÉNÉRALE. By Mariano H. Cornejo. French translation by Emile Chauffard. 2 vols. Paris: Bibliothèque Sociologique Internationale, 1911. 20 francs.

TREATISES on general sociology, written to expound the subject as a whole rather than to defend a special theory, are rare, and it is a striking fact that one of the best and most satisfactory works of this kind should emanate from the remote University of Lima. As M. René Worms points out in a short prefatory note to this translation, the occupant of a South American academic chair who undertakes an extensive work on abstract science labours under serious disadvantages in comparison with a European professor. The absence of well-stocked libraries, the difficulty of obtaining current literature, and above all the non-existence of a body of students and investigators devoting themselves to abstract pursuits, and providing the necessary intellectual stimulus, are grave obstacles in the way of such an undertaking. The success of the author in his task is all the more remarkable in view of the fact that he has, as politician and diplomatist, played an active part in the public life of Peru.

We find in this work a definite adoption of the view that sociology is to be regarded as an independent science, having its own methods and its own laws, and not as a congeries of separate social sciences, still less as a mere department of biology or psychology. The treatment is eclectic, based mainly on Comte, Spencer, and Wundt, but utilising the conclusions of the principal workers in this field. The author's reading has been wide, and his keen critical faculty gives great value to his discussions of rival

hypotheses and opinions. This quality is well exhibited in the critical consideration of the analogy between the social and the biological organism, and of the purely psychological conception of society.

After some general chapters and a somewhat lengthy account of the evolutionary doctrine of Spencer, the author proceeds to the discussion of the ideas of solidarity, of adaptation and of synergy in social groups, and thence to an examination of the social factors, external and internal. The treatment of this part of the subject is admirable. Modern society is essentially the product of social forces, and the influence of climate and topographical conditions, so powerful in primitive communities, steadily diminishes with the advance of civilisation. The school which regards these physical factors as all-important fails to perceive the true character of sociological laws. A similar criticism is applied to the idea of race, which is invoked by the anthropological school to explain the most varied phenomena of modern history. The supposed relations between the anthropological characters of races and their tendency to assume some particular form of civilisation are mostly illusory, and owe their origin to a confusion between inherent tendencies and the effects of social environment. The author looks forward to a gradual lessening of racial differences in the future by intermixture and by the approach to a more uniform type of world-civilisation with the advance of science, and is optimistic as to the capacity for advance of the so-called "backward" races. Population and heredity are also discussed as factors in development, but the latter chapter is inferior to the rest of the work. The Spencerian view of the inheritance of acquired characters is assumed without argument, whilst the Galtonian and Mendelian theories of heredity, which occupy so prominent a place in this branch of the subject at the present day, are left out of consideration. The omission is, however, the less important in view of the author's insistence on the predominance of social over individual inheritance.

In the treatment of the more purely social factors, Wundt's classification is adopted, and chapters are successively devoted to imitation and education, division of labour, and conflict, and to language, myth and morals, concluding with the resulting forms of social organisation. Many of these subjects are handled in an extremely interesting fashion, and special reference may be made to the discussions of animistic and other hypotheses of the origin of religion, and of totemism, in which good use is made of modern investigations, without falling into the common error of explaining all the higher developments by reference to the practices of a few isolated tribes. It is in the handling of such questions as these that the author's sanity of judgment is most conspicuous.

The principal lack of the work as a whole is the absence of the conception of sociology as a philosophy of history. As in so many modern works on the subject, the historic civilisations of the West receive less than their due share of attention, and the function of sociological knowledge as a basis for action, whilst clearly perceived and emphasised, is not illustrated, as it might be, by a scientific examination of the actual course of development in those communities with which we are best acquainted. This aspect, which is the principal one in the work of Comte, has received too little attention from most of those sociologists who in the main accept his conception of the science.

It remains to be said that there is a preface by M. José Echegaray, and that the work of translation has been excellently done by M. Chauffard, so that the style is easy and flowing, and the reader is never reminded that the work is not an original one.

C. H. DESCH.

THE ECONOMIC EXPERIMENTS OF 1848.

THE FRENCH REVOLUTION OF 1848 IN ITS ECONOMIC ASPECTS. Vol. I. Louis Blanc's *Organisation du Travail*. Vol. II. Emile Thomas's *Histoire des Ateliers Nationaux*. With an Introduction (in Vol. I) by J. A. R. Marriott. The Clarendon Press, 1913. 5/- net each volume.

THE Industrial Revolution in England began before the Revolutionary outbreak in France, took its course as a purely economic movement, far removed from the political contests of the time, and was practically completed before the country emerged from the long reaction into which the counter-revolution and the war with France had plunged it. In France, the Industrial Revolution followed the political, and the hardships, the disturbance of old economic relations and the insecurity of the worker occurred among a people with whom the tradition of revolutionary methods was still living and active. Hence the union of political and economic discontents which culminated in the events of 1848. In France, too, the orthodox political economy never obtained so complete a domination as in England. That doctrine occupied an intermediate position between the revolutionary metaphysics of the eighteenth century and the sociology of the nineteenth. It recognised natural law in social events, and it denied the power of the legislator to mould societies at will. But it had its defects. Even in England, Carlyle and others protested against some of its conclusions. More reasoned attacks were made in France. Saint-Simon and others urged the need of social organisation, instead of individual competition. Auguste Comte objected to the treatment of one side of the social evolution without taking the interaction of all elements of the social organism into consideration. He pointed out that the existence of natural law did not preclude human interference with results, but gave the necessary conditions of that interference. He denied the scientific validity of the "economic man." Then came Louis Blanc with a passionate denunciation of the sufferings of the workers and the suggestion of a new organisation of society in their interest.

In his excellent introduction¹ which gives so clear a sketch of the course of events leading to the Revolution of 1848, Mr. Marriott rightly claims for Louis Blanc that his scheme was no detailed utopia like those of Fourier or the Saint-Simonians, that with it we arrive at the threshold of the socialistic plans of the present day. His scheme, indeed, had something of state-socialism and something of syndicalism in it; and it conformed to a common aspect of their propaganda; for Louis Blanc devotes some hundred pages to showing the miseries of the workers under present conditions and less than twenty to the much more difficult task of providing a remedy—a proportion which perhaps was justifiable at a time when the Economists insisted that the position of the workers was at once excellent and unalterable by human endeavours. His main proposal was the establishment by the government, and the financing by government credit, of workshops, the directors of which should after one year be elected by the workmen, and which in open competition with private industries, would, he had no doubt, beat these out of the field. Incidentally, he proclaimed "the right to work."

The Revolution of 1848 seemed to bring Louis Blanc his opportunity. He became a member of the provisional government. His colleagues—to stave off the evil day of action—set up a labour parliament at the Luxem-

1. Mr. Marriott's Introduction is of course in English. The works of M. Blanc and M. Thomas are printed in the original French.

bourg, where under Louis Blanc's presidency, some hundreds of delegates of the workers discussed the social revolution and the reorganisation of industry. But meanwhile, thousands were out of work, and the doctrine of the "right to work," was the very part of his gospel which had sunk into the minds of the proletarians. Under these circumstances the government decided at once to open National Workshops. This was really nothing new. Before and since "relief works" were a means of combating unusual distress, as in Ireland during the Famine. But partly from its revolutionary setting in the great revolutionary centre, partly from its connection with the doctrine of the right to work, the Paris experiment looms much larger in the eye of history than any of the others. The first difficulty as in all such cases was to find work. Workshops in the proper sense of the word cannot be improvised at will; and the workless were already waiting. The artisans, skilled in the delicate arts for which Paris is famous, had to be set to ruin their hands by acting as most inefficient navvies; and even at digging there was not enough work for the workless. One of the diggers suggested that when their present job was done, they would be set to bottle the Seine; and in these very years the famine-stricken in Ireland were employed in making roads that led nowhere. The authorities in Paris adopted a different method. They had promised work for all. To those for whom they found work they paid two francs a day and each man for whom there was no work was given one-and-a-half, with the result, as M. Thomas puts it, that the workers made this simple calculation: "The State gives me 30 sous for doing nothing, it pays me 40 sous when I work, so I need only work to the extent of 10 sous." Meanwhile, the number of applicants kept on continually increasing, and the confusion grew worse and worse.

Then M. Emile Thomas offered his services as organiser. He was no Socialist; but he borrowed from the Saint-Simonians, the idea of a quasi-military organisation. He undoubtedly, considering the impossible basis of the whole thing, did wonders. He, too, had a kind of labour parliament, composed of the delegates from the units of his organisation—for the most part devoted to himself. It soon seems to have dawned on the non-Socialist members of the Provisional Government that here was an instrument with which to oppose Louis Blanc and the Socialists, and accordingly they did not stint money for the "National Workshops." On the other hand, Louis Blanc refused to recognise these as his offspring and repudiated all responsibility for them, though they owed their origin to his own theory of the right to work. In the sequel, however, Louis Blanc and the National Workshops were involved in a common ruin. Once the elections were won by the Moderates, the Government were ready to crush Louis Blanc and discard Emile Thomas. The latter was forcibly deported in May, to Bordeaux, for fear his friends among the workers might oppose his dismissal; and the National Workshops were abandoned soon after. The Socialist revolt in June was suppressed with much bloodshed. The Moderates had triumphed; but only to find before very long, that they had made ready the way for Louis Napoleon.

S. H. SWINNY.

THE LIFE OF FLORENCE NIGHTINGALE. By Sir Edward Cook. In two vols. Macmillan, 1913. 30/- net.

"THE opinions of others concerning you depend, not at all, or very little, upon what *you* are, but upon what *they* are," wrote Florence Nightingale to her father in 1853. With all due allowance for the psychological truth of such a dogma, one shuts up the volumes of her life with several very

decided opinions upon the woman herself. The actual mass of her correspondence, one hazards, must be almost unequalled: her output by pen and tongue marks her one of the most overwhelmingly articulate minds of her time. Her long life easily separates itself into (1) the preparation, both conscious and unconscious, for her career, (2) her twenty-one months at Skutari and the Crimea, and (3) her direct and indirect public administrative toil on her return, while (4) in the ten or fifteen years before her death she was forced to prove "they also serve who only stand and wait." Her biographer has made such wise use of her hoarded piles that one can read the book from start to finish without skipping a line, without once losing interest—a notable attainment.

It need hardly be said that Florence Nightingale's life may be studied as a triumphant refutation of all that has ever been said against her sex, as well as the most glowing confirmation of all that has ever been said in praise of woman. Her clearness of thought and expression, her mental grasp, and her powers of intellectual concentration have by some been labelled, though unnecessarily we think, masculine. Her mysticism, self-dedication, genius for organization, gentleness, tact, stern discipline, and self-restraint, though in her case unusually developed, have been commonly assumed feminine. There is an interesting eugenic study in her parentage: of her mother she wrote "she has the genius of order, the genius to organize a parish, to form society"; from her father she may have derived her intellectual curiosity, her reflective and speculative temperament. Then, too, one cannot fail to be impressed by the education and the environment of her first thirty years (she was 34 when she went to the East): besides modern languages and the then usual accomplishments, Florence and her sister were taught Latin, Greek, mathematics, and constitutional history, mainly under their father's guidance. Without doubt Florence was blue; she travelled a great deal—in France, Switzerland, Germany, Italy, Greece, and Egypt—and when in England divided her time between their Derbyshire and their New Forest country seats and London; and everywhere the most interesting society welcomed her. In these years she made the acquaintance of Lord Palmerston, the Ashburtons, Mrs. Gaskell, M. and Madame Mohl, Jenny Lind, Monckton Milnes, Julia Ward Howe, and most important of all perhaps—at Rome through the Bracebridges—Mr. and Mrs. Sidney Herbert. But the constant contact of other minds, the stimulus of travel, the part of Lady Bountiful in villages or in London—all this left her cold, or rather in a hot passion of discontent. She vexed her sister, worried her father, disappointed her mother, and "I have never known a happy time," she exclaimed; "except at Rome and that fortnight at Kaiserwerth." (At Kaiserwerth she began her hospital training.) But then, as Sir E. Cook tells us elsewhere, "happiness as the world accounts it, she neither attained nor desired." "O, Happiness," she said of a friend in domestic bliss, "like the bread-tree fruit, what a corrupter and paralyser of human nature thou art!" No! she never attained what a modern novelist has well called "the culmination of sainthood." A saint she was, and the self-torture that her diaries attest is worthy of any mediæval devotee: without doubt this was the morbid taint, the kink that the great are seldom without. Indeed, some symptoms of the long invalidism, that dated from her return to England in 1856, might pass for hysteric.

This publication should destroy for ever the legendary character that was current of her for years with not only English people, but in Europe generally. "The Lady of the Lamp" was a poet's picture of her nursing

ministrations at Skutari. But her biographer has given us in addition the inspirer of Cabinet Ministers, the sanitary reformer, the "governess of the Governors of India," the health missionary, and pioneer of modern nursing—the range is immense. He does not gloss her impatience of delay and her over-emphasis, he chronicles her incessant toil in the collection of information (particularly statistical information!), he illustrates her extraordinary capacity for detailed organisation, and by accumulation of detail as well as by sympathetic insight he succeeds in depicting vividly enough this master spirit enshrined in frail body, this ruthless taskmistress of herself and her too willing helpers. Needless to say, the latter picture is enormously the more attractive. After reading her life one understands the admiration and even worship that she called forth, why secretaries of State fell over one another's heels in attendance at her bedside. She simply identified herself with her cause, and this was the secret of her unsparing use of others. Perhaps her self-reproach at the death of Sidney Herbert, her devoted servant at the War Office, was not altogether unmerited; Arthur Hugh Clough is another illustration, she once called herself a vampire (*sic*) and there is much to be said for the truthfulness of the comparison. Of the innumerable interesting points raised in the book one would select a last, essentially a woman's point. In an able address to the Sociological Society, Miss Jane Harrison lately suggested that a possible sex-difference in thought was insulation and clarity in man and resonance in woman: in the subsequent discussion the insulation was explained by the freeing of the man from domestic entanglements. In Florence Nightingale's Life we have a practically complete freedom from domestic entanglements combined with a "masculine" intellect. The long and satisfying friendship with Jowett, and her influence on his work, is a significant illustration. On the other hand, the whole tendency of her life was to embody her thought, her theories, in action; and her activities were one and all connected with the essential functions of a woman, the preservation and amelioration of the life of the race. K.M.R.

SCOTLAND AND THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. By Henry W. Meikle, M.A., D.Litt. Glasgow: Maclehose. 10/- net.

In this volume Dr. Meikle proves himself a worthy recruit in the band of investigators led by Professor Hume Brown and Dr. Law Mathieson, who have set themselves to explore the more recent and less familiar periods of Scottish history. Since the Union of the Parliaments there is perhaps no phase of that history so significant as that represented by the last decade of the eighteenth century, and Dr. Meikle has spared no pains in collecting and arranging the available material for studying it. One is inclined at times to wish that he had been more venturesome in suggesting an interpretation of the facts he puts before us, but if he seems to shrink from any general summing-up, at least it is clear to the reader that the treatment is at once enlightened and judicial. The main thesis of the work is that Scotland, which during the greater part of the eighteenth century had been preoccupied with its industrial development, was just ready to turn its attention to political and social problems when the influence of the French Revolution gave a definite form to its aspirations. Dr. Meikle shows that her progress towards the democratic ideal had features that distinguish it from the parallel movements in other countries. On the one hand education was at that time more widely spread than anywhere else, and the recent

rapid advance in material prosperity had predisposed the mass of the people to accept the monarchical principle as embodied in the Hanoverian régime. On the other hand the system of representation was further from resting on a popular basis in Scotland even than in England, alike in municipal and national affairs. The record of what was achieved under these circumstances is a tribute at once to the intellectual consistency and to the practical good sense of the Scottish people, and Dr. Meikle deserves the thanks of all students of sociology for the skill with which he has set it forth.

J.O.

THE FAMILY AND EDUCATION.

THE PRIMITIVE FAMILY AS AN EDUCATIONAL AGENCY. By Arthur James Todd, Ph.D., of the Department of Sociology, University of Illinois. New York and London: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1913. 7/6 net.

"THE family has changed its form and function many times in the course of its age-long evolution. The indications are that it is changing now and will continue to change in response to changes in general social needs and in the alignment of social institutions. Neither is there anything disconcerting in the fact that the family never has been the type and foundation of all education. If, owing to changes in the industrial and religious world, the family is losing much of its educational significance, this simply means that we must find other sanctions and other bases in its place. From the very fact that the family in times past has shown itself so variable and flexible, are we not warranted in looking for such new adjustments in its form and content as to make it an increasingly valuable social institution?"

Such is the argument of Dr. Todd's well-timed study. In developing it he cites sufficient anthropological literature to make a good case against the primitive family as being anything more than an economic and biologic institution. The uncritical compilations of Featherman, however, are not worth citation. The long account of parental and filial relations—a difficult subject—is an excellent piece of work. The same may be said of the analysis of the aims, content, and methods of primitive education. It is clear that, throughout, education has been a group-concern, or state-department, primarily. "Primitive parenthood brought with it, *per se*, no capacity for maintaining the child's life or giving him adequate and fitting nurture. The child was regarded as a *plaything*, or a merchantable *thing*, or a *thing* out of which service might be extracted." The family is no more the type and basis of education, than it is of the State itself. But in one or other of its forms it is necessarily a part of the social order; necessarily also it exerts some educational influence. The business of practical sociology is to keep this at least innocuous.

A. E. CRAWLEY.

AZTEC, INCA, AND MAYA.

THE MYTHS OF MEXICO AND PERU. By Lewis Spence. London: G. G. Harrap and Co., 1913. 7/6 net.

THERE is something unique about the civilisation which Spain found—and destroyed—in Central America. In language, religion, art and architecture, it was self-made, and long isolation emphasised its specific character. And in the myths and beliefs of Mexico and Peru "we are also struck with the strangeness and remoteness alike of their subject-matter and the type of thought which they present." Mr. Spence is an enthusiast on the subject in which he is our highest authority, and invests his eloquently told story

with no little romantic charm. It is a long story, for he includes in it descriptions of the civilisation, the history and the religion of the three great peoples. Very useful are the frequent sketches of the story of archæological discovery; a story as fascinating as the myths themselves. No better introduction to the general study of pre-Columbian America could be recommended. The book is good, both scholarly and popular. The pictures by Gilbert James have caught that curious combination of the poetic, the cruel and the grotesque, which characterise the Central American mind.

A. E. CRAWLEY.

INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AMONGST THE GREEKS. By Marcus Niebuhr Tod, M.A. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1913. 8/6 net.

THIS essay by Mr. Tod, lecturer in Greek Epigraphy at Oxford, was awarded the Conington Prize in 1912 and is now reprinted in convenient form with a useful concordance to the other authorities on the subject. Its aim is to give a complete and accurate view of the evidence, especially that from inscriptions, as to the occasions and methods of arbitration among the Greek states; and it has been very thoroughly carried out. No less than eighty-two inscriptions are set in order; considerations of space prevented the author from reprinting them *in extenso*, which causes the book to lose somewhat in vividness; but full references are given. As, with one important exception, the earliest inscription dates from as late as 390 B.C., literary sources still remain the sole guide for the earlier period.

There is nothing particularly new or striking in the general results arrived at. Arbitration, as every reader of Herodotus and Thucydides knows, was a conception familiar to the Greek mind and was frequently invoked by Greek statesmen. But in the days of the City-state, at any rate, there was no means by which a State could be forced to accept arbitration, even when expressly prescribed by treaty; and possibly for this very reason no attempt was made, as in modern treaties, to separate off "disputes involving matters of vital interest or the independence or honour of the contracting parties" from more ordinary causes of difference.

It will be surprising to many readers to find how small a part the oracles played in settling disputes between Greek states. Mr. Tod is only able to quote two cases in which the Delphian oracle is invoked as interstate arbitrator. The normal appeal is to another Greek city. Delphi had neither the judicial knowledge nor the sense of procedure necessary for a satisfactory court.

There are many other interesting points of detail scattered throughout the book—such as the arrangements for providing unpopular arbitrators with safe-conducts on their way home, and the discovery of four roof-tiles at Sparta belonging to what seems to have been a hostel for travelling judges and others.

A.E.Z.

GREEK IMPERIALISM. By W. S. Ferguson. Constable, 1913. 8/6 net.

PROFESSOR FERGUSON'S new book consists of seven lectures on what he very suggestively calls the "constitutional development" of Greece from the early days of the City-state down to its absorption in the Roman Empire. Successive chapters deal with the City-state in general, with Athens, with Sparta and Plato and Aristotle as its theorists, and then with Alexander, the Ptolemies, the Selencids and the Antigonids. Everywhere

the most recent literature is laid under contribution and a number of new and interesting ideas and discoveries brought into the light.

The leading idea running through the book is that the kingdoms of Alexander and his successors formed, not the close but the natural continuation and development of Greek political life. The City-state, as petrified at Sparta and in the political theory of Plato and Aristotle, was incapable of expansion. However perfect it might be in itself, it could not fail to succumb to the superior *strength* of outside powers. What was needed, therefore, was some means of enabling it to live on under the new conditions, some point of living contact with the territorial kingships into whose strong hands the power was bound to fall. Professor Ferguson finds this link in the very fact of kingship itself. All that the City-state needed to do was to add a new god to its Pantheon, a new Protector to its patron-deities. "Deification of rulers," he says, "was the Greek method of legalizing absolutism." This ingenious and indispensable fiction gave the City-state a new lease of life, not only in Greece but in Asia. There is no space to follow Professor Ferguson's argument in detail. One quotation will best illustrate how he develops it.

"The Greeks came to Asia," he says, speaking of the Seleucid Empire, "'not to send peace but a sword.' They came to fill the continent with cantankerous little republics, where formerly a dense multitude had lived in a state of political lethargy. And curiously enough those who directed the dismemberment of Asia into far more states than even mediæval Germany produced, were the rulers who had the responsibility for the government of the whole region." Sociologists will find much food for reflection in this policy, and the condition of affairs to which it led. Whatever may have been its failings, both in theory and practice, it not only kept Hellenism alive but led it, as Dr. Stein has lately proved to us, to the very frontiers of China.

But there was one force with which Alexander and his divine successors did not reckon. There was one among their many peoples to whom the deification of kings was an abomination. Professor Ferguson does well to pause for a moment in his narrative to refer us to the Books of the Maccabees.

A.E.Z.

MONTSSORI PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE. By E. P. Culverwell. Bell, 1913.
3/6 net.

ROUND ABOUT A POUND A WEEK. By Mrs. Pember Reeves. Bell, 1913.
2/6 net.

THE Montessori system was developed by Madame Montessori as a method for giving the opportunity of normal human development to the poor children of a great city. How urgently some such system is needed by those children can probably only be realised by those who, like Mrs. Pember Reeves and her helpers, have investigated the problem of poverty in a particular district at first hand, the poverty, that is, not of the casual worker but of the ordinary labourer. The system is however now being considered in this country apart from its social advantages and mainly from the psychological side, because the better-off parent is anxious to adopt whatever advantage there may be in it for the sake of his own little ones. The book before us is an instance of this tendency, it represents only one side of the movement started by Madame Montessori, a movement which is perhaps most clearly expressed by the statement that Madame

Montessori has used the resources of psychology to make the crèche scientific.

Madame Montessori pleads eloquently for the communal nursery, and this part of her work needs emphasizing at the present moment because of the urgent nature of the child problem in our mean streets. While educationalists are endeavouring to obtain more money for advanced subjects and keep children longer in school, too little attention is paid to what is happening to the children before they enter the school. Defects are set up which are never remedied or remedied only with difficulty and which a little care would have obviated; the proper physical basis is not attended to; good habits of mind and body are not started; the children are hampered from the start. Those, if there are any, who are doubtful of this, cannot do better than read Mrs. Pember Reeves' unvarnished account of what life is like when the family income is £1 a week or thereabouts. The enquiry deals with a particular district in Lambeth—typical of how many more—and has spread over five years. The book contains interesting budgets and also accounts of the typical day of several mothers of families of various sizes which 'give furiously to think.' It should be read by any who want first-hand evidence as to how the poor really live.

"Montessori Principles and Practice," as we have said, ignores all this social element in the Montessori method. At the same time, it is no doubt important that the method should also be considered in its application to any children, in so far as it contains, as it does contain, principles and general applications, in order that the points of special educational advantage in this method over others should be realised. Mr. Culverwell gives a clear account of the method from this point of view and some useful criticisms of its details. It is a point of view which is needed and the book should be of assistance to many parents in helping them to judge of the system. But it is incumbent upon those who care for the interests of the children of all classes of the nation, to remember the other side of the Montessori system and to utilise the interest aroused in it for the development of a system which shall give a better chance of all-round development to the children of our great cities. S.B.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CHILD DEVELOPMENT. By Irving King. With an Introduction by John Dewey. University of Chicago Press, 1912. 4/- net.

THIS little book is an able fusion of the author's own observations and experiments on children with the well-known results of Dewey, Stanley Hall, and Earl Barnes. Attention is wisely drawn to the special difficulties inherent in the use of the common questionnaire method with children. After all, there is but one really effective way to study the child: it is to become a child again oneself in loving association with children enjoying life abundant. Mr. Irving King points out the rich complexities of the child-temperament, the combined simplicity, and yet subtlety of its nature. In a word, the child is an inchoate personality, not a bundle of chaotic tendencies: the child is, indeed, the father of the man or the mother of the woman, but, above all, the child is itself. But being itself it is also a creature of its environment; hence the author stresses the need of studying the child in its environment, and not in isolation therefrom. The matter is rich in suggestive observations and acute inter-

pretations. The style is very readable. We commend the book as a worthy continuator of the excellent works emanating from the American School of Child-study. But is it not time that we had a similar rich crop of works on Adolescent-study—a subject touched upon in the concluding chapters of the present work. And, thereafter, Maturity-study? And why not also, be it added, studies of mid-life, senescence and old age?

An index and bibliography add much to the usefulness.

B.

ENVIRONMENT AND EFFICIENCY: A Study in the Records of Industrial Schools and Orphanages. By Mary Horner Thomson. (No. 1 of Birmingham Studies in Social Economics.) Longmans, Green and Co. 2/- net.

MISS THOMSON attempts in this little book to establish two positions, first to refute the extreme Eugenic view that environment is negligible, and secondly, to prove that as compared with inferior types of the family, institutional training has many advantages. For this purpose she has investigated the careers of nearly three hundred cases from five institutions, Children's Emigration Homes, a Home for Boys, and three Industrial Schools (one for girls). She has also had the records of about twenty Glasgow children boarded out. Mr. Mudge in the *Mendel Journal* (1909) had insisted that it was the degenerates who made the bad environment. The slums did not produce degenerates, but the degenerates, slums, and they were 'mutations,' breeding true to their degeneracy. Miss Thomson has little difficulty in showing that in the great majority of the cases she investigated, children born in the worst environment and generally from bad stock, but brought up in different surroundings, became useful citizens, displayed normal efficiency in industry, became in some cases skilled workers and in others rose to positions of trust. As against the extreme position taken by Mr. Mudge, the proof is complete. She is less successful in the harder task of defending institutional training. Though the home is no doubt robbed of many of its advantages when the mother goes out to work, though in the poorest homes the children suffer many hardships, they are brought into contact with the life of the world in a way almost impossible even in the best institutions. It depends, as Miss Thomson admits, very largely on the head, whether the institution can fulfil the function of the home. One such she found, but I suspect they are very rare, and even the best have many disadvantages. While on the other hand, very few even of the poorest, least capable, and most vicious mothers are without affection for their children. In this case, Miss Thomson's figures prove little. Even supposing the institution showed the best results in industrial efficiency, the starving of the affections might remain as a permanent loss through life.

S. H. SWINNY.

ENGLISH INDUSTRIES OF THE MIDDLE AGES. By L. F. Salzmann, B.A., F.S.A. Constable, 1913. 6/6 net.

MR. SALZMANN takes the principal English industries one by one, and sketches their local distribution and historical development in the Middle Ages. Mining of various minerals, quarrying, metal-working, pottery, cloth-making, leather-making, brewing, are dealt with, not exhaustively, but in a brief and fairly effective résumé. Mr. Salzmann's book will be a valuable aid to students who are already engaged in the pursuit of industrial history, but we doubt whether it will inspire enthusiasm in those not

already interested. He has evidently read widely and noted perseveringly, but he has not the illuminating touch of sympathy and insight that can give significance even to the most forbidding historical material and make the reader feel it part of the unfolding story of human development. Mr. Salzmann gives us however a readable and interesting sketch of the various mining industries, particularly of that curious institution, "a state within a state," the Cornish Stannaries, and a picturesque account of the gold and silversmiths and the pewterers. In the chapter on cloth-making he does not allude to the artistic skill of nuns in the manufacture of rich stuffs for ecclesiastical purposes, and he ignores that sociologically interesting transition, the passing of the loom from the hands of women to those of men. The chapter on the Control of Industry is slight in texture and includes no reference to Mr. Unwin's "Industrial Organisation," which though ostensibly devoted to a period later than that covered by the present work, would probably have been of service. It should be said, however, that Mr. Salzmann's view of industry has a certain freshness; he is not obsessed by the independent craftsman, and brings out the fact of the antiquity of wage-work, *e.g.*, in the Cornish mines (p. 70), and he shows that the sentimental assumption that medieval work was always honest and of good quality is without foundation in fact (p. 204). We greatly regret the volume of historical material collected by Mr. Salzmann, which, as he tells us in his introduction he is unable to publish, owing to the difficulty and expense of publishing similar works in this country. The proposed volume would have undoubtedly been a valuable contribution to knowledge, and we hope circumstances may yet permit it to see the light.

B.L.H.

SOCIAL PROGRESS IN CONTEMPORARY EUROPE. By Fredk. A. Ogg. New York : Macmillan, 1912. 6/6 net.

PROFESSOR OGG has set out to answer the following question : "Wherein and to what extent are the conditions amidst which the average European of to-day lives and works more conducive to welfare and happiness than were the conditions surrounding his ancestors of the third and fourth and even of the first and second generation removed?" His rapid survey touches lightly on the 18th century background, and carries us over all the main lines of social reconstruction in every European country during the last 120 years. Some would say that his assumption of greater welfare and happiness itself wants proving, but at least in the various adaptations—the limitation of monarchy by constitutions, the ever widening franchise, the greater facilities for education and the treatment of disease—even down to the acceptance of the principle of social insurance—we see the encroaching rule of the many over the minds of individual statesmen. Sympathy may be imperfect, and concessions grudging, but a conspectus of European effort such as Professor Ogg gives us proves that the psychological expansion of the people's influence is universal. And that fact is perhaps the best argument for their well-faring. As to happiness, that is after all less a goal than a by-product. Professor Ogg, however, does not argue his thesis. He merely epitomises historical facts and leaves them to speak for themselves. Special interest attaches to the chapters on the Spread of Social Insurance and Wages and Savings for their comparative records and statistics. For those students who desire to know more of the trees when they have grasped the lie of the forests, a selected bibliography of some 450 volumes has been included.

F.M.

AMERICAN SOCIALISM OF THE PRESENT DAY. By Jessie Wallace Hughan, Ph.D. John Lane, 1912. 5/- net.

ALL who are desirous of a detailed and comprehensive knowledge of where Socialism stands to-day in America will echo Mr. Spargo's appreciative welcome to this volume. That the Socialist vote reached over 600,000 in the 1911 elections is not forgotten, nor the presence of Mr. Victor Berger in Congress, but information regarding the local strength and influence of the different Socialist and Labour organisations, with their differing views and their agreements for common action—their "means of grace and their hope of glory"—is hard for outsiders to come by, and Miss Hughan's admirable study and résumé will prove of great service to the social student.

F.M.

THE MODERN PRISON CURRICULUM: A GENERAL REVIEW OF OUR PENAL SYSTEM. By R. F. Quinton, M.D. Macmillan, 1912. 5/- net.

THE title of this book is somewhat misleading. The sub-title is less so, for it points to the fact that it is "our," that is, the English, system that is under review. Even so, there is not much about the curriculum. There are a few excursions into American systems; which is unfortunate, for the author is not well informed on the subject. The book is likely to please British prison administrators and those who take their opinions from official sources; but it contributes little that is original to the subject of the treatment of criminals. It is, however, of some value to have, as we have here, an admission on the part of an ex-prison official that a large proportion of the inmates of our prisons should not have been sent there. This, of course, was already well known by all who have studied the subject; but it is just as well to have it written down in a book which contains nothing calculated to wound the susceptibilities of British administrators and officials. When we have relieved the prisons of the feeble-minded, inebriates and vagrants, then, Dr. Quinton seems to think, the prison staffs will be free to turn to and reform such of the real criminals as are reformable. But he gives no evidence of any clear notion of the way in which this is to be done. He does indeed make some excellent remarks, as, for instance, that the criminal's will generally needs strengthening not weakening. But he has no condemnation for the system which tends to weaken rather than strengthen the will. He apparently does not recognise that such is the tendency of the prison system. Moreover, he actually commits himself to the statement that the general effect of the existing system of remissions and "progressive stages" is "to place each prisoner's fate to a large extent in his own hands." A person who can write like this is hardly a serious contributor to the study of correctional methods. Dr. Quinton approves of the Borstal system but casts at Elmira, with its probably longer average of confinement and more thought-out and elaborate system, the curious gibe of "quick-change methods." He seems to be unaware of the fact that the Elmira Reformatory is for first offenders in felony between 16 and 30 years of age. He condemns our fine-or-imprisonment methods of dealing with inebriates; but it is somewhat disappointing that a medical man of his experience has nothing to suggest by way of improvement on our inebriate reformatories. However, the book is well written. The publisher's part is very well done. And, after all, it is worth having the co-operation of the estimable ex-governor of Holloway Prison in the effort to save a vast army of unfortunate people from the present insensate folly of being passed in and out of prison.

A. ST. J.

THE CHILDREN IN THE SHADOW. By Ernest K. Coulter. Bale, 1913.
6/- net.

THIS is the book of a practical worker in the Children's Courts of New York, and as such demands the attention of those who are still unfamiliar with American methods of dealing with juvenile offenders. During the last few years, however, English educationists and criminologists have absorbed so many ideas from the United States, that for some the value of the present volume may be found rather in the suggestive anecdotes of which it is full than in its theoretical arguments.

In dealing with the causes of crime amongst the young, Mr. Coulter sees the danger of attaching exclusive blame to the parent, the child, or the State, but in certain passages he seems to suggest that the State is possessed of certain abstract rights and duties independent of the feelings of the individuals of which it is composed and to such suggestions many may take exception. It is also a little doubtful whether Mr. Coulter considers that the community as a whole should be taught good behaviour or merely forced into it. Although stating emphatically that parents are better than institutions, and that friendship and not law is needed in dealing with young offenders, he seems in special cases to side most unexpectedly with the law and to suggest the most drastic theories of legal interference between the parent and the child. The fact that laws which aim at emptying workhouses and jails may leave as many state parasites as before their enactment, seems to be entirely ignored. There are also passages in which the community and the consumer are treated somewhat unscientifically as two separate classes of persons, and in another chapter the line between "property rights" and "human rights" is not perhaps as clear and obvious as we are led to suppose.

In the simpler and more practical parts Mr. Coulter's words are easier to understand and are of considerable value. The importance of satisfying the spirit of adventure lies very near the root of many offences, and the writer deals ably with the unwholesome stimulus of many cinematograph entertainments and suggests the advisability of using waste land, either permanently or temporarily, as playing fields under a trained supervisor. Mr. Coulter advocates strongly the system of groups of cottages as homes for children who come under the care of the State, but it is rather disappointing to find that he condemns homework as leading to overstrain and long hours, and looks forward to the day when all will be forced to work in factories. It is also rather difficult to reconcile the writer's appreciation of the value of the home with the amount of intrusion and investigation which he considers necessary; the essence of our English idea of home still involves the idea of individual responsibility, and this is not often fostered by State inspection and State regulation. Mr. Coulter lays emphasis on the importance of providing all workmen with cottages near their work, and also suggests the advisability of affixing the landlord's name in small but clear letters over all slum property and tenements—a proposition strongly objected to by American landlords.

In the latter part of the book the writer predicts the usefulness of psychopathy in raising the level of the normal child, by improving his environment and in alleviating moral as well as physical suffering; he considers that the scientist has now clearly shown what can be done to improve health, and that it remains for the legislator to safeguard the child from stunted growth and premature work without necessarily bringing starvation on the family. A wider appreciation of the real meaning of religion will also, he hopes, play a considerable part in expediting these reforms. Perhaps the

most interesting part of the whole book is a chapter in which Mr. Coulter gives a short account of the already famous "Big Brother" movement in New York. The big brother works by suggestion rather than by platitudes and patronizing, and acts up to the definition of a friend as "a feller wot knows all about yer and likes yer jest the same." CYRIL B. ANDREWS.

OUR VILLAGE HOMES : PRESENT CONDITIONS AND REMEDIES. By Hugh Aronson, M.A. Murby, 1913. 2/6 net.

No one with a knowledge of the countryside will disagree with Mr. Aronson's statement of its present condition in regard to labourers' cottages, and the impelling need of re-making England in that fundamentally important quarter. But turning to some of the proposed remedies, there will be difference of opinion, especially in regard to the necessity for a regulated minimum wage, with which Mr. Aronson does not concur.

The book has an individual note, and its writer clearly is not only a student of rural conditions but a keen lover of rural life. Some of the references to the skill required in country employments will serve as a corrective of the prejudice that regards industrial efficiency as confined to town workshops. A deep-chested, hearty-faced countryman, with a bunch of wild flowers stuck in the band of his battered felt hat and a hedge stake in his hand—such a living relic of a departed age is still incidentally to be encountered along remote hedge-sides—though he get only 15/- a week and cannot write or read, may yet be a very highly skilled and sagacious person, with a reserve of human qualities entitling him to cordial respect. Mr. Aronson has evidently met the congeners of this type, and his emphasis on their high skill as "agricultural artisans" is a timely reminder in this over-urbanised age. Lord Henry Bentinck contributes a sympathetic preface to the book, and there are a series of serviceable appendices.

PERIODICAL LITERATURE.

FRENCH.

"The Sociological Conception of Punishment" is the subject of a long article by Dr. Szerer in *LA REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE SOCIOLOGIE* for October. Considering, after the manner of M. Simmel, what punishment is in all societies and periods apart from its particular manifestations, and thus reducing it to its skeleton, the author comes to the conclusion that it is a device for preventing social disintegration. Of this he points out that there is more danger in uncivilised communities, in which such an act as eating some comestible that is sacred to the monarch may lead to the sundering of social bonds, than in civilised nations, in which the division of labour so specialises the individual that he fits into no society but his own, and therefore does not seek to get away from it. Under the primitive conditions the criminal, or ultra-individualist, could find sanctuary in another group. Now, owing to the international standardisation of industry and conduct, he cannot count on hospitality in a foreign land, unless his individualist acts are of a political nature, and therefore belong to the category of non-standardised procedure. Dr. Szerer goes on to demonstrate that social stability is endangered, nowadays, not by actual crimes, but by the will to commit them, which is contagious. Therefore it is the judge's duty, not to deal out so much punishment for so much crime, but to find out how much ill-will there is in the given case. In view of the antipathies that are now arising between employer and workman, the article should receive attention. In the same number Dr. Krumme continues his examination of John Stuart Mill's liberalism. At the end of his paper he emphasises Mill's doctrine that society would be the better for "the excelsiorisation" of the individual at the expense of the mere multiplication of individuals. The interest of the November issue is narrowed down to afforestation and proportional representation in France, but it broadens out into the sociological field of thought in a chapter on the nature and limits of modesty from *Amour et chasteté* by Professor Robert Michels, who finds that "modesty is variable and dissociable according to profession, education, temperament and environment"; and that it may disappear and reappear in the same individual by turns. As illustrative examples he mentions the covering of the mouth and the occiput among Arab women, the objection of European working folk to wearing evening dress, and the shame of the artist's model in the presence of spectators who are not engaged in life study.

The land reformer and the feminist may be advised to read a brochure entitled *Les cercles de fermières* which appears in the series of *LE MUSÉE SOCIAL* for November. It shows how the back-to-the-land problem is being solved on the American continent by the formation of professional groups of "farmeresses," of which there are no fewer than 750 in Ontario alone, although the movement started only in 1898. In the States as many as 300 unions were formed in 1909 and 1910, and there are now 720 of them in all. The author relates how similar associations have been founded, within the last few years, in Belgium, France, Poland, Hungary—almost everywhere

but England;—have multiplied with extraordinary rapidity: and by means of technical conferences, lectures, libraries, magazines and other educational agencies, including even dances and dramatic performances, have made country life at once interesting, educative, and prosperous. The whole pamphlet makes lively reading; and it closes with an account of the international congresses held, respectively, at Colorado Springs in 1911, Lethbridge (U.S.A.) in 1912, and Ghent in 1913, which ought to give new courage to everyone who deplores rural depopulation. The other autumn additions to this extremely useful set of monographs are *L'Egypte et l'Association Agricole*, by M. Joseph Ribet, *L'Enseignement ménager en Angleterre et en Ecosse*, by Mme. Jeanne Morin, and *Les Ecoles de Servantes en Belgique et en Hollande*, by Mme. Auguste Moll-Weiss, whose enquiry was a thankless task; for, apart from nursery and housewifery schools, she found that the educational institutions that she was in search of were practically non-existent in Belgium, and were represented by only one establishment in Holland.

The October and November numbers of *LA SCIENCE SOCIALE* are studies of the Le Play and De Tourville methods of sociological investigation by M. Champault and M. Descamps respectively, not a paragraph of which any sociologist in this country can afford to neglect. Anyone who wishes to have legislation and social construction based on facts and carried through on scientific lines, should master these two treatises from cover to cover.

The *REVUE DE MÉTAPHYSIQUE ET DE MORALE* for November is a monograph on Henri Poincaré as philosopher, mathematician, astronomer, and physicist. Mr. L. Brunschvigg, who writes the first section, represents him as a man who had a very keen scientific conscience. In *Savants et Ecrivains* he wrote, "In this world of relativities every certitude is a lie." He regarded the pursuit of truth, we are told, as a sublime and inspiring contest in which nature and the mind are engaged in ceaseless conflict.

GERMAN.

In a remarkable paper on "Asthenic Infantilism among Women," which appears in the *ARCHIV FÜR RASSEN- u. GESELLSCHAFTS-BIOLOGIE* for October, Dr. Mathilde von Kemnitz argues that hitherto intellectual education has been given mainly to women who have a tendency to infantilism, which she defines as development that falls short, in one or more directions, of what it should be at a given age. She thinks that if social selection did not favour higher education only in the case of women in whom the sex instinct is ill-developed, there would be many more mothers who took a delight in brainwork than there are now. Infantilism among women in the form of hysteria she attributes to the primitive education they receive, whereas Janet and Anton argue that it is constitutional. She points out that on the higher levels of culture hysteria never assails a crowd, and attacks only those individuals whose education has been childish. Not until women have for some generations enjoyed the same educational advantages as men have done, does she believe that any definitive statements ought to be made as to the incompatibility of motherhood and intellectual work. In an article entitled *Soziales Aufsteigen in rassenhygienischer Beziehung*, Dr.

Theilhaber shows that increase is taking place in only half of the Jewish population of Berlin, while in only one-third of the other half are more than two children per family being produced. He traces this movement back to the year 1895, and reckons that the Berlin Jews are to-day bringing into the world only enough children to replace two-thirds of the existing families. With these revelations the author couples the significant fact that the taxes paid by Jews in the city rose, between 1892 and 1905, from 317 M. to 355 M. per head, although many of the richest Jewish families became Christians within that period, or migrated to Charlottenburg, Grunewald, Schöneberg and Wilmersdorf. In another article, on the diminishing native population of Australia, Dr. Ernst Schultze contradicts most of the disparaging notions that Europeans cherish with regard to these people. He states that they are not degenerate, but backward; that they are not unable to count or to appreciate jokes: and that many of them are beautiful, inaggressive, modest and polite. He admits, however, that the women have such a hard life that they die at a much earlier age than the men. Dr. Schultze's paper may be put beside that by Mr. Spiller in the October number of the *Sociological Review*.

To the October, November, and December issues of the *POLTISCH-ANTHROPOLOGISCHE REVUE* Dr. Schmidt-Gibichenfels contributes three articles on the regeneration of the peasant, the knight, and the citizen class respectively. His ideal is that the nobility should devote themselves entirely to military and governmental offices, that there should be a numerous peasantry of pure German race, and that the townsmen should be content with modest gains and avoid plutocracy. One of the means which he recommends for the accomplishment of that object is the driving of the Jews out of the community. On all classes he inculcates a high sense of duty that is a good deal out of harmony with modern industrial conditions and educational standards. Thus he bids the landowners keep the country folk well under discipline, and set them a good example from both the moral and the æsthetic view-point. From the labourers he would exact love and respect for the lord. Failing these he would at least have them assume a non-contemptuous attitude. To the December issue Herr Emil Horst contributes a paper on *Genie und Rasse*, in which he claims that only the Aryan race are capable of achieving progress in culture, that only the Germans fully represent the Aryan race to-day, and that wherever genius and energy are lacking, as, he alleges, in the Romance countries, the German element in the population has died out. In the course of the article he remarks that self-depreciation serves no good purpose. Dr. Chatterton-Hill writes an alarming paper on degeneration, in which he states that the welfare of the individual is incompatible with that of the race, which can be maintained only at the cost, among individuals, of suffering and sacrifice that beggars imagination. He gives statistics to show that although the death-rate has gone down within the last thirty years, the illness-rate has gone up; but he has not allowed for the better system of registration of cases which treatment in public institutions has brought about.

In the *VIERTELJAHRSSCHRIFT FÜR WISSENSCHAFTLICHE PHILOSOPHIE UND SOZIOLOGIE* for the last quarter of 1913, Dr. Sauerbeck continues his treatise *Vom Wesen der Wissenschaft*, the conclusion of which is that the knowledge of reality is built on both perception and belief by means of science and art

respectively. The next article, which is an answer to the question *Gibt es intuitive Erkenntnis?*, offers a striking contrast to this epistemology and that of Professor Bergson. The author, Dr. Moritz Schlick, maintains that knowing is essentially a process of comparison of concepts, which represent repetitions of what has already happened, not artistic manipulations of it into something new. Mystic contemplation, which consists in thinking and living oneself into the objects on which one is meditating, brings one no sense of contrast at all, and cannot therefore be called knowledge. If that were the case then every animal would be a better philosopher than any man. Dr. Moritz traces the idea that intuition is a source of knowledge to the child's method of learning by touching and holding things which has given rise to the words "grasp" and "seize" as epistemological terms.

Also received:—*L'Action nationale* (August-September-October); *Le Musée Social, Annales* (September, October, November); *Bulletin de l'Institut de Sociologie Solvay*, No. 28; *Bulletin de la statistique générale de la France* (October).

ITALIAN.

RIVISTA INTERNAZIONALE DEI SCIENZE SOCIALI E DISCIPLINE AUSILIARIE. (Published monthly by the Italian Catholic Society for Scientific Studies.) September: Sig. Toniolo continues his monograph on political and administrative problems of the Age of Constantine.—Prof. Amando Castroviejo contributes a short paper on the writings of Marcellino Menendez y Pelayo, "Gloria vera della Spagna."—Signor C. Grilli continues his papers on colonial experiments in Neo-Latin Africa. October: Sig. Grilli continues his papers on colonial experiments in Africa.—Sig. Emilio Pasteris continues his account of his travels in Germany as an emissary of the Baltic Mission, and incidentally gives a charming description of the beautiful town of Hildesheim.—Doctor G. De Mauro writes on the shifting of indirect taxation. November: Sig. Corsanego writes on the railway industry in Italy.—Sig. G. Bruguier continues his study of the Agro Romano and civic customs.—Prof. Toniolo continues his study of the Age of Constantine.

ENGLISH AND AMERICAN.

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY. The September number contains an article on *The Sphere of Pecuniary Valuation*, by Charles H. Cooley, which deals ably with the psychological and moral factors which are being recognized more and more in the study of values. An article by Maurice Parmelee, on the possibilities of an *Introductory Course to the Social Sciences*, furnishes some practical suggestions for a school course which emphasize the fundamental unity of such studies as ethics, psychology, philosophy, religion and jurisprudence which are not usually directly connected with Social Science. This will be a serious question for educationists in the near future and Mr. Parmelee's remarks deserve careful attention.

In the November number there is an excellent article on *The Social Function of Religion*, Mr. Ellwood draws attention to the importance of a positive and constructive religion: he dismisses the plea of metaphysical

difficulties by pointing out the metaphysical assumptions which are made every day in education, such, for example, as our belief that we do not dwell in a rigid universe, but can shape the destinies of the future. The positive value of religion is as important as education, and there is no reason why the validity of metaphysical postulates should hinder us more in the one than in the other. Religion has too often been confused with Theology and Mythology, which may be essential parts in certain stages of evolution, but, like intellectual attempts at the interpretation of religion, appear and disappear. Professor Ames' definition of religion as "participation in the ideal values of social consciousness," is perhaps the most comprehensive, although even the partial and one-sided definition of such materialistic-monists as Ward contain valuable suggestions. Mr. Ellwood contends that the Social reconstruction of the future must wait largely on the teaching and activities of the Church, and that, until a Church exists that is effective, social law and government, science and education, will not do much to give us a social life that is harmonious and truly progressive or a human life that is moral and truly satisfying.

There is a good and well-balanced article on *Social Science and What Labor Wants*, by Mr. Yarros, and a careful study of some of the essential relations between *Sociology and Psychology*, by Mr. Leuba, deals chiefly with mystical tendencies involving ideas of religion and magic. Two other articles are also of considerable value. One by Mr. Woods on *The Social Waste of Unguided Personal Ability*, which suggests a more psychological, and at the same time more practical, education, furnishing in the future a better preparation for the choice of a career. The other, by Mr. Ash, on the causes which determine a *Community's Lethargy or Energy*. Mr. Ash deals with the results of communism, the hypertrophy of institutionalism, the effects of a preponderance of elderly men in places of authority and of an undue reverence for past achievements. Considerable stress is laid on the removal of stimuli or goals of achievement, sometimes from physical, social, or economic isolation, but especially from the growth of those forms of industry in which emphasis and attention must be directed to processes rather than to purposes. It is now generally recognized that such forms of industry involve a far greater strain of conscious effort than those in which the individual is working for a definite end and in which the motive is interest in the outcome. Psychology to-day is proving the truth of Luther's words that "only slaves die of overwork."

In the *POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY* for September there is a good historical article on *Syndicalism in America*, by Louis Levine. The rival socialistic policies of revolution and of "boring from within" are well outlined, and the parallel growth of an exaggerated class consciousness and of attempts at co-operation between capital and labour, are also ably dealt with.

Mr. W. A. Dunning has an interesting article on the *German Idealists*. Humboldt's Ideas on the Limits of the Activity of the State are clearly outlined; his insistence on the idea of the state as a means, with negative duties only, is compared with the theories of Milton, Locke and Voltaire. The evils of turning energy, which should be used for self-development, to prescribing rules for others, is well expounded, and leads up to the idea that the most progressive state consists of individuals chafing against the fetters of external control and gradually seeking their removal. In the latter part of the article Hegel's more abstract idea of Will is discussed, and

his glorification of the state is contrasted with his want of sympathy with the will of the people as represented by a popular assembly. Mr. Dunning sums up the effects of the psychological analysis and greater scientific precision of Kant, Fichte and Hegel as follows: (1) The idea of will as the ultimate element in politics and law was developed to its utmost limits. (2) Contract, as the formula through which the individual will creates social and political authority, received the highest degree of philosophical finish. (3) The gradual decline of the contract theory took place owing to Hegel's exaggerated views on the importance of the state and of political authority. (4) The doctrine of nationality as a fundamental principle of political organization was generally acknowledged.

THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS for October is an excellent number. In an interesting article on *Christian Ethics and the Ideal of Nationality*, Mr. Barbour suggests that the twentieth century may combine the rational, and therefore somewhat cosmopolitan, thought of the eighteenth century with the romantic movement of the nineteenth. The New Testament teaching does not necessarily imply a Tolstoyan belief that it is impossible to combine Christianity with patriotism. There is little doubt that before long Mr. Angell's theories of war will become known to everyone and finance, which often favoured war, will be a strong factor in favour of peace; but in this tendency Mr. Barbour sees considerable danger. Cosmopolitanism is leading to class concentration, and this will be an even more uncontrollable element than the national patriotism of old: if patriotism fails to unite all classes in the bonds of nationality it is doubtful whether any kind of international authority will achieve this. In cosmopolitanism, Mr. Barbour sees a tendency to level down as well as level up, a tendency towards a standardization of cheapness rather than of excellence, and in the decay of patriotism many wholesome restraints seem to fall away. It is in international sympathy, rather than in cosmopolitanism, that we are likely to preserve a wholesome rivalry between country and country, rather than between class and class.

In an article on *The Hegelian Concept of the State and Individualism*, Mr. Shelton suggests that the philosophic view of the state is often construed as far too favourable to what is commonly known as Socialism. The underlying assumption of the Hegelian argument appears to be that when a system is so established that resistance is useless and criticism futile, the loss of liberty entailed is not really felt. Green's respect for government was certainly not deduced from the mode in which it was carried on, and yet, while the individual's obligation to the state was emphasized, the state's obligation to the individual was practically ignored. Mill's justification for interference can be stretched indefinitely if we accept Green's idea of the General Will. Mr. Shelton considers that many are obsessed by this Hegelian idea, and that the differences between State control and Social control are not sufficiently recognized. He suggests that in the idea of the General Will, there arises a mystical concept with no clear and intellectual meaning, and that, although the paternal state may be defended as a practical necessity, there is no ideal behind it and state craft should be reduced to a minimum.

In an article on *The Object and Mode of Moral Judgment*, Mr. Mukerji contends that while Martineau's ethical position requires modification in detail, it remains the most faithful interpretation of our moral consciousness. Agreeing that desires and ends are inseparable, he upholds Martineau's

theory that desires (or ends) are good in themselves and not good because of the end or *summum bonum*. The writer also upholds Martineau's other contention, that the character of our desires are known by intuition rather than experience, arguing that an appeal to consequences is really only an appeal to other desires intuitively discerned. An evolution of morality from un-morality can only be explained by a metaphysical legerdemain, which is as self-destructive as the attempt to evolve mind out of mere sensations. After an analysis of Sidgwick's criticism of Martineau's scale of higher and lower springs of conduct, Mr. Mukerji contends that moral progress consists in straightening out the scale; it does not discredit intuitionism, but merely proves that moral progress has been largely a progress from error to truth rather than from truth to truth. Martineau's theory, he considers, may be qualified in two ways: (1) That there are exceptions to the general rank of impulses but that these exceptions are intuitively discerned, and (2) that there is an order of springs of equal rank. These qualifications, however, are merely supplementary, and in no way destroy the main proposition that there is a graduated scale of springs of conduct intuitively discerned.

The Proceedings of the Conference of Legal and Social Philosophy will also be found of considerable interest. Mr. Pound suggests that the present complete separation of Law and Philosophy arose from three causes: (1) The need for a science of law, (2) a reaction against abuses due to the philosophical method when it held complete sway, and (3) the need of stability and a consequent call for analytical rather than philosophical method. Several fruitful fields of study are outlined in the region of Psychology and Jurisprudence; as Mr. Pound points out, the law is ripe for influence from outside, and the philosophic jurist would give form and consistency to the changes that must inevitably take place. The report of the proceedings of the conference contains papers by Felix Adler and several others, all of considerable interest both to the student of jurisprudence and to the psychologist.

THE MONIST for October contains an interesting article on *The Accessibility of Buddhist Lore to the Christian Evangelists*, by A. J. Edmunds, and also a good article on *Christian Elements in the Bhagavadgîtâ*, by Richard Garbe. It is interesting to note that unlike the Sâukhya-Yoga, the Bhagavadgîtâ recognizes a soul which continues to all eternity as a separate conscious existence, and which maintains its individuality even in the presence of God. Mr. Garbe also points out two further agreements between the Bhagavadgîtâ and Christian views. (1) Faith in God's love to man and in his mercy and forgiveness of sins arising therefrom. (2) The requirement laid upon man of faithful love to God. Mr. Lorinser's theory of a Christian influence on the Bhagavadgîtâ and of the acquaintance of its author with the New Testament is not credited, and Mr. Garbe comes to the conclusion that the Bhagavadgîtâ should be characterized as an out-growth of genuine Indian religious feeling.

In an article on *The Monism of the German Monistic League*, Dr. Otto Herrmann lays out a Monistic Catechism by Dr. Frei, of which Professor Haeckel is said to approve. It is a curious document, and in its absolute disregard of all the deeper philosophical and metaphysical problems reminds one of Karl Marx's views in the sphere of social science. In reading it one would imagine that the problems of individuality, will and memory had never arisen, and that the relation between appearance and reality had never presented any difficulty. There is also an interesting article on the

possibility of a *Universal Language*, by Sydney Waterlow, in which the writer, while recognizing the value of international communication, doubts whether "Interlingua" would not destroy as much as it created, and thinks its chief duty should be merely a medium in which scientific works could be published and correspondence carried on between the learned of different countries. In the *Discussion* at the end an interesting attempt is made at a wider and less negative monistic theory than that of Professor Haeckel.

THE OPEN COURT (October) contains an interesting paper by Professor Josiah Royce on *Primitive Ways of Thinking*, with special reference to negation and classification. Professor Royce points out how frequently our study of primitive thought seems to centre round animism and magic, and how seldom we form a just appreciation of the dawn of scientific and exact thinking in the primitive mind. Such writers as Frazer, who have collected vast masses of material relating to the primitive tabu, have always treated the tabu as a check rather than a stepping stone to scientific thought, and although Jevons recognizes the social binding force of the tabu, he speaks of it as "a vicious circle surrounding the mind of the Savage." While agreeing that the strict observance of tabu may sometimes be opposed to clear thinking, Professor Royce protests against the assumption that it always forbids experience, and that dread in every case overpowers investigation. Exactness of thought may often be encouraged by the tabu and it may have a far-reaching scientific value quite apart from its religious and moral aspects. A consciousness of a strong negation frequently arouses the logical faculties, and in many cases we find that a special incantation is invented to remove the prohibition. Professor Royce finds the proof of *reductio ad absurdum* in the scientific realm a sort of rational equivalent of the tabu in the realm of the savage, in it he sees a dawning appreciation of something, which must not be done, in the way of assertion, the penalty being self-destruction of the thought which undertakes to violate the logician's tabu. The separation of objects and of social classes seems to Professor Royce to be the beginning of a new and more exact method of thought, and he suggests that the words "cursed be he that removeth his neighbour's landmark" shows a clear scientific consciousness of the legal limits of property as well as the ethical significance usually attached to them. It is true that a vicious circle of thought exists which makes sacred things tabu and the tabu sacred, but in agriculture, especially the tabu is often united to an observation of the laws of life, and in them we find the beginning of an appreciation of an exact law as well as an insight into natural causes. With the tabu comes a consciousness of "yes" and "no," a sort of categorical imperative, and the omen or warning often furnishes a hypothetical counsel. The "no" of the tabu produces a close scrutiny and a balance of alternatives, and often a negation of the negation. On these foundations all the classification of black and white magic, of orthodoxy and heresy, arises until the fury of the contending priests gives place once more to the calm reasoning of the *reductio ad absurdum*.

Also received :—*Scottish Geographical Magazine* (October, November and December); *Eugenics Education Review* (October); *Town Planning Review* (October); *Man* (October, November and December); *The Path* (October and November); *Positivist Review* (October, November and December).

THE SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY.

The meetings of the Session 1913—14 began on October 14 (evening) with a lecture by Mr. Cloudesley Brereton on "National Secondary Education: The Lesson from France." The chair was taken by Professor J. Adams. The paper was published in the October number of the *Sociological Review*.

The first afternoon meeting was on October 28, when Miss Jane Harrison lectured to a large audience on "Woman and Knowledge," Professor Gilbert Murray being in the chair.

On November 11, also in the afternoon, Mr. Edward Cadbury read a paper on "Some Principles of Industrial Organisation," Mr. J. A. Hobson being in the chair. It is hoped that this paper will appear in a subsequent number of the *Sociological Review*, with a discussion to which various authorities on the subject will contribute.

On November 25, Mr. F. G. D'Aeth read a paper, which appears in this number of the Review, on "The Unit of Social Organisation in Towns." Professor Urwick took the chair.

On December 9, in the evening, Miss Winifred Stephens lectured on "Current Movements in French Literature," with Sir Sidney Lee in the chair. This paper also appears in the present issue of the Review.

On January 12 (evening), Professor Patrick Geddes lectured on: I. "A Notation of Life (Social and Organic)"; and II. "An Interpretation of Parnassus." Dr. Wildon Carr took the chair.

FORTHCOMING MEETINGS.

The following meetings have been arranged for the second part of the Session, in addition to that addressed by Professor Geddes on January 12 and noticed above:—

Tuesday, February 10 (afternoon, 5-15 p.m.). Dr. William Brown: "Psycho-Analysis and the Problem of Personality."

Tuesday, February 24 (evening, 8-15 p.m.). Dr. C. W. Saleeby: "The First Decade of Modern Eugenics, 1904—1914." (The Bishop of Birmingham will take the chair.)

Tuesday, March 10 (afternoon, 5-15 p.m.). Mr. F. S. Van Oss: "The Effect of Public and Private Extravagance on the Rate of Interest."

Tuesday, March 31 (evening, 8-15 p.m.). Mr. S. K. Ratcliffe: "Changing America."

[Tuesday, April 28. To be announced.]

Tuesday, May 12 (evening, 8-15 p.m.). Mr. Gustav Spiller: "Darwinism and Sociology."

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY GROUP.

Wednesday, January 21, at 5-15 p.m. Mr. Cyril Burt: "The Psychology of Sex Differences."

Tuesday, February 3, at 5-15 p.m. Dr. C. W. Saleeby: "The Parental Instinct."

Tuesday, March 3, at 5-15 p.m. Mr. Morley Dainow: "Self-Assertion."

Tuesday, April 7, at 5-15 p.m. Mr. C. F. Lambert: "Self-Abasement."

GROUP FOR THE STUDY OF THE RELATION OF WOMEN TO SOCIETY.

Membership of this group is open (1) to all members of the Sociological Society who give in their names; (2) by payment of 10s. 6d. per annum. Mr. J. A. Hobson is the Chairman and Miss L. Keyser Yates, Hon. Secretary.

The following meetings have been arranged:—

Wednesday, January 21, 5-15 p.m. Mr. Cyril Burt: "The Psychology of Sex-Differences." (Joint Meeting with the Social-Psychology Group.)

Friday, February 27, 8-15 p.m. Mr. Leonard Doncaster, M.A.: "Sex Determination and the Inheritance of Secondary Sexual Characters."

Wednesday, March 25, 5-15 p.m. Miss L. M. Whitehouse (Girton College): "The Position of Women among Primitive Peoples."

The meeting of January 21 will be held at the Royal Society of Arts, John Street, Adelphi, W.C.

The February and March meetings will take place in the Rooms of the Sociological Society, 21 Buckingham Street, Strand, W.C.

It is proposed to revive the Civics Group. Names of those wishing to join should be sent to the Secretary, Sociological Society, 21 Buckingham Street, Strand, W.C.

A work by Mr. Victor Branford, M.A., the first Honorary Secretary of the Sociological Society, will be issued in February by Duckworth and Co. (7/6 net). It is entitled "Interpretations and Forecasts: a study of survivals and tendencies in contemporary society," and an excerpt from it appears in this number of the REVIEW. Among the headings of Chapters are: Some Illustrations of Sociology; The Citizen as Sociologist; The Sociologist at the Theatre; The Mediæval Citizen; The Present as a Transition.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

- Johnson, Stanley C. "A History of Emigration from the United Kingdom to North America, 1763—1912." Routledge. 6/- net.
- Montgomery, Louise. A Study of Chicago's Stockyards Community. II. "The American Girl in the Stockyards District." Chicago and London: Cambridge University Press. 1/- net.
- Cole, G. H. D. "The World of Labour." Bell. 5/- net.
- Purdom, C. B. "The Garden City." With illustrations and four coloured plates by T. Friedenson. Dent. 10/6 net.
- Dahlinger, C. W. "The New Agrarianism." New York: Putnam's. 4/- net.
- Robinson, M. Fothergill. "The Spirit of Association." Murray. 6/- net.
- Carr, A. S. Comyns, Garnett, W. H. S., and Taylor, J. H. "National Insurance." Fourth edition. Macmillan. 15/- net.
- Reeves, Mrs. Pember. "Round about a Pound a Week." Bell. 2/6 net.
- Bax, E. Belfort. "The Fraud of Feminism." Grant Richards. 2/6 net.
- Colquhoun, Mrs. Archibald. "The Vocation of Woman." Macmillan. 4/6 net.
- Stobart, Mrs. St. Clair. "War and Women." Bell. 3/6 net.
- Swanwick, Mrs. H. M. "The Future of the Woman's Movement." Bell. 2/6 net.
- Hutchins, B. L. "Conflicting Ideals." Murby. 1/6 net.
- Pankhurst, Christabel. "The Great Scourge and How to End it." E. Pankhurst. 1/- net.
- Cook, E. T. "The Life of Florence Nightingale." 2 vols. Macmillan. 30/- net.
- Strahan, James. "The Maréchale." Hodder and Stoughton. 6/-.
- Tod, Arthur James. "The Primitive Family as an Educational Agency." New York and London: Putnams. 7/6 net.
- Frazer, J. G. "The Golden Bough. Part VII. Balder the Beautiful." 2 vols. Third edition. Macmillan. 20/- net.
- Culverwell, E. P. "The Montessori Principles and Practice." Bell. 3/6 net.
- Leathes, Stanley. "What is Education?" Bell. 2/6 net.
- Pitt, St. G. L. Fox. "The Purpose of Education." Cambridge: University Press. 2/6 net.
- Grant, Cecil and Norman Hodgson. "The Case for Co-education." Grant Richards. 5/- net.
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SOME PRINCIPLES OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANISATION.¹

THE CASE FOR AND AGAINST SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT.

THE purpose of my paper is to summarise briefly the principles and methods of Scientific Management, to discuss its advantages and to suggest what seem to me its dangers. Then I wish to show how in an actual business organization we have endeavoured to carry out some of its principles and avoid some of its dangers.

Scientific Management as defined by those who have originated this system "fundamentally consists of certain broad general principles, a certain philosophy, which can be applied in many ways, . . . the best mechanism for applying these general principles should in no way be confused with the principles themselves."² The new system throws increased responsibility, new burdens and new duties on the management. "The managers assume the burden of gathering together all the traditional knowledge which in the past has been possessed by the workmen and then of classifying, tabulating and reducing this knowledge to rules, laws and formulæ, which are immensely helpful to the workmen in doing their daily work. In addition to developing a *science* in this way, the management take on three other types of duties which involve new and heavy burdens for themselves."³ They develop a science for each element of a man's work; they scientifically select and then train, teach and develop the workman; they co-operate with the men so as to ensure all the work being done in accordance with the principles of the science which has been developed. In short, the science says it is possible to find the best man, make him produce the best possible work as to quality and quantity, and at the same time improve the wages, the health, and the morals of the worker.

When one examines in detail the operation of Taylor's system as it is actually being carried out, the questions that arise are too many and varied for all to be dealt with in this paper. For

1. A paper read before the Sociological Society, November 11, 1913.

2. Taylor's "Scientific Management," pp. 28-9.

3. Ibid., p. 36.

example, no business man who claims to be efficient will deny the necessity of such methods as accurate and detailed costs, the careful and scientific planning out of the machinery in a workshop, and a planning department to systematise the flow of work from one process to another. Although one may criticise some of the principles underlying Taylor's system of task work, there are many suggestions of his which as time goes on will have to be much more widely adopted, although probably they are not altogether new. Amongst these are the careful and accurate teaching of the workers, instead of their being left to find out the methods from their fellow-workmen as best they can (this point I shall deal with more fully later on); the study of the right kind of tool for any particular piece of work, which is obviously a most important problem; and the selection of the workers best suited to any particular task.

The last named is now receiving an increasing share of attention. In the past there has not been very much done on these lines, but in the United States considerable attention is now being devoted to it, and important conferences have met in New York and other places dealing with the question of vocational guidance. In Boston a Bureau was established in 1908, in which all Boston boys and girls were to receive advice as to the calling in life to which by their mental or physical characteristics they were best adapted. The methods adopted were at first superficial, but at the same time very interesting and suggestive. It is now claimed, however, by certain writers, such as Hugo Münsterberg, that the problem can be and should be handed over to the experimental psychologists, and that it is possible to evolve a definite science of vocational guidance. At the same time, of course, the applied psychologist will have to get part of his material from the factories and workshops where the industrial operations proceed, and enlightened employers can render great assistance to the movement. The problem, as Münsterberg states it, is that "we have to analyse definite economic tasks with reference to mental qualities which are necessary or desirable for them, and we have to find methods by which these mental qualities can be tested. We must, indeed, insist on it that the interests of commerce and industry can be helped only when both sides, the vocational demands and the personal function, are examined with equal scientific thoroughness."¹ Münsterberg himself has carried out experiments in the interests of electric railway service, his problems being to secure fit motormen for the electric railways. For example, the qualities needed in an efficient motorman are the ability to keep attention constant, to resist distraction by chance happenings on the street, and especially the always needed ability to foresee the possible movements of pedestrians and vehicles. These qualities are

1. "Psychology and Industrial Efficiency," p. 57.

extremely different in different men. Some motormen hardly ever have an accident, while other motormen keep better time, and so on.¹ Similar experiments have been carried out in the interests of the shipping service and the telephone service.

Another interesting example is given by Taylor in connection with the manufacture of the balls used in cycle bearings. After these balls are manufactured they are most carefully sorted by girls. Now one of the qualities needed in this work is the ability to perform quickly the action of picking out a ball which is faulty. This psychological and physical process takes time, and the time varies in different persons. Some people who wish to pick out a thing can do so much more quickly than others, and if a certain time is saved on each ball that has to be picked out it will amount to a great saving of time during the day. Acting on this idea experiments were made to find out the girls who had the quickest co-efficient of action. The girls who were relatively slow were dismissed, and the output was increased by more than one hundred per cent. We have been doing something of this kind when selecting girls for employment at Bournville. With the help of our lady doctor we pick out those who are suited for heavy work; we also select those with a particular type of hand for special work in connection with chocolate; and any who say they can draw are given a test of their powers, and if suitable are put on the list for decorative work requiring a steady hand and trained eye. Time-workers who inspect the work of pieceworkers are tested for their eyesight before their appointment to this post. There is no doubt that we shall develop still further on these lines.

The question, however, which appeals to me most is what the exponents of this system call "the task idea." It is here that we reach the most important point, for we are dealing not with inanimate things, but with men and women, with all their physiological and psychological needs and possibilities, as well as prejudices and social sympathies. Even if on the productive side the results are all that the promoters of scientific management claim, there is still the question of the human cost of the economies produced.

As I have said, according to Taylor, "the most prominent single element in modern scientific management is the task idea."² The task of every workman is fully planned out, and each man usually receives written instructions describing in the minutest detail the work which he is to accomplish, as well as the means to be used in doing it. It is stated that even in crude and elementary unskilled work the science and method are quite

1. Ibid., p. 64.

2. Principles of Scientific Management," p. 39.

beyond the man who is doing it. And this is equally true of the skilled mechanic. Taking the handling of pig-iron as an example of unskilled work, we are told that one of the first requirements of a man for this work is that "he shall be so stupid and so phlegmatic that he more nearly resembles in his mental make-up the ox than any other type."¹ Again, it is stated that "It is only through *enforced* standardization of methods, *enforced* adoption of the best implements and working conditions, and *enforced* co-operation that this faster work can be assured."² In the case of a machine shop, under functional management, the old fashioned single foreman is superseded by eight different men, who direct the workman.³

The incentive to the workman is supplied by higher wages, from 30 per cent. to 60 per cent. above the average rate being paid. In this connection it is suggested that too high a wage has a deteriorating effect on the workman—while 60 per cent. increase makes him more healthy, regular in his habits and in attendance at work, 100 per cent. makes him shiftless and careless and he loses time at his work: a surprising assertion after what has been claimed for the moral effect of the system!⁴ The increase is given on the differential premium basis, the more work a man does the more in proportion he gets. The various foremen have also an interest in the work on the same differential basis—*i.e.*, they receive a bonus for each man who fulfils the allotted task, and an additional bonus when all the men under their supervision fulfil the task.

It has in fairness to be pointed out that the founders of this system, Taylor and Gantt, emphasise that at all costs overwork of the employees must be avoided. They aim at the best interests of the employee as well as of the employer. After careful consideration of this system various questions arise in one's mind, and it seems doubtful if the efficiency engineers have adequately faced the cost to the individual and the effect on society of their extremely clever system.

First there is the question of physical strain. In some of the illustrations given increased efficiency was obtained by enforced periods of rest. This was the case in the loading of pig-iron. But in more complex tasks the problem is not so simple. The essence of the system is the concentration of attention upon limited and intensive tasks. The work is minutely sub-divided and this must mean monotony and greater nervous strain. It is impossible to give specific proof of this, but the evidence offered on the other side

1. *Ibid.*, p. 59.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 83.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 123.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 74.

by the efficiency engineers is too general to be satisfactory. In relation to girls in particular the question of fatigue is all important. In saying this, I am assuming that the best conditions for the welfare of the employee are actually carried out as far as possible, and that such matters as hours of work, ventilation of workshops, sanitation, and all other conditions will be in conformity with the best modern practice. But in actual working the danger of the whole system, as Taylor himself sees, is that the mechanism of the system without the spirit will come into operation, and then we get a system of "drive" and "speeding-up" more intense than the industrial world has ever previously seen.¹

It is still an open question whether the device of specializing workers by limiting each man to one minute section of work is a step towards economic progress from a national point of view, but I will leave this matter until I deal with the effect of scientific methods on personality and character. At this stage I merely state that the trade-unionists assert that the whole system is unremunerative to the worker,—an exacting and rigorous process, which paves the way for deterioration both mental and physical in a future generation, and which courts inevitable failure as soon as the trade-unions are strong enough to stop it. The trade-unionists are thus definitely opposing methods, some of which in themselves are legitimate and even necessary when properly used.

Another point that arises is in respect to wages. It is clear that so long as only a few firms have this system, the increased production will allow of higher wages being paid; in fact such higher wages will have to be paid or the employee will leave and go to another factory where his traditional methods are not interfered with. But when all factories adopt this method, and all workmen are trained in the new way, the monopoly value will have disappeared and the labourer will no longer be able to enforce the higher wages. Of course as a consumer he would reap some benefit, for some at least of the economic benefits must pass to the consumer, but it is probable that his gain would not make up to him for the increased strain of the new methods. The increased output of each individual would mean a large decrease in the number of labourers who would have been required under the old methods, and unless there was a considerable increase in the number of hours worked, the tendency under the law of supply and demand would be to lessen the demand for workmen and thus weaken the bargaining power of the worker.

To conclude my remark on wages: some attempt has been made by English firms to adopt the American system of payment on the differential bonus basis, though, generally speaking, the amount

1. Ibid., pp. 128-9, p. 134.

offered the workmen is not so substantial as that suggested by Taylor, and in many cases has been no incentive but rather a cause for friction, so much so that the Amalgamated Society of Engineers have voted against its continuance—24,314 being against it, and only 4,777 for its continuance. There are at least half-a-dozen ways of calculating the scale of bonus-rates. In all of these, where trade-unionists are concerned, a day-rate has to be guaranteed, and the bonus for time saved is usually paid in such a way as to prevent more than time-and-a-quarter being earned. According to the Engineers' ballot, this percentage is considered out of proportion to the increased gain of industry. In respect to this matter, a committee of the Trade Union Congress was appointed in 1909 to investigate the methods and defects of the premium bonus system, and they reported that "almost without exception the premium bonus system is condemned by all who have practical experience of its working," "that it destroys the principle of collective bargaining"; "that it is destructive of trade-unionism and discourages organization"; "that it is one of the causes of unemployment"; "that it leads to scamping of work"; "that it prevents the proper training of apprentices"; that it promotes selfishness amongst the men in the shop and that "it promotes workshop favouritism."¹

These are examples of how such schemes of recompensing workmen for improved efficiency have been distorted and must not be mistaken for their true methods of remuneration, of which I have already spoken.

The most important question of all is the effect of the task system upon the personality and character of the worker. Under present conditions many unskilled jobs allow a limited amount of freedom and initiative, and even some of the most mechanical can be done in different ways; yet one has to admit the justice of the criticisms on unskilled labour in its effect on personality and character. The work is monotonous and depressing, the subdivision of processes being carried to such an extent that there is a narrowing of interest, and automatic machinery almost eliminates any demand for initiative and adaptation. The low standard of comfort and order among the unskilled workers, their lack of discrimination in literature, their want of foresight and thrift, the easy way in which they are swayed by rant and rhetoric, are facts familiar to us all. Even if monotony of work is not solely responsible for this condition of things it at least intensifies it and does nothing to counteract it. Therefore any further sub-division of labour in the direction of eliminating any little judgment and initiative as to methods of work, valuable as it might be in its

1. Report of the Joint Committee of the Trades Union Congress on The Premium Bonus System (1910).

immediate results on production, would almost certainly in the long run produce effects which would lower the whole capacity of the worker. At the recent meetings of the British Association it was stated by the reader of one of the papers,¹ that the gulf between the artisan and the unskilled labourer has widened in the last thirty years; while the artisan has progressed the unskilled labourer has remained stationary if he has not deteriorated; and I believe the greater monotony of his work is partly accountable for this. And would not this tendency be accentuated by the Taylor system?

Undoubtedly there is great waste in the present slipshod methods, and great advances towards the scientific selection of workmen, time-study of operations, recording of results, standardization of tools and equipment, and careful cost estimates, are necessary; but the reduction of the workman to a living tool, with differential bonus schemes to induce him to expend his last ounce of energy, while initiative and judgment and freedom of movement are eliminated, in the long run must either demoralise the workman, or more likely in England, produce great resentment and result in serious differences between masters and men. In this connection we must remember that the present industrial unrest is not a mere demand for higher wages and shorter hours, but an increasing knowledge on the part of the workman of his lack of control of the conditions of his own life. Our whole scheme of social, industrial and political life rests on the idea and practice that management and control are in the hands of the middle-classes and the rich. The controlling positions in the army and navy, in the civil service, and in all the professions are practically barred to the workers, and the growth of the Labour Party and Trade Unionism, and even Syndicalism properly understood, are expressions of the workman's demand to control his own life. And this demand will have to be reckoned with, for as we have seen there have already been strikes arising out of the attempt to introduce the mechanism of scientific management into various establishments.

This raises another important point that time will not allow me to discuss adequately. What is the relation of this new science to trade-unionism? Up to the present time most of the literature dealing with the subject has come from America, and there the spirit and practice of trade-unionism is very different from what it is here. It is relatively weak in numbers and influence, and as far as the I.W.W.² is concerned, distinctly revolutionary and syndicalist in spirit and practice. But granting this, it does not justify the position taken up by the pioneers of scientific management. Gantt, for example, while admitting that trade-unions have been necessary

1. Mr. Frank Tillyard's Paper at the British Association Meetings, 1913.

2. Industrial Workers of the World.

to the workmen in the past and have distinctly improved the lot of the workers, goes on to say that "Unions are formed as a rule by men of energy to help each other, and the poor workman is taken in, not for the good he does to the union, but for the harm he does if not in."¹ "And if we wish to prevent him joining the union, we must make it to his interest not to do so. In other words, we must provide him with means of advancing his interest that is superior to what the union offers."² Possibly this will be a ground of appeal to employers in this country, but I believe that such a policy will be most mistaken. Any scheme which aims at lessening the worker's independence by drawing him from his Union is running counter to the very spirit of the times and will arouse the fiercest hostility. Gantt says at bottom the worker is governed just by narrow self-interest.³ I think that the modern democratic movement disproves this assertion. There is a devotion and a spirit of solidarity that cannot be explained on any such basis. The solution of these problems will have to come by working through the unions, and any attack upon the workman's power of collective bargaining is foredoomed to failure. Of course up to now the unions have failed to understand this new industrial advance. They will have to admit many of the new methods and principles, and one of the next steps of advance is to educate them as to its possibilities and to use collective bargaining as one of the means. Any attempt to detach one man after another by promises of higher pay, in the way scientific engineers appear to have done in the States, is impossible in England at the present time.

In this rapid summary of scientific management I have emphasized its dangers, not because I feel the way to avoid them is a simple matter, but rather because their very difficulty emphasizes the need of careful thought and consideration by employers. It seems to me that in the long run it will defeat itself for employers to consider a man merely as a tool. We must keep in mind that a man and his personality is always an end in itself, and working people in the future will have to be treated less as tools and more as men.

This is the principle on which we have endeavoured to organize our own factory. We have always believed that business efficiency and the welfare of the employees are but different sides of the same problem. As I have stated elsewhere,⁴ my test of any factory organization is the extent to which it creates and fosters the atmosphere and spirit of co-operation and goodwill, without in any way lessening the loyalty of the worker to his own class and its

1. H. L. Gantt's "Work, Wages and Profits," 2nd edition, p. 57.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 59.

3. *Ibid.*, pp. 57—59.

4. "Experiments in Industrial Organisation."

organizations. The worker has also the right to be considered as one who ought to play his part as an intelligent and capable citizen.

I now propose to give briefly some of the actual schemes and methods we have adopted with a view to minimising the evils which have seemed almost inherent in any factory organization.

I have always considered it a very important matter to eliminate as far as possible the internal friction which must arise to some extent in a factory under the present wages system. In any wages system there must be some element of driving, and the interests of employer and employed are never absolutely identical. On the other hand there is some identity of interest, and by the recognition of the workers' point of view, and by taking human nature into account this identity of interest can be emphasized, with the result that the goodwill and efficiency of the employees are fostered, and the staff and foremen can give practically the whole of their attention to organizing their departments, instead of their time and attention being absorbed in irritating details of personal friction or disobedience. It is not merely a question of preventing the workmen breaking rules and regulations, but of inducing them to take a positive interest in the welfare of the business, and in making them feel that their work and their personality count, no matter how humble the position they occupy. This attitude of mind on the part of the employee shows itself at once in the elimination of avoidable waste and other ways of reducing cost of output. I cannot, of course, claim that we have entirely succeeded in eliminating friction, or in satisfying all the legitimate demands of our employees, but we have gone some way towards it, and I think, too, I can fairly say that some of the difficulties we have arise from the more intelligent outlook of our employees, and from the fact that we have trained them to apply to us a standard which they would not apply to many employers. This is particularly noticeable in the demand the different trade-unions make. They have become accustomed to our giving careful consideration to the points they raise, although, of course, we do not always agree to what they ask. This appears to me a natural outcome of the educational training and the higher standard of life attained by our workpeople.

SELECTION OF EMPLOYEES.

In the selection of employees we keep in mind the fact that older people are not easy to train into new habits and methods, so wherever possible we take on young people and train them ourselves. All applicants are obtained through the local Labour Exchange, the officials of which know our standards and requirements, and so save us a great deal of trouble by eliminating those

obviously unqualified for employment by us. The applicants are seen by a director, assisted by the staff including the firm's medical officer. The director, not the foreman, engages the applicant, and thus favouritism is eliminated from the start and the applicants are appointed purely on their merits. There are three tests: educational acquirements; general tone and character; and physical efficiency. We give preference to applicants from secondary schools and from the higher standards in elementary schools. We also prefer them just leaving school, as they have not lost their habits of discipline and have not yet forgotten what they learned. A schedule of questions as to place in school, previous employment, name of school, age, etc., is handed to each girl applicant. This she herself has to fill in, thus making her own statement—which is verified later by a visit to her home. Applicants must reside within three miles of their work. The works' doctors examine all applicants, and in passing those physically fit recommendations are made as to the class and nature of work for which they are fitted.

The new employee has to agree to attend continuation schools and physical training classes to the age of 18, the latter being held in the firm's time. Boys and girls under 18 must have their teeth examined by the works' dentists and where necessary undergo treatment, without, of course, any expense to themselves. A letter is sent to every parent of employees of 18 and under, explaining the purpose and method of the educational and other schemes, and asking for co-operation in carrying them out, so that the young employee may obtain the maximum benefit from them. The parent is also asked to sign an authorization note agreeing that the boy or girl shall attend the educational and physical training classes until 18 years of age, and shall be willing to receive treatment by the works' dentists up to the age of 21. In this way an attempt is made to ensure both mental and physical development.

EDUCATION OF EMPLOYEES.

It will be noted that we consider the selection of our workers one of the most important functions of the management, and the quality and efficiency of labour is an integral and co-ordinated part of our business.

Classes of various kinds have been carried on by the firm for more than twelve years. In 1906 the whole of the educational work was co-ordinated and centralized under a Works Education Committee. Another fact, which will show how seriously we view the importance of our educational work, is that overtime is never allowed to interfere in any way with the education of our employees, even at the risk of some dislocation of our work.

I have not time to deal in full detail with the educational schemes. The various forms may be classified under five heads :—

1. Compulsory Evening Classes.
2. Physical Training Classes.
3. Miscellaneous Classes.
4. Apprenticeship Scheme.
5. Trade Classes.

In developing these schemes, amongst many important things we have endeavoured to keep in mind that the employee has to be considered as an end in himself; his education has to fit him to be not merely a good workman, but a good man. It should develop in him a capacity for a life varied in interests and tolerant in outlook. This is especially true of the unskilled man, because of his lack of opportunity in other ways. At the same time there is the economic aspect, and we want a scheme that will develop initiative, self-control and general knowledge. Specialized knowledge is necessary and is determined by the future occupation of an employee.

APPRENTICESHIP SCHEME.

I have already mentioned the Apprenticeship scheme. At Bournville we carry on more than twenty specified trades, and there are apprentices in each of these. Apprenticeship is considered a form of promotion. All boys who obtain employment at the Works must do unskilled work until 16 years of age, and at the same time must take the general education course. At the age of 16 those showing special ability are selected to come under the Apprenticeship scheme. The basis of selection is :—

1. Report from Foreman.
2. Report from School.
3. A Works examination, which includes an essay on the trade the boy would like to enter.

Merit and capacity, not favouritism, thus determines who will get promotion. The boy signs an indenture to attend classes and to work for the firm until he is 21. The syllabus for the respective trades have been drawn up by the Works Education Committee in consultation with the foremen concerned. The details of the boys' work and training in the shop are carefully thought out, and both the boy and foremen understand what the apprentice has to be definitely taught, and what he must teach himself. Afternoon classes have been arranged, and the apprentice attends these in the firm's time. Facilities are also given for the apprentices to do their technical-school homework under supervision and guidance during the day, and a special Trades Library has been formed to

give the student ready access to books dealing with his trade. Writing and drawing materials are provided, and informal instruction is given on such subjects as note-taking, power of expression, use of reference books, etc. This experiment of organized homework in the firm's time is of considerable interest.

DISCIPLINE.

I should like now to deal briefly with our system of discipline. In the early days of the firm we adopted the usual methods of fines and deductions, but experience showed that it was not in any way reformatory. When the fine was paid the worker considered the offence wiped out. This system did not lead to efficiency, and so we adopted the record system—*i.e.*, each girl has a record card and on this any offence is entered in the same way that any special merit is. Each month one of the directors interviews the alleged offenders. The whole system is designed to be reformatory, so we have no fixed rules as to punishment. The record is kept on the card for two years, and then if no further offence has been committed the card is destroyed and a clean record substituted. In dealing with these offenders actual punishment beyond a caution is not often necessary. The system leads to greater efficiency, because it has been possible to weed out the inefficient, although it is found that fewer discharges are necessary than under a system of fines.

SLOW WORKERS.

Another important class that have to be dealt with are the slow workers—*i.e.*, those who regularly fail to attain the minimum output fixed for their class of work. The simplest plan would be to discharge them, but it is worth a little trouble to attempt to find the cause of their inefficiency and to adopt reformatory and remedial agencies where possible. Sometimes a little consideration shows that a change of work is all that is necessary, or that ill-health is the cause. Accordingly our method is for a director to consider each case and to interview the girl. A report on her general behaviour is presented, and a report from the doctor as to her physical condition and fitness for the work she is doing, and for any work that she might do better. Most of the cases of inefficiency are due to physical causes, and these are put under the care of the doctor with instructions to follow the advice. Some girls are sent away at once to the convalescent home. In some cases it is found that the girls are keeping late hours, and are therefore not getting sufficient sleep; others are found to be cases of malnutrition caused either by want of food or by want of proper varieties of food, due to poverty or mismanagement in the home. Only about five to seven per cent. of the inefficient girls are found

to be indolent and lazy. This is often the case where the girl's parents are fairly well-to-do and the girl keeps most of her wages for pocket-money. The large majority of the girls reported as slow and inefficient are improved and become normal workers. I have always been much impressed by our results, and they suggest to me that care and organization could prevent much economic and social waste, and loss of individual character and efficiency. It is less costly in the end for the nation to keep the worker efficient than to allow him to deteriorate until he becomes one of the unemployable, a burden to himself and to society.

ORGANIZATION.

We adopt a system of committees in the general organization of the factory. The four managing directors divide the business organization between them, and have the control of their own departments. They and the Chairman meet weekly as a Committee of Management, and this Committee is the final authority in all cases. There are also several committees with one of the managing directors as chairman,—for example, the Men's Works Committee, which is responsible for the internal working of the men's departments, and the Girls' Works Committee, which has the same function with regard to the women's departments. These two committees consist of one of the directors as chairman, members of the staff, selected by the Board of Directors, and a foreman or forewoman representing the foremen or forewomen. The secretary of the Men's Works Committee is a member of the Girls' Works Committee, thus keeping the two committees in touch with each other. These committees serve a most useful purpose, and the directors have continued to devolve duties upon them. They have a large amount of business, having an agenda of seventy to eighty items each week.

In addition to the above are the two Suggestion Committees, one representing men's departments and the other women's departments, which deal with the suggestions received through the Suggestion Scheme. The majority of the members of these committees are elected by the workpeople and staff. Through the Suggestion Scheme and the Committees we hope to develop the initiative and responsibility of the workpeople, and in the same way through the other Committees we endeavour to develop the initiative and responsibility of the staff.

Another Committee which deals with the interior organization of the Works is the Education Committee, which is composed of two directors and eight members of the staff. All the members of this committee take a keen interest in education, and the whole of the educational work of the firm, including the physical instruction.

is under their control. This is looked upon as one of the most important committees and is the only one on which more than one director serves. It is divided into two sub-committees, dealing respectively with the men's and women's departments.

There are other committees dealing with the external side of the business, such as buying and selling; and there are also technical committees, but these are outside the scope of my paper.

SUGGESTION SCHEME.

I mentioned above the two Suggestion Committees, one for men and one for women. For many years we have had Suggestion Schemes in operation, and we annually receive about 8,000 suggestions, of which 24 to 25 per cent. are adopted. The two committees deal with the consideration and carrying out of these. Every employee is encouraged to make suggestions for the improvement of machinery or processes, conditions of work, health and safety, recreation, etc. Grievances can also be ventilated in this way, especially as the Committee does not know the name of the suggestor, and the committees are largely composed of representatives of the workers elected by ballot. Prizes are awarded for suggestions adopted, and reasons are given to the suggestor for those rejected.

CONDITIONS OF WORK.

There are many other matters of importance, such as the arrangements for preserving the health and safety of employees, that have to be carefully considered—but space forbids more than a passing mention. In my paper I have taken it for granted that any efficient industrial organization necessitates that a living wage must be paid, and hours of labour and general conditions must not involve the deterioration of the workers. From the purely utilitarian point of view good conditions of work and wages, such as good lighting, well-ventilated rooms and cheerful surroundings have a direct effect on the economic efficiency of the worker.

CARD-BOX DEPARTMENT.

In conclusion I propose to deal briefly with the actual working of one department to show how our theories develop in practice, and for this purpose I propose to take the Card-box department, which employs nearly 500 women. In this department, as in others, we give the most careful attention to the planning out of the workrooms, and the procuring of the most up-to-date machinery, as the higher the wages the more important becomes the question of labour-saving machinery. There is a costs system and also a planning department, which maps out the year's work and adjusts

it according to the actual demand from week to week. Time will not allow of my entering into details of these, as I am chiefly concerned in this paper with the human side of works' organization.

In the first place the girl would be selected by a director, after passing the doctor and dentist, and as card-box making is a skilled trade the more intelligent girls are selected for this department. She would undergo the four years' course of physical training at the Works, and also take the four years' educational course. For the first two years, from 14 to 16, she would be a learner, and would receive for the first year 4/6 to 5/- per week of 42 hours, and for the second year 5/6 to 6/- per week of 42 hours. This is a less wage than a girl of the same age would get in departments where she is not learning a trade. We have not found that this modified form of apprenticeship is an efficient way of training taken by itself, and we have therefore supplemented it by a course of special trade classes in card-box making. These classes are held in the department itself, where the student is surrounded by the machinery and tools that she will use in her ordinary work, and therefore the student is more likely to apply the lessons learnt there to her everyday work, than if they were learnt in the surroundings, necessarily somewhat artificial, of a trade school and then applied in the workshop. The head of the department acts as teacher of the practical classes, and these classes are supplemented by lectures on the manufacture and properties of paper and cardboard, which are given by the firm's buyer of these commodities, who has made a life-long study of them. Therefore the course is truly educational, not merely a training in manual dexterity and time-saving devices, and it aims at giving the students an interest in, and a knowledge of, the materials which they have to use.

During the session 1911-12 elementary classes alone were held. The girls received practical instruction in the fundamental operations of hand box-making. Right methods of working were substituted for wrong methods which the young girls had picked up; the students were practised in the detection of errors committed in previous operations, such as cutting, marking and staying; manual dexterity was acquired in some of the operations which present difficulties to the learner. It was found advisable to devote the whole of one lesson or more, as the case might be, to mastering one operation. Only at a later stage did the student make a box throughout.

During the present session junior and senior courses are being held. The more advanced syllabus includes, in addition to the foregoing, boxes of various shapes; the complete construction of more complicated boxes, and additional practice in difficult operations. The correct naming of parts of boxes, the right temperature and consistency of glue and its proper application to

the material are dealt with, and other matters of interest relating to the trade are also considered.

In the lectures on paper and cardboard a concise account is given of the nature and origin of the chief materials, and the processes involved, in making papers, strawboards, wood-pulps, greyboards, etc., used in the manufacture of boxes. The lessons are illustrated by means of diagrams of the machinery employed in the mills, and specimens of the raw materials used are shown as well as the finished product.

Simple test questions on the subject matter of the lectures are set, and answered. In addition, the students are taken to a local paper mill, when the chief points of the lectures are emphasized whilst passing through the various departments of the mill.

The girls who attend this course thus know something of the materials they handle day by day in their work, and as a result of the lessons they have a more intelligent interest in what they are doing. They also know something about the physical properties which render certain boards or papers suitable or unsuitable for particular classes of boxes.

Such methods, I think, will obtain efficiency without making the worker merely an animated tool.

REMUNERATION.

The question of remuneration is a complex one. In this department, as in others, we have a minimum which all girls on piece-work should earn, this minimum being advanced on our own initiative as the cost of living increased (from 15/- for girls of 21 years and over in 1901, to 17/6 for girls of 20 and over in 1913, both rates for a 42 hours' week).

The card-box trade comes under the Trade Boards Act, and a minimum rate of 3d. per hour, with certain conditions as to learners, etc., has been fixed by the Trade Board, and where piece-rates are adopted this minimum must be guaranteed. We had always managed this department on the flat piece-rate system, and for some years have made a careful study of the operations involved in the processes, and piece-rates were fixed on the basis of these operation rates. But for some time we were convinced of the failure of this system. Our rates were based on the output of the average worker, not on the fastest; but the girls had an idea that they knew what we expected them to earn, and the fast girls deliberately avoided earning much above this wage. The introduction of new methods or new machines necessitated the fixing of fresh rates, and it was difficult to know when the girls were working at a proper speed or deliberately working slowly. Adjustment of rates were sometimes necessary, and this made the girls fear that increased output would merely mean a cutting of the piece-rate and

possibly harder work for the same wages. These difficulties we have attempted to get over in the following way:—First we make a study of every piece of work and the operations involved to determine what is a fair task for the average operator, so that the rates will not have to be altered unless some new machine or method is employed.

When the Trade Boards Act came into operation one of the directors met the whole of the girls in this department and told them that the firm wished to modify the system of payment. He asked the girls to elect by ballot a committee representing every department of the work, to confer with him and the officials of the department on the proposed changes. There was no stipulation made as to whether the members of the committee should or should not be members of the trade union. Most, however, did belong to the union, and they appointed the secretary of their local branch as secretary of the girls' committee. With respect to the union (The National Federation of Women Workers) it may be interesting to record the fact that one of the directors had taken the chair at the meeting called to form the branch, and he had advised the girls to join. As the director was assisted by members of the staff who were experts, it was made clear to the workers' committee that they were at liberty to call in the aid of their officials and other expert help if they so desired.

The workers' committee considers the matter in its minutest details; they are furnished with the basis of the firm's estimate for piece-rates, and the girls can, if they think fit, check the firm's method of obtaining the basis. Under the scheme each girl is paid a time-rate on the full number of hours worked, this time-rate being the minimum fixed by the Trade Board, and in addition a differential piecework and bonus-rate on work done. Where there is no piece-rate an additional time-rate is fixed. The net result of the time-rate plus the piece-rate is to give the girls about 100 per cent. increase over the minimum fixed by the Trade Board. Thus the Committee had to discuss time-rate where a pieceworker is temporarily on time-rate only, the differential bonus-rate, etc. For example, it was decided that in handwork any girl whose average piece earnings for the quarter exceed the scale-rate by 30 per cent. should receive for the succeeding quarter and as long as she keeps up that standard $\frac{1}{2}$ d. per hour bonus on the time-rate. Any girl whose average piecework earnings for the quarter exceed the scale-rate by 50 per cent. is to receive for the succeeding quarter and as long as that standard is kept up, a bonus of 1d. per hour on her time-rate.

It was also arranged that during the twelve months succeeding this agreement, piece-rates queried by the girls shall be considered and adjusted if possible each month; any alteration which may be

made to be regulated by the "Median," and when bad rates are increased, excessive rates to be reduced, the object being to adjust, not increase or decrease, wages; a general basis being arrived at. All adjustments are submitted to the committee before being put into operation. Adjustments may also be made under any of the following circumstances: Alterations to, or re-arrangement of workroom, which affect output; alteration in style or finish of boxes; introduction of new, or improvements in existing machines or tools; and if a machine should be speeded up, one-third of net gain to be allowed to operator in revising rates.

After the twelve months provided for in this clause the firm reserve the right to make such revision in piece-rates as they deem necessary, although they offered the girls' committee a three years' agreement if they desired it.

A scale for learners had also to be drawn out, and allowances for girls teaching learners. There was also considerable discussion on the length of time necessary to learn the trade, and it was ultimately unanimously agreed to reduce the period from three years to two, especially as it was felt that the trade classes already referred to had greatly helped the learners to acquire a knowledge of the card-box trade much more quickly. Other points settled were allowances for new work, and rate to be paid for delays due to matters outside the girls' control. The firm retain the right, in the event of the Trade Board revising their minimum rate, to make such alterations as they may deem necessary, but no alteration will be made without consultation with the girls' representatives.

The point I wish to emphasize in this method of fixing wages is that no attempt is made to detach the workers from collective bargaining, but the influence is in the other direction. We work through and with the trade unions. The educational effect on the girls concerned, especially the representatives, must be great, and they are taught to see the employer's side and made to realise the complexity of wages rates. The girls also realise the fact of competition, and that the wages paid to them must bear some relation to the rate of wages paid by competitors, and that the only way we can maintain a higher rate of wages than our competitors is by more efficient management and more skilful workers. They also feel they have some control over the conditions of their work and wages. Needless to say there has been a distinct improvement in output. It must not be thought that either the firm or the workers gained all they asked for, but we came to a reasonable compromise which has been accepted by the whole of the department. The greatest gain has been a growth in mutual respect and understanding between the workers on the one hand and the firm and its officials on the other.

CONCLUSION.

In conclusion—I have endeavoured, though I am afraid in a somewhat disconnected manner, to show in the first place some objections to the Taylor system of management, especially with regard to “the task” wage. In the second place, I have made some tentative suggestions of another way of meeting the difficulty of an adequate output from the employee. We must not forget that, fortunately, the wage-earners in this country are steadily becoming better educated and acquiring a more intelligent appreciation of the industrial system and of their place in it. They think with truth that in the past they have not had a fair share either in wealth or leisure of the immense gain that has been made through the progress of science and invention. But this is not the only cause of the industrial unrest. They want—and surely this is a very legitimate demand!—more control over their own lives. The problem of the future which the capitalist classes have to meet is in the first place a wider and more equitable distribution of wealth and leisure, and in the second, to devise some method by which the workers can have some share in the control of the industry in which they are engaged. The former problem will soon, without doubt, become more acute; the latter problem—*i.e.*, the control of industry—is not so likely to become acute at present. The time for study and experiment, I maintain, is *now*, before the problem becomes acute. Industrial organization is not something fixed and immutable, and our duty is to experiment so that we may accumulate some data upon which the next generation can work.

EDWARD CADBURY.

DISCUSSION ON SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT.

The following notes have been contributed, from varying points of view, in relation to the exposition and criticism of Scientific Management in the foregoing paper. We hope to publish, in the July number of the *Sociological Review*, further contributions to the discussion, together with Mr. Cadbury's reply.

Mr. J. A. HOBSON.

With most of Mr. Cadbury's criticisms of American Scientific Management I agree. From the writings of Mr. Taylor and others it is possible to present a powerful condemnation of its methods on the score of ‘driving’ and ‘speeding-up,’ mechaniza-

tion of the worker, excessive appeal to individual gain, etc. Some of the economies, however, practised under scientific management do not appear to involve either an increase of effort in the worker or a loss of interest or initiative. The physiological and psychological tests for selection and for training in the several kinds of work, the correction of customary errors in the handling of tools, the better disposition of tools and materials in the workplaces, and the careful time records of each piece of work in its several processes, appear to me to belong to a sound commonsense economy and to make for increased wealth without increased human cost. The dangers, as Mr. Cadbury rightly recognises, are chiefly two: first that the net effect of scientific management may be to damage the worker as a human being by overwork and loss of initiative and interest; secondly, that the system furnishes no real security for the worker, either as an individual or a class, getting, for himself or themselves, any adequate share of the increased wealth produced by the new economies. Though Mr. Taylor and his associates disclaim all idea of driving, and even assert that it would be an unsound economy, this disclaimer does not meet the difficulty. Excessive labour and other damages to workers may in some circumstances be profitable to employers. Under scientific management there is no guarantee that only those economies which involve no increase of human costs shall be adopted.

In the scheme at Bournville, whose operations Mr. Cadbury describes, the point of central importance is the contention that "we have endeavoured to keep in mind that the employee has to be considered as an end in himself; his education has to fit him to be not merely a good workman but a good man." How far is this theory and practice of a private firm compatible with successful profit-making, so as to be held out as an example for general adoption? It is of course true that a firm which, by virtue of its skill of management, size, reputation, superiority in processes, or other advantages, is able to earn higher profits than are necessary to pay the ordinary interest on capital, can indulge in philanthropic schemes for the benefit of its employees as human beings and citizens. Most of these benefits will naturally have some influence in maintaining or evoking a higher efficiency of labour. But it is not clear to me whether Mr. Cadbury maintains that the business advantages of this philanthropic management are such that the ordinary selfish employer, if he understood his real business interests, would practise them. In other words, is there a real and full consistency between high dividends and a management which considers the worker "as an end in himself"? Up to a certain point this harmony is widely admitted, *i.e.* a subsistence wage and an eight-hours day are often admitted as good business. But are all these expensive schemes of Mr. Cadbury good business that comes home in higher profit, or does the firm really take a lower net profit than it could obtain, in order to forward the humane interests of its workers? In the latter case, the common adoption of this humane scheme is impracticable. For only firms screened from the full force of competition, and therefore earning surplus profits, can afford to practise it.

J. A. H.

Mr. G. D. H. COLE,

Author of *The World of Labour*.

Under modern factory conditions the worker is treated purely as a raw material of industry. Labour is bought in the cheapest market, and, when high wages are paid, they are justified solely on the ground of increased efficiency. But the worker is not the raw material of industry, and labour ought not to be bought or sold as a commodity.

As Mr. Cadbury clearly shows, the system known as 'Scientific Management' has two main aspects. It is first an appeal to the manager to organise his factory more efficiently, with especial regard to the ordering of the human beings who work in it "on scientific principles"; and secondly, a theory of the methods of industrial remuneration most likely to promote efficiency. These two aspects should be kept distinct.

On the former side, Scientific Management contains much that is good, and also much that is old. It may plead in many cases, like Eugenics, the agnostic privileges of an infant science; it may fail, like Eugenics, to convince some of us that the fact that it embodies some true principles, which we knew before, entitles it to rank as a new science. We all admit the need for efficient factory organisation: the novelty, however, is supposed to lie in the application of this principle of efficiency to men as well as machines. Here, too, no one will dispute the value of increased vocational training; but in so far as the differentia of the new science lies in its application of the methods of experimental psychology it is open to criticism. It is highly doubtful if any tests, beyond the crudest physical tests, are really of value; it is more than doubtful if mental characteristics admit of exact measurement. Vocational selection, where it has succeeded, has been, as Münsterberg admits, the result far less of scientific method than of the selector's individual commonsense.

Scientific management advocates not only vocational selection, but also vocational training. Here Mr. Cadbury well points out the value of proper technical training on the one hand, and the danger of further sub-division and mechanisation of industrial processes on the other. At the same time, there is little doubt that, if the more mechanical method is, in the long run, the more economical, it will be adopted, unless an economic revolution displaces the profiteer. The fact that it destroys the personality of the worker will not for a moment count with the employing class as a whole. If a few adopt the more economical method, the rest will be forced to toe the line. And, however true it may be that in certain specialised trades it pays to develop the worker's individuality, it is far less arguable that this is so for industry as a whole.

Mr. Cadbury has been to a great extent successful in adopting those elements in scientific management which tend to develop the worker's personality. He has done nothing to show that what has paid him in his specialist trade will pay employers generally. His experience points rather to the view that his experiments have paid

largely because he is almost alone in the field and has a wide range to choose from.

It is therefore to be feared that, in industry generally, scientific management will take rather the opposite line of development, and will make the worker's life more monotonous. It will increase his efficiency, and attempt to compensate him for speeding-up and wear and tear by premium bonus systems and the like. It will be very difficult for the Unions to resist the new processes; the bonus systems they can resist. If they are driven to accept increased mechanisation of their daily work, they must secure at least that their wages are raised directly, and not on any bonus system. All such systems have been clearly shown to be fatal to effective Trade Unionism.

Mr. Cadbury seems to think that the growing demand of the workers to control their work can be met by such methods as his own without a radical change of system. I do not believe this. I believe that the struggle between employers and employed, in the great industries at least, will grow more acute, and that it will end in the entire abolition of the employer, and in the assumption by the workers, in partnership with the State, of the full control of industry. I admit that this might be prevented were all employers in a position to be as good as Mr. Cadbury; but I believe scientific management will take the easier path, and, in the pursuit of profits, bring about its own downfall. I doubt if, under the present system, 'enlightened' employment is possible for more than a small minority of employers.

G. D. H. C.

Mr. WALTER HAZELL,

*Chairman of Hazell, Watson and Viney, Ltd., London
and Aylesbury.*

I am obliged to the Editor of the *Sociological Review* for the opportunity of contributing to the symposium on the above subject. I have read Mr. Richard Cadbury's paper with much interest. I have also read his book entitled "Experiments in Industrial Organisation," which ought to be studied by all large employers with a conscience. Further, I have read Mr. Frederick W. Taylor's book upon "The Principles of Scientific Management," which Mr. Cadbury takes as his text.

Mr. Taylor, as an American, has again placed us under an obligation to that country for new ideas upon an important question. The economic results of his methods are so startling that one questions whether he has been able to put all the data before the reader. There is little doubt that his studies tend to a great increase in the quantity of work turned out, but on page 71 we are told the scientific handling of pig-iron reduced the number of labourers to about one-fourth, while the earnings of the survivors were increased from \$1.15 to \$1.88 per day, and yet the cost of handling dropped to much less than half. Again, on p. 95 there is an interesting story of 120 girls inspecting bicycle bearing-balls.

After scientific handling had been introduced 35 girls did the work of 120 with two-thirds more accuracy, with hours reduced from $10\frac{1}{2}$ to $8\frac{1}{2}$ per day, and wages increased from 80 to 100 per cent., and with great economy to the employer. In both these cases one imagines that the old management must have been exceptionally lax and incompetent even for rule-of-thumb methods. These two experiments resulted in a large number of employees losing their jobs, and this taken by itself is a great evil. Probably similar changes in this country would have come about more gradually owing to our slower ways, and no such sudden displacement of labour would have happened. Even going slowly has its advantages!

If workers are displaced by better management they are in the same position as those displaced by new machinery. I wish it were practicable for new inventions to compensate those who are for a time unemployed. Mr. Cadbury appears to believe that the workers might be permanently injured by these methods. I do not think so. If, for example, the cost of building could be halved, surely the difficult problem of rural housing would be met and more builders' workmen than ever would be wanted.

The scheme means more sub-division of labour, which would tend to make work still more uninteresting, but it needs so much more supervision that many intelligent working men would find openings as organisers and administrators generally. Mr. Cadbury's firm are carrying on scientific management in an admirable way, and Mr. Taylor's scheme appears to be somewhat the same idea under another name. A careful study of an individual's fitness for certain work ought to be a great social benefit by putting people to work for which they are naturally fitted by their temperament. Better organisation and larger output need not mean more strain but rather less: *e.g.*, some early scientific manager found that carrying a pail of water in one hand was more strain than carrying a larger quantity in two pails upon a yoke. The system would need to be carefully watched, as no right-minded person wants workers to be overstrained or not to get increased benefit from improved machinery and methods. Larger output with larger wages for a time ought not to be neutralised by cutting wage rates later on.

I greatly admire Mr. Cadbury's methods of selecting bright, clever and well-educated girls, but I fear that much manufacturing work to-day is so monotonous that there is not sufficient scope for individual brain power in it. The evil is obvious but the remedy is difficult to find. I still think that both Mr. Taylor's and Mr. Cadbury's systems deserve the most careful study by employers and employees. They should not be worked for greater output only, but also for the social and material benefit of the employees. To secure these ends for them there is needed the continued power of collective bargaining and the development of the Trade Boards Act, enlightened public opinion, and last but not least, employers who realise that it is a duty and a pleasure to make the well-being of their employees their aim and not merely to work for their own profit.

W. H.

Mr. C. G. RENOLD,
of Hans Renold, Ltd., Manchester.

I HAVE read Mr. Cadbury's paper dealing with Scientific Management with the greatest interest, and would like to contribute something from my own experience to the discussion of the subject.

For two years past I have been connected with the introduction of some of the methods of Scientific Management into a manufacturing engineering works employing about 1,000 people. Although we have not as yet gone as far in the direction of Scientific Management as Mr. Cadbury has done, we have satisfied ourselves of two things:—

- (1) That the increased productivity claimed for the system is borne out by experience, and is more than worth the expense involved.
- (2) That the system can be adapted to English engineering conditions.

On both of these propositions the English engineering press has been sceptical.

In dealing with this subject I consider that most people make a mistake in treating Scientific Management as though it enunciated principles quite new and different from any in operation hitherto. This is obviously not the case. For many years works jobs have been closely studied, workmen have been carefully selected, detailed instructions for doing work have been given, tools and appliances have been standardised, even "functional" foremen—notably inspectors—have been used. The principles underlying these schemes have long been at work to a greater or lesser extent, though, generally, not all in the same works. The novelty of Scientific Management lies, not in the fact that these principles have been set to work, but that they have now achieved consciousness. They have become objects of study in themselves, and their scope and relationships have been investigated.

It is true that the conscious recognition of these principles produces a works organisation very different from the older types; but the question before the industrial world is not the adoption or rejection of the principles of Scientific Management—these have been accepted piecemeal and unconsciously long ago—but the means to be taken to overcome the objections inherent in the type of organisation produced. Scientific Management is the inevitable result of past and present industrial evolution, and it is too late now to discuss whether or not it shall be tolerated. By implication it is here already, and all we can do now is to study how to turn it to the best use of the community. Mr. Cadbury points out two serious objections to the system. These are:

- (1) A tendency to increase the monotony of work and to reduce the initiative and responsibility of the workman.
- (2) A doubt as to whether wages will be increased in the long run.

Taking the question of monotony first: The specialisation of jobs, which is responsible for monotony, is not a new force introduced

by Scientific Management but has been at work throughout the whole course of the industrial development of the last fifty years. In the engineering trade the all-round mechanic had already disappeared before the system was heard of in England. Scientific Management may carry this specialisation further still, but it introduces another force which tends to counteract the cramping effect of this on the man. To simplify a job is not necessarily to condemn the skilled man who did it previously to less skilled and more monotonous work. Often the studying and specialisation of a job simplifies it to such an extent that it can be done by a less skilled worker, and for him it may actually be an improvement in grade of work. This has been our own experience so far, and we have also found that the skilled men so displaced have all been required for work of a still better grade than that from which they were taken. I refer to such positions as inspectors, machine setters, time-study men, leading hands, etc., of all of which a greater number are required under the system than heretofore. Whether this relative redistribution of men and work will in the long run meet the objection, it is as yet too early to say. The system, however, makes possible another solution of the difficulty, *viz.*, a comprehensive scheme of transference and promotion of men from one kind of work to another. This was difficult in the past, because the knowledge and skill needed for any particular kind of work was not easy to come by. But under Scientific Management this knowledge is vested in those who control the factory, and they also have at their disposal the means of imparting it through the organisation of foremen trained for that purpose and through the detailed instructions we have heard so much about. There is still a third influence at work tending to reduce the amount of monotonous work to be done. The careful studying and costing of jobs required by Scientific Management will lead in more and more cases to the introduction of automatic machinery so that many of those jobs which hitherto were the most monotonous will disappear entirely. Mr. Cadbury seems to suggest that the increase of machinery would in itself be an objection to the system, as likely to diminish the demand for labour. Surely the history of industry shows this to be a fallacy, and that in the long run the replacement of hand operations by machine operations has led to such cheapening of products and consequent increased demand that the amount of labour employed has been increased rather than diminished.

With regard to the effect of the system on wages in the long run, it is too early to speak from experience. I would suggest, however, that the increased productivity, both of labour and machinery, will at least make the paying of higher wages possible.

Thus, to both of the objections raised I believe the system offers its own possible answer. But this fact does not of itself ensure that the objections will be met in actual practice. For this we must look to the workmen's organisations, and it seems very probable that Scientific Management will increase rather than diminish their bargaining power. When all the elements, movements, and times for doing a piece of work have been studied and defined, it becomes possible to negotiate between employer and employee

as to what shall be the wages for doing that work in a way which is quite impossible under the old system. Mr. Cadbury seems to have done this in his own case with extraordinary success. He is to be congratulated on having seen the dangers of the system and provided for them adequately, both by throwing the settlement of terms of work open to free discussion with his employees, and by establishing a comprehensive system of education which provides a ladder of promotion for those who choose to use it.

C. G. R.

Mr. W. H. JACKSON,

of Hans Renold, Ltd., Manchester.

OF all the questions relating to Scientific Management raised by Mr. Cadbury, those of widest public interest are probably :

- (1) What will be its effect on wages ?
- (2) Will the monotony of work be increased ?

(1) Mr. Cadbury points out that the fact of higher wages being paid by a few firms is no proof that the general level of wages will be raised when the new methods are adopted all round. Higher wages may have been paid either as a merely temporary move in order to make it easier to start the scheme or as the result of a demand for more skilful or more strenuous work, and in neither case is the general rate necessarily increased. Nevertheless, whilst waiting for the conclusive verdict based on experience, the following considerations would lead us to anticipate a general increase in wages, as the result of the general introduction of Scientific Management. In the first place its effects must be very similar to those of the introduction of machinery, and it will not be denied that the tendency of the latter has been to increase wages, not to decrease them. In the second place, if we describe this increase in general terms as due to the increased productivity of labour, there is a second source of increase, arising from the standardisation of work made possible by Scientific Management. Such standardisation makes the free and open discussion of wage questions easier, as may be inferred from the committees for sanctioning wage rates, which Mr. Cadbury describes. The bargaining power of the worker and the force of public opinion will, therefore, be considerably increased, and accordingly wages will tend to rise. The relatively high wages in the cotton industry are generally attributed to the extent to which the details of the various processes have all been standardised. Lastly, not only is the general rate likely to be increased but individual cases of very low wages will be less likely to occur because comparison between different firms will be less difficult than at present.

(2) It seems to be generally accepted that Scientific Management means more monotonous work. The following considerations, based on personal observation, tend to oppose this view.

First, there is a quite new scope offered to those who absorb the elements of scientific method; secondly, the standard of general education required by those who work to detailed written instructions is higher than that required at present from the bulk of unskilled operators; and lastly, the very monotonous work will more and more be done by automatic machinery rather than by hand. This last consideration does not apply, however, to office work; here standardisation undoubtedly increases the monotony if the daily task is never varied, but on the other hand makes it very much easier than before to give change of occupation.

W. H. J.



THE FIRST DECADE OF MODERN EUGENICS.¹

IF we look back, even to the history of thought in our own species, we find abundant records of the forerunners of what we now call Eugenics, not least in association with the great religions. It would be possible, if one knew enough of Confucianism, to demonstrate that there were eugenic principles there. They are most conspicuously to be found in Moses, and there are certain commandments of the Decalogue which are quite clearly eugenic in consequence, and to which we must refer as part causes of the existence of such valuable aids to contemporary eugenics as Professor Bergson and Professor Ehrlich; and Lycurgus was conspicuously a eugenicist in result, although his method, which involved killing, was not eugenics as I, at any rate, understand it. In the last century, to say nothing of other authorities in antiquity to whom Darwin refers (Plato is notable in this connection), writers such as John Ruskin repeatedly preached high, pure, admirable eugenics; so did Herbert Spencer, as for instance, in his little book on "The Study of Sociology." Walt Whitman preaches pure eugenics repeatedly, and to come over to this side of the Atlantic, I can quote a few lines from the book on the "Criminal Responsibility of the Insane," written in 1856 by Dr. Caleb Williams, my grandfather (*vide* the passage beginning: "The hereditary transmission of disease and the occurrence of the same disease in several members of the same family," &c.).

But it was Francis Galton, the author of "Hereditary Genius," of which I do not even possess a copy because it is still out of print, who in 1869 raised this question to a new plane, and who in 1883, in his "Inquiries into Human Faculty," a volume reprinted in Everyman's Library, first used the word Eugenics, which is now, therefore, rather more than thirty years old. The world was not ready for the idea, and it was not until 1904, just a decade ago, that Galton emerged from his retirement, and then, though far on in the ninth decade of his life, gave before the newly-formed Sociological Society at our request a lecture on "Eugenics, its definition, scope and aims." The definition which he then gave was, in my judgment, by far the best that exists, and much superior to that which Galton himself later substituted. He said: "Eugenics is the science which deals with all influences that improve the inborn qualities of a race; also with those that develop them to the utmost advantage,"—a phrase which includes the whole

1. A lecture delivered before the Sociological Society, February 24, 1914, and on March 26 before the Royal Institution.

of nurture from beginning to end. The reference to the influences that develop to the utmost the inborn qualities of the race suggests to us that Galton did not want merely the hereditary potentialities, but he wanted those potentialities to become real and actual and effective. In *Sociological Papers* for 1904 you will find some remarkable communications from authorities, but the audience was very small, smaller than the one I am now addressing, and very little notice was taken at that time. After further valuable communications to the Sociological Society, Mr. Galton, as he then was, very soon endowed eugenics in the form of a scholarship at University College. Very industrious and interesting work has been done there since by Mr. Schuster, the first Eugenic Scholar, and later by Dr. David Heron; and in 1907 and 1908 it was my privilege to discuss eugenics, though the word did not appear in the titles of the lectures, before the Royal Institution.

Sir Francis Galton, shortly before he died, wrote his beautiful and fascinating and ever-to-be-returned-to book, "Memories of my Life," quite the nicest autobiography, surely, that was ever written, because it is perfectly candid, and, though perfectly candid, includes nothing disagreeable, because there was nothing disagreeable in the writer. It reveals the character of this man, who illustrated the truth that, as I say so often, "Youth is a state of the soul." I knew him only in his ninth decade, but he was always the youngest man there, wonderfully enthusiastic and yet with all the great qualities of age. His entirely characteristic complaint of old age was that it had almost all the advantages except that one was not sufficiently criticised by one's juniors. He died in January, 1911, and left very nearly all his money to eugenics at University College, London, founding the Chair now held by Professor Karl Pearson. In the portrait by the late Charles Furse of this noble and venerable old man you may see hereditary resemblances, allowing for the different disposition of the facial hair, to other members of the illustrious Darwin stock to which he belonged—the eyebrows and the formation of the bone over the eyes, and the shape of the head. He had a lovely low-pitched voice, and though he was intensely deaf physically, he had no spiritual deafness whatever; he was always prepared to listen to new truth. We shall not look upon his like again, and eugenics has greatly suffered by his death, though he was within three weeks of his ninetieth year when he died. A short time ago the Eugenics Education Society had the admirable notion of perpetuating the birthday of Galton in the form of what they call Galton Day, and on February 16th, the 92nd anniversary of the birth of Galton in 1822, the Society held the first Galton Anniversary Lecture. It was delivered by Sir Francis Darwin, his relative, with another relative, Major Leonard Darwin,

in the chair. The great interest and importance, I think, of that lecture was that we had a Darwin and a relative of Galton saying that the Galtonian method of studying heredity must now be abandoned, and we must substitute for it the Mendelian method of studying heredity, the facts of which, said Sir Francis Darwin, could no longer be disputed. I welcome that statement, coming from a son of Charles Darwin, as of the very greatest importance for the future development of eugenics in this country.

The next record I want to refer to is the development of eugenics upon its popular side. It is astonishing how many societies have been founded in many parts of the world. I do not say that the activities of those societies, or that all the things said in discussion at all the meetings of all those societies, are invariably based upon the sound knowledge that would lead to desirable practice; but at any rate the matter is being discussed. The first society to be founded for the service of race hygiene was in Germany, I believe, but shortly thereafter the first society with the title of "eugenics" in its name was founded in England—the Eugenics Education Society, and after a period of characteristic caution Mr. Galton became its honorary president. Its first president was Sir James Crichton-Browne, and its second the late Mr. Montague Crackanthorpe, K.C., whom Major Leonard Darwin succeeds. There is now a society in Ireland, there is a society in New South Wales, in New Zealand, a very important body (to which I shall refer later) in the United States of America, the society I have already referred to in Germany, the Société Française d'Eugénique in Paris, societies or committees in Italy, Belgium, Denmark, Holland; and in all quarters of the globe, north and south of the Equator, there are bodies of persons who are interested in this matter. Some important publications are also now to be had. In England we have the *Eugenics Review*, started in April, 1909. Sir Francis Galton, as he had become, contributed to its pages the last of his papers upon this subject, which he had begun to discuss as far back as 1865 in his articles in *Macmillan's Magazine* on "The Heredity of Ability." Then the French publish every month their journal *Eugénique*, which contains the reports of the meetings of their interesting society. The Eugenics Education Society inaugurated and carried through with remarkable success the First International Eugenics Congress in London in 1912. The Papers are to be obtained under the title of "Problems in Eugenics." It was a most valuable and excellent occasion, and it was a great privilege to be there; and, having said so, one may also say that there was a most astonishing amount of obvious nonsense talked in every possible direction, and, so far as one could judge from what one saw of the Press, almost nothing but the nonsense was reported. The Second International Congress is to be held in

New York in September, 1915. The French would have welcomed the privilege of having the next Congress in Paris, but they have not yet got the machinery for carrying such a thing through, and so I understand we are to go to America.

In this lecture, the most important thing, I think, that needs to be said has already been hinted at in the passage I quoted from Sir Francis Darwin's First Galton Anniversary Lecture. It is really that we have, as eugenists, to reconsider a good deal of the older scientific beliefs upon which our practice—for eugenics is a practice—is to be based. When Galton read his first paper to the Sociological Society—that historic paper—Mr. Bateson, who is now Professor of Physiology in the Royal Institution, sounded a warning note. He hinted that the actuarial study of heredity had attained remarkable results in the hands of Mr. Galton himself, but that means of attacking the problem directly and with greater effect were already well developed. He proceeded to say that the actuarial method would perhaps continue to possess a certain fascination in regions of the inquiry where experimental methods were still inapplicable—for instance, I am sorry now to comment, in the case of tuberculosis, leading to conclusions which, I believe, are worse than worthless—but that conclusions drawn from facts not capable of minute analysis are at best to be regarded as interim conclusions waiting a test which in all likelihood they will never endure. That test they verily have not endured.¹ We of the Royal Institution are well aware how much water has flowed under the bridges since Professor Bateson spoke those words ten years ago, and how actual means of knowledge have accumulated under his direction and in his hands in respect of the fundamental science underlying eugenic practice, to which he has given the extremely convenient and proper name of Genetics.

We come now to the work of Mendel. Gregor Mendel did his useful work as far back as 1865, in the very year in which Galton was writing about heredity in *Macmillan's Magazine*. He was appointed abbé in the monastery of Brunn; he gave up all his scientific work, he lost heart in the matter, and he omitted to do even the one easy thing which he should most assuredly have done—write to Darwin. If he had only sent a copy of his paper (which is reprinted in Professor Bateson's now classical work "Mendel's Principles of Heredity"), in a separate envelope to Charles Darwin, as Wallace had done a few years before, I believe we should know more to-day about human heredity and heredity in general than we shall know for many years to come. But Darwin died without ever having heard that a man called Mendel had ever lived, and

1 See *Sociological Papers*, 1904, p. 64.

we have had to wait till 1914 for a son of Darwin to say that it is with Mendelian heredity that we must now make a fresh beginning. Mendel died in 1884, two years after Darwin's death, and it was not until 1900, barely 14 years ago, that his paper was re-discovered. It had been sent to various places—I daresay it was sent to the Royal Institution—but apparently no one had troubled to read this obscure production coming from an out-of-the-way part of the world, and it was not even known that the work had been done until it had been done for 35 years and its author had been in his grave for 16 years. We are now in a new epoch. Professor Bateson was appointed in 1908 to the Chair of Biology at Cambridge, and his inaugural lecture on "The methods and scope of Genetics" is well worth reading. That chair no longer exists, but Mr. Arthur Balfour has lately founded in its place a Chair of Genetics, which is held by a pupil of Professor Bateson, Professor Punnett. He has to range over the whole gamut of bi-sexual life, but the time is coming when we shall have to endow Chairs of *Human* Genetics, for eugenic purposes, in Cambridge and elsewhere. The Americans have gone very rightly ahead in this respect; I suppose largely because they were unhampered by the development of the subject. They had known nothing of that personal allegiance to Galton which all of us must feel who have been in the presence and the confidence of that noble man, and therefore it was easy for them to make a fresh beginning, and they did so on Mendelian lines. There already existed the American Genetic Association, which publishes the *Journal of Heredity*, and which founded in 1910 its Eugenics Record Office. (I am rather proud of the date, because my book on eugenics, which was revised by Mr. Galton, and was the first to introduce the subject, was published a year before in America, as here.) In 1910 they set to work to study eugenics, on Mendelian lines. A munificent lady, Mrs. Harriman, has given very large sums of money, and the work is done on a scale and with resources which have no parallel whatever either in this country or in any other part of the world.

A prime demand of the Mendelian method is that we must study more than two generations. We must study at least three generations—that is absolutely fundamental. Here you have many more than two or three generations studied (Lantern slides shown.) All those figures refer to individuals fully discussed, and this is a record of a particular family with a very disastrous history. All those individuals have been actually seen and studied at first hand by the field workers trained by Dr. Davenport at the Eugenics Record Office. All such work will need to be done again, for a reason to which we shall shortly come. But it was good pioneer work. A great deal of faith and a great deal of ability were put into it, though I fear, considering that all the inquiries were

neurological, that the measure of clinical skill in neurology was somewhat deficient, and that mere names have too often been used where it was supposed that things were being referred to. "Epilepsy," "neurasthenia," "mental deficiency" and other terms which cover a great variety of realities have been used with inadequate analysis, but still the work done was very fine. Nothing like it had been done anywhere else, with the exception of Lundborg's work in Sweden. Results were thus obtained which, whilst they can only be looked upon as preliminary, carried us far beyond anything yet obtained in this country or anywhere else in the study of human genetics. My friend Dr. Kerr Love of Glasgow, who has long devoted himself to the study of deaf children, has carried this work on, thanks to the generosity of Mr. Leo Bonn, who in London founded the National Bureau for the General Welfare of the Deaf. Mr. Bonn has given many thousands of pounds to that bureau, and he made it possible for Dr. Kerr Love to do a great deal of valuable work in the study of deaf-mutism. On my advice, Dr. Kerr Love began by studying everything the Americans had done. He got hold of the American method; he saw its soundness, and then he saw its unsoundness; and he saw there was not sufficient clinical knowledge there, that all the workers taught to construct pedigrees were not sufficiently trained to distinguish, for instance, between one type of epilepsy and another type of epilepsy which might be quite different in origin. He attempted the problem of deaf-mutism, to which he has devoted his life, with the Mendelian clues but with his own profound clinical knowledge, and with the addition of a special test for the existence of inherited disease which the Americans did not employ. The Wassermann test, as we call it, was not used by the Americans in any of their work, and I am afraid that what they have done, from beginning to end so far in the study of neurological genetics, requires to be re-done with the addition of the Wassermann test. We do not know how much of such pedigrees is really genetic, so to say, and how much is inherited infection—a fundamentally different thing. Dr. Kerr Love has done superbly that work for deaf-mutism, and he is now being followed by other workers in Glasgow and all over the world. The most recent application of the Wassermann test to cases of mental deficiency has compelled us to realise that even the excellent preliminary work done by the Americans is quite inadequate in this connection. In this country valuable pedigrees have been collected by the late Mr. Nettleship, by Major Hurst and others; and many of them have been shown at the Royal Institution by Prof. Bateson. Major Hurst was the first to show that the Mendelian principle applies, in some degree at any rate, to man. He did so in respect of

eye colour, and although that is now several years ago, I believe that, with amplifications, his results were absolutely accurate, and that the inheritance of the pigmentation of the back and front of the iris of the human eye follows substantially the same laws as those which Mendel elicited for the pea very nearly half a century ago. This work of Hurst's has been confirmed by Davenport on the other side of the Atlantic, and it led the way onwards to the study of such Mendelian inheritance in man as may bear upon eugenics. Of course, eugenics is not concerned with such things as eye colour, but there are other cases where eugenics is very distinctly concerned. For instance, suppose it were shown, as the Americans thought they had shown, that mental deficiency is a Mendelian characteristic like the shortness in the case of the edible pea, then it would have great eugenic significance; and Dr. Kerr Love has shown that the Mendelian principle applies to one form, and to one form only, of deaf-mutism. I have three slides for which I am indebted to the Eugenics Record Office. (Lantern slides shown). In that last picture you see how these field workers, as Dr. Davenport calls them, go into many parts of the United States and pursue their inquiries, beginning, of course, with near New York and then spreading about in various parts following the line of families so as to give as far as possible complete family charts corresponding in some measure, at any rate, to the completeness which Mendel was able to obtain in his study of lower forms of life.

Now, it is unfortunately the case that the Mendelian methods and Professor Bateson's methods in this country are not looked upon with favour by those who have devoted part of their lives to the study of heredity by the method initiated by Francis Galton himself. Indeed there may be a fine quality in the loyalty to that great man which prefers to follow strictly the methods which he initiated, and yet it is also worth remembering that Galton realised the value of Mendelism. Some years before he died, when I happened to mention the subject to him, he said: "I do not question the existence of Mendelian segregation." That elementary fact is still questioned within the laboratory which bears his name. In "Memories of my Life" he writes as follows, and I ask you to observe this; it is Galton writing on Mendel:

I must stop for a moment to pay a tribute to the memory of Mendel, with whom I sentimentally feel myself connected, owing to our having been born in the same year 1822. His careful and long-continued experiments show how much can be performed by those who, like him and Charles Darwin, never or hardly ever leave their homes, and again how much might be done in a fixed laboratory after a uniform tradition of work had been established. Mendel clearly showed that there were such things as alternative atomic characters of equal potency in descent. How

far characters generally may be due to simple, or to molecular characters more or less correlated together, has yet to be discovered.

Those are Galton's own words in which he asserts that Mendel clearly showed that there were such things as alternative atomic characters of equal potency. I beg that you will remember that generous Galtonian passage, lest anyone should suppose that there is any treachery to the memory of Francis Galton in proceeding, as now Sir Francis Darwin has told us we must do, upon Mendelian methods in our study of these matters. No member of the Royal Institution who has heard, now for years past, Mr. Bateson's lectures on this subject can possibly be in doubt that the assertions of the Mendelians correspond to facts which we have seen with our own eyes, which have been handed round for us to look at, animal and vegetable forms which have visible existence, which we have seen together with their parents and grandparents. To be told, as I was lately told by a pupil of Professor Pearson, that those results are mythical, is too ridiculous; and it was very disappointing, after my lecture in January to the French Society of Eugenics, to find that there Mendelism was looked upon as illusory by students, not biometricians but real students of biology, the leaders and founders of the French Society of Eugenics, who have not yet had opportunities of seeing the wonderful new forms of life which, as Professor Bateson once said at a Friday evening discourse at the Royal Institution, have been "created" by the application of the Mendelian method. It was somewhat disheartening to realise that just on the other side of the Channel the whole of the Mendelian results were looked upon as mythical, and I am very glad indeed, for his prescience and unselfish love of truth, that when they come to read the autobiography of our Founder they will find the paragraph which I read to you.

Professor Bateson again in 1909, in his "Mendel's Principles of Heredity," warned men of science that it would not do any longer to go on with the methods which Galton employed, but which now can no longer be looked upon as valuable. Professor Bateson said that our successors would fail to understand how methods so unsound were treated with respect at all by men of science. I am sorry if you feel that I am insisting upon this too much, but if you will have the patience to look into the results which have been obtained by the Galtonian method, and have been widely discussed and argued with notable bearings upon every kind of social questions, upon problems of health and disease, the care of tuberculosis, the control of alcoholism, infant mortality, and so forth, you will realise it as an important matter that the fundamental basis of those researches is unsound. I believe that, at the end of this first decade of modern eugenics, we know very

much less than many thought we knew in 1904, that a great many points on which even Galton himself would have said "Here we have knowledge, here we may advise society," are points on which further knowledge is now, ten years later, required, because, having put our suppositions to the test imposed by the Mendelian ideas, and above all to the analysis required in terms of the significance of nurture as well as of nature, we realise that we have no right to dictate to society on a great many of those matters. When you read, as we continually do read, that eugenists say this and say that, and require such and such a thing, and object to something else, it is not responsible eugenists, or those who have done anything for eugenics, who are necessarily being quoted in that connection. As likely as not it is an enemy in the guise of one of us.

In the syllabus of this lecture I have ventured to put down—in the most inappropriate place in the world—that the motto of institutions is "No new truths wanted." It gets to be remembered that they were founded for certain truths,—which soon comes to mean that new truths are not wanted: hence the motto which I see, in my mind's eye, over the portals of most institutions—not here, where for more than a century new truths of many kinds have been first promulgated. But it is a very general principle, and we eugenists must beware of it. It is an unfortunate thing to have the experience I have had, to realise that just on the other side of the Channel biologists had nothing to say to Mendelism, except that it was a delusion, and further to realise that they accepted as unquestioned the teaching of Lamarck regarding the influence of nurture upon succeeding generations, for which I can hardly obtain a hearing in this country. When I had spent something like a quarter of an hour in my lecture in Paris in showing that as eugenists we must recognise that nurture of the individual affects his or her parental possibilities, and that it was not right to ignore it, I was forcing an open door; every one there took that for granted, and never questioned it for a moment. The countrymen and followers of Lamarck have never questioned for a moment that influences acting on the individual may affect his or her parental possibilities. If only one may contrive that the Mendelian belief be taken over to Paris, and this clause of the Lamarckian belief be brought to London, I believe both countries would greatly profit.

A word now about the "science of eugenics." The term has been employed by Galton himself, but I conceive it to be a term that is useless, and that deals with no existing reality. It is true, and it is important, that in later years, near the very end of his life, Galton used the term "eugenics" for practice, not for knowledge,

not for science. In his very last paper, speaking of my term "Negative eugenics," which I myself define as "the discouragement of unworthy parenthood," Sir Francis Galton, then accepting the term, said: "It is the hindrance of the marriages and production of offspring by the exceptionally unfit." That, you will observe, is practice. The word eugenics means "good breeding." It is doing that which we believe is the finest thing to which we can set ourselves. It is not science, it is not knowledge, but their application. Similarly, in exact analogy, there is no such thing as the science of medicine, but the doctor goes to the sick-room and he practises the art or practice of medicine beside the patient's bed, and his value to the patient (apart from suggestive and "Christian Science" sort of influences) depends upon the extent to which his practice is dictated by knowledge, by certain sciences which are not medical practice but constitute its foundation. For instance, he must know about bacteriology, he must know about physiology, he must be able to tell the knee-joint from the ankle-joint, and so forth, in such a way that he will become capable of serving his patient; and the service performed to his patient is what we call medicine, or the practice of medicine. Further, the practising physician is always at the mercy of the man of science, and when a scientist who never had a medical degree made certain discoveries in his researches, almost the whole of medical practice and the whole of surgery had to be revolutionised, because that man, Louis Pasteur, had changed the scientific foundation upon which the doctor works when he practises medicine. The doctor must always be prepared to have his opinions and his practice revolutionised by advance in the sciences which underlie medicine. Now eugenics is racial medicine: it will be much more, but it is already at least racial medicine, trying to heal and trying to maintain the health of the race as well as the individual; and similarly this practice requires to rest upon foundations. We go back to Confucius and to Moses, and we realise that they had not much knowledge, and that some of their eugenic practices were erroneous, because they did not have the knowledge, though it is amazing to realise how much knowledge Moses had, or acted as if he had. To-day we are gradually accumulating knowledge which will ever more firmly constitute the foundations of eugenics, broad and deep, and I should like briefly to refer to one or two of those.

First, we have to deal with the principles of heredity, named by Bateson "genetics." If in a given case we have no genetic knowledge, then so far as that is concerned eugenics must hold its peace. If it says "You must marry," "You must not marry," "You should become parents," "You should not become parents,"

it will be only in the long run stultified and discredited. I regret to say that it is only in a very limited degree so far that eugenics has any real right given it by genetics to dictate to society, and in a host of respects where people call themselves eugenicists, and profess to interpret eugenics as saying what should or should not be done, they have no genetic warrant. Professor Bateson, five years ago, pointed out that as regards valuable characters in man our genetic knowledge is so small that we have no right to dictate, but that as regards disastrous characters there is a certain amount of knowledge, and that certain forms of vice and defect and disease might be effectively weeded out by the application of that knowledge on the side of negative eugenics. But on the side of Galtonian or, as I call it, "positive eugenics," I do most earnestly say we must beware of going in front of assured genetic knowledge. Some of us have erred, not once or twice, not in small matters but in great and urgent matters, in this respect; we have interfered with useful things, and we have done that which we ought not to have done in many ways, because we have called our prejudices science, and have built what are mere castles in the air for lack of genetic knowledge.

Secondly, it seems to me perfectly clear that for eugenics we are required not to take up the egregious attitude of some eugenicists towards the medical sciences, but we require to use them. A eugenicist going into the problem of insanity, into the problem of mental deficiency, into the problem of deaf-mutism or "paralysis," with no medical knowledge, cannot reach true conclusions. To anyone with the barest rudiments of clinical knowledge, or even, failing that, of common sense, it is obviously unthinkable that he should do so; he does not know that with which he deals. We need the neurologist, and progress will come when the neurologist looks at these matters from the genetic point of view, as he is now doing. At the International Medical Congress a few months ago, in the appropriate section, under the presidency of Sir James Crichton-Browne, there was a paper read by a neurologist from New York who described a rare form of psychiatric lesion which obeyed the Mendelian law in its inheritance. Similarly, there are all the incidents of pathology associated with infection. We find parents and children tuberculous, and all the purely actuarial followers of eugenics say, "This is heredity." Hence no one who is tuberculous or has had consumption in his family, anywhere in his record—in fact, as far as I can see, no one whose parents or any of whose ancestors have ever died of anything, according to some pseudo-eugenic teaching—should become a parent. When you inquire you find that this disease, tuberculosis, is an infection. With exceptions so rare that they are the rarest

incidents in pathology—every one is recorded, and I suppose there are not half a dozen in the whole literature of medicine—no baby is born infected with tuberculosis; and every tuberculous person, with these apparent exceptions, so rare, and even so proving the rule, has been infected by a particular germ. That factor must be taken into account. When, further, we find that the children of tuberculous parents, removed at birth before infection, and taken care of elsewhere without infection, do not become infected, we must look into the matter. When we find that in Copenhagen, and now in this country, it is possible to eradicate tuberculosis from herds of cattle by the simple principle of taking away the non-infected calves from the infected parents, must we not think again as regards ourselves? When Dr. Halliday Sutherland finds, as he did lately at a dispensary for tuberculosis, that about three-fourths of the children of cases of consumption which are infectious, where the unfortunate patient is expectorating the germ, are infected with the disease, but that the children of other cases, where there is no infection because the parent is not yet expectorating the germ, do not have the disease in the great majority of cases, clearly we must consider such facts. Conclusions which are independent of any knowledge of the medical facts must be regarded as unsatisfactory; and a grave responsibility attaches to the authors of certain publications on this subject. The same applies, of course, to the great medical science of obstetrics, and to the care of expectant motherhood. It applies, again, to the question of dietetics. When we learn, as we do, that there are forms of insanity, forms of mental deficiency, which nothing can cure, apparently, no education, no love, no patience, and which might be looked upon as hereditary, which can nevertheless be dissipated as by magic by the use of such a drug as extract of the thyroid gland, then we realise that the problems of pharmacology and therapeutics are also strictly relevant to the problems of eugenics. Some of the most disastrous and lamentable things said by eugenicists in this connection have proceeded from those who had no knowledge of the medical facts involved.

Then, again, consider anthropology. I remember how Dr. McDougall, the distinguished psychologist and eugenicist, and I used to be invited to consult with Mr. Galton nearly ten years ago in connection with his endowment of eugenics at University College. Dr. McDougall lectured recently upon the mind of certain low forms of man, and made out a very good case to show that those low forms were just about as high as any of us. Now all the problems of racial eugenics—the problem, for instance, of our duty from the eugenic standpoint towards the various races in South Africa—must depend, if it is to be worth anything, upon what anthropology reports, not upon prejudice, not upon conven-

tional notions, not upon racial or religious or economic or any other kind of prejudice. We must go to the anthropologists humbly and ask them: "What do you find of the real worth of such and such a race?"—Japanese or Chinese or Spaniard or Kaffir or native of Borneo, or whoever it may be: and only then shall we be able to say what our duties are. Further, the anthropologist must report upon questions of racial intermingling, such as those which are looming more and more upon the horizon in Australia and South Africa and in the United States.

Lastly, there is the science of sociology. It was most appropriately the Sociological Society that invited Mr. Galton to use its new platform to give his eugenic propaganda to the world. Sociology has some knowledge of the fact that the individual does not live for himself alone, but is part of the great social organism; and when so-called eugenists are proposing to do without marriage,—some modern Plato, perhaps, saying that all the babies are to be shuffled at birth so that none of the mothers shall know them, and that the application of maternal prejudice shall be wiped away, and eugenics be able to go forward without it—then the sociologist, who has some notion of the family, some notion of the structure of society and the relation of the family and of marriage to the social organism, will think again. I suggest, therefore, that sociology will be very much required by the eugenist, and that also when political proposals are made which would involve, for instance, it may be, the gravest injury to real liberty, then the sociologist is urgently required. The sociologist is no less required if we make proposals which are alleged to outrage liberty, and which may seem to outrage liberty, and yet which may be the best friends of real liberty, such as the Inebriates Bill, now before the country. Such are a few of the many questions where foundations of science are required before the eugenist is entitled to proceed.

I have so much still to say—and I have a minute and a half now—that I will proceed to the first paragraph of the syllabus of my next lecture. Galton dealt with the inheritance of ability. Galton was tremendously able; he belonged to a tremendously able stock; he had a rare combination of qualities, including that gentleness of disposition, that incapacity for losing his temper, which he inherited, perhaps, from Josiah Wedgwood: most or all the descendants of Josiah Wedgwood seem to have it—Charles Darwin, Francis Galton, and so forth. His work was especially directed towards ennobling the mind; for his was the verdict of Walt Whitman: "Produce great persons, the rest follows." And he was ever trying to produce great persons. His book "Hereditary Genius" was published in 1869, and dealt with that matter. It went out of print; Messrs. Macmillan re-published it in 1892, with a very valuable introduction

to the second edition by the author, but that has been out of print for many years. It was out of print in 1904. Mr. Galton himself referred to it as being out of print then, and for many years I have been trying to get a reprint of it. It ought to be all over the world. There are people quoting Galton, calling themselves eugenists, founding and running eugenic societies all over the world, who, as far as I can honestly see, have never read a line of Galton himself. His masterpiece, a classic of science and literature, should never have been out of print, and I am very happy to say that, thanks to the help of Major Leonard Darwin, which I sought from him on Galton Day, Messrs. Macmillan are about to publish a new edition.¹

C. W. SALEEBY.

In a second lecture before the Royal Institution, Dr. Saleeby dealt with the present position of Eugenics and the immediate outlook. The following is an outline summary of the address:—

EUGENICS TO-DAY: ITS COUNTERFEITS, POWERS AND PROBLEMS.

The need to extend Galton's original conception.—Failure of human genetics hitherto regarding valuable qualities.—Their genetic complexity.

Counterfeit Eugenics.—The almost universal misunderstanding of "natural selection."—The "better dead" school.—The champions of the slum-landlord.—Class eugenics.—The defenders of alcoholism, infant mortality, tuberculosis.—Wicked and impudent proposals to abolish marriage and to outrage love.

Eugenics as here advocated:—

I.—PRIMARY OR NATURAL EUGENICS.

(a) POSITIVE: *The Encouragement of Worthy Parenthood.* (The Homing Question.—The words of King George V.: "The foundations of national glory are laid in the homes of the people."—The example of the Duchy of Cornwall in South London.—The redirection of Charity.)

(b) NEGATIVE: *The Discouragement of Unworthy Parenthood.* (The Mental Deficiency Act.—Problems of Insanity, Epilepsy, Deaf-mutism.)

(c) PREVENTIVE: *The Protection of Parenthood from the Racial Poisons.* (Definition and examples of racial poisons.—Contemporary study of alcoholism.—The work of Laitinen in Helsingfors, Mjöen in Christiania, Stockard in New York, and Bertholet in Lausanne.—The Inebriates Bill.)

1. The records of modern families in this book must now, in an Appendix, be brought up to 1914 from 1892, by some competent genealogist. I hope Messrs. Macmillan will have this done for us.—C.W.S.

its reintroduction demanded.—Continued neglect of politicians to meet the demand formulated by Sir James Crichton-Browne, first President of the Eugenics Education Society, in 1909.)

II.—SECONDARY OR NURTURAL EUGENICS.

From care of expectant motherhood to education for parenthood.—The Boy Scout movement.—Ellen Key.

Problems now before us.—Imperial Eugenics.—Patriotism and parenthood.—The National Birth-rate Commission.

Eugenics and the religion of the future.—Modern vitalism (Driesch, Bergson, McDougall).—Eugenics as Creative Evolution become self-conscious.—The Eastward Window.



WOMEN IN PRIMITIVE SOCIETY.¹

MOST of us have realised how dangerous it is to make sweeping generalisations on sociological matters, especially with so vast a subject before us. I propose simply to deal with certain aspects of this question of the position of women among primitive peoples, emphasising points which I regard as significant, and in a few cases mentioning the conclusions of certain writers whose opinions are of weight. May I disarm criticism at the very outset by explaining that I have used the term "primitive" in the less restricted sense as applying to peoples who are in a stage of savagery or bordering on barbarism—those whom we term backward peoples, *Naturvölker*.

1. *Social structure*.—We will begin with the more theoretical side of the subject and consider the place of woman in the social structure of the community. Now the community may consist of groups reckoning relationship either through the mother or through the father, or through both—though this last need not trouble us much in the case of savages, as either matrilineal or patrilineal grouping preponderates nearly always.

We see before us in civilised societies such institutions as primogeniture and the English law of coverture, attesting a stage of almost complete male ascendancy: on the other hand, we dip into books of travel or into the immortal *Kim* and we find records of female ascendancy almost as complete. One may leap to the conclusion that in primitive societies woman was supreme, but that she proved unequal to the position and so man came to his own. Or one may have recourse to the *Encyclopædia Britannica* and study the all-too-brief article "Matriarchate," wherein it is stated that "the mother took precedence of the father in certain important respects, especially in line of descent and inheritance. . . . The prominent position then naturally assigned to women did not, however, imply any personal power." According to this description woman does not stand so utterly condemned of inefficiency, for it seems that she is more a connecting link uniting her children to her own clan or group, wherein her male relatives wield the power, than herself the holder of that power. The idea that the women actually ruled is probably due to the rather misleading term matriarchate, which from its derivation (Greek *ἄρχω*, I rule) implies that such was the case. For this reason sociologists often employ instead of matriarchate and patriarchate the terms mother-right and

1. A paper read before the Group for the Study of Women in Society, Sociological Society, March 25, 1914.

father-right. In the glossary to his *Races of Man*, Dr. Haddon¹ describes mother-right as: "A state of society in which there are two or all of the three conditions: (1) descent is reckoned through the mother; (2) on marriage the husband goes to live with the wife; (3) authority in the family is in the hands of the mother, the maternal uncles, or the mother's relatives in general" (p. 116). Father-right represents the converse of conditions (1) and (2), the third being that "authority in the family is in the father's hands."

The Seri Indians afford an example of mother-right in a high phase of development,² all of these three conditions being fulfilled. The Seri inhabit Tiburon island in the gulf of California, a few islets, and a strip of the Mexican coast opposite. Cut off by the sea and by deserts, the tribe lives in complete isolation and is extremely hostile to any aliens who may attempt to establish a footing in its territory. The social institutions have therefore evolved without any modification from outside. These Indians are loosely organised into a number of groups or clans tracing descent through the mother. At present polygyny prevails owing to the fact that there are more women than men, but both custom and tradition tell of former monogamy, with a suggestion of polyandry. Marriages are arranged by the mothers of the parties, the girl herself having power to refuse her suitor. There follows a year's probation during which the bridegroom has to pass severe material and moral tests. He comes to live with the bride's clan and in her hut, and during the period must provide for her entire family in order to prove his skill and competence as a hunter and turtle-fisher. Meantime the prospective bride receives intimate attentions from the groom's brothers—a fact which suggests earlier conditions of polyandry. No ceremonies attach to the taking of the second (or third) wife, who is usually a widowed sister of the first. The matron rules in the home, and the clan-mother keeps order in the clan. Within the hut, which the women erect without help from men or boys, the matron's brothers may claim a place whenever they like, but the husband must occupy the outermost position in the group and act as sentinel. In forming a new ranch it is the matrons who take the initiative, the brothers and husbands following a few days later when the huts have been erected and belongings arranged. In times of stress when hunting or fighting is going forward, the men take the lead and the women have an inferior position.

As an instance of father-right we will take the social organisation

1. I should like to thank Dr. Haddon for his kindness in criticising the present paper and suggesting certain alterations.

2. The following data are taken from "The Seri Indians" by W. J. McGee, *17th Annual Report of the Bureau of American Ethnology*, pt. 1, 1895-96.

of the Dinkas of the Bahr-el-Gebel in the Eastern Sudan.¹ The father is head of the family and rules within it, appeal being allowable, however, to the council of old men. A man's wives, for whom he makes payment in cattle, are regarded as his property and so are all children born to them, irrespective of actual paternity—is *pater quem nuptiae demonstrant*, as in English law. So absolutely is the woman a passive chattel that faithlessness on her part is not punishable, though the male offender must pay compensation in cattle to her husband. The husband cannot break the marriage on this ground so long as the woman elects to remain in his compound.

The custom of "raising up seed" to a man who dies childless has been carried to unique lengths by Dinka law, a male heir being essential, since property cannot pass to a woman except in trust for a prospective heir. As in many other African tribes, a widow's children born however long after her husband's death count as his progeny; if a man dies leaving no male issue it is therefore incumbent upon a close male relative to beget a son for him. But Dinka law goes yet further and provides "for the extreme case of a man's dying childless, or at least sonless, without near male relatives and leaving only widows beyond the age of child-bearing, by allowing the widow or daughter in whom his property may temporarily vest, to contract marriage in his name with a woman who is, by the act of marriage, to become his widow and bear his heir. . . . He is his son by a legal fiction as ingenious as any ever propounded by lawyers of more civilised countries" (Hartland). In two respects, however, the Dinkas show traces of a probable earlier stage of mother-right. First, a man lives in his wife's village till their first child can walk, after which the couple remove to his village²—manifestly a survival of matrilocal marriage under which a man shall "leave his father and his mother, and shall cleave unto his wife." Secondly, descent is reckoned on both sides in the Dinka table of affinities, any breach of which entails a fine in cattle and a sacrifice of atonement to the ancestors.

I have chosen two extreme cases, which, however, must not be regarded as typical; under mother-right the woman need enjoy no authority—indeed formerly in West Torres Straits, though marriage was matrilocal, once the husband had paid the bride-price for his wife he might kill her if she caused trouble.³ Westernmarck

1. The following account is taken from Captain H. O'Sullivan's article, "Dinka Laws and Customs," in *Journ. Roy. Anth. Inst.*, x1, 1910, p. 171. With introd. by E. Sidney Hartland.

2. Cummins, "Sub-Tribes of the Bahr-el-Ghazal Dinkas," *Journ. Anth. Inst.*, xxxiv, 1904, p. 151.

3. Haddon, *Reports of Camb. Exped. to Torres Sts.*, v, 1904, p. 229.

4. *The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas*, i, 1906, pp. 655-7.

considers that the position of women is not really dependent upon organisation according to mother-right or father-right, though where marriage is matrilineal the presence of the wife's relations tends to restrict marital despotism.

II. *Economic position of women*.¹—Among primitive peoples a hard and fast line divides man's work from woman's—which we may observe also in higher stages of culture. Man does what requires strength, violence, speed, while to woman falls the slow, unspasmodic, routine work. Roughly speaking, man's attention is devoted to animal life which is stimulating and yields a rapid and concrete return and involves violent and intermittent activity; he frequently also undertakes the arduous work of felling trees and building the hut. Woman on the other hand devotes herself to the vegetable world; in the earliest stages she collects berries and roots, then she gradually acquires the art of cultivation. Man hunts and fights, woman labours with her hands; man makes weapons and snares, woman makes clothing and objects of domestic use like baskets and pottery, though more rarely we find men working as weavers and potters. A Kurnai tribesman (Australia) once described a man's activities as follows:—"A man hunts, spears fish, fights and sits about." We hear the same story from many parts of the world. On the march the Bushman will carry simply his spear, bow, and quiver, while his wife goes loaded with a mat, an earthen pot, ostrich egg-shells, skin bundles, and the baby. Among the North American Indians, too, the squaw had the lion's share of the hard routine work. Once man had killed his game it was for woman to do the rest—to convert the flesh into food, the skin into clothing. The domestic tasks of fetching wood, grinding corn, tanning hides and, in the main, the preparation of clothing are woman's work. But when it is a question of clothing from the decorative standpoint, it is primitive man, not woman, who stands convicted of vanity—witness the marvellous feather ornaments of South American Indians and Central Australians and the fearful and wonderful head-dresses affected on great occasions by certain Papuans. And these works of art are the outcome of man's originality. In some parts of Africa, too, it is men who dress leather and sew. At a later stage when man has exterminated the game it may be that he takes to domesticating animals; work connected therewith is usually his affair, though the women may help with the young, e.g. the Uriankhai of Central Asia with young reindeer.² Or perhaps man may turn to agriculture or industrial pursuits in which at earlier stages women alone engaged, and on them he brings to bear the organising force engendered by his male

1. In this section I have found Prof. W. I. Thomas's *Sex and Society* (Chicago, 1907) most suggestive.

2. Douglas Carruthers, *Unknown Mongolia*, 1913, vol. i, p. 234.

enterprises of the past which required concerted action, and in his new field of activity things go forward on a larger scale.

Primitive woman, though undoubtedly a drudge, felt this no hardship. It was only later that man kept her in idleness as a sign of wealth and secluded her by way of self-assertion against others of his sex, relegating her work to slaves. Something must be said in defence of the character of primitive man. He was not merely the slothful overlord of woman. On the path, when she goes heavily laden, he must have his hands free to defend her. And it must be borne in mind that male activities were violent and of a sort to demand great energy, so that men really were exhausted and needed to recuperate, while woman's manual labour did not drain her energies to the same extent. Woman considered it man's part to do deeds of daring, hers to applaud his prowess—note the modern popularity of the military with women.

This primitive division of labour, which arose largely from natural aptitude, became so rigid a custom that a man who does a woman's work is regarded as contemptible and women are the first to object to any breach. Among the Eskimo it is an indignity for a man to use the women's *umiak* (large skin boat), he must always use the *kayak*. In Abyssinia it "is infamy for a man to go to market to buy anything. He cannot carry water or bake bread; but he must wash the clothes belonging to both sexes, and, in this function, the women may not help him."¹ After all one still has a sense of unfitness about a man with a perambulator.

And the marked differentiation in sphere, though it may work out hard for the wife, tends to give her authority in the sphere which is exclusively her own. For primitive woman's home is her castle; there she rears her children, it is the centre of many of her activities, and comes to be regarded as her property. For instance, among North American Indians the lodge itself is absolutely under the wife's control, the husband having no voice in matters connected therewith. Her connection with industry and with land in course of time constitutes her a holder of property. In North America many title-deeds in regard to land bear the names of women as owners, and among the Akikuyu, as we shall see, it is the wife who owns the arable land. In virtue of manufacture and utilisation woman owned the household goods and food stores and controlled them. "She considereth a field and buyeth it; with the fruit of her hands she planteth a vineyard." (Prov., xxxi, 10-24.) So, too, as manufacturer she becomes trader *par excellence*, and often the markets are run by women entirely in certain parts of Africa and Papua; for the women had this advantage, they could trade whereas

1. Bruce, *Travels to Discover the Source of the Nile*, iv, p. 474.

the men might fight when different groups came together, and in time of war they counted as non-combatants.

As a concrete instance of the effect upon woman of the division of labour, we may cite the case of the Akikuyu,¹ of whom Mrs. Routledge says: "The stranger passing through the land who sees the women working with bent backs in the field, or toiling along the road with huge loads of firewood, obtains little idea of the home life of a Kikuyu woman, and that little erroneous. The position of such a woman in girlhood, wifehood, motherhood, and old age is in many ways preferable to that of her white sister." (p. 120.) "A woman has no legal status. Theoretically her husband may treat her as he likes, without being amenable to tribal justice; in practice she is protected by her initial value and by tradition. Custom prescribes the line between a man's work and a woman's, and this begins in earliest years,—the little girls make string bags, the little boys herd the goats." The line is not so hard and fast but that a man will sometimes help his feminine belongings. "The plot of ground, or *shamba*, which the woman tends is looked upon as hers; she can take a pride in its success or failure. She prefers to be the owner of a large *shamba*, which can be the envy of her neighbours, regardless of the extra work it may entail. Each wife has her own little granary in which to store her corn; she does not share it even with other members of the same homestead." (p. 121.) They carry very heavy loads of firewood and produce (to which they are inured from early childhood), fetch water, sew skins, help to build the huts and so on, but take their position for granted and feel that all is in the day's work.

Economic conditions certainly do affect the position of women in many cases. Often, though not always, women of hunting or herding people are in a low position (*cf.* the Dinkas) because they do not contribute essentially to the food-supply, whereas with more backward people who live on simple agriculture or collecting, women are better treated. Westermarck cites as an exception to this rule the Kara-Kirghiz of Central Asia, a pastoral people where women have a high status; but possibly this is no exception, since their better position may be due to the important part often played by the nomadic women of the steppes in packing up and erecting the yurt and its furniture as they move from place to place with their herds; the conditions of their nomadism have given to women an improved position.² Before leaving the economic side of the question, it may be pointed out that the dominant position enjoyed by women in polyandrous communities is at root due to economic causes. The custom of polyandry persists among the Lolos,

1. W. S. and K. Routledge, *With a Prehistoric People*, 1910.

2. Paul Bureau, "Les Tartares-Khalkhas," *La Science Sociale*, v, 1888, p. 414.

Mossos, and other peoples of the Indo-Chinese frontiers, among the lower castes of Malabar, the Todas of South India, and others. It looks as if it were the outcome of special conditions where the struggle for existence is severe and it is essential to impose limits to the increase of population. In Tibet polygyny is practised by the wealthy side by side with polyandry; monogamy is the rule among the poor pastoral nomads of the northern steppes.¹ From the economic standpoint polygyny is a distinct advantage to women, as the work is divided between the wives.

III. *The religious aspect.*—The close association of women with agriculture and the crops has sometimes a religious significance which has survived the stage of savagery. The fertility of the vegetable world is somehow connected with that of women. Success in agriculture is then supposed to depend on some magic quality in women connected with the bearing and rearing of children. Some Orinoco Indians said: "When the women plant the maize the stalk produces two or three ears; when they set the manioc the plant produces two or three baskets of roots; and thus everything is multiplied. Why? Because women know how to produce children, and know how to plant the corn so as to ensure its germinating. Then let them plant it; we do not know so much as they do."² And in certain tribes we find special ceremonies connecting the fertility of women with the crops. Dr. Haddon witnessed such a one at Bakaka, British New Guinea, when young unmarried girls wearing numerous grand skirts were taken on to the *dubu*, or platform, which no woman might ascend in the usual course of things. There they removed their petticoats and an old woman anointed certain parts of their bodies with coconut oil in order to ensure abundant crops.³ Some such idea underlies the rural customs of Europe connected with the Corn-mother or Corn-maiden, the beliefs in regard to the Maize-mother of ancient Peru, the Rice-mother of Sumatra and the Malay peninsula,⁴ and the Lady Godiva story too.

On the whole, however, religion tends to degrade woman, regarding her as a polluting influence. Even a Christian bishop at the Council of Mâcon raised the question: Is woman a human being? It was decided in the affirmative.⁵ The exclusion of women from religious rites is very widespread, *e.g.* in Melanesia, from the shamanistic ceremonies of the Siberian peoples, &c. Her

1. Keane, *Man: past and present*, 1900, p. 180; cf. also Wilson, *A Naturalist in Western China*, 1913, i, pp. 213 ff.

2. Quoted by Westermarck, *op. cit.*, i, 637.

3. Haddon, *Head-hunters*, 1901, p. 218.

4. Fraser, *Golden Bough*, 1900, ii, pp. 168 ff.

5. Westermarck, *op. cit.*, i, p. 663.

sinister influence may affect the pursuits of men: The Watusi of British East Africa, like most pastoral peoples, will not allow her to milk the herds; among the Bechuanas she might not touch the cattle; and she may not enter the sacred dairy of the Todas of Southern India.¹ No woman might come near while a Maori man was engaged in cutting nephrite.² At certain times, when with child, or at childbirth, women are supposed to emanate a baneful energy dangerous to all around them; they might not then touch anything belonging to a man (Austr., Torres Sts., W. Eskimo, Uganda); in many cases they are isolated in special huts; cf. the churching of women. Often the men have to live separately from their wives before going on a war expedition. But by the possession of this mysterious energy woman gains a secret power over her husband. Women become credited with magical powers, especially old women. In Southern Siberia about Tomsk witches are more numerous than male sorcerers, and it was the same in ancient Peru, Babylonia, and mediæval Europe.

In many parts of Australia and New Guinea the exclusion of women from religious ceremonies is very marked, indeed if one should set eyes on the sacred bull-roarer whose sound is supposed to be the voice of a spirit, she would be killed. It is interesting to note in this connection a myth of the Bukaua, German New Guinea.³ Missionary Lehner was told: Once a woman was chopping wood and a little lanceolate chip flew a long way with a humming noise. She was frightened and went and told her husband. He tried to produce the same sound, tied a piece of wood to a string, and swung it round in a circle, and the sound came. He told the other men, and they agreed to kill the woman and compensate the husband with a new wife. Since then the *balum* as producer of the spirit's voice is kept a secret from women. On Yam, one of the central islands of Torres Straits, the myth of origin of the cult of the heroes who were later associated with the hammer-headed shark and crocodile totems tells how it was an old woman out looking for octopus who first saw the two heroes in fish form in the lagoon and told her husband; the men in council in the sacred enclosure adopted them into their totemic cult. Again, when Bomai, the hero who founded the sacred Bomai-Malu ceremonies from which women are excluded, arrived at the eastern islands, it was a woman who discovered him in the form of an octopus.⁴

1. Rivers, *The Todas*, 1906, p. 245.

2. Elsdon Best, "Stone Technique of the Maori," *Dominion Mus. Bull.*, 4, 1912, p. 55.

3. R. Neuhaus, *Deutsch-Neu-Guinea*, 1911, iii, p. 414.

4. Haddon, *Reports of the Cambridge Expedition to Torres Straits*, v, 1904, pp. 64-5; vi, 1908, pp. 38-40.

With primitive peoples religion is a social affair entering very largely into the everyday life and tinging it. Here again we find the line of demarcation between the sexes emphasised. Initiation marks the beginning of this separation between men and women; then youths are segregated, often for months and taught all that it behoves them to know and the mysteries which must on no account be revealed to the other sex or the uninitiated. Ceremonies which take place when a girl reaches puberty are distinctly less impressive than those for boys.¹ As a rule there is no attempt at formal initiation with tribal significance and secret rites; usually the girl is simply secluded in the care of female relatives. Occasionally there are more important ceremonies, *e.g.* the Arunta of Central Australia have rites for girls parallel with the first two stages of those for youths, and some African tribes have elaborate rites obviously modelled on the boys', *e.g.* Bechuana. The Vey girls of Liberia have a long seclusion in the bush from the age of ten, and receive instruction by the oldest women in womanly duties, also dances and songs. Among some north-west American Indians girls are secluded for years in a tiny hut; this seems to be with a view to ensuring chastity, an early assertion of proprietary rights by the future husband. The separation of the sexes finds expression in the existence of the special men's house which women may not enter, except perhaps an old woman or two. The men's house is of very widespread occurrence: we see its beginning in the separate camping-ground for men of the Arunta, and the house itself is found in Papua and Melanesia, in Torres Strait as the *kwod* or sacred enclosure, in Micronesia and Polynesia, among the Land Dayaks of Sarawak, Battak of Sumatra, Igorots of the Philippines, Oraons (Dravidian), in all parts of Africa (Basuto, Masai, Kabyles, Mandingoes), among the Bororo of South America and other Brazilian tribes, in Mexico and Central America, as the sweat-house of north-west America, and as the *kashim* of the Eskimo which at certain times and during certain rites is rigidly closed to women.

Another development, akin to the men's house, is the Secret Society from which in its earlier phases women were excluded. This is very characteristic of Melanesia. On Banks islands no woman may approach the *salagora* or lodge of the secret society, though the women know that the *tamate*, or apparitions sent out for the intimidation of the uninitiated, are men disguised.² The masked figures in the Bomai-Malu cult of Mer, Torres Straits, are supposed by the women to be spirits of the heroes and are a means

1. On the subjects of initiation, men's houses, and secret societies, many points have been taken from Prof. Hutton Webster's *Primitive Secret Societies*, 1908, chaps. i, vi, and *passim*.

2. Codrington, *The Melanesians*, 1891, p. 74.

of terrorising them, the same is true of the *harihu* of Papuan Gulf, British New Guinea.¹

The system of secret societies is very well developed in certain parts of Africa. In the Yoruba villages of the Slave Coast, the famous Ogboni society holds sway; the members are representatives of the god Oro, a great bugbear. They use the bull-roarer, the voice of Oro, to keep the women in subjection. No woman may see the bull-roarer and live. When Oro is supposed to be present in Yoruba towns women must seclude themselves from 7 p.m. till 5 a.m., and on special Oro days they must remain so from daybreak till noon. A few elderly women are always admitted to Ogboni, they are distinguished by cotton strings tied round their wrists; they are supposed never to marry.² Another sort of bugbear for keeping women in subjection is Egungun. The men know he is a mortal, but the women believe him to be a dead man risen from the grave; if they owned to doubting this they would be killed. Among the South Guinea tribes similar societies exist for keeping women under.

But the men have not got things all their own way everywhere. In West Africa there is a flourishing secret society for women, called the Njembe, which admits only women.³ It possesses great power, based on the threatened employment of fetish medicines to injure the recalcitrant. There is a considerable fee for entry. Formerly it was a great honour to belong; now in order to perpetuate itself young women are compelled to enter it if they have derided Njembe. Initiation lasts for two weeks, during which harsh treatment is inflicted. Nothing is known of their rites which take place in a secluded place in the jungle. It is said that they dance nude, and that their songs have vile words. They profess to detect thieves, find out the secrets of enemies, and so on. The original object was no doubt to protect wives from harsh treatment by their husbands, and of course their reputation for magic is a deterrent on men. This description is practically true of present-day conditions, except that white influence has had the effect of lowering the status of the society. In tribes where Njembe exists women are much freer from male control, though its obscenity has not raised them in men's esteem. The secrets of the society are wonderfully well kept; even Christian converts refuse to divulge anything. Among the Vey of Liberia the women have the "Devil Bush" association which enables them to prevent undue tyranny by husbands. If the tribe decides to go to war, the declaration is first referred to the women.⁴

1. C. G. Seligmann, *The Melanesians of British New Guinea*, 1910, pp. 300-01.

2. Dennett, *Nigerian Studies*, 1910, p. 32.

3. Nassau, *Fetichism in West Africa*, 1904, pp. 249-50.

4. Hutton Webster, *op. cit.*, p. 120, n. 4.

The admission of women is characteristic of the disintegration of secret societies and their conversion into purely social clubs or magical fraternities. For example, the Egbo society of West Africa has an affiliated society for free women and one for slaves, both distinctly subordinate. Women may not attend the Egbo meetings but may buy Egbo privileges. The Lubuku of certain tribes of the Lulua River, Congo, freely admits women, but now it is primarily social; the initiatory rites are highly indecent. The American secret societies frequently admit women—perhaps a late development; their duties in ceremonials are distinctly subordinate among the Menomini and Hopi for instance.

The subject of secret societies, which are to some extent political institutions, leads to our next section.

IV. *The political status of women.*—On this score there is not much to be said about primitive women. One does hear or read of women attaining to power as chieftainesses. During the work of the Border Commission in East Africa for delimiting the boundary between British, German, and Belgian territory, Major Jack stated in a recent lecture that things went smoothly till a Bakiga woman chief stirred up her tribe vowing (like Jeanne d'Arc) that every alien must leave the country. Her rising was quelled and I believe she is now in prison at Entebbe. A District Commissioner in Uganda tells me that in introducing any new measure if the women and the old men can be talked over, the thing is accomplished. In the Bushongo kingdom of the Upper Kasai, Congo, women hold certain offices of state—not of a very dominant character—but then the Bushongo are really a wonderfully advanced people who have come from far away in the north. No doubt a savage woman of dominant character will make herself felt—she can always resort to a little magic to win a position for herself.

Among many North American Indian tribes the women wield great power—the Cherokee, Iroquois, and other Eastern tribes left important matters relating to peace and war to be decided by a vote of the women.¹

Celibacy on political grounds. In Uganda no princess, even if married by the king, might have a child under pain of death, for fear of her son aspiring to the throne. The king always married one of his half-sisters (by a different mother). She shared in the coronation ceremonial and had a court of her own separate from that of the king. But on account of this very power which she exercised she was not allowed to have children, lest her son should use his mother's powers for his own advantage. The king's successor had to be selected from among his sons by other wives, not the queen.²

1. Mooney, *Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn.*, xix, pt. i, 1897-8, p. 489.

2. Roscoe, *The Baganda*, 1911, pp. 83-4.

Africa yields us an instance of a rather curious function allotted to women, namely a military one. Under the military system of Dahomey the standing army consisted of (1) a female corps known as "The King's Wives" and "Our Mothers"; (2) a male corps of palace guards, etc; and (3), the male population of the kingdom as a sort of reserve liable to be called out. The female corps "was raised about 1729, when a body of women who had been armed and furnished with banners merely as a stratagem . . . behaved with such unexpected gallantry as to lead to a permanent corps of women being embodied."¹ Till 1818, when Gezo began to reign, the Amazon force consisted chiefly of criminals in the Dahomey sense, faithless wives, termagants, and scolds; thenceforward every head of a family had to send his daughters for inspection and suitable ones were selected. For many generations all the hard work had been done by women, and they were of splendid physique. The Amazons were regarded as the king's wives and might not be touched without danger of death. They were sworn to celibacy, but the king might take any of them to wife. Gezo attributed his military conquests to the prowess of these Amazons.²

Agricultural communities consisting exclusively of women have been reported from some parts of the world. They have arisen, it would seem, through spontaneous emigration on the part of the women and derive continuance through periodical visits, usually once a year and lasting a month in spring, by males from outside. Colombus, while coasting Hayti in 1493, heard of one of these communities from an Indian who visited him on board. He reported that the male visitors on their departure took with them the boys born in each interval, the girls being kept to replenish the society. Later accounts, says Payne,³

"afford a body of evidence strongly tending to prove the existence of such societies in the valley of the mighty stream on which these communities have indelibly stamped the name of River of Amazons . . . Women, as the Spaniards often found to their cost, can use the bow and arrow not less effectively than men. In possession of this deadly weapon, as well as of the materials of subsistence, they might easily form independent communities, and maintain them . . ."

"Such societies, however, would perish . . . not from man's hostility, but from his indifference, and his unwillingness to play the undignified part required of him to ensure their continuance; from internal dissension, from ennui . . . Man ultimately comes to an agreement with woman on his own terms. Struggle as she may, she is born for subjection, and will in the end return to her master."

With which conclusion the learned writer changes the subject!

1. A. B. Ellis, *The Ewe-speaking Peoples of the Slave Coast of West Africa*, 1890, pp. 182 ff.

2. Dowd, *The Negro Races*, i, 1907, p. 168.

3. Payne, *History of the New World called America*, 1899, ii, p. 11; cf. also Friederici, *Die Amazonen Amerikas*, 1910.

V. *Family Life*.—Such customs as the sale or loan of wives, their immolation at the husband's death (Africa, India, Fiji, Madagascar), and child-marriage, show the absolute control of the husband in such communities over the person of the wife. Often chastity is regarded as of no account in a girl, but faithlessness in a wife, the husband's property, is a crime. As regards the loan of wives (Tasmania, N.E. Siberia, and many other places), it must be remembered that this may reflect an early social organisation by which certain men, potential husbands, had access to women of certain divisions of the tribe. Though a woman may be owned as property like a dog, first by her father and then by her husband, generally there is some public opinion against too hard treatment of her. For example, among the Boloki of Central Congo a woman (or slave) if driven to desperation will go and break the witch-doctor's saucepan (*eboko*); heavy damages are then required from the husband, or master.¹ In S.E. Africa there are well-defined legal limits beyond which a wife may not be ill-treated, nor may she be re-sold.

The custom of paying a bride-price for a wife sounds worse than it really is. It is simply a compensation to a girl's family or clan for the loss of her labour—after all, it shows that she is valued, and a man is likely to set more store by that for which he has paid a good price. "It does not *eo ipso* confer on the husband absolute rights over her."² It does mark proprietary rights over her, but at the same time if treated too abominably she may return to her people, who will have to give back part or all of the bride-price. Among the Plains Indians of North America, a wife may leave her husband for a lover, provided the latter is able to pay for her. In the patriarchal community, where the family is of greater importance than the clan, the power of the father over the daughter is enhanced, and when he disposes of her to a husband the latter assumes the same control—authority is simply transferred from father to husband. However, the authority of savage husbands over their wives is not always so great as it is said to be. Often the married woman, though in the power of her husband, enjoys a remarkable degree of independence, is treated with consideration, and exercises no small influence over him. Among the Shans of Burma a wife may turn out a husband who takes to drink or otherwise misconducts himself, and she retains all their joint property.³ *Esprit de corps* among women may help matters; among the Papuans of Port Moresby, it has been said, a man rarely beats his wife, for the other women generally make a song about it and sing it when he appears and

1. J. H. Weeks, *Among Congo Cannibals*, 1913, p. 126.

2. Westermarck, *op. cit.*, i, p. 632.

3. Colquhoun, *Among the Shans*, p. 295.

the Papuan is very sensitive to ridicule.¹ As an instance of thoroughly well-treated women, let us take the Veddas of Ceylon, studied by Dr. and Mrs. Seligmann, who write:

"In every respect the women seem to be treated as the equals of the men, they eat the same food; indeed, when we gave presents of food the men seemed usually to give the women and children their share first; the same applies to areca nut and other chewing stuffs. The women are jealously guarded by the men, who do not allow traders or other strangers to see them, and those at Sitala Wanniya were too shy to visit our camp, though they welcomed us to their cave, and their dances performed for our benefit took place in the dense jungle so that the women might be present and partake of the food offered to the *yaku* The day after hearing the phonograph at our camp, the men came to us to request that we should take it to the cave as they had told their wives about it, and they all wanted to hear it too. From these examples the position of Vedda women will be understood."²

It is recognised that Vedda women may become possessed by spirits in the course of the ritual dances. Nevertheless, women are regarded as ceremonially unclean, and the shaman of one settlement kept his sacred arrow (*aude*) and other objects in a place away from home, where their baleful presence was counter-balanced by the presence of cows. (p. 48.) They are strictly monogamous, infidelity on part of either seems to be unknown. (pp. 67-8.) A sixteenth century MS. refers to a woman chief among a list of insurgents. (p. 10.)

Dr. Landtman of Helsingfors, who was recently studying the Kiwai Papuans at the mouth of the Fly river, kindly gives me the following information:—

"Among the Kiwais it is the rule that the women are excluded from participation in all matters of public concern and all public ceremonies of any importance, except those which purport their own initiation; in connection with the latter they are instrumental in certain sexual orgies. A couple of very old women are, however, associated with each men's house and play a part in the ceremonies which take place there. A woman would be killed in case she would get to know a secret rite, and the same would be the case with the man who would have let her into the secret. The men do not know of the existence of any private rites among the women, and I do not think they can possibly have any, for they could not keep the existence of such secret. But what I believe they have are many private observances of which the men know little or nothing, and they must possess all sorts of ideas regarding many things largely differing from those of the men. I obtained all my knowledge of the women through men. In matters which concern the family the women are nearly on a footing of equality with the men, and on the whole the family life of the natives is very happy, one could often see how contented the women were with their husbands and *vice versa*. The

1. Nisbet, *Colonial Tramp*, ii, p. 181.

2. Seligmann, *The Veddas*, 1911, pp. 88-9.

women enjoy a private ownership of their own things which they have manufactured, or which have been given them, etc."

The position of its women, Westermarck maintains, is no criterion of the advancement of a people. The women of many backward folk (*e.g.*, the Veddas, Andamanese, Bushmen) are treated with greater consideration than is often the case among higher savages and barbarians (*e.g.*, the Chinese). Woman kept in idleness, the chattel of her wealthy lord, is a less important factor socially than the muscular Bantu or Papuan wife toiling away in her garden or tramping home beneath her load of food and fuel.

JULIAN M. WHITEHOUSE.



THE RELATION OF GENIUS TO INSANITY.¹

SOCIOLOGY deals with all that concerns individuals having necessary relations with one another and living together in a community. It has been defined as the science that treats of the origin and history of society and of social phenomena. But it deals also with the progress of civilisation, with educational ideals and efforts, as well as with the nature and development of the laws controlling human intercourse.

The cause and origin of insanity is a subject for sociological study, as is also the relationship between different mental conditions in so far as these may depend upon the manner of life, the custom, the ancestry, and the habits of individuals belonging to a social organism. It may not be inappropriate therefore to discuss under this heading the origin and the relationship of certain mental states or qualities when these are found to bear a direct influence upon the efforts and the actions of others living in the same social group. It is acknowledged that conditions such as the environment do exercise an important influence upon social humanity. If the environment were incapable of influencing the organism, then life would be a mechanism governed by the laws of statics. On the other hand the effect of Mendelian research has been to show that variations in a species may occur irrespective of environmental forces. The kindling of interest through any regenerative cause awakens knowledge, not only in the sociological field, but also in biological, ethical, and psychological directions.

The fact that variations occur in mental endowments was the theme of study a generation or more ago by Sir Francis Galton. He regarded men of genius as sports, for he maintained that no one can acquire, or make himself, or gain by education, the peculiar insight which characterises the creative powers of a great artist, poet, or discoverer. The powers possessed by these are correctly described as "gifts," and they might be considered to be innate characters or intuitions, *i.e.*, mental instincts which, though capable of being developed and strengthened by education or cultivation, are never thus originated *de novo*. The fact that among the inmates of asylums are found, not a few but many, persons who are endowed with rare mental ability, if not with genius itself, has justified Dryden in the lines :

Great wits are sure to madness near allied
And thin partitions do their bounds divide.

1. A paper read before the Social Psychology Group of the Sociological Society, April 28, 1914.

Pascal also remarked that an extreme mind (genius) is akin to extreme madness, that the "bound" was a thin partition. The specific nature of these bounds affords material for a fruitful study, but no writer of note—among British alienists at any rate—has contributed any serious addition to our knowledge in regard to genius, talent, or distinction as related to insanity. Max Nordau, together with Lombroso, contributed some important literature in regard to the degenerate class; whilst J. F. Nisbet, Havelock Ellis, W. H. Mallock, Mark Baldwin, and others, have studied the subject from the psychological and historical side. It would appear from the experience of alienists that the border territory between genius and insanity, or between the sane and the insane, is often very narrow and ill-defined, although, naturally, well-marked and prominent cases are very definite and distinct. Nothing for example, is easier than to classify the extreme degenerate on the one side as against the richly endowed mind on the other; but when cranks and oddities, inspired poets and mono-ideists, anarchists, and misanthropes, and eccentric persons, have to be considered and classified, it is difficult at times to exclude some of them from the types of inscrutable and subtle persons who are best described as having "kinks in their minds" or "bees in their bonnets," or who are, as the East-Enders would have it, "balmy on the crumpet," and for whom the Lunacy Act provides convenient and suitable accommodation. The eccentric person is only an example of the predominance of some factors of the mind whereby an alteration has occurred in the process of association, or one in whom there is a tyranny of certain emotional states, or where there is a defect of voluntary attention or the predominance of automatism causing a want of harmony between the individual and his environment. It is on the borderland of insanity and often is seen in the genius. Upon the assumption that blanks in our knowledge are worse than superfluous information I have attempted to supply some suggestions, but no one will deny that the task is difficult, and most will agree that it is one of great interest as well as of curiosity. My daily rounds through the wards of one of the largest Metropolitan asylums

. exempt from public haunt
Find tongues in trees, books in the running brooks,
Sermons in stones, and good in everything;

and this is the inspiration of my paper. Many of my readers will doubtless be familiar with much that I have to say, but it may be better that a few should meet with what they know rather than that the rest should miss what they may have a wish to learn.

As an alienist I do not claim an exclusive right to consider the complex problems of mind. They are quite as much the domain

and study of the teacher, the spiritual adviser, or even the politician, as they are that of the scientist, the psychologist, or the mental specialist, and as the brain is the organ by means of which we are enabled to exercise mental powers, so the body is the organ by which these are expressed, and observations in regard to the mind not infrequently resolve themselves into those of bodily movements, gestures, or positions. Mental states and habits are imprinted upon the eye or the mouth, or upon general bodily attitudes. St. Paul is probably the best known exponent of Christian philosophy, and he was a psychologist as well as a teacher. In his psychology he taught the tripartite division of body, soul, and spirit, but he nevertheless considered the soul and spirit to be one independent whole, although exercising a double function—this being manifested on the one hand in the department of the mental life, and on the other in the department of the moral and religious. Bergson considers that the body is to the mind what the point of the knife is to the knife itself: it enables the mind to touch reality. The interactionists fail to demonstrate the creation of material energy by conscious processes, and Shadworth Hodgson, as representing the materialists, can hardly claim support when he states that we or our spirit or our mind is at the mercy of material happenings. We cannot yet resolve consciousness into physical and chemical changes in brain cells, of which the calculating American considers there are over 9,000 millions in an averagely developed brain cortex. Although we take shelter to-day in parallelism, there is a growing tendency to revert to the Pauline doctrine, and to regard body and mind as independent actors. Much that has been written of late postulates a mental energy independent of bodily or material energy.

In order to comprehend more fully the title of this paper it is necessary to recall how the brain acts, and by this acting how the mind grows. The moment a child sees or hears something, rays of light or waves of sound have already impinged as impressions or stimuli upon a specially prepared outer organ such as the eye or the ear. These impressions travel along nerves very rapidly in their journey to the brain. The moment they reach the brain they are registered and are transformed so that rays of light are seen as objects and waves of sound are heard as music, voices, noises, etc. In this way the sensations are perceived and they then become perceptions or percepts, which can be revived in memory as concepts and these again as images or *recepts*. The same process occurs with the information conveyed by touch, smell and taste. These then are the operations of the mind in definite order. When the outward stimulus caused by objects has been removed and has ceased to act, the mind has the power to recall in memory the original picture or parts of the percept, and a second picture, a concept or an idea—

weaker, of course, than the first picture is presented to the mind. Some great portrait painters have exhibited this power inasmuch as they have painted their pictures after the sitters had gone. William Blake is an instance of great power in this direction, for he had aural and visual ideas—correctly described as hallucinations—of historical figures from which he painted very remarkable pictures. The mind tends to associate the presentation of the original object with all its combining qualities—a rose may be remembered as of a certain colour and of such a pleasant scent, worn by the object of one's adoration and associated with the sweet words breathed in the intervals of a dance or during the entr'acte—so that when a rose is again encountered all the former pleasant associations tend to be revived in idea at the same moment. It is the same with other ideas that occur to the mind; there tends to be an association of the different presentations and combinations of these which can all be revived in memory. Now it is the possession of this association by similarity to an extreme degree that accounts for the ability to create something new out of these ideas, and this is the necessary basis of imagination and the true explanation of genius. Minds which possess unusual energy in association by similarity are exceptional. The flash of similarity between an apple and the moon or between the rivalry for food in Nature and the rivalry for man's selection could only occur to a Newton or a Darwin. William James considers there are two types of genius, one where similarity calls up cognate thoughts—the analysts or abstract thinkers, for instance—and the other where these thoughts are noticed and acted upon—the intuitionists, such as artists, poets, writers, or critics. When an *outward* recollection is revived the term "fancy" has been used for the revival, but when the reference and combination is an *inward* weaving the term "imagination" has been employed, but this is an artificial distinction, and both points arise in considering the essence of genius. Genius is original and inventive; it creates and improves, and its product is the effect of great and unusual power to form new combinations and new ideas or imagery. The man of genius has a clearer perception and reaches this with quicker steps and more rapid strides than the ordinary mortal, who is slower and less brilliant. The person of genius possesses insight—or, as it is called, "inspiration"—and gets to the heart of things and to the very essence of reality without a purposive end independently of training. Training, in fact, tends to extinguish genius, which does not necessarily imply or connote superior intellectual powers; on the other hand, genius is an indication of abnormality, of instability, or of dis-equilibrium, and this is the subject of my thesis. A "mute inglorious Milton" lies in many a churchyard.

I should like to raise the point for discussion at this Society, of which some distinguished psychologists are members, whether genius is controlled by voluntary action. John Stuart Mill used to say that the occupation of the mind was not thinking but dreaming, and George Eliot stated when she wrote a "not-herself" took possession of her. It has been stated that ideas arise spontaneously or automatically in the mind, but that the will fixes the attention upon them and they thus become the absorbing central focus for meditation and reflection. The difficulty in analyzing genius is partly due to the fact that persons who are geniuses are rarely capable of mental introspection and psychological description. Wordsworth, however, describes his own mind and states that his creative power depended upon continued meditation upon themes he had set before himself acting with the influences surrounding him, but neither reflection nor the environment could have made Wordsworth a poet. The faculty he possessed was an inborn gift working either automatically and spontaneously or through the mechanism of the will. It has been stated that the power which Wordsworth acquired was original with Shakespeare. In some this intuition appears to be original and spontaneous, in others to be the result of rigorous and painstaking training. Are we justified in considering the latter to be genius? We know the *will* cannot help us to recollect something forgotten, and that the best way to recollect anything is to go back and dwell upon the idea most likely to suggest it by association. Neither can the will suggest ideas for the imagination, although it can withdraw the attention from ideas which cognition or judgment can make use of. Scott often asserted that the writing of good verses was an act separate from volition, and Shelley stated that the finest passages of poetry could not be produced by labour and study.

Thus it is that the ideas of the creative genius may be controlled, "set going and kept going" by the will, but they must arise automatically and spontaneously, and so the will may do much indirectly in the work of the creative power of genius. Further, it has been stated that genius has an ethical or an æsthetic end, that there is Truth, or Beauty, or Goodness to be considered. Praxiteles, for instance, is said to have combined the most beautiful parts of the most beautiful figures for his statue of Venus for the people of Cos. Great architects produce their designs in the same way and with the same object, and the great engineers have done the same. Whether the constructive imagination is entitled to be considered in the same class with the creative is a matter for discussion, but great writers like Sir Walter Scott can hardly be excluded from the list of geniuses. Another point which this Society might consider, as it is well able to do, is the effect upon a

community of men of genius, and the influence of great social or political events upon individuals. We know the great height to which men rose in the fifteenth century, whether their appearance was due to the great need of the occasion, and whether an environment can create its own geniuses. I only suggest these points for consideration. Is the imaginative faculty cultivated, invigorated, and developed to the fullest expression by the needs of the time? or are those right who state that genius is unsummoned, involuntary, and spontaneous?

The ironical definition of genius as "the infinite capacity for taking pains" confuses genius with talent; and is a "sop to the minnows"! Talent connotes the possession of special aptitudes for some purpose, and implies education. It is very much the result of memory and, as in Macaulay, it was the ready and responsive reaction to education and training. A person may have a talent for the kind of business to which he has been trained but such is not a genius. A carpenter may be talented, but he is not a genius; a musician may be talented, when he is the clever exponent of another's work; but a musical genius is a creator or an originator. A diplomatist may be talented because he is a good tactician, but he is a genius only when he has propounded some great and clever policy which redounds to his country's credit. Talent implies discrimination and a talented person is usually clever, and of good judgment; a genius is often erratic, unreliable, unstable, and irresponsible—George Morland, Robert Burns, Byron, Chatterton, Edgar Allan Poe are cases in point. Many of these and others of their kind betray a real want of equilibrium. They are dreamers and persons incapable of appreciating circumstances at their proper value and incapable of finding opportune adaptations. I am not contending that genius is a morbid neurosis or a neurotic phenomenon, but I do maintain that there are considerable resemblances between the highest mental activity as evidenced in genius and the disordered mind of the insane; both are departures from the normal type, and the territory of the imagination is the common province of both. The conduct and character of any individual, whether sane or insane, is the resultant of his ideative processes, his emotions or sentiments and his attentive or volitional power, and the predominance of one or the defect of another mental activity is reflected in behaviour and conduct. In the genius as in the insane person there is a want of co-ordination of conduct for the end in view, and there is a defect in the proportional relationship between thought and action, with frequently in them an incapacity which in the one case brings the person into the asylum, the other by accident remaining free. In the conversation and declamations of a person in

acute mania the imagination is extraordinarily active; images crowd each other in such rapid succession that words fail to be uttered fast enough to describe them. Like genius, insanity is as impatient as it is highly sensitive. Novel suggestions and situations present themselves so quickly that the rapidity of the conceptual and associative products are those of extreme mental brilliance, ability, and power. In acute insanity, as in genius, the perceptions are quicker and the associations keener. Wagner, for example, composed some of his best music when suffering from melancholia; Ruskin is stated to have been more interesting, as well as writing better prose, when suffering from sub-acute mania, and Cowper wrote "John Gilpin" when suffering from acute depressive insanity. I have played billiards for three hours continuously with a university don suffering from sub-acute mania, and during the whole of this time his conversation was brilliant and epigrammatic. He composed and recited stanzas of poetry which were most apt, correct, and striking. The hearing in some cases of acute mania shows an abnormal perception for sounds, and, in many cases, the whole of the mental faculties appear to be quickened and brisker. The antithesis of acute maniacal excitement is the state of profound melancholia, when there is an intense emotional state of sadness and reserve. In this state persons are often timid, apprehensive and self-depreciating, and it is the state into which many men of genius have found themselves. Aristotle described all men of ability as being of the melancholic temperament and some of them in this state have made attempts upon their lives. They have become introspective and suspicious, overcome with the fear of others. Erasmus Darwin, Clive, Romilly, Cowper and Collins as well as Chatterton were of this order. I knew a clever novelist who to avoid mortal ken concealed himself in a boat moored for weeks to an uninhabited island. Some men of great mental power have felt obliged to give up their adopted professions from an overwhelming fear and an apprehensive horror of having to appear in public, and Sir Thomas Browne is stated never to have overcome the act of blushing at the slightest emotional change; and many men of genius have experienced a dislike almost amounting to fear in regard to social life. Of all forms of insanity probably the class described as paranoia is the nearest allied to genius. Those of this type are strong-minded, often extraordinarily able, but irreconcilables and quite "impossible" persons. They are the material out of which canonized saints, martyrs, prophets, inventors and cranks of all sorts are recruited. We are all familiar with the fantastic ways of very clever people, with their personal appearance, their style of clothing, their hair, and their style of writing. We know the professed spiritualists, the rabid anti-vivisectors, the collectors of useless

objects, and those who devote their lives to fantastical strivings; conditions not infrequently associated with the presence of unusual mental ability. Maudsley states that there has hardly ever been a man of genius who had not insanity or some form of nervous disorder in his family tree.

Indeed insanity is known to occur with unusual frequency among the relatives of men of genius. Life, however, is a matter of compensation and equilibrium, and if great development occurs in one direction there is a compensating defect in others. All are familiar with the so-called calculating boys, who are usually infants of prodigious memories but no "minds." I knew a man who could recite *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* from cover to cover, yet his mind continued to be of the nursery type and he did not understand what he dramatically recited. I knew another who would play upon the organ any music he had previously heard, and this without notes—of which he knew nothing—to remind him. Another person visited the *Great Eastern* steamship and he afterwards constructed from memory an accurate model of it, yet he possessed only the mind of an inordinately vain and egotistical child. It is known that genius is frequently associated with a deficient moral sense, being found with drunkenness, prodigality, crime or immorality, as well as epilepsy or insanity. On the one hand the psychic wave rises to a great height, whilst on the other it falls below the level of what society can tolerate and the certificate of insanity is called to limit the "bound." Every person who has walked through the wards of an asylum must have realised the vivid imagery and the creative fancy of some of the inmates and could not fail to be reminded of the flights of genius on the other side of the "bound." Such an association tends to persuade any observer that genius and insanity are both products of a morbid instability and that the partition between the two is both narrow and ill-defined.

ROBERT ARMSTRONG-JONES.

REVIEWS.

ASPECTS OF THE POSITION OF WOMEN.

- WOMAN, MARRIAGE AND MOTHERHOOD. By Elizabeth Sloan Chesser. Cassell. 6/- net.
- THE FUTURE OF THE WOMEN'S MOVEMENT. By H. M. Swanwick. G. Bell and Sons. 2/6 net.
- CONFLICTING IDEALS: Two Sides of the Woman's Question. By B. L. Hutchins. T. Murby and Co. 1/6 net.
- ELLEN KEY: HER LIFE AND HER WORK. By Louise Nyström-Hamilton. Translated by Anna E. B. Fries. Putnam. \$1.25 net.
- WAR AND WOMEN. By Mrs. St. Clair Stobart. G. Bell and Son. 3/6 net.
- WOMAN'S PLACE IN RURAL ECONOMY. By P. de Vuyst. Translated by Nora Hunter. Blackie. 3/6 net.

THESE six volumes are all concerned with some aspect or aspects of the position, present or future, of women. One of them, Mrs. Sloan Chesser's "Woman, Marriage and Motherhood," aims mainly at a consideration of fundamentals; Mrs. Swanwick, in "The Future of the Women's Movement," deals with matters that belong to a stage of transition; and so, in a measure, does Miss B. L. Hutchins in the summing-up of "Conflicting Ideals." All these may be said to travel in the central channel of controversy. The biography of Ellen Key keeps the sound of its agitated waters still in the reader's ears; while "War and Women," by Mrs. St. Clair Stobart, and the translation of a Belgian report upon "Woman's Place in Rural Economy" are a little off the main course.

It will be observed that Mrs. Sloan Chesser employs in her title that much-to-be-distrusted word Woman. No less in argument than in law is it true that pitfalls lurk in generalities. Dr. Chesser, in common with many other writers and many scores of speakers, would have occupied safer ground if she had confined herself to statements about women—creatures more or less within the cognizance of every reader and hearer—and had abstained from making any about that imaginary impersonation of a whole sex, Woman, whom it is not possible to bring to the test of the actual, and who, under the mask of a fallacious unity, often succeeds in playing incompatible parts without detection. The idea of "woman" will be apt to vary, not merely in every different mind but even in each single mind. Some such shifting of basis it probably is which accounts for some instances of vagueness, of repetition, and of self-contradiction that may be noted, here and there, in Dr. Chesser's industrious pages. Literary distinction is absent from them and there are indications of somewhat hurried production, among them a lack of unity and an overlarge accumulation of illustrative facts and figures. Without its excellent index it would be difficult to find one's way through the book, and Dr. Chesser's leading idea (which is that good motherhood is the world's greatest need) is sometimes actually obscured by the mass of detail designed for its exposition. Good mothers would, she believes, be obtained if specific instruction in the care of children and in the management of a house were imparted to all schoolgirls. Thus, she explicitly declares that "a knowledge of child hygiene should be regarded as an essential part of a girl's education, whatever her station."

She speaks with praise of a school in Wales where girls of from 12 to 14 spend "half the school hours of each day of the school year in learning practical housecraft," while "the last five weeks of the course are devoted wholly to the care of children." She is, indeed, of opinion that, in every school, "a recognised course should be compulsory, followed by an examination."

Mrs. Swanwick, on the other hand, although no less convinced that good mothers are greatly needed, says roundly:—

"Women should not be trained to be mothers; to do so at once introduces all sorts of arbitrary limitations and restrictions and hampers the very mission it is designed to serve. Women should be trained to be whole human beings; the measure of a woman's motherhood, like the measure of her love, is the measure of her whole nature. Cramp her nature, limit her activities, and you cramp and limit her love and her motherhood."

It is curious to find a medical practitioner who is a woman apparently sharing the very common but mistaken view that domestic labour is likely to be less harmful than most forms of trade-work to expectant mothers. A considerable knowledge of households in which mothers do all the work has led me to regard the heavier processes of washing (the wringing of sheets, for instance), the making of beds, when the turning of heavy mattresses is involved, the carrying of coal and water, especially upstairs, as among the most dangerous to health of actions commonly performed by women. When performed, as they frequently are, within ten days, or even within a week, after the birth of a child, they are the main causes of those internal injuries that afflict a majority of working-class mothers. Housework, as it is among the conditions ordinarily existing in wage-earning families, ought to be recognised by enlightened eugenists as a trade unfit for mothers. Evidently Mrs. Swanwick knows how the poorer working woman of this country lives; "Think," she cries:

"Think of the crowded condition of the rooms, so that the Sunday clothes must be kept in the parlour, and there is no room whatever for storing perishable food, to say nothing of groceries! Think of the extravagant ramshackle grates on which these women are expected to cook appetising food, without which the man will go to the public-house! Think of the washing on a wet day! . . . It seems to me indecent to blame the woman if she succumbs to such conditions. When she revolts from them, she ought to have the hearty help and sympathy of every reformer in the land."

To another danger, also, which has escaped many writers, Mrs. Swanwick is awake:—

"The people who talk as if a girl should be trained from childhood up for motherhood quite overlook the very real possibility of tiring out the instinct before its time of fruition. There are very many girls who would have quite a healthy and natural fondness for babies, but who have had the feeling literally worn out by premature exercise."

The instincts and interests of a normal woman become developed at the time when they are needed. As a little child she cares for play and for the companionship of playfellows; as a girl in her teens she becomes engrossed

in school life, either in learning or in games, and in the later school years, if not earlier, a preference for some particular sort of occupation will be apt to show itself. Unless her mind is left vacant, she seldom, at this stage, thinks much about marriage and may even entertain and express some aversion from it. No wise elder need be alarmed or distressed; the wholesome attitude is not to desire marriage, but to desire marriage with some particular person. When her heart turns to some one man the girl will be ready enough to marry him, and then, also, she will begin to hope that there will be children of their union. Household affairs, in which she may, probably, have shown no previous inclination to take part, grow interesting when they concern the home that will be hers and his. This is the period in which she will be anxious to acquire the knowledge that bears the new names of "housecraft" and "mothercraft," and at this period she will profit by them. As for the girls of twelve to fourteen, it will be wiser to interest them in botany or geology or the learning of a new language—matters to which they are not likely to turn their attention for the first time at two-and-twenty. But at two-and-twenty a young woman—if her schooling has taught her the great lesson of how to learn—will find no difficulty in the processes of cooking or of house-cleaning. Few educated women, however, and certainly none who have become accustomed to a professional standard of work, will fail to perceive with some disapproval that housework, owing to the isolated and individualist manner in which it has been carried on, is a backward and undeveloped industry. As such, it is, in its present form, unacceptable to an increasing number of modern women belonging to every grade of the community. To scold them for this state of affairs is futile—as futile as the lamentations that no doubt were uttered by some ancient Britons when woad began to be superseded by Roman fashions. There is no commoner weakness than to believe the passing customs of our own day inextricably bound up with the vital instincts of the race. Yet it is a safe assumption that the natural relations of man, woman, and child will persist even if every private kitchen in England disappears and every child of two and upwards comes to spend its time in a Montessori day-school.

The most remarkable and original chapter of Mrs. Swanwick's book is that in which she analyses the exploitation for profit of the appetites for drink, for sexual indulgence, and for war. She compares the spontaneous passions of the natural human animal with the same passions as deliberately provoked and fostered by some second person for the sake of gain:—

"Natural appetite may be gross, may even be brutal, but in simple communities where each individual must rely on his own strength for his own livelihood, it tends to return to a norm which is that of health . . . These appetites have, by indulgence, by stimulation, and by exploitation, become lusts which . . . threaten the existence of the Empires which are allowing themselves to be eaten up by them."

It is, indeed, the chief characteristic of this volume that the author is able to see facts and to expound what she sees in terms so lucid as absolutely to preclude misunderstanding.

Similar merits belong to the unassuming but illuminating little book to which Miss B. L. Hutchins has given the name of "Conflicting Ideals," and in which she marshals the advantages and disadvantages of two diverging views as to the position of women. In doing so she presents arguments on behalf of the patriarchal ideal which I, at least, have never seen adduced by its professed advocates:—

"In theory, at all events [this arrangement], does set free a certain number of women for work that 'does not pay,' viz., for the care of home and children, the training of character, the development of social traditions and of a standard of life. In an age when so many things are bought and sold that formerly were without price, it is well to remember that the most important things in life have no exchange value."

After an examination likely both to clarify and to widen the reader's thoughts upon the whole question, the conclusion, however, is that: "The economic subjection of women is no longer valuable for the maintenance of the family and is positively harmful in view of the need for building up a higher standard of human intelligence, character and citizenship."

The biography of Ellen Key is so merely a biography that but for Mr. Havelock Ellis's introduction some readers might be left wondering what was her position in regard to the great questions with which her mind has been occupied. The volume has apparently been rendered into English by a translator whose native tongue it is not, and, as might be expected, the translation is uncouth. The original is probably better than it appears; if Mrs. Nyström-Hamilton's narrative ever showed any power of vivid portrayal, the quality has evaporated in the process of transmutation.

Mrs. St. Clair Stobart's record of the work done in the Balkans by a small group of English ladies testifies convincingly to the usefulness of educated and trained women as organisers and helpers in the care of the wounded and sick in times of war; and she is probably right in believing that women who have thus an opportunity of beholding war at close quarters will learn to think of it as altogether an evil. The wholesome satisfaction which she evidently feels in the good service performed has led some—surely, careless—readers to suppose her no opponent of warfare as such. She would, perhaps, have been wiser, remembering how many readers always will be careless, if she had set forth more distinctly her perception of the ironical situation in which all persons are placed who, while war is not yet publicly reprobated, endeavour to mend the men whom war is permitted to lacerate.

The report upon the place of women in rural economy, drawn up by the Director-General of Agriculture in Belgium and provided, in its English guise, with an introduction by Sir R. P. Wright, Chairman of the Board of Agriculture for Scotland, strikes a British reader as a singularly sociable and friendly document. It talks more about happiness, the beauties of nature, the colour of walls and the charms of the farm garden than an English official paper would be likely to do. The author hardly, perhaps, realises how heavily overworked farmers' wives are apt to be. It is pleasant, however, to think of these busy women meeting together and discussing their affairs, from time to time; and it is to be hoped that on these occasions the element of instruction is not permitted to overpower that of social intercourse.

Taken altogether, the six books bear witness to the degree in which women are at this time occupying the attention of all thoughtful people. In a sense each of them is ephemeral because it deals with conditions rapidly changing. The one which will remain most permanently interesting is "Conflicting Ideals," which in its judicial impartiality already sees the phases of the present in their essence, clear and bare of confusing excrescences—even as some wise historian looking back will see them in the future.

CLEMENTINA BLACK.

THE FRAUD OF FEMINISM. By E. Belfort Bax. Grant Richards. 2/6 net.
 THE VOCATION OF WOMAN. By Mrs. Archibald Colquhoun. Macmillan.
 4/6 net.

THESE two books may usefully be read together, because while Mrs. Colquhoun's work is pervaded by an unconscious, but none the less unmistakable, air of feministic superiority, and this in spite of a very obvious desire to deal fairly with the position of man and woman, Mr. Belfort Bax expresses an open and frank belief in man's superiority. Mrs. Colquhoun has many phrases such as the following: "Man still falls far behind woman's ideal of what the father of her children should be"; "It must not be assumed that there is any intention of justifying the errant courses of man"; "It is quite true that men do not always act up to their marriage vows," etc., and does not sufficiently realise that women may fall far short of man's ideal of motherhood, that a woman has errant courses, and that women do not always act up to their marriage vows but fail in these matters as men do. Mr. Bax does not logically fail from the other aspect of sex and claim that men have the greater moral virtue and woman the less, but there is at times an asperity and a rough unsympathetic handling of the subject which is greatly to be deplored. Neither book has an index, which greatly detracts from the reference value of each, and in several places there is evidence of hurried writing. The value of Mrs. Colquhoun's book is briefly in this, that it is one of a series of works by women that mark the turn of the tide of which "An Englishwoman's Home" and Mrs. Frederic Harrison's "Freedom of Women" were earlier pioneers. Women do not feel so sure of the value of political agitation as formerly, and Mrs. Colquhoun sees, like Miss Ida Tarbell in America, that the home must stand as the ideal for the majority of women in all coming ages and that the modern unreasoning antagonism to it must pass away.

Mrs. Colquhoun begins with an examination of the revolt of woman, of which she takes a grave view. She warns women, almost in the terms of Mazzini in his appeal to men, to think of duties as well as rights. She insists on the fact that marriage is essentially an institution which protects woman, and in doing this binds the less responsible man more strongly than he would be bound but for its legal strength and religious control. She also sees nothing but danger in the growing manifestation of sex hostility on the part of the modern woman and thinks that a real education for marriage responsibilities is necessary for women. Further, she points out that the need of men is not for an economic partner—were this so men would live with other men—but for one who represents another side of life and who is not of the turmoil of the business world. Mrs. Colquhoun has much in her book that is wise and sane in its outlook, and her thought-taking as its standpoint the problem of the more or less financially well-placed woman—fills a needed place in current controversy.

Mr. Bax, as one naturally expects and as his title implies, makes an attack on the modern woman—an attack with a great deal of truth in it, but hardly a careful criticism. His claim is that the public woman has deliberately misrepresented her case by intentionally stating facts wrongly or drawing false inferences from them. We may admit that this is true in some instances without assuming that the modern woman's movement as a whole rests on such an evil base, and the real weakness of Mr. Bax's book is to be sought in his failure to separate genuine aspiration from self-seeking notoriety and unfortunate but sincere obsession by an idea. He contends that there has been a deliberate anti-man crusade, and had he limited this

contention to a section of the woman movement only, he could easily establish his position from the literature of the past hundred and fifty years. Mrs. Colquhoun, a sympathetic critic of womanhood, herself admits the tendency and traces the sources of it to the women's colleges. Again, Mr. Bax urges that woman has persistently traded on her innocence, an innocence which is apparent and not real, and the instances he gives undoubtedly support his view. There is a class of woman, as every medical man of experience knows, given to using the cloak of innocence to hide a nature that has become insincere and coarse; but it is unfair to assert that a real innocency of life is not a very beautiful characteristic of some of the best wives and mothers of our own and past times. And when he claims that 'chivalry' is a false ideal and women have used it to enslave men, his argument is only true of what is still a small section of women. Yet in this as in his other books and papers Mr. Bax cites evidence to prove that the law as a whole has not been unjust to women, and even that in its main tendency it has treated her more leniently than man, although largely man-made. He is weak, however, in his biological knowledge of the subject, and he admits it, as also does Mrs. Colquhoun. Both would have written more surely, and Mr. Bax more temperately, had they been better equipped in this respect. None the less both books are of considerable current value. Few men, and I hope few women, will rise from a serious perusal of "The Fraud of Feminism" without wishing to state a comprehensive fair-minded case for woman, which Mr. Bax fails to do. Nevertheless, there will be left in their minds the thought that the less scrupulous woman in the care of her home and in her parental duties, as well as in the outside world, has been covered too long and too successfully with a veneer of qualities which she has no right to assume. So that whether Mr. Bax intended it or not, his book arouses just the right feelings in the reader—a wish to be fair to women and yet to see, and honestly see, her many failings, which the present agitation has disingenuously tried to conceal. Incidentally one may mention one great lack in both writers which reveals a characteristic failure of our times. Mr. Bax mentions an early writer new to the reviewer, but otherwise both author and authoress make no use of the historical studies of their question and the great writers on the subject, Comte, Spencer, Laycock, etc., are all omitted or if referred to, quoted side by side with some popular writer of ephemeral reputation. Perspective is a missing feature; all thoughts and all people are pictured not only as being of the same stature and quality but even as being on the same plane.

J. LIONEL TAYLER.

LESSONS IN EMPIRE.

POLITICAL AND LITERARY ESSAYS, 1908—1913. By the Earl of Cromer. Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1913. Price 10s. 6d. net.

THE ROMAN AND THE BRITISH EMPIRES. By James Bryce. Oxford University Press, 1914. Price 6s. net.

THESE two works have much in common. They are both written by men of wide experience acquired in various lands and in many high offices. Lord Bryce has long been famous as historian and as student of institutions, occupations for which his service in the British Parliament and Cabinet and in the United States has only given him greater experience. Lord Cromer, at the close of his career in India and Egypt, writes with all the knowledge of a practised administrator and yet with the literary skill that

we should rather expect in one whose life had been devoted to letters. Neither book contains matter hitherto unpublished, if we except a few notes. Lord Cromer's Essays are collected from various periodicals. Lord Bryce's studies of Empire and Law are two pieces which originally formed part of a larger collection. But both will be new to most readers and will well repay a careful study. Lord Cromer ranges over a wonderful array of diverse subjects from Army Reform and Free Trade to Russian Romance and Songs, Patriotic, Military and Naval, from the Classics to China, from Antigonus to Tallien and Disraeli. But, in view of his career, it is naturally his papers on Imperial questions, on India and Egypt, on his comparisons between the British and Roman Empires, and between the former and the French Empire in Algeria, that have the greatest interest; and of these the most important is the one on "the Government of Subject Races." The same questions are treated in Lord Bryce's first essay, though from a somewhat different point of view.

"The main justification of Imperialism," according to Lord Cromer, "is to be found in the use which is made of the Imperial power." Englishmen in India "are apt to lose sight of the fact that the self-interest of the subject race is the principal basis of the whole Imperial fabric." If we do not secure contentment, "we must govern by the sword alone," and that is a policy for which Lord Cromer has no liking. As a consequence, since we have imparted knowledge and therefore stimulated ambition, reforms are "imposed by the necessities of the situation." A still more "potent instrument with which to conjure discontent" is low taxation. But if this policy "is to be adopted, two elements of British society will have to be kept in check at the hands of the statesman acting in concert with the moralist"—Militarism and Commercial Egotism. He thus sums up the results of the forward policy on India:—

Under the influence of a predominant militarism acting on too pliant politicians, vast military expenditure was incurred. Territory lying outside the natural geographical frontier of India was occupied, the acquisition of which was condemned not merely by sound policy, but also by sound strategy. Taxation was increased, and, generally, the material interests of the natives of India were sacrificed and British Imperial rule exposed to subsequent danger, in order to satisfy the exigencies of a school of soldier-politicians who only saw one, and that the most technical, aspect of a very wide and complex question.

This is, as the late Lord Salisbury put it, "to try and annex the moon in order to prevent its being appropriated by the planet Mars."

One great difficulty in the government of subject peoples is the ignorance of the rulers; for while "deliberate oppression" is highly improbable, "unintentional misgovernment" is far more conceivable. Another difficulty lies in the inflexibility of Western methods especially in finance. Though the only limit in an Oriental State to the demands of the rulers has been the ability of the taxpayers to satisfy them, yet those "rulers recognise that they cannot get money from a man who possesses none The idea of expropriation for the non-payment of taxes is purely Western and modern." Speaking of Algeria, Lord Cromer remarks that French officials, who may be assumed to be "courageous, intelligent, zealous, and thoroughly honest," but also "somewhat inelastic" and "wedded to bureaucratic ideas," must recognise, if self-government is to be a success, "that it is politically wiser to put up with an imperfect reform carried with native consent, rather than to insist on some more

perfect measure executed in the teeth of strong—albeit often unreasonable—native opposition. English experience has shown that this is a very hard lesson for officials to learn.”

It is noticeable that Lord Bryce, who has taken an active part in popular government, is on the whole more favourable in his judgment of the Roman Empire than is Lord Cromer who has been himself a ruler of subject peoples. Lord Cromer complains of the bequest of that “word of ill omen—the word ‘Imperialism,’” and speaks of “the Nemesis which attended Roman misrule.” Lord Bryce is struck by some obvious similarities between the two Empires, such as this, that while the Courts in both were open for the redress of private wrongs—and even more in India than in the Roman world—there has been in neither a remedy for errors of policy or defects in the law itself, save by appeal to the sovereign power. But he also sees some points in which the earlier Empire had an advantage. While both made use of natives for subordinate posts, in Rome the higher posts also were open to them; and as a consequence, since the rulers came from amongst the ruled, there was not the same chasm between them. Again, Rome, as Lord Cromer also recognises, succeeded better than the modern Imperialists in the conciliation of local patriotism and Imperial loyalty. Perhaps Lord Bryce is inclined to exaggerate the difficulties due to differences of religion and colour: religious in England itself are very various; and colour prejudice is not only much less strong in some Western nations than in others, but even in individuals of the same nation—a sure sign that it is in the mass neither permanent nor instinctive.

Another point that strikes Lord Bryce in modern Imperialism is the opposition between the theories of government professed by the ruling nation at home and among subject peoples. Speaking of the Philippines and the incongruity of their position with the theory that the consent of the governed is the only foundation of just government, he remarks that it gives to thoughtful Americans “visions of mocking spirits, which the clergy are summoned to exorcise by dwelling upon the benefits which the diffusion of a pure faith and a commercial civilization may be expected to confer upon the indolent and superstitious inhabitants of these tropical isles.” Lord Bryce himself has few illusions as to the motives or effects of Empire-building. “Every one of these nations professes to be guided by philanthropic motives in its action. But it is not philanthropy that has carried any of them into these enterprises, nor is it clear that the immediate result will be to increase the sum of human happiness.” Lord Cromer takes a different view. While he demands that our relations with subject peoples must be “economically sound and morally defensible,” he insists that we should accomplish our manifest destiny, and that we would “sink into political insignificance,” if we refused the main title which makes us great. It is not easy to understand the meaning attached to the words, “manifest destiny.” Sociologically, it is true that every nation was destined to do that which it has done, but according to Lord Cromer’s own showing, whether this will continue our destiny depends on many circumstances both moral and material. In regard, however, to our danger of lapsing into political insignificance, if we fail to do that which we are destined to do, it is perhaps well to be reminded, as Lord Bryce reminds us, how little the Empire has affected either the constitutional or the economic development of England or her position among the nations. “England was great and powerful before she owned a yard of land in Asia, and might

be great and powerful again with no more foothold in the East than would be needed for the naval fortresses which protect her commerce."

The second portion of Lord Bryce's volume deals with the extension of Roman and English Law throughout the world—a subject peculiarly fitted to its author's powers. No short notice would do it justice, but two characteristic passages may be quoted. The first will be cold comfort to the enthusiasts for democratic forms of government:—

"Indeed the world seldom realizes by how few persons it is governed. There is a sense in which power may be said to rest with the whole community, and there is also a sense in which it may be said, in some governments, to rest with a single autocrat. But in reality it almost always rests in every country with an extremely small number of persons, whose knowledge and will prevail over or among the titular possessions of authority."

The second passage deals succinctly with the history and present position of the two systems:—

"The world is, or will shortly be, practically divided between two sets of legal conceptions of rules, and two only. The elder had its birth in a small Italian city, and though it has undergone endless changes and now appears in a variety of forms, it retains its distinctive character, and all these forms still show an underlying unity. The younger has sprung from the union of the rude customs of a group of Low German tribes with rules worked out by the subtle, acute and eminently disputatious intellect of the Gallicized Norsemen who came to England in the eleventh century. It has been much affected by the elder system, yet it has retained its distinctive features and spirit specially contrasted with that of the imperial law in everything that pertains to the rights of the individual and the means of asserting them. And it has communicated something of this spirit to the more advanced forms of the Roman law in constitutional countries."

S. H. SWINNY.

MR. BRANFORD'S INTERPRETATIONS.

INTERPRETATIONS AND FORECASTS: A STUDY OF SURVIVALS AND TENDENCIES IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY. By Victor Branford, M.A., some time Honorary Secretary of the Sociological Society. London: Duckworth and Co., 1914. 7/6 net.

MR. BRANFORD and his ideas are so well known to readers of the Review that the occasion may seem to call rather for an expression of satisfaction at the successful completion of his book than for a detailed account of it. It is true that in form it is not a connected treatise but a series of papers, "nearly all prepared in order to serve some momentary purpose in the propaganda of sociology," of which Mr. Branford is so unwearied an exponent. Yet the reader will feel that the papers, though somewhat unequal in tone and treatment, fall naturally into their place within the covers of the book, and that the work can be considered and judged as a whole. This is what Mr. Branford asks us to do: and the most that he modestly claims for his book is that "it illustrates a sociological way of looking at things, of thinking about them, and trying to understand them." The book consists of eight chapters, which illustrate what Mr. Branford calls the sociological point of view in dealing with a well-chosen variety of subjects, mediæval and modern, European and American. Perhaps the most interesting sections, considered as concrete expositions, are those dealing with "The Mediæval Citizen: What He Was and What He

Made," and the two entitled "The Sociologist at the Theatre" and "Town and Gown in America." But the book as a whole is full of stimulus, and charged with that peculiar suggestiveness which we have learned to associate with Professor Geddes and his group of fellow-workers. Perhaps it will be the sincerest compliment to Mr. Branford if, in commenting on it in the pages of this Review, we take his book as read and deal with the line of thought suggested in his opening words about "a sociological way of looking at things."

Many of us in this generation are attempting to shape for ourselves a vision of a more satisfactory condition of human society. But our visions must differ, not merely according to our own prepossessions, but according to our estimate of the relative strength of the various forces in the world of to-day; and that again must vary according to our own personal experience. We are none of us detached enough to be perfect seers of our own time. In this sense sociology, which aims at interpreting and co-ordinating the changing life of a contemporary society, however scientific it may aspire to be, however it may equip itself with surveys and statistics, must always remain, in the last analysis, subjective. For the thinker, in dealing with the life of men in society, is handling imponderabilia, which elude measurement and classification. It was inevitable that, in the flush of the first attempt to introduce scientific conceptions into the study of human affairs, this should to some extent have been forgotten. But sociologists, like historians, have slowly come to see that a living difference of opinion or outlook is better than a mechanical agreement, and that human society is too complex and various to be satisfactorily summed up in any one formula of interpretation.

Reading Mr. Branford's book in this spirit I came across a sentence in the first chapter which made me jump. "If we can discover," he remarks in his placid, flowing way, "*the formula, the process for making a society*—that is, an effective spiritual community—then (may we not say so?) we shall have God on the side of the small battalions." I make no apology for shamelessly isolating this sentence from its context and italicising its salient words: for it embodies, in a daring form, certain elements in Mr. Branford's thought which I should like to discuss.

Societies are not made: they grow. Mr. Branford knows that as well as I do. We both learnt it at the university. Why, then, should he commit the playful extravagance of using the language of a chemist when he is talking sociology? I think the answer is partly that he has been reading (of course, I mean *re-reading*) Aristotle, and partly that he has been travelling in the New World, where things seem (though I doubt whether they are) more machine-made than in the Old. Aristotle, as Mr. Branford tells us in his opening pages, is a very dangerous and much misunderstood writer. He wrote a treatise on Human Nature in Society, which his editors divided into two parts, known as the *Ethics* and the *Politics*. In the *Ethics* he dealt with men as human beings; in the *Politics* with men as citizens. Mr. Branford has been re-reading the *Politics* to some purpose; and he rightly calls the attention to the mistake made by many generations of writers regarding the *Politics* as a work on the "City-State," or even "the State," rather than on "the City." He speaks of the "capital literary fraud" by which this mistake has been perpetuated, and the interest of students of political theory diverted from civic to national institutions. But I am not so sure that he has been re-reading the *Ethics*; and when he is discussing, as he does throughout his book, civic institu-

tions in the abstract, I am not certain whether he is remembering that the *Politics* is not a book about cities in general, "from San Francisco to Salonika, from Bergen to Buenos Ayres" (p. 18), but about cities inhabited by Greeks and inheriting Greek institutions. No doubt Aristotle thought, as Mr. Branford in places seems to think, that he was writing about cities in general. But that was only because he took it for granted that there could be only one kind of city—the Greek kind. If he had been presented with some of the problems of modern American municipalities—with cities devoid of any common basis of tradition among their inhabitants, where no common standard of virtue or obedience or civic sentiment can be assumed or expected, he would have despaired of including them in his scheme of thought.

The fact is that there are two elements in Greek political thought which modern writers do not sufficiently disentangle. There is, as Mr. Branford rightly sees, the scientific element, the element of sociology or civics, which is simply the application of human reason to the general problems of human society. In this sense the problems of San Francisco are the same as those of Salonika. Both need schools and parks and drains and law courts, and town-plans and theatres, and cloisters or Houses of Quiet, and the other excellent things which Mr. Branford tells us about. He has studied cities in this spirit, and we take it from him that whether we or the citizens of Salonika or San Francisco know it or not, they need these things as part of their standard civic equipment.

But there is another element in Greek political thought, and in modern social thinking, which I somehow miss in Mr. Branford. It is the element which gives life and colour and variety to these somewhat abstract problems.

Men call it by various names—names which, unlike pale intellectual conceptions such as civics and sociology, have enlisted men's emotions and awakened them to the exercise of high powers of devotion. How can I think of Salonika as a typical city, when I remember that it is a city with a Jewish proletariat; or think of San Francisco as typical and forget its earthquake and its Chinese? The truth is that no two collections of human things are alike: and that the more alive they are the less alike they must necessarily become. Stimulating as many of Mr. Branford's conceptions are, I feel no desire to see every civilised city divided into the four social elements of "Town," "School," "Cloister" and "Cathedral," or its population ranked into "People," "Chiefs," "Intellectuals" and "Emotionals." For in the long run it is not the sociologists or any other group of social thinkers who will make the cities and nations of the future, but the citizens themselves. It is not for the sociologist to prescribe; but to listen, to sympathise, to understand, and to interpret. If he "surveys" cities in this spirit he will find no two alike, not even in standardised America.

It is not very easy to discern from Mr. Branford's pages how far he appreciates the main difficulty in the way of a decent standard of civic life in industrial countries to-day. Why, for instance, do not the universities play the part in our national life which Mr. Branford rightly assigns to them? It is not because the people do not dream dreams and see visions of the cloister and the city beautiful; it is because industrial conditions, sometimes created or intensified by men whose names are associated with universities, prevent them. One of Mr. Branford's chapters is entitled, "Youth and Age in the Cloister." If Mr. Branford will con-

sult those who at Oxford, Cambridge and elsewhere, try, summer by summer, to bring age from the office and the factory for a fortnight to the cloister, he would realise that the Democracy is alive enough to his ideas. It is the power, and not the will, to lead the higher life which is lacking. Here is work to be done yet, not by the municipality but by the State; and this is why I jumped again and rubbed my eyes, when I found Mr. Branford writing (on p. 319) that "the best Government will be the one which most steadfastly sets before itself the ideal of preparing its own euthanasia." But these are ungrateful carpings: and I have no right to assume that Mr. Branford is not as enthusiastic a Democrat and a Nationalist as he is a citizen and an intellectual.

A. E. ZIMMERN.

THE REFORMERS AND THE LAND.

THE REPORT OF THE LAND INQUIRY. Vol. I: Rural; Vol. II: Urban. Hodder and Stoughton, 1913. 1/- net, each.

HOW THE LABOURER LIVES. By B. Seeborn Rowntree and May Kendall. Nelson, 1913. 2/- net.

ENGLISH AGRICULTURAL WAGES. By Reginald Lennard. Macmillan. 5/- net.

ENGLAND'S FATAL LAND POLICY. By Sir William Earnshaw Cooper, C.I.E. Pearson, 1913. 2/6 net.

OWNERSHIP, TENURE AND TAXATION OF LAND. By Sir Thomas Whittaker. Macmillan. 12/- net.

It is now very nearly thirty years since the agricultural labourer was entrusted with a parliamentary vote. The first result of his enfranchisement was the remission of school fees in elementary schools, the second the creation of parish councils, the third old age pensions, the fourth a Small Holdings Act which has done little more than whet the craving it was intended to satisfy. Now, at last, the flood of books on the problem of the rural worker, of which five of these six volumes are a sample, indicate that after the passing of a generation the agricultural labourer's enfranchisement is having its full effect, and that the sort of serious attention which produces real reforms is being paid to the problem of his condition of life and work.

By far the most important of all these recent publications is the report of the Liberal Land Inquiry. We have had also a Unionist land inquiry, a Fabian land inquiry, and a Labour Party land inquiry. But the report produced by the Committee under the very able chairmanship of the Right Hon. A. H. Dyke Acland, besides possessing an intrinsic importance through the connection between its authors and the Government of the day, is also the most thorough. It suffers, as do the others in varying measure, from the fact that it is to a great extent the work of town-dwellers, but fortunately these town-dwellers are conscious of the disability under which they have laboured, and have taken exceptional pains to get at the thoughts, the feelings, and the fundamental realities of life of the rural worker. This is no easy task. It is one of the terrible results of the crushing and degrading conditions under which the agricultural labourer has been toiling for generations, that he commonly does not know what he wants, beyond the most elementary needs of more food, better clothing and shelter, and a weekly half-holiday. If British agriculture is to be rescued from its

present condition of a degraded and sweated industry, and made the sound basis of a rational and civilised national life, the reforms by which such a transformation is effected must be a real expression of the instincts and cravings of the agricultural worker himself, as they would be if he lived a normal life. Hence the great riddle for the land reformer is the reading of the heart of the peasant, not as he is now, but as he will be when he is emancipated.

The plan of reform set out by the report of the Land Inquiry is a systematic and logical one—perhaps too systematic and logical. The basis of the whole is the fixing of a legal minimum wage by some form of wage tribunal. This wage is to be fixed high enough to enable the labourer to keep himself and an average family in a state of physical efficiency, and to pay a “commercial rent” (whatever that may be) for his cottage. Then the tenant farmer is to be given the right, if the increased wage adds to the cost of production, to recover the cost from the landowner. The labourer is to have a statutory right to a cottage, as in Ireland, and the central authority is to have the power to stimulate local authorities to supply cottages, by giving or withholding grants in aid, and the power of acting in default. The tied-cottage system is to be got rid of. The basis of a somewhat more human existence for the labourer being thus provided, the possibility of an agricultural career is to be provided by improvements in the Small Holdings Acts. Next, the whole industry of agriculture is to be freed from certain obstacles to its natural development on scientific lines, by laws restricting the right of landowners to sacrifice crops to game, by the establishment of a Land Court for England and Wales, similar to that created for crofters and small holders in Scotland, the main work of which would be to give the cultivator full security of tenure, and by changes in the law of rating devised to stop the penalisation of improvements. There are no definite recommendations of any importance on the important questions of co-operation, credit, transit facilities and rural education.

This is the main drift of a report likely to occupy a place in English history somewhat similar to the reports of the two great partisan Commissions of the thirties, on the Poor Law, and on Municipal Corporations. It will, of course, not give complete satisfaction even to Liberal land reformers. To some it will seem too much directed towards the control of the distribution of the wealth produced by agriculture by a political machinery, and too little concerned with the advance of agriculture itself; while on the other side many keen politicians are disappointed because the Committee as a whole did not endorse the Baron de Forrest's appeal for Land Nationalisation. But it is nevertheless well qualified to secure the hearty support of the main body of Liberals. Conservative land reformers, tenant farmers, and agricultural labourers are also giving its proposals very serious attention, and considerably more favour than might have been expected. The following are the points of criticism which I am disposed to urge:—

(1) The reiterated insistence that cottages should be let at an economic rent, without any definition as to what an economic rent is, appears to me to be pedantic, and, if adhered to in practice, likely to be a serious stumbling block. If agricultural labourers were in the habit of paying economic rents, which I take to mean rents sufficient to yield average rates of interest on the capital necessary to supply similar cottages, and profits to the builder, then it would be necessary to consider very carefully whether public authorities should disturb such a custom by letting cottages more cheaply. But the actual rents paid average between 1s. and 2s. per week.

If now the State or Local Authorities, recognising the need shown by the report, of 120,000 additional cottages, is to build them and refuse to let them under "economic rents" of 5s. a week and upwards, they are likely to remain untenanted, at least by the class of labourers for whom they are built. Of course if by "economic rent" the authors of the report meant the best rent which such cottages would fetch, the building and letting policy could be carried out; but this they do not mean. The policy of building and letting at the rents customarily paid is that which has been pursued in Ireland. It is a serious blot in the report that no investigation has been made into the merits of the policy of the Labourers (Ireland) Acts, and, without any inquiry, that policy is condemned as "unsound." "Unsound" I am inclined to suspect, means only that the policy is not in harmony with certain exploded doctrines of the political economists of a hundred years ago, which still, like Ibsen's ghosts, haunt the minds of politicians and publicists.

(2) Since it is alleged that the superior condition of well-being of agricultural labourers in the Lothians is due to the local custom of payment of wages partly in meal and milk, whereby the labourer practically gets these fundamental necessities at wholesale prices, and the labourers' children have the diet they need, the report, in my opinion, should not have declared in favour of the payment of wages entirely in cash, without any investigation of this assertion.

(3) Seeing that the investigations of the Committee itself lead to the conclusion that one of the chief causes of the terrible condition of rural housing is the utter incompetence of the Local Government Board as the Central Health and Housing Authority, it is a defect in the report that the obvious remedy, the transfer of these powers to the much needed Ministry of Public Health, is not advocated.

The second volume of the Report of the Land Inquiry deals with Urban housing and the tenure of land in towns. It is not possible in a short space to summarise or criticise its proposals. Perhaps the most striking is the extension of the principle of the legal minimum wage to low-paid urban workers, which is recommended as a necessary step to make possible a decent standard of housing. In this volume also one is struck by the failure of the Report, in analysing the causes of the shortage of houses and the failure of local authorities to deal with slums, to point out that the Local Government Board is directly responsible, and that its systematic neglect of its duties with regard to housing, and the fact that when it does take action its action is obstructive more often than 'helpful, is the most easily remedied cause of the present evils. Reform, after all, is as much a matter of men, of administrators, as of legislative schemes. The creation of a Ministry of Public Health, and manning it with able and zealous workers, both men and women, is a necessary preliminary to all the reforms advocated with respect to housing in this volume, and, when once it is taken, the others will follow with comparative ease.

"How the Labourer Lives," by Mr. Seebohm Rowntree and Miss Kendall, is practically a companion volume to the Land Report. It consists of the family budgets of 42 different agricultural labourers, living in various parts of the country. It is a grim story of habitual under-nutrition; and it demonstrates that under-nutrition is almost an unavoidable condition of the life of a family of average size dependent on the wage of an agricultural labourer during the period when there are several children not yet old

enough to help with their earnings. It is characterised by the statistical carefulness which Mr. Rowntree always cultivates, and the picture drawn will in no way appear exaggerated to those familiar with rural conditions.

Mr. Lennard's little book, on "English Agricultural Wages," is a careful attempt, by a trained economist, to investigate the question whether any inconvenient results, as in the reduction in the number of men employed and increase of unemployment among agricultural workers, is likely to follow from an attempt to raise labourers' wages by the establishment of a legal minimum, and if so, to what extent. His conclusion is that while such a tendency might result, in a limited degree, it could easily be neutralised by simultaneous measures to increase small holdings and encourage more scientific and intensive agriculture.

In curious and interesting contrast to Mr. Lennard's academic and frigidly scientific treatment of one aspect of the agricultural problem, is Sir William Earnshaw Cooper's fierce denunciation of our national neglect of agriculture, of the "insensate party system of government" and "Manchester's sacrifice of agriculture on the altar of her greed." The burden of his demand is that the land of the British Isles should be thoroughly cultivated. Perhaps the most interesting point in the book is the author's statement with regard to his own conversion from a belief in occupying ownership to one in land nationalisation and tenancies under the State.

"In "Ownership, Tenure and Taxation of Land," Sir Thomas Whittaker has produced a somewhat ponderous volume dealing with the ethics, origin, history and economics of the existing English land system, and finally setting out his own position with regard to the reforms necessary. The historical portion of his book, which is the larger part, is largely a hash of extracts from a large number of writers, and may be recommended rather as a guide to the literature on the subject than as a competent summary. On the practical question Sir Thomas Whittaker endorses the "minimum wage" proposal with regard to agricultural labourers, and advocates some reasonable and moderate reforms in the rating system.

GILBERT SLATER.

THE LIMITATIONS OF PRAGMATISM.

PRAGMATISM AND IDEALISM. By William Caldwell, M.A., D.Sc., Macdonald Professor of Moral Philosophy, McGill University, Montreal. London, A. and C. Black, 1913. 6s. net.

THIS is an interesting attempt to indicate how the elements of value in Pragmatism and Idealism may be combined into a constructive philosophy based upon the conviction that "reality is what it proves itself to be in the daily transformation of our experience" (p. 229). Professor Caldwell endeavours to hold the balance between the pragmatist and the idealist interpretations of reality, and, though clearly in sympathy with Pragmatism, is not blind to its many defects, while idealism of some description attracts him. He is thus able to do justice to both views in carrying out his proposed "examination of the pragmatist philosophy in its relations to older and newer tendencies in the thought and practice of mankind."

As used by Professor Caldwell the term "pragmatism" is given a very wide meaning; it implies an attitude, a way of looking at life; it is an attempt to fulfil a want neglected by other philosophies. This want is the recognition of man as primarily active, volitional, purposive, a being with unfulfilled desires. In the "great idea of the identity of the desirable and

the intelligible" consists, for Professor Caldwell, "the fundamental principle of the true humanism of which pragmatism is in search." (p. 155 n.) But pragmatism fails to reach the heights of this true humanism because it fails "to see that in the highest reaches of our active life the controlling ideas (justice, humanity, courage, and so on) have a value independently of any consequences other than those of their realization in the purposes and in the dispositions of men." (p. 147.) This surely is both a true and a serious indictment against pragmatism.

In a chapter upon 'Pragmatism as Americanism' put forth, the author assures us in his preface, "in the most tentative spirit possible" (p. vi.), the merits and defects of pragmatism are admirably summed up. There is undoubtedly in the pragmatist philosophy a reflection of the American democratic spirit, and of those conditions of American academic life which force a professor to advertise the utility of his subject, to show that philosophy can bake bread; and, as Professor Caldwell elsewhere remarks, pragmatism is the only philosophy that attempts to perform this feat. Like the typical American, then, pragmatism is practical, concrete, empirical, eclectic, highly social and eminently democratic. Professor Caldwell points out that all this is in most favourable contrast with "the scholastic and the Procrustean attitude to facts that has so long characterized philosophical rationalism," but he is aware that there is some danger of going too far in this direction and that pragmatism "is inclined in some ways to make too much of people's rights and interests, and too little of their duties and privileges and of their real needs and their fundamental human instincts." (p. 192). Surely another serious indictment! The "satisfaction" that is the keynote of pragmatism must be deepened in meaning before this philosophy can rise "to the height of the distinctive message that it is capable of giving to the thought of the present time." (p. 195.)

Professor Caldwell is, indeed, in some doubt as to whether pragmatism can be regarded as a philosophy; it is rather an "approach" to philosophy, a method of attack. He criticises pragmatism for its failure in logic and theory of knowledge—that it has no adequate criterion of truth, nor adequate account of its nature, and that it does not define or explain those consequences by which truth is to be tested. He urges that "taken literally, the doctrine that truth should be tested by consequences is not only harmless but also useless" (p. 127), and he adds the trenchant criticism that "it is literally false for the reason that the proof of truth is not in the first instance any kind of 'consequences,' not even the 'verification' of which pragmatists are so fond." Further, pragmatism is guilty of "failure to give consistent account of the nature of reality" and of "unsatisfactoriness in the realm of ethics." This last charge may surprise many, for it is frequently claimed that the chief stronghold of pragmatism is in ethics and religion. But Professor Caldwell finds that it "completely fails . . . to provide a theory of the ordinary distinction between right and wrong" (p. 138), owing to its merely practical standard.

Yet, in spite of these grave defects, Professor Caldwell insists upon the importance and value of pragmatism, mainly, as we have pointed out, in supplying an admitted need of the time, and as orientating a new attitude towards philosophical problems. This attitude is not confined to James, Dewey, and Schiller, upon whose work pragmatism rests in the main. In Chapter II Professor Caldwell gives a review of the 'Pragmatist movement' into which so many names are crowded that it leaves one with the breath-

less feeling of having read through a bibliography. It may well be doubted whether any useful purpose is served by classing together names such as Papini, Marx, Renouvier, Boutroux, Bergson, James, Poincaré, Brunschvicg and Blondel—to mention only a few—under the one all-comprehensive term “pragmatist.” The fact—which Professor Caldwell notes—that M. Blondel independently originated the name *Pragmatisme* proves nothing as to the similarity of his doctrine with that of Anglo-American pragmatism, especially in view of the fact—which Professor Caldwell does not note—that M. Blondel subsequently rejected the term because of the fundamental divergence between his own Philosophy of Action and pragmatism. Perhaps, as Professor Caldwell urges, “the term ‘pragmatism’ is not of itself a matter of great importance,” for “there is no separate, intelligible, independent, self-consistent system of philosophy that may be called pragmatism,” and he uses it as “a general name for the practicalism or voluntarism or humanism or the philosophy of the practical reason, or the activism, or the instrumentalism, or the philosophy of hypotheses, or the dynamic philosophy of life and things.” (p. 22.) Now there undoubtedly is a common element in these variously named philosophies, *vis.*, the insistence upon the philosophical importance of activity, but this is not by itself sufficient to justify our classing together the instrumentalist theory of truth, for instance, and the philosophy of Bergson. The pragmatist elements that Professor Caldwell finds in the philosophy of Bergson are (i) his anti-intellectualism, and (ii) his activism or actionism. With regard to the first, it is surely evident that Bergson’s condemnation of intellect is the result of his view that the structure of the intellect is purely utilitarian. It is just the pragmatic nature of intellect that disqualifies it for speculation as to the nature of reality. While Bergson condemns intellect for being too practical, the pragmatist condemns it for not being practical enough! Bergson, therefore, cannot be reckoned among the allies of pragmatism. With regard to the second ground: it is surely an error to consider that activism is as such bound up with the anti-intellectualism that is essential to pragmatism. It is in accordance with such a wide signification of the term that Professor Caldwell finds a pragmatic element in the “dynamic idealism” of Dr. Bosanquet! But he regards *The Principle of Individuality and Value* as representing an extreme of rational idealism against which pragmatism is a justifiable protest. His treatment of this question is too hurried to be at all convincing, and some of his criticisms are trivial and carping, as for example, when he complains that Dr. Bosanquet uses Dante’s mind for a simile instead of Goethe, who “is of infinitely more value to us men of the twentieth century than Dante.” (p. 215.) The critic here seems to have entirely missed the point of the comparison. It is in the philosophy of Bergson that Professor Caldwell finds the indication of that combination of pragmatism and idealism that he desiderates.

The book is both interesting and opportune, for it gathers together a vast amount of information as to the trend of recent speculation in Europe and America. The historical account is more valuable than the criticisms that accompany it. Anyone anxious to learn the origin and affiliations of a manner of thinking that is popular and widespread could not do better than turn to Professor Caldwell.

L. S. STEBBING.

THE EGYPTIAN OF TO-DAY.

A MAN OF EGYPT. By C. S. Cooper. Illustrated. Hodder and Stoughton, 1913.

THE author states in his preface that the object of his book is "to give to the person who stays at home as well as to the prospective Egyptian traveller, a brief, and if possible, an unbiassed idea of the Coming Man of Egypt, in his industrial, educational, political and religious awakenings." This is a formidable task and Mr. Cooper has not failed to equip himself for it. He has had the privilege of conversing with high officials from Lord Kitchener downwards. "I have talked with the Earl of Cromer in London, whose point of view in perspective was especially illuminating; I have studied the Egyptian press, both English and native; I have talked with prominent sheikhs and with the chiefs of Bedouin tribes; I have heard some of the prominent business men, judges, lawyers, and principals of schools discourse upon the sudden rise of industry, education, and civic pride; I have visited personally virtually every type of educational institution in Egypt." He shows how the nation is emerging from the morass of illiteracy. The number of pupils and students in government schools and colleges of all grades was 30,742 in 1911 as against 9,259 in 1890. This does not represent the total of children receiving instruction, for the village elementary schools numbered 3,664 in 1910 with 202,095 pupils, including 15,000 girls, as against 7,536 pupils in 1898. This remarkable increase is due chiefly to the action of the Government in establishing grants-in-aid, amounting in 1910 to £E. 21,888. In addition there are 45,000 pupils receiving instruction in schools not under control by the Government. Outside these again are the schools and colleges of the foreign missions. The establishments of the Jesuits and of the Sisters of St. Vincent de Paul, those of the Church Missionary Society and other bodies are open to Egyptian youth of both sexes. One of the chief establishments is Assiout College, with 825 students, of whom 599 are Protestants. These Protestant converts are Copts, for the conversions from Islam are few and far between. The impression of the technical schools received by Mr. Cooper is distinctly hopeful. There are 4,000 students working in the twenty-six schools devoted to technical and agricultural training. In these, "I beheld the most vital and emotional interest displayed anywhere amongst the youth of Egypt." The boy in the foundry who exclaimed "Isn't it fine to see how one thing bursts into another without breaking?" will probably be more useful to his country than the majority of pupils in another school who, on being asked what career they intended to follow, cried with one voice, "The Law." Of course Mr. Cooper visited Al Azhar, the great university with its 12,000 students from all the nations of Islam. Al Azhar has been compared to Oxford "since the breath and magic of the Middle Ages are alike enshrined in these old-world institutions. Both contain the changeless laws and doctrines of the past, grown old without changing. Both are still the centres of educational and religious conservatism." Al Azhar is "in the same condition to-day as when it was founded in the year 973 A.D." Oxford would not, perhaps, admit the exactitude of the parallel at all points. Al Azhar with its curriculum of twelve years, its undergraduates of all ages between fifteen and seventy, its unfrequented library

with copies of the Koran minutely written in gold on thirty small pages or emblazoned in thirty exquisite volumes, provides the theme of one of the most entertaining chapters in the book.

Space forbids notice of the chapters "Moslem and Copt" and "Islam and Modernity." Copt and Moslem are rivals, and the former complain that the English show partiality to the Moslems. "There is, however, a growing tendency for both Copt and Moslem of the better class to unite upon questions having to do with Egypt's prosperity, and in these questions there is indicated an increasing and common desire of 'Egypt for the Egyptians.'" Mr. Cooper, when he sets down the Moslem as descendants of the Arab conquerors, forgets the enormous numbers of Copts who apostatized at the conquest and subsequently. Elsewhere he says that it is not possible to distinguish the Moslem from the Copt. Both are Nilots in fact, and contrast strongly in physique with the Bedawy of the desert and the Turco-Circassian of the large cities, who is a descendant of the Memlooks. The Egyptian is Arab in tongue but not in race, and he is brother of the Copt in blood. Mr. Cooper is in error, too, in stating that Egyptian students did not begin to visit Europe and America for expert training until 1902. Students were sent to France in the days of Mehemet Ali, and in the reign of Said Pasha. There was an Egyptian boy at the High School of Edinburgh a few years later, and surely the name of one Egyptian was borne on the register of St. John's College, Cambridge, in the 'eighties, whilst a little later some were sent to training colleges. The sending of girls to Europe for their education is, however, a new departure, and very significant in view of the rigidity of Moslem law and custom. The author tells us that the first girl student went in 1901. The results have more than answered expectations. There is a demand among the younger generation for educated wives. But after all Mr. Cooper is vague as to the future Man of Egypt, though he tells us much of the present man. He does say this however: "When a few thousand more of these same Egyptian youths are turned out from modern schools . . . creating a new period of citizenship as well as a new age of industry—then let Britain with her policy 'What we have we hold' be ready for new adjustments. Egypt will speak and Europe and the nations of the earth will hear."

Greater care might have been bestowed both on the writing, which is frequently slipshod, and on the revision of the book. The slips are almost without number. Assiout is such a well-known place that it ought not to be miscalled "Assuit" as it is repeatedly in these pages, although it is rightly spelt on the title of a photograph. One of the many teachers whom the author interviewed might have told him that fellaheen is the plural of fellah; yet we have on page 288 "the average Egyptian fellaheen knows," and on page 17, "the weary fellaheen dreams," whilst on page 231 occurs a slip in the other direction, "for what the Copt consider." The founder of the present Egyptian dynasty, a native of Cavalla, called himself Mehemet Ali, after the Turkish custom, and as Mehemet Ali his name is known in history. He never learned Arabic, although some of his contemporaries called him, in Arab fashion, Mohammed Ali. Mr. Cooper follows neither. Nor does he adopt the French substitute, Mahomet, but writes him down Mehomet Ali. One must not carp at the transliteration of Arabic words, though *galabeighs* hardly conveys the sound of *galabeāh*. But there is no excuse for miscalling such a familiar theological term as Monophysite which on page 223 occurs as "Monothysite," an expression

devoid of meaning. One would prefer "helots" to "healots" (p. 174). On page 190 we read of "Eton, where Cromwell aptly said that the great battles of England were fought and decided"! Z.D.F.

THE MAKING OF GARDEN CITY.

THE GARDEN CITY. By C. B. Purdom. With four coloured plates by T. Friedensen, and numerous photographs. J. M. Dent and Sons, 1913. 10/6 net.

THIS is a carefully written account of the foundation and history of the Garden City of Letchworth. Its origins, its ten years of growth, its architecture, rural belt, industries, arts, recreations, and the possibilities of its future are all examined, while valuable information is arranged in the appendices, by various authors, on the land tenure, the town-planning, the ideals, and the technical aspects of the place.

The writer is well read and not deficient in the sense of humour. Perhaps it is because of these idiosyncrasies that his candour conveys more than he seems to realise, and that his enthusiasm, the reader feels, is more for some unattained "great good place," as Henry James puts it, than for the result of the earnest attempt which we contemplate as Letchworth. There is a kind of wistfulness in some of these pages known only to those acquainted with the ironies that attend the materialisation of a dream. There is also, however, an indomitable desire to remain cheerful and to make the best of what has been accomplished.

The City in the Garden, the Garden in the City—that conception has always haunted the mind of man as a supremely suave and felicitous form of human congregation, evident even in odd ancient traditions of Eden as a kind of castellated hill-town, refreshed by the springing of the four great rivers, in persistent reveries concerning the hanging gardens of Babylon, and the groves of Athens, and basking pleasure places of the Mediterranean, or the flowery towns of romance, like Camelot and Miraflores and Beaucaire. Even the actual closely pressed mediæval burg invited brook and tree; and the real Renaissance city called the country-side rejoicingly to its embrace. Indeed, all cities born before the grip of the capitalist had power to make or absolutely to mar them plainly desire to be garden-cities.

It is just as much the nature of a countryside to grow cities as to grow wheat or firs or olives or vines. The carven masks and foliage on beautiful building appeal to faun and dryad not to abandon the clustering dwellings. If the garden-gods entirely vanish, it is because the increasing greed and insensibility of the money-getter dismally convert the city into a slum for the poor and a counting-house for the rich,—a nest of ugly warrens or grim model tenements for the serfs, a blatant and senseless array of façades for their exploiters. The story of different efforts to protest against this consummation—sincere though fumbling labours towards the re-creation of a nobler form of visible community—introduces this volume. We are told of projects such as those of Robert Owen and James Silk Buckingham, and other anxious and meritorious schemes somewhat uninspired by civic imagination. We hear also of the energetic enterprises of one or two modern capitalists; and last we reach this earnest and valuable attempt on

the part of a group of people, instigated by Mr. Ebenezer Howard, to make a modern town without its evils—to build a garden city in a plain.

The plan and the endeavour all seem rational—too rational. Cities are born, not made, as the founders have quite evidently been told with great frequency, and the best town-planning is, like the best education, auxiliary rather than initiatory. Of course the cities of old were conscious enough, in that they obeyed a tradition urging them to glorious building; but their beginnings were predestined. The site of the real city must be inevitable, determined by geographical conditions. Letchworth is where it is simply because so much land was there purchasable for so much money. It has confessedly not yet begun to fulfil its eager intentions, and the very heart and centre of its plan remains blank. But that does not discredit anybody or anything, except the spirit of the age. The old order is ended; the new is not yet in sight. And Letchworth remains a suburb. Nor does one believe it can become anything else, because its inhabitants are not of the region. The dwellers are people who toil by day in London, or persons with small private incomes from anywhere, or imported factory workers, many of whom, the author sadly admits, prefer to live in Hitchin. Many an old English county town that has been decently let alone, with its meadows and waterways, its lifted towers, its discreet and dignified houses, its pleasant cottage plots of old-fashioned flowers, is more of a garden city than this. That may have its stains and imperfections; but the core of the thing is human.

Of course Mr. Purdom has some praiseworthy incident to record, such as the defeat of the speculative builder; and his sense of the wickedness of most contemporary architecture is admirable. But even in Letchworth exists the invidiously labelled "workman's cottage"; and the historian admits that the development of an area to the west of the town for industrial purposes is a severe blow to the original intention. The unfortunate results of the accident of the Exhibition of Cheap Cottages during the genesis of Letchworth is clearly underlined. It may also be sufficiently true, as the author suggests, that vacuity rather than effusion in the minds of present-day architects is responsible for many of the feeble or forced structures in the Garden City. Still, of all artists, the architect is not restricted by his clients, so that the architecture of an age remains the most just criterion of its psychology and sociology. It is not surprising, therefore, that a body of inspired builders did not suddenly appear upon the site of the new town. Still, several of the houses illustrated in his volume make an agreeable impression, and the old incorporated villages have been carefully respected.

Mr. Purdom has written a competent and interesting book; but, just as the centre of his city remains unfulfilled, so the communal life is not revealed as actual, nor are the civic ideals made plain. Even the school has been yielded to the "authorities," and the hope that classes might be limited to thirty-two children left unrealised—a sadly significant detail. Perhaps the writer has not completely grasped the analysis of a city, as formulated, say, by Professor Geddes. He hardly imagines how hills and plains and rivers conspire with the conscious and unconscious nobilities of man to make the thing worthy of that great name. Nor does he quite realise that not all of us wish to see factories, however improved, planted over the fair meadows of England, or to pen the workers in compounds, however hygienic, however thoughtfully composed of cottages with a bath and copper in the scullery—preferring that such factories as must exist

should be humanely rebuilt in their own place, consuming their own smoke, while their toilers live like freemen among other freemen.

With all its optimism this record leaves the heart a little heavy. Is this the best our idealists can do? Probably it is. They are timid, for the pride of life has been scourged out of them by the dominion of plutocracy. The old order had its magnificences, irretrievably part of the world's tradition; but now we endure all the miseries of transition. It is yet too early to build a garden city, to beat the swords into pruning-hooks before they have completed their natural uses.

ADRIAN BERRINGTON.

MARRIAGE AND RELATIONSHIP TERMS.

KINSHIP AND SOCIAL ORGANISATION. By W. H. R. Rivers, M.D., F.R.S. (Studies in Economic and Political Science, No. 36). London: Constable and Co., 1914. 2/6 net.

THE three lectures embodied in this remarkable little volume "are largely based on experience gained in the work of the Percy Sladen Trust Expedition to Melanesia of 1908, and give a simplified record of social conditions which will be described in detail in the full account." Dr. Rivers's aim is to show that "the terminology of relationship has been rigorously determined by social conditions"; in other words, that the terms for relationship, wherever occurring in the world, denote actual facts of marriage-relations. It may be said at once that his demonstration of the theorem (in some cases beautifully worked out by the method of concomitant variations) is convincing, though not yet complete. As far as it goes, and that is a long way, it is the most decisive piece of sociological reasoning yet achieved, and it will assist enormously in removing the reproach against sociology that "it is not a science." For it establishes by absolute logical proof that here at least sociology is "rigorously deterministic."

The author's chief field is the classification system, and he makes an impressive apology for the great work, consistently misunderstood, of Lewis Morgan, though he corrects his unwarranted inferences from his splendid and well-digested material. He wisely refuses to believe in either primitive promiscuity or primitive monogamy, or that the terms were terms of address. As for group-marriage, he deprecates the term, and suggests "sexual communism," and shrewdly surmises that such forms of marriage may be late. An opportunity for pressing the logical view that only social conditions can produce social terminologies, was afforded by Professor's Kroeber's recent view that linguistic and psychological causes alone can be applied to explain terms of relationship. Extremely simple and interesting cases illustrate the forcible argument of the author. In the well-known cross-cousin marriage, when C (male) and d (female) marry, A, mother's brother of C, becomes his wife's father; b, A's wife, becomes his wife's mother. This, and other logical results, have been actually found to be facts. Again, in the Banks Islands, cross-cousins apply to one another terms of relationship which are otherwise used between parents and children. And as a fact a man does take the widow of his mother's brother.

Similarly is explained the remarkable fact that persons two generations apart are classed together; Raga, *e.g.* "is the place where they marry their granddaughters." To give further instances would be to spoil the reader's

pleasure in this convincing sketch. Its principle should be applied at once to all the marriage systems of the world, especially those of Australia. The author has applied it in a few illustrative cases to our own. On the whole the theory looks like one of those things which elude all minds for ages, but which, when discovered, seem to be quite obvious. And that is the way with truth.

A. E. CRAWLEY.

THE HISTORIAN AS SOCIOLOGIST.

THE EVOLUTION OF STATES: An Introduction to English Politics. By J. M. Robertson. Watts & Co. 5s. net.

WERE this a new treatise, it would require and deserve a much longer notice than is here possible. Even as an expansion of a work published some years ago, it has two special claims on the attention of sociologists: it recognises the need of sociology for the interpretation of history; and it deals with one of the most fertile, possibly the very central, approach to the study of the science—the evolution of society as shown in the historic record. To this line of attack, the biological, the psychological, the anthropological, are only preliminary. To this the purely economic and other studies of one or other side of the social process, should be strictly subordinate. It provides the synthesis that should follow every analysis. Mr. Robertson, indeed, does not profess to write a treatise on the historic method in sociology; but he applies it to the study of various problems in history, and deals in his trenchant style with some dangerous fallacies that have long beset such investigations. The book is divided into several parts. The first three deal with the political, economic and culture forces in the ancient world, the fourth with the Italian Republics of the mediæval and early modern period, the fifth—which is perhaps the most original, as it will certainly be the least known to the majority of readers—with the smaller states, Holland, the Scandinavian countries, Switzerland and Portugal, while in the last he comes to the more familiar ground of English history.

There are four fallacies of which the author is the determined opponent; and in attacking these he has done a great service to historic sociology. The first, which is the most popular and therefore the most dangerous, is the theory of race, the explanation of history by the supposed racial characteristics of each people. He has no difficulty in showing—and he very much enjoys the process—that the same "race" in different periods of history under different circumstances has acted in entirely different ways: that, for instance, Teutons have been at one time adventurous and seafaring, at another immobile and agricultural, that they have been noted for their turbulence and again for their abject submission, that the Teuton and the Celt—supposed to exhibit such violent contrasts—have often interchanged the characteristics that were supposed to be indelible. The whole racial explanation of history is an example of the futility of purely biological explanations in sociology. Another fallacy, also biologic in its inception, is the theory that states, like individuals, have their growth, maturity, and necessary decay. It may be true that Humanity as a whole, under the influence of climatic changes, is destined after long æons to decay. But the life of each state shows no such process, which is founded solely on a false analogy between the state and the biologic organism. Of more practical application is the author's refutation of "the vulgar delusion

that 'possessions' are the great sources of a nation's wealth." Taking, among other instances, the case of Holland, which the supporters of the impugned theory put forward as one of the strongest on their side, he shows that at the period of greatest national prosperity, the colonial trade was in every way inferior to the fisheries, and that war in the modern world is the worst enemy both of free institutions and of material well-being. Finally, he repudiates the common material standard by which civilisations are often judged. "What may be termed the coal-civilisations, with their factitious rapidity of exploitation, are in the nature of the case relatively ugly and impermanent."

There are, however, one or two points where he condemns the true with the false. For instance, he not only refuses to believe in a French race, but even objects to France being considered as a whole, except when it is united in fighting some outside enemy. But surely, though in every internal contest Frenchmen will be found on either side, there is, as a result of its previous historic and consequent social tradition, a determination in particular directions. Frenchmen fighting Frenchmen will still be conditioned by the antecedents of their country—as well as by the wider antecedents of La Vendée and the Cevennes. The national character and national tendencies will change as circumstances change, but they will change gradually, will retain a certain continuity through long ages, and will exert an influence on civilisation which may be for centuries in one direction. In this sense, such expressions as "France" and "Frenchmen," as used by earlier sociologists, seem scarcely to deserve the opprobrium which Mr. Robertson so unsparingly applies. So, too, when he identifies militarism with conservatism in the higher stages of civilisation, should it not be remembered that, in an earlier stage, the theocracies, comparatively peaceful, were the most conservative communities, in comparison with which the military states of antiquity represented freedom and progress. A more serious blemish is Mr. Robertson's failure to recognise, in his account of the middle ages, the advantages alike to unity and freedom of the existence of a spiritual power, separate from the temporal and dependent, always in theory and often in practice, on other arms than those of force. It is true that the absolute doctrines of the Church impelled it towards Theocracy and kept it from necessary adaptations, so that in the end it became enslaved to the temporal power. It should also be said, to Mr. Robertson's credit, that if he is unduly severe on the mediæval Church, in the subsequent period he holds the balance very even between Catholic and Protestant. One apparent contradiction on another subject may be mentioned. A nation immersed in commerce will be drawn away from intellectual pursuits, and surely the same is true of a nation immersed in politics. Yet we are told that without free political institutions, the intellectual life of a nation cannot flourish. Is this true of France, as compared with England in the middle of the eighteenth century? Is not the second statement too simple? Is not the truth rather that the same causes often destroy both political and intellectual freedom?

Coming to more general considerations, it may be noted that Mr. Robertson is far from belonging to the materialist school of history founded by Marx. He gives great weight to cultural elements, to political animosities, as in the case of the abandonment of the French language by the English aristocracy, and even to the influence of personalities. His stress on economics does not imply the exclusion of other elements, and for a survey no objection can be taken to this stress; but for a theory of progress,

is it not the continuous cultivation of science which has been the main cause of the greater rapidity of change in the last four centuries? In his account of the causes underlying the differences between Greek and Roman civilisation, he is in line with most of the sociological interpreters of history. In modern Europe, his exposition suffers somewhat by the absence of an *explicit* theory of the history of the West; for the first simplification the study allows is the separation of the common elements in the history of all or most of the Western nations from the elements due to the special environment of each. No notice, for instance, is taken of the close—though of course not perfect—correspondence between the power of Imperial Rome and the victory of Catholicism at the Reformation—the less Romanised countries being the chief scene of Protestant triumph. It is even suggested that some slight changes in the sixteenth century might have made Spain Protestant. It is a sign of Mr. Robertson's great power that, though without a general theory, he is not overwhelmed by his wealth of local facts.

S. H. SWINNY.

LIFE, EMOTION AND INTELLECT. By Cyril Bruyn Andrews. T. Fisher Unwin. 5s. net.

At the moment when feelings are vigorously translating themselves into deeds, necessarily under the guidance of the intellect, sensation, thought and will are indistinguishable from each other. In this book, accordingly, Mr. Andrews neglects these artificial distinctions in order to study emotion defined as

"that condition of the human mind in which past experiences seem to come back with unusual vividness and meaning, but in which the intellectual chain which used to bind them together seems to become misty and unreal, in which remembrances of the past and feelings of the present rush violently, yet apparently unsummoned, into consciousness—that condition of the mind in which a being foreign to ourselves in some ways, and absolutely ourselves in others, seems to have command over our actions, in which a feeling of supernatural control is combined with an intimate self-realization and self-consciousness—when we find ourselves sometimes startled, sometimes pleased, in a state where willing and unwilling, pleasure and pain, seem to lose much of their meaning and to be empty words belonging to another and a different world."

All through the writer pleads for the direct, natural expression of emotion, which would consist, he believes, not in those manifestations of degeneracy, such as masochism and sadism, of which there is so much talk nowadays, but in "acts as wholesome as the sun at noonday." The shy Anglo-Saxon is better than he seems, and the secrets that his reserve shelters are often very beautiful. Why, then are there "few men in any profession who are willing to boast that they have imagination as well as method; a vision as well as a time-table; who care to acknowledge that they love as well as study their fellow men?" Rather than that these "fine-nerved humanities" should be repressed, Mr. Andrews would willingly tolerate the display of some other emotions, like revenge, or revolutionary pugnacity or unreasoning conservatism in religion, which are not so beneficent. Here he betrays a certain lack of idealistic imagination; and yet the book evidences a faith in humanity which, if it is not stated in poetic language, is refreshing and stimulating.

M. E. R.

THE IRISH QUESTION. (Reprinted from the *Round Table*.) Macmillan & Co. 6d.

THIS anonymous pamphlet is written in a moderate tone and seeks to find by a careful discussion of many aspects of the Irish question a means of agreement. It is to be feared, however, that in a world where Orangemen and Nationalists have strong feelings, and the Parliament Act dominates the situation, it will be difficult to revive the spirit of compromise, even if it be desirable. The importance of the pamphlet is much enhanced by a foreword from Sir Horace Plunkett, who wishes to express his complete agreement with the author on one point, his "insistence upon the unity of Ireland." Holding that the chaos of opinion on the Irish question is largely due to considerations other than Irish ones which have obtruded themselves upon the controversy, he yet welcomes a new factor of this kind, the extension of federal government to the four elements of the United Kingdom.



PERIODICAL LITERATURE.

GERMAN.

In the ARCHIV FÜR RASSEN- U. GESELLSCHAFTSBIOLOGIE for March there is an article on *Religion und Geburtenrückgang* which should be interesting to sociologists. The writer, Professor Julius Wolf, expresses the opinion that the decay of religious faith is one of the direct causes of the fall of the birth-rate. At the end of the article he draws attention to the extended inquiry which Levenstein has recently made as to the religion of miners, metallists, and workpeople engaged in the textile industries. Out of 712 Berlin metal-workers whom this investigator questioned on the subject only twenty professed any faith in God. "The confidence and the moral sustenance which they formerly sought in the church they now obtain from the upspringing fountain of socialistic activity. Their faith and energy are directed to the things of this world. They have taken the responsibility of mankind on themselves, and are making organised efforts to meet that obligation."—Dr. Grassl contributes a demographic article in which he maintains that the question of over- and under-population would not arise if modern societies observed nature's law of keeping the child dependent upon the mother for a whole year. He does not explain why the period of dependence should not, as among the Jews of the Middle Ages, be two years; or, as in Japan, three years; or, as among other peoples, five or six or seven years. The reason is that he is bent on recommending an ideal—that each married woman should have a child every two years. His researches were made in Bavaria. He reckons that for each mother in that province the normal number of children, if she is married at twenty-three, is ten. He deplores the hygiene of the modern nursery because it relieves the mother of much of the educational work that Nature intended her to perform, and affords her some non-vicarious distinction and enjoyment. He condemns neo-malthusianism on the ground that it tends to reduce the birth-rate faster than the infant death-rate.—Another attractive article in this number is *Rasseywertung in der hellenischen Philosophie*, by Dr. Lenz. It is for the most part an exposition of the philosophy of the Cynics. Dr. Lenz opposes the race ideal to that of culture, intellectualism, individualism and humanitarianism. Very clearly does he demonstrate the action of the crude and cruel race instinct which prompts one to declare, "My own clan is the noblest," by reference to the symbol by which Antisthenes advertised his philosophy to the world, and which gave its name to the school to which he belonged. The dog is loyal to his master's tribe and hostile to all other tribes. Hence it suitably typifies not only the teaching of the Cynics, but also the Pan-German doctrines which inculcate contempt for every kind of individualism, socialism and internationalism.

This German Cynicism has an able exponent in the Editor of the POLITISCH-ANTHROPOLOGISCHE REVUE. In the January, February and March numbers respectively he discusses "The Educational Problem from the Standpoint of Race Biology," "The Greatest Evil of our Time and its Remedy," and "How can Class Antagonism be mitigated?" To the question put forward in the last paper he answers, "The best, the greatest, the

most effective means of reconciliation is a righteous war produced by vigorous national sentiment. And from such a trial of strength we shall not be spared. Sooner or later war will surely come." The same truculent spirit manifests itself in the educational article, which is a plea for the establishment of schools for children of pure German extraction which would be free from the influence of Jews. The competition of the Jewish boys and girls he regards as harmful because they reach maturity at an earlier age than the native children. On this psychological ground the writer's critics will stand side by side with him; but from the position which he takes up at the end of the article they will dissociate themselves. In the last sentence he assures his readers that if the "Aryan" culture which he recommends were realised "the course of the whole world's history would cease to follow misleading tracks and would assume the right direction." As for "the greatest evil of our day," this is individualism, especially that form of it which is promoted by social democracy and by pacificism. Dr. Schmidt-Gibichenfels prophesies the failure of these movements. No social system of thought and conduct can maintain itself, he argues, unless it is supported by authority, for the most part of a military nature, directing organised forces; and such organisations are of very slow national growth. The Englishman's comment on that assertion will probably be—the German Empire itself is not fifty years old; socialism has been developing in Germany for at least fifty-five years: and the peace movement has a world history extending over a whole century.

Also received:—*Bulletin de l'Institut de Sociologie Solvay* (Nos. 29 and 30); *Le Musée social, Annales* (December, January, February); *Le Musée social, Mémoires et Documents* (December, January, February); *Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie und Soziologie* (December).

FRENCH.

The 1913-14 session of the Paris Sociological Society, which is being devoted to the discussion of "Economic Liberalism," was opened by M. Yves Guyot, whose paper appears in the *REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE SOCIOLOGIE* for December. His argument may be summed up in a sentence which he quotes from Quesnay—"The merchants of other nations are our own merchants." He finds the germ of this free-trade ideal in the substitution of barter for robbery in early times, and the full flower in the contractual system of exchange practised by the Manchester individualists. He describes the *laissez-faire* policy as the realisation of productive civilisation; while he identifies every form of group-bargaining, monopoly-holding, and paternal legislation with destructive or military civilisation. In the second lecture, which is reported in the January number, M. Rabany opposes war to economic liberalism in the same way; but he points out that for the workers no such thing as freedom in bargaining has ever existed, and that State interference with their concerns, under the conditions of machine industry, is a necessary provision for the future welfare of the race. The third lecture, printed in the February number, was given by M. René Worms, who showed that no country has ever adopted, or could adopt, economic liberalism unconditionally. It was a virile doctrine, and the men who preached it were "professors of energy"; but if it were not tempered with the teachings of socialists and protectionists it would bring about national destruction. At the same time the weak owed the strong a large debt of gratitude for spreading it abroad. The workman naturally

rebelled against the "administrative nihilism" of the Manchester school of economists, but it was they who had given him the idea of winning freedom for himself by means of trade-unionism and education.

LA SCIENCE SOCIALE for January is entitled *La fonction de l'élite dans la société moderne*. It is the work of M. Paul Rousiers, who has written it as a sequel to his treatise on the directors and managers of industrial and commercial undertakings, and as an introduction to an essay on the education of men of superior intellect and character which he is preparing. Here he discusses the non-compulsory services of such men to the community. He maintains that it is the wide range of the knowledge on which they act that constitutes the greatness of the leaders of a nation, particularly of the artists and the men of science, who present every subject of discussion from many points of view. He therefore deplures the trade-union spirit in which the servants of the government so often perform their duties nowadays. The upper classes no longer claim any well-defined responsibility for the welfare of the lower; and the latter, for their part, interpret their privileges as parliamentary electors as the right to realise their sectional interests without regard to those of the people at large. M. Rousiers suggests that self-interest in these new forms could be converted into public spirit by more careful study and better organisation of all the group interests, the chief representatives of which ought to compare every set with every other set, and thus form a new State philosophy which would give each calling its just place in the life of the nation. He sees the beginnings of such a philosophy in the many social-service organisations of England, and in the political leadership which university men are undertaking in America. The December and the February surveys relate, the one to *L'industrie rurale à domicile en Normandie*, the other to *Le montagnard auvergnat*. Among the paragraphs of general interest to sociologists which precede the latter study are some noteworthy methodological observations drawn from Professor Bergson's centenary speech on Claude Bernard, and a short essay on *Les fonctions de la cité* by M. Hottenger, who states that Grenoble is now the only town in France in which the gas supply is not in private hands. He attributes the failure of municipal enterprise among his countrymen to State government of the communes. "Behind the democratic façade it is always beaureaucratic work that is being done." The quotation from the speech is a protest against the artificial distinction that is made between the collector of data and the inventor of hypotheses. "To generalise is not merely to use cut-and-dried facts. It is not so much a special procedure, as a certain force of mind which enables one to guess the inner meaning of a fact that is the key to the explanation of a large number of other facts. In short, the disposition to synthetise is only a development of the disposition to analyse."

The place of honour in the REVUE DE MÉTAPHYSIQUE ET DE MORALE for January is given to a paper on *Religion et raison*, in which M. Emile Boutroux reconciles the two spheres of thought and action by making an ingenious Platonic distinction between concept and idea, and marking out religion as the chief theatre of the latter and science of the former. The concept is the outcome of the logical arrangement of ready-made facts. The idea "consists in bringing the light of experience, history and science to bear upon the ideals of living and becoming perfect which one forms naturally in the social clash and communion of wills and intelligences. A great idea is one which has been derived from the past, but has a formative and ameliorative influence on future generations."

THE BULLETIN DE LA STATISTIQUE GÉNÉRALE DE LA FRANCE for the first quarter of the year contains a study of *Le travail des femmes en divers pays*. So extensive is the survey that the author, M. Marcel de Ville-Chabrolle, has been able to bring his figures up to 1907 only. At that time 25 per cent. of the women of the British Isles were engaged in some industry or profession. The proportion was 40 per cent. in France and Austria, 14 per cent. in the United States, and 28 to 30 per cent. in the German Empire, Luxembourg, Denmark and Switzerland. It is in farming that the greatest differences between one country and another manifest themselves. Thus in the United Kingdom only 7 and in America only 9 per cent. of the wage-earning women are working on the land; while in France the proportion is 40 per cent., in Luxembourg 42 per cent., in the German Empire 47 per cent., and in Austria 50 per cent. As far as official and professional work is concerned the British Isles come at the top of the list with nearly 200 per 10,000 of the women inhabitants; while in France, the German Empire, Denmark, Switzerland and the United States the number is only from 100 to 150 per 10,000. In the United Kingdom and the States teaching, medical work and the dramatic arts are chosen by women oftener than elsewhere: and in all industrial countries the employment of women increased steadily between 1885 and 1907. M.E.R.

ENGLISH AND AMERICAN.

THE OPEN COURT for February is published in celebration of Professor Haeckel's eightieth birthday and its various articles, all bearing on the same subject, form a very fair survey of Professor Haeckel's work. In reading the opening article by the Editor one cannot help feeling that the pure scientist often makes a poor philosopher or metaphysician. The significance of the various different schools of monists which have already sprung up cannot be ignored, and it may be felt that in forming the German Monistic League and attempting a world-conception Professor Haeckel hardly appreciated the importance of disunity in the furtherance of progressive thought: such attempts at a complete scientific comprehension of the universe probably belong rather to the last century than to the present one. Professor Haeckel in his own article seems to state very little when he says that all science is "natural" science, and when he attempts to put forward a view "free from all traditional dogmas" many may consider that he is attempting an obvious impossibility. The pitfalls of language, both physiological and psychological, are plainly evident in a discussion of monism, and Professor Haeckel in his present article practically ignores the difficulties of consciousness and of ultimate truth. Monism will no doubt be an important stepping-stone in the progress both of science and philosophy, but its attempt to establish one universal truth seems to have already faded into past history. The third article by Dr. W. Breitenbach gives an interesting account of the progress of Haeckel's evolutionary theories, and describes how many of Darwin's opponents have now absorbed these theories as part of their own. While acknowledging the importance of Sir Ernest Shafer's statements on spontaneous generation he acknowledges that very often the original creative act is merely driven back to plant or cell life. Dr. Breitenbach considers that philosophy and the Church must either revert to mediæval scholasticism or come to some understanding with the facts of anthropology and construct a new world-conception.

The Editor in a second article entitled "Religion in a Monistic Interpretation," admits that monism often tilts at windmills, and that in the victory of the unitary world-conception the abuse of religion should cease: he considers that with a fuller realization of the importance of hero-worship and of the God idea as the first sense of order, the necessity of building on the past becomes obvious. In Professor Haeckel's eulogy of the work of Professor Ostwald, the President of the German Monistic League, the neglect of all philosophic difficulties is very apparent. The strict division between science and the supernatural may seem to the modern thinker curiously strained; it is perhaps more usual at present to regard the supernatural as merely that which is beyond our *present* conception, and even in science it is generally allowed that the only possibility of growth is towards that which is outside its bounds; to say that transcendentalism has only an emotional value seems a stifling and narrow view. Philosophy, in the opinion of Professor Haeckel, lapsed into unpopularity because of its hasty generalizations which displeased the naturalists of the first half of the nineteenth century, and he suggests that it is to Professor Ostwald that we owe the higher type of monistic nature-philosophy which has enlarged monism into a philosophy and freed it from its mechanistic or materialistic character by emphasizing its "energetic" side. Professor Haeckel, however, makes no attempt to deal with the natural repugnance of mankind to a "universal philosophy" nor the influence of Eastern mysticism on European thought. In the last article, which deals with Conservatism and morality, Mr. Blaise lays stress on the important truth that all conceptions imply conflict and that what we call prejudice, sentiment, or bad logic, is often merely a point of view which we fail to realize. "The thing that is old ever abhors the thing to be unless the latter serves as a complement or synergist to the former"; a modern truth can only embellish an old one. Rules of conduct must be continually re-born if they are to survive and a conservatism that excludes the future from its view degenerates into mere scepticism. Mr. Blaise gives an excellent description of true conservatism, and suggests that if people lived as God acted there would be less need of quarrelling over what he was supposed to have said. This appears to follow the line of several modern philosophers who believe that actions savour more of reality than words. While acknowledging the non-morality of science, the essential morality of every act, and therefore of every act in thought, is strongly insisted on. It is suggested that the purely theoretical wrong thought does not exist since thought must necessarily hang round action, and the present popular demand for employment is brought forward as evidence of the growing realization that in action and labour lie "true dignity and genuine sanctity."

THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL, March. In this number Mr. P. H. Wicksteed has an article entitled "The Scope and Method of Political Economy in the light of the Marginal theory of value and of distribution," and his broad outlook should do much to widen and improve our economic theories. Excellent as are most of Mr. Wicksteed's terms, occasional statements appear which may perhaps require a little criticism. It is suggested, for example, that in order to obtain some conception of what are, and what are not, economic actions, the action done entirely for its own sake may be regarded as uneconomic: yet making a thing for the sake of making it may be economic if it stops the maker from buying a similar article from some one else; the very fact of making the thing may also stop the worker

from performing work which could be more properly called economic and even by his so-called uneconomic work he may often create desires in others which can only be satisfied by economic transactions. With a few such exceptions Mr. Wicksteed has a fundamental grasp of the real nature of economic theory; his treatment of the subjective side of economics is excellent, and his suggestion that the economic equilibrium produced by balance of various desires in the person should be treated as identical with the equilibrium produced by the same desire on different people is well worth serious attention. There is no doubt that in the past almost all economists have excluded too arbitrarily transactions which seemed to them outside the circle of economic exchange; it is perhaps not often realized that such heterogeneous desires as fresh eggs and friendship are often balanced when choosing a town or a country house. Mr. Wicksteed considers that our reconstructed system of economics should be another application of the principle of Aristotle's *Ethics*, and that we should no longer imagine that by picking out a few scattered psychological facts we have reached a true system of psychological economics. He has some interesting criticism of the two curves of demand and supply used by many economists, and emphasizes the fact that the cost of production of one thing is nothing more than an "alias" of efficiencies in the production of other things; he hopes that before long all factors of production, however heterogeneous, may be reduced to a common measure and that such curves as land curves should, if true, be treated as universal curves. He considers that the confusion between the geometric properties of arbitrarily selected constant factors in a diagram and the economic property of land has not only brought confusion into economic thought but is likely to be particularly mischievous in its misdirection of social imagination and aspiration. Everyone will agree that it is of the utmost importance to fulfil Jevons's dream and re-establish economics on a "sensible basis."

THE SCOTTISH GEOGRAPHICAL MAGAZINE for March contains a paper by Mr. H. J. Findlay on "The Scope of School Geography" which should be of considerable value to teachers. Mr. Findlay considers that the term geography has recently developed such a wide meaning that some new definition is necessary; he considers that in the advanced, as well as in the elementary, classes, the British Empire as a geographical unit should be strictly excluded: politics, he considers, introduce complications which are in no sense geographical; natural divisions should come first and political boundaries should be deferred till later. While appeals to the eye such as lantern slides should be valuable adjuncts it must not be forgotten that the main function of geography is to teach the child that he is living in a world dominated by laws capable of analysis and explanation. Man should be accepted as the standard of reference in geographical study although certain reservations must be made in regard to the method of applying this principle. Mr. Findlay considers that the young mind is often incapable of grasping generalities and these must be discovered rather than taught. The geography of the child's near environment should be taught concurrently with that of the wider world outside; a broader knowledge of the home climate and the various characteristics of the neighbourhood should enable him gradually to apply abstractly what he has learnt concretely, but it must never be forgotten that a measure is necessary and the measure must be that of his own surroundings. Mr. Findlay laments the fact that this measure, though emphasized in the opening

stages, is completely lost sight of until towards the end of the course a return is made to the local Ordnance Survey Sheet. Other sciences, he considers, should be introduced incidentally and their influence traced, but geography lessons should not be converted into a general knowledge course.

THE TOWN PLANNING REVIEW for January contains an interesting article on "Town Planning and the Rural Population," in which Professor Adshead draws a terrible picture of the effects of rural development if no system of planning is adopted, and his æsthetic opinions will no doubt appeal to the cultured class of to-day. His description of the old-fashioned village is delightful, although some may wonder whether its chief charms are not ultimately connected with inefficiency and unconscious simplicity. If this really prove true, the advocates of town planning find themselves in a rather dubious position. Town planning can certainly not be unconscious and it is doubtful whether our practical nature will ever allow us to make it inefficient. We may praise inefficiency if it is the price we have to pay for a certain freedom for individuality and personal caprice, but in a scheme for town planning no such excuse would be present and we should do nothing but condemn the waste of time and money. Whatever views therefore we may hold on the merits of conscious and unconscious beauty we must allow that a town-planning scheme can neither be unconscious nor inefficient. A second, and perhaps an even more serious, difficulty also presents itself: no class feeling is to be aroused and yet a large part of the population are "to be housed," which is a distinctly different thing from housing themselves. Presumably some part of the population would be allowed a certain latitude for individual taste, but the whole population must be willing to have the town planned for them and for the greater part of the population must be willing to be housed. Before any scheme of town planning can really succeed two important tendencies must show themselves more plainly than they do at present; first, there must be a far greater local patriotism among all classes of the towns and villages; and, secondly, we must become more unconsciously socialistic in our ideas. When we feel socialistic legislation pressing on us a reaction is almost inevitable; it is only when we have unconsciously incorporated a certain amount of socialistic feeling into our individual desires that schemes of town-planning can become a lasting success.

C. B. A.

ITALIAN.

RIVISTA ITALIANA DI SOCIOLOGIA, Sept.—Dec., 1913.—Signor Pareto employs statistics of commerce and exchange in tracing the relation between the social condition of a people and the variations in its economic prosperity. Sig. A. D. Xénopol contributes a short article on positive science and historical science. History works, he says, in materials utterly diverse from those of the positive sciences, and the methods used in these last cannot be applied to history. For while the phenomena of the visible world are perpetually repeated with negligible differences and can be resumed in the formulæ of laws, the facts of development, which belong to a pre-existing reality, continue but do not repeat themselves, and constitute historic series but not laws. Sig. Ricci discusses statistical method and its limitations. Sig. Sensini contributes a long article on the

equilibrium of the composition of the social classes with mathematical diagrams and illustrations. Sig. Tucci discusses recent theories of totemism and exogamy.

RIVISTA INTERNAZIONALE, Dec., 1913.—Sig. Corsanego writes on the defects in the working of the present Italian railway system with suggestions for remedying them and improving the control and management generally.—Sig. Grilli continues a study of Colonial experiments in Neo-Latin Africa.—Sig. Corridore discusses some statistics of longevity.—Sig. Tolli contributes a short article on the Italian Anti-slavery Society.

January, 1914.—Sig. Main writes on the Panama Canal.—Sig. Grilli concludes his study of the Neo-Latin Colonies in Africa.—Sig. Bruguier continues a paper on the Agro Romano and civic customs.

February, 1914.—Sig. Main continues his paper on the Panama Canal.—Sig. Grilli continues a study of Neo-Latin Colonies in Africa.—Sig. Pasteris continues an account of his mission to the Baltic.

The *Cronaca Sociale* contains an interesting brief account of our Home Rule crisis.



THE SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY.

REPORT OF THE COUNCIL FOR THE YEAR 1913.

THE following is the Report of the Council for the year 1913, presented to the Annual General Meeting of Members on March 31, 1914 :—

During the year the Society continued its various activities, of which the chief were the holding of meetings for the reading and discussion of papers, and the issue of the *Sociological Review*. The meetings held during the first term were as follows :—

- January 28. Sir J. George Scott, K.C.I.E., on "The Position of Women in Burma." Sir Frederic Fryer in the chair. (The paper was published in the *Sociological Review*, April, 1913.)
 - February 11. Mr. H. W. V. Temperley on "Federalism." The Earl of Dunraven in the chair.
 - February 24. Mr. Maurice S. Thompson on "Economic and Social Conditions in the Southern Balkans." Mr. G. P. Gooch in the chair. (*Sociological Review* for July, 1913.)
 - March 11. The Annual General Meeting, followed by a paper by Mr. Norman Angell on "The Foundations of International Polity." The Right Hon. Sir Frederick Pollock in the chair.
 - April 22. Mr. A. E. Crawley on "The Unconscious Reason in Social Evolution." Mr. J. A. Hobson in the chair. (*Sociological Review*, July, 1913.)
 - May 7. Dr. Harold Mann, Principal of the Government Agricultural College, Poona, on "The Untouchables of an Indian City." Lord Sydenham in the chair.
 - May 20. Dr. W. H. R. Rivers, F.R.S., on "Survivals in Sociology." Professor Hobhouse in the chair. (*Sociological Review*, Oct. 1913.)
- The meetings held during the second (autumn) term were as follows :—
- October 14. Mr. Cloudesley Brereton on "National Secondary Education : The Lesson from France." Professor J. Adams in the chair. (*Sociological Review*, October, 1913.)
 - October 28. Miss Jane Harrison on "Woman and Knowledge." Professor Gilbert Murray in the chair.
 - November 11. Mr. Edward Cadbury on "Some Principles of Industrial Organisation." Mr. J. A. Hobson in the chair. (*Sociological Review*, April, 1914.)
 - November 25. Mr. F. G. D'Aeth on "The Unit of Social Organisation in Towns." Professor Urwick in the chair. (*Sociological Review*, January, 1914.)
 - December 9. Miss Winifred Stephens on "Some Current of Modern French Thought as Reflected in the Novel." Sir Sidney Lee in the chair. (*Sociological Review*, January, 1914.)

FINANCES OF THE SOCIETY.

The Society closed the year with a total indebtedness, including the accumulated deficits of former years, of £119 10s. 5d. The hopes expressed during the past two years that it would be possible, by means of careful

economies in working, to make the Society practically self-supporting have not been realised. Towards the close of the year a meeting of the Council was called for the purpose of taking the financial situation into consideration, and it was resolved to make a special appeal to members for the raising of an Emergency Fund to clear off the debt. It was estimated that a contribution of half-a-guinea from the members as a whole, added to several larger donations promised, would enable the Council to meet current expenditure and to wipe off the overdraft at the Bank. The appeal was accordingly sent out, but it met with a somewhat smaller response than was hoped for. The total sum raised by December 31, was £118 2s. 0d., since when £31 11s. 6d. has been received, making in all £149 13s. 6d. The Council therefore must regretfully record that the position, although improved, is still most unsatisfactory. The establishment expenses, as members are aware, are kept down to the minimum level, and in view of the work carried on and the increasing call for a society fulfilling the functions of the Sociological Society, the maintenance of the organisation on a self-supporting basis ought not to be a matter of difficulty.

THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW.

The expenses of the *Sociological Review* have been met since its foundation by means of a special Guarantee Fund provided by members. This fund, renewed last year for a further term of three years, has enabled the Council to continue the *Review* as a quarterly publication. A statement of income and expenditure on account of the *Review* has, as usual, been supplied to members. From this it will be seen that the deficit of the year, made up by the guarantors, amounted to £189 16s. 4d.

GROUP FOR THE STUDY OF WOMEN IN SOCIETY.

The increasing interest in the present position of women and the many controversies aroused by the subject led to a discussion among some of the members of the Society last year, and in the autumn a new group was formed for the study of the relation of women to society. At the preliminary meetings an outline syllabus was discussed, and a scheme of lectures and discussions tentatively drawn up. Miss Jane Harrison's paper, read at an ordinary meeting of the Society on October 28th, was arranged partly as a starting point for the group, which by the end of the year was organised and ready for work. It consists of 28 members, 20 of whom are members of the Sociological Society. The president is Mr. J. A. Hobson, and the Hon. Secretary Miss L. Keyser Yates, to whose efforts the launching of the group is mainly due.

THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY GROUP.

The Social Psychology Group, formed in 1912, has continued and extended its work with gratifying success during the year. The group now numbers 48 members, of whom 16 are members and 30 non-members of the Sociological Society. Meetings are held monthly, in the Society's Rooms, and the thanks of the Society are specially due to Dr. William Brown, the chairman, who has taken the chair at most of the meetings, and on one occasion, when the expected lecturer failed, delivered a valuable extempore address on "The Aims and Ideals of Social Psychology." It had been thought advisable to raise the subscription—which only non-members of the Sociological Society are asked to pay—from 2/6 to 5/-. The estimate

is that the new subscriptions should wipe out the debt, cover all the expenses of the coming year, and provide the Treasurer with a small sum which may probably form the nucleus of a propaganda fund.

The Report and Accounts having been adopted, the honorary officers of the Society were unanimously re-elected, namely :—

THE RIGHT HON. A. J. BALFOUR, President.

Mr. J. Martin White, Hon. Treasurer.

Mr. S. K. Ratcliffe, Hon. Secretary.

The members of the Council were re-elected *nem. con.*, the name of Mr. Graham Wallas being added to the list.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY.

On Tuesday afternoon, February 10th, Dr. William Brown lectured on "Psycho-Analysis and the Problem of Personality," Dr. E. Lauriston Shaw being in the chair.

On Tuesday, February 24th, at 8.15, Dr. C. W. Saleeby read a paper on "The First Decade of Modern Eugenics, 1904-1914." The Bishop of Birmingham was in the chair. The paper appears in the present issue of the *Review*.

On Tuesday, March 10, Mr. Frank R. Cana, F.R.G.S., read a paper on "The Future of the Kaffir," Mr. J. A. Hobson in the chair. (Mr. F. S. Van Oss, who had been announced to read a paper on "The Effect of Public and Private Extravagance on the Rate of Interest," was unable to do so on account of illness.)

On Tuesday evening, March 31, following the annual general meeting, Mr. S. K. Ratcliffe read a paper on "Changing America," Professor L. T. Hobhouse being in the chair.

FORTHCOMING MEETINGS.

Tuesday, May 5, at 5.15, Mr. Edward A. Filene, of Boston, Mass., will address the society on "Coming Business and Social Changes." The chair will be taken by Sir Albert Rollit.

Tuesday, May 19 (not the 12th as originally arranged), at 8.15, Mr. Gustav Spiller will read a paper on "Darwinism and Sociology," with Sir Edward Brabrook, C.B., in the chair.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

- Braunford, Victor. "Interpretations and Forecasts: a Study of Survivals and Tendencies in Contemporary Society." Duckworth. 7/6 net.
- Bennett, Frank. "Forty Years in Brazil." Illustrated. Mills and Boon. 10/6 net.
- Robertson, J. M. "A Short History of Christianity." Second edition, revised, with additions. Watts, 1913. 5/- net.
- Marett, R. R. "The Threshold of Religion." Second edition, revised and enlarged. Methuen. 5/- net.
- Sikes, E. E. "The Anthropology of the Greeks." Nutt. 5/- net.
- Frazer, J. G. "The Golden Bough." Part IV: Adonis, Attis, Osiris." 2 vols. Third edition, revised and enlarged. Macmillan. 20/- net.
- Temple, Sir Richard C. "Anthropology as a Practical Science." Bell. 1/- net.
- Cannan, Edwin. "Wealth: a Brief Explanation of the Causes of Economic Welfare." P. S. King. 3/6 net.
- Vanderlint, Jacob (edited by J. H. Hollander). "Money Answers All Things, 1734." A Reprint of Economic Tracts. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press. \$1.00.
- Whittaker, Sir Thomas P. "Ownership, Tenure, and Taxation of Land." Macmillan. 12/- net.
- Lennard, R. "Economic Notes on English Agricultural Wages." Macmillan. 5/- net.
- Harben, H. D. "The Rural Problem." Constable, 1913. 2/6 net.
- "The Report of the Land Inquiry Committee. (Vol. 2.) Urban." Hodder and Stoughton. 1/- net.
- Johns Hopkins University Studies. Series xxxi, No. 3. "The Free Negro in Virginia." John H. Russell, 1913. \$1.00. Series xxxii, No. 1. "Jurisdiction in American Building-Trades Unions." N. Ruggles Whitney. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press.
- Columbia University Studies. Vol. LVI, No. 1. "Speculation on the New York Exchange, Sep. 1904 to March 1907." A. A. Osborne. 1913. \$1.00. No. 2: "The Policy of the United States towards Industrial Monopoly." O. W. Knauth. \$2.00. Vol. LVII, No. 1. "The Civil Service of Great Britain." Robert Moses. \$2.00. New York: Columbia University.
- Harvard Economic Studies. Vol. IX. "History of the Grain Trade in France, 1400-1770." A. P. Usher. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1913. \$2.00 net.
- Rivers, Dr. W. H. R. "Kinship and Social Organisation." Constable. 2/6 net.
- Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. No. 140. "Housing and Town Planning." Philadelphia.
- Culpin, E. G. "Garden City Movement up to Date." Garden City Association. 1/- net.
- Bosanquet, Mrs. "Social Work in London. A History of the Charity Organisation Society." Murray. 8/- net.

- Way, Herbert W. L. "Round the World for Gold." Illustrations and Maps. Sampson Low, 1912. 21/- net.
- Blaiklock, G. (edited by J. T. Rae). "The Alcohol Factor in Social Conditions." The Report of an Inquiry presented to the National Temperance League. P. S. King. 1/- net.
- Best, R. H., and Ogden, C. K. "The Problem of the Continuation School." P. S. King. 1/- net.
- Montessori, M. "Dr. Montessori's Own Handbook." Heinemann. 3/6 net.
- Mallock, W. H. "Social Reform : its Relation to Realities and Delusions." Murray. 6/- net.
- Bloomfield, Meyer. "The School and the Start in Life." Washington : United States Bureau of Education.
- Siegfried, André (trans. from the French by W. D. Stewart). "Democracy in New Zealand." Bell. 6/- net.
- Ward, Wilfrid. "Men and Matters." Longmans. 12/- net.
- Severn, Dr. Elizabeth. "Psycho-Therapy : its Doctrine and Practice." Rider. 3/6 net.
- Carrington, Hereward. "The Problems of Psychical Research." Rider. 7/6 net.
- Baldwin, J. Mark. "History of Psychology : a Sketch and an Interpretation." 2 vols. Watts, 1913. 1/- each net.
- Bryce, Viscount. "The Roman and the British Empires." Oxford University Press. 6/- net.
- Angell, Norman. "The Foundations of International Polity." Heinemann. 3/6 net.
- Haldane, Viscount. "The Meaning of Truth in History. Being the Creighton Lecture for 1913-14." University of London Press. 1/- net.
- Morley, Viscount. "Notes on Politics and History : a University Address." Macmillan. 2/6 net.
- Douglas, James. "New England and New France." With illustrations and maps. New York and London : Putnam's, 1913. \$3.00 net.
- Beard, Chas. A. "Contemporary American History, 1877-1913." New York : Macmillan. 6/6 net.
- Lytton, Lady Constance, and 'Jane Warton.' "Prisons and Prisoners." With Portraits. Heinemann. 3/6 net.
- Ives, George. "A History of Penal Methods." Stanley Paul. 10/6 net.
- Adam, H. L. "Woman and Crime." Illustrated. Werner Laurie. 6/- net.
- Dawson, W. H. (edited by). "The Year-book of the Universities of the Empire, 1914." Jenkins. 7/6 net.
- Descamps, Paul. "La Formation sociale de l'Anglais moderne." Paris : Armand Colin. 4 frcs.
- Etudes de Politique Internationale. "Le Problème Mondial." Alberto Torres. Rio de Janeiro : Imprensa Nacional, 1913.

PAMPHLETS.

- "The Irish Question." With a Foreword by Sir Horace Plunkett. Reprinted from the *Round Table*, December, 1913. Macmillan.
- "First Annual Report of the Chief, Children's Bureau, to the Secretary of Labour for year ended 30 June, 1913." Washington : Department of Labour, U.S.A.

THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

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JULY, 1914.

THE MATERIAL CULTURE AND SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS OF THE SIMPLER PEOPLES: AN ESSAY IN CORRELATION.

The following article constitutes the first portion of a more extended inquiry into the organization of the simpler societies, the object of which is to ascertain whether there is any correlation between the type of material culture and social institutions. In the present article we state the nature of the problem, and indicate our methods of distinguishing types of material culture. In a second article to be published in the October number of the *Sociological Review* we deal with the forms of government and of the administration of justice in relation to these types. A complete list of the peoples dealt with and of the authorities for each of them has been separately printed along with the bibliography, and may be obtained from the Hon. Secretary of the Sociological Society. References are generally given in abbreviated form, and for the full titles the bibliography must be consulted.

I.—THE PROBLEM.

THEORIES of social evolution are readily formed with the aid of some preconceived ideas and a few judiciously selected corroborative facts. The data offered to the theorist by the voluminous results of anthropological inquiry on the one hand, and by the immense record of the history of civilisation on the other, are so vast and so various that it must be an unskilled selector who is unable, by giving prominence to the instances which agree and by ignoring those which conflict with his views, to make out a plausible case in support of some general notion of human progress. On the other hand, if theories are easily made, they are also easily confuted by a less friendly use of the same data. That same variety of which we speak is so great that there is hardly any sociological generalisation which does not stumble upon some awkward fact if one takes the trouble to find it. Anyone with a sense for facts soon recognises that the course of social evolution is not unitary but that different races and different communities of the same race have, in fact, whether they started from the same point or no, diverged early, rapidly, and in many different directions at once. If theorising is easy when facts are treated

arbitrarily, a theory which would really grow out of the facts themselves and express their true significance presents the greatest possible difficulties to the inquirer. The data themselves are vast but chaotic, and at every point incomplete. They fall into two main divisions. On the one hand, there is the historical record of the civilisations; upon the other there is the immense field of contemporary anthropology. In both alike the data are equally difficult to ascertain with precision, and when ascertained to reduce to any intelligible order. In the history of civilisation we have full studies of many institutions, and we can learn something, not only of what they were at any one moment, but of their development in time, their genesis, their rise, their maturity, their decay. But even here the information often breaks off short at the most interesting point. Beginnings are frequently matter of conjecture. The nature of institutions, as they appear on paper, may be known to us, while we are left to reconstruct their actual working from casual examples, hints, and references that leave much to the imagination. We find them decaying without intelligible cause, and often enough we are faced with the fact that more thorough-going inquiry has completely revolutionised our view of an institution which had been taken as thoroughly explored and fully interpreted by earlier schools of historians. So is it also with the anthropological record. Here indeed we have a handful of monographs made by trained and skilled observers in modern times, which leave nothing to be desired excepting that the work had been carried out three or four generations ago before contact with the white man or with other more civilised races had begun to corrupt the purity of aboriginal institutions. Outside these monographs we have a vast mass of travellers' reports, good, bad, and indifferent, data which it is impossible to ignore and yet which can seldom be taken at their face value. Moreover all anthropological data of this kind, however simple the life of the people with which they deal, are modern; with the exception of the few available references that we have to the peoples that surrounded the Greeks and Romans in Herodotus, Tacitus, and other writers of antiquity, the great bulk of anthropological inquiry dates from the last three or four centuries, and it is sometimes forgotten that the peoples of whom they treat must have lived as long, must in a sense have had as extensive a tradition behind them, and to that extent are as far removed from the true primitive as civilised man himself.

Therefore when we are inquiring into development and origins we have to be careful how we take the findings of inquirers among the people of our own day, however simple, as evidence of what must have been in the beginnings of human kind. What ethnographical research yields us is not a history but a number of pictures of given peoples each taken as it were by an instantaneous

photograph at a given time. It is a piece of good fortune if in any case we get successive pictures of the same people so full and true that by comparing them we can arrive directly at the actual course of the development of its institutions in a given period. Before the period of civilised influence sets in we have at best only fragments of such history, and in the main our data are descriptive rather than historical. No comparison or classification of these data can tell us offhand how institutions grew, any more than the classification of existing rocks tells the geologist how strata were formed. Yet it is in the main from the actual composition and arrangement of existing strata, assisted by what he knows of permanent physical laws and of recorded or clearly proved physical changes, that the geologist infers the history of the earth's crust, and it is on analogous methods that any scientific theory of social evolution must rely. Such a theory must rest at the outset upon the discovery of some order in the ethnological data. To this end two preliminary steps seem to be necessary. The first consists in taking the main institutions, customs, practices, and beliefs that constitute the structure of social life at any given time, and distinguishing the varieties of form which each institution actually presents in the various peoples among whom we find it. Many institutions can thus be treated from more than one point of view. Taking marriage, for example, we can obviously distinguish monogamy, various forms of polygamy and of polyandry, intermixtures or combinations of these forms, and, some may add, in addition to all some form of group marriage. Again we can treat any of these forms of marriage from the point of view of its rigidity or otherwise. We can inquire how far it is binding, distinguish cases in which it is entered into or dissolved so easily and so entirely at the will of either party that it is doubtful whether the term marriage is strictly applicable; and from this onwards we can trace every sort of gradation in the rigidity of the institution up to indissoluble monogamous marriage. Or again we can exhibit methods by which a partner is obtained, whether it be by free courtship, by child-betrothal, by the exchange of women or of gifts, or by presents to the parents or relations, by sheer purchase, by capture, and so forth. And so carrying this method through the whole field of inquiry relating to marriage, we can set up a system of forms all of which shall be illustrated somewhere in the light of human society; and in general, we can so arrange them as to show transitions from any one form to another of such a kind that we can very easily conceive an institution beginning at one end and passing through these transitional forms until it reaches the most extreme point in the opposite direction. What may be called a social morphology of this kind, that is to say, the ascertaining and classification of the actual forms of any institution known to exist may be regarded

as the first step towards the introduction of order into the field of comparative sociology.¹

But beyond this lies a second and far more difficult step. We have spoken of the form of an institution passing by gradations from one stage to another, very remote from it perhaps. It is one thing to exhibit and even to illustrate possible gradations of such a kind, and another thing to show that actual institutions do pass along such a scale of development. In some cases no doubt we can historically trace a line of change, but it would be exceedingly difficult to maintain that the line of change had always been the same in all cases, and quite impossible, we think, at the present stage of our knowledge to lay down that any given institution must take its rise in one form and must pass through a series of graded changes in a uniform direction. If indeed we could make any assumption of this kind, the process of sociological inquiry would be enormously simplified. We should have as it were a scale of development, the direction of which would be definitely known. We should be able to assign to any form of institution credibly reported in any given society, its particular place in that scale. We should know that it had never been further on in the scale, nor yet that it had reached its particular place by any roundabout road. We should be able to infer that it had passed through the earlier phases and no other, and we could in fact treat all differences to be found in social institutions as due to a single comprehensive cause—the difference in the rate of development. In point of fact inquiry lends no countenance to any such simplicity of view. A single instance from the institution that has already been mentioned may suffice to explain this point. We commonly think of strict monogamy as the product of a high civilisation, though not necessarily the highest civilisation, and it is true that we find polygamy associated upon the whole with the lower civilisations and with the peoples whom we do not regard as civilised at all. But apart from the fact that, for fairly obvious reasons, the majority of men in all races live with one wife at a time, we find quite a number of instances in which a rigid monogamy is the established rule among some of quite the rudest races of mankind. By whatever road the Veddas, or the Semang, or the Karok, or the Dyaks have arrived at monogamy, we may be pretty sure that it

1. The chief danger in forming any social classification is that of over-rigidity in definition. Customs and institutions vary continuously, and the lines of demarcation which any classification must draw are apt to be artificial and unreal. Moreover what is on the surface the same institution may have a different content at different stages of social development. A certain elasticity of interpretation must therefore be allowed in order to adapt any scheme of classification to the facts without forming them into unreal categories.

was by a road quite different from that which established this system in mediæval Europe. Nor can we even infer from the fact that nations of European culture agree with the Veddas, the Semang, and the Karok, any far-reaching identity in ethical views as to the relations of the sexes, or in fact in any other social and moral customs or ideas which in many races stand closely associated with the monogamic rule. We have to recognise from the outset that two societies, as widely divergent as possible in almost every respect, may exhibit close agreement on some one or more points, and we have to learn accordingly that to infer from any single institution a general state of development is to fly in the face of the anthropological facts.

If then we cannot assume any single line of development, what use are we to make of our morphology? Let us consider where we stand. We suppose ourselves to have ascertained the forms which any given institution assumes. We have now recognised that in different societies an institution may arrive at the same form by completely different paths, and that agreement in respect of any one institution is no evidence for agreement in other respects. We cannot lay down any absolute order of development, nor can we maintain as a strict generalisation that any given form of any given institution is to be found only in some determinate stage of the development of society. Sociology in fact is not a science of rigid generalisations. Where rigid generalisation fails science resorts to statistical methods, and the question arises whether this is possible in sociology. On the practical difficulties of applying statistics to the study of social institutions, we shall speak in the next section. But if we suppose for a moment that these are not insuperable, let us see what might be gained. We might begin with any two institutional forms, A and B, and find on inquiry that in 90 per cent. of the cases where we have A we also find B, and that in 80 per cent. of the cases where we have B we also find A. If that is so we can infer some connection, though probably an indirect one, between A and B, and perhaps research may show that the residual instances where we have B but not A are associated with the presence or absence of a third institution C. This would throw considerable light on the connection of these forms, and by multiplying such conditions we might obtain considerable insight into the inter-connexion of certain groups of institutions. This was in fact the method applied by Dr. Tylor to the study of certain marriage customs some twenty years ago, and it is to be regretted that little has been done in the interval to extend the method to other problems.

What we propose to ask is whether it is possible to apply this line of inquiry to elucidating the changes of institution which accompany the growth of civilisation, the most important feature of

social evolution. The first difficulty that occurs here is the vagueness as to the term civilisation, which, as generally used, implies elements of material, religious, artistic, and intellectual culture. If all these elements are insisted on and civilisations are judged in accordance with the level attained, not in one respect but in all, we shall of course find, if we find anything, that the most civilised race is that which has developed furthest in all these directions. We shall, in fact, achieve a purely identical proposition. The real question is how far these different developments imply one another. To attack this problem with any hope of a fruitful issue it is necessary to find some one characteristic which would be generally regarded as essential to civilisation, as possessing real significance in the life of a people, and as advancing in some determinate direction, which can be recognised and measured with some facility, and of which tangible evidence can be obtained. It will then be possible to follow other lines of development and observe the correlation of various forms of institution with successive stages in this advance. It may always be objected that we have not chosen the most essential point as the basis of our inquiry, but of that the results of the inquiry themselves will afford some test. At any rate, on these lines, if the work can be carried through, we may expect to learn something of the correlation of different elements in social growth.

The development which seems best to serve this purpose is that of material culture, the control of man over nature as reflected in the arts of life. It may be objected that this implies too materialistic a view of human society, and is too superficial a criterion of general progress. It may be replied to the latter point, in the first place that we do not use it as a criterion of general progress, but propose to inquire how far progress or (if the word be disliked) change in any definite direction is in fact associated with advance in the control over the forces of nature. On the former point it may be remarked that material culture is a fair index of the general level of knowledge and, if we may use a more general term, of mentality. The desire for comfort in his material surroundings is, with few exceptions, common to man. How much energy he will put into the business of securing it, how much organising capacity he can apply, what ideas, what knowledge, and what imagination he can bring to bear on it, what fears or scruples deter him from using all his available powers are questions which have different answers for different people, and on the answer depends in general the level of his material culture. Hence this culture does, roughly, though no more than roughly, reflect the general level of intellectual attainment. Moreover, in this case it is fairly easy to agree on the meaning of what in other instances is a very disputable term—the meaning of progress. The control

of man over nature is a definite conception, and it is generally easy to recognise any advance on this particular line, while it is also the fact that it is on this particular line that the people that we call civilised show the most palpable advance over those to whom we deny the term. In the history of mankind as a whole the advance in this direction, though neither universal nor continuous, is probably more widespread and more continuous than in any other, and in modern civilisation it becomes more continuous and far more rapid. Finally the question whether there is any correlation between advance on this line and any particular movement on other sides of human life is perhaps the most important question for the general theory of social evolution. Does the advance of human knowledge which in relation to the understanding and control of natural forces seems unlimited, carry with it any distinct movement in morals, law, religion, the general organisation of society? Does it make for progress in these directions, or the reverse, or is it indifferent to them?

We do not here attempt to deal with these problems in general. To grapple with them at all would involve to begin with a definition of progress which lies outside our immediate sphere. We offer only a preliminary contribution. We do not, in fact, deal with "civilised" peoples at all, but confine ourselves to the classification of those less fortunate races which range from the lowest known *Naturmenschen* to the confines of the historic civilisation. We seek within these limits first to distinguish the advancing grades of material culture, and, secondly—without any systematic inquiry as to what constitutes "progress" or the reverse—to determine how far various forms of political and social institutions can be correlated with each grade.

The Possibility of Sociological Correlation.

We have next to inquire how far it is actually possible to establish any correlations between social and political institutions on the one hand and stages of economic culture on the other, and to what extent ordinary statistical methods can be made available to forward this result. It must be replied at once that in view of the peculiar nature of the subject, and in particular of the data on which we have to rely, statistical methods can only be employed with certain reserves. All results must be rough. All are open to certain special causes of error, and any inference based on a comparison of numbers alone is dangerous. On the other hand, numerical results in combination with close analysis of accompanying conditions, are of high utility, both in checking generalisations and in measuring the value of data. This will be better understood if we study the actual difficulties which confront the inquirer who endeavours to apply the test of numbers to sociological facts.

(1) *The Character of the Data.*

If we confined ourselves to monographs compiled by skilled observers, there would be comparatively little difficulty with the data themselves, but unfortunately, as already remarked, such monographs are few and they would not in the aggregate prove sufficient to warrant any statistical calculations. Moreover, so to limit our vision would be to leave out of sight a vast amount of material which contains valuable evidence, even if the ore is sometimes difficult to sift from the dross. We are therefore forced to take account of the ordinary materials of anthropology—reports of travellers, missionaries, explorers, and casual observers, and it need hardly be said that in all such reports the problem of inferring from the statements of the observer the precise nature of the facts which he means to report, is not one which admits of an easy and straightforward solution. In particular when one endeavours to classify forms of institutions under heads, which is the necessary presupposition of any attempt at correlation, we must bear in mind that no observer has the scheme of classification in his mind, and there is considerable opportunity for error in reducing the contents of his report to the heads of any classification, however wide we may cast our net. Over and above these well-known difficulties in anthropology, there are all the sources of error, obscurity and confusion which arise from the intermixture of cultures, the rise or decay of institutions under the influence of foreigners, and in particular of the white immigrants themselves, to whom the reporter may belong, and there is always the probability that the peoples whom the reporter comes in contact with are precisely those specimens of the tribe who lie nearest to the white man or to other civilised people, and are most influenced thereby. All this, however, is common matter to anthropologists and not much of it presents any difficulty to our inquiry as compared with others.

(2) *The Unit.*

It is otherwise when we pass to the question of the unit which we must take as the basis of our calculations. Every rigid statistical inquiry supposes that the phenomena with which it deals can be stated in terms of some unit which is constant throughout its field. What is the unit social group? Let us consider a people occupying a certain area, the natives of Australia, let us say, or the Algonquin Indians. There are certain features common to the culture of these peoples, but within them there are a great many tribes and even groups of tribes. Not all that is true of one tribe will be true of others even within the same group, and certainly not all things true of a group would be true of all the Algonquins or all the Australians. And lastly, within what is called the tribe itself, there are often clans,

local groups, and even sub-tribes, and even these are not always alike in all their institutions.

Now the reports of ethnographers sometimes deal with tribes, sometimes with divisions or branches of a tribe, and sometimes with groups of two or three, a dozen, or even a score of tribes taken together. We might be inclined to take the tribe as the unit. But the term tribe is used with the utmost variety of meaning by our reporters. Some apply the name to the smallest group of people living together, others to the loose unity which extends over a great area and covers all groups using a common dialect and recognising a certain affinity which distinguishes them from the rest of the world. In this wider sense tribes differ greatly in extent—one may contain a dozen or a score of subordinate groups; another may contain one or two only. And moreover, the limitations of the tribe sometimes seem to be assigned rather by the purview of the traveller or by the chance extent to which a dialect has spread than by clearly marked divisions separating it off socially or politically from its neighbours. Indeed a population which is treated as a "tribe" by one writer might be regarded as a collection of many tribes by another. Thus the statements which form our data refer to populations of different magnitude, and there is no discoverable means of reducing these to units of equal magnitude. But in fact no such reduction is necessary for our purpose. What we are examining is the correlation of social institutions with grades of economic culture. For this purpose we wish to know the number of separate social groups at any given grade possessing a given institution, and for this purpose the population or the number of subordinate bodies contained by any given social group is of secondary importance. The real question is, what constitutes a separate social group? In the higher grades of social development political independence supplies a fairly definite criterion. Yet even here it must be remembered that independence may be partial, as well as absolute, and that it might be legitimate and even necessary to count a population as forming one society for certain purposes and two or more for certain other purposes. Be this as it may, on the lower levels political unity is a much vaguer conception, and when the observer finds fundamental similarity of type and custom, uninterrupted intercourse and, in particular, free intermarriage extending over a certain area he will generally treat that area as one, whether the population corresponds to what he calls one tribe or not. In this he will not be far wrong, for the customs and institutions of such a collection of people in all probability have a common origin. They arise and flourish and decay in the main from the same causes and in close interconnection. In general we have no alternative but to follow the reporter, and take each institution that he reports as one case of the existence of that institution. Of

course in so doing we are trusting to the judgment of our witness. It may be that he ought to have drawn distinctions and demarcations, and these may in fact appear when we compare his account with that of another observer, while sometimes it becomes apparent through internal evidence. In such a case we should in fact divide the group in our tables and count each of its parts as one. But in so far as groupings and divisions have been made by original observers with judgment and knowledge, it is reasonable to treat as a single instance a homogeneous population living in a continuous area enjoying regular intercourse throughout and not divided by clear lines of racial, social, or political difference.¹ The mere difference in size of these units need not greatly disturb our calculations.

On the other hand, we must recognise that the judgment of observers is not equally to be depended on in all cases, and that sometimes mere chance or the bare impossibility of obtaining detailed information as to separate committees has led our reporters to treat as one peoples who might very possibly be distributed into many distinct sections as the result of further enquiry. We note in their place certain possibilities of error in calculation that arise from this source, and throughout, as will be explained presently, we so limit our inferences as to guard against this danger in cases where its presence may have passed unnoticed.

At the same time it may be pointed out that on this side the very defects in our reports tend to cancel one another. Close inspection shows that statements made about a group of tribes are in reality based often enough on the one or two members of the group with whom the reporter has had close personal contact. Hence different reports about the same group often prove to be inconsistent and the explanation of the inconsistency not infrequently is that both are true, one of some members of the group and the other of others. Sometimes we are able to fix the exceptions, sometimes we can only table the statements as true, one of "some" members of the group and the other of "some other" members. But the repeated experience of discrepancies of this kind reduces the value of large generalisations and tends to equate the statistical value of the units with regard to which we may conceive ourselves to possess trustworthy information.

Further, it must be remembered that when we are comparing peoples at much the same level of general culture, whatever irregularity there is in our units will be pretty evenly distributed. Suppose we are dealing with two opposite customs, both found pretty frequently among hunting tribes. Let us say that we have

1: In a few cases our units are in strictness too large for this definition. Our reasons for attempting to divide them are indicated below.

100 cases of the one and 50 of the other. The 100 will no doubt contain large groups and small, but so also will the 50. If we know of one group of special magnitude and importance, we note the fact and give it due weight in our summing up. But in general there is no reason to think that there will be any aggregation of the larger instances on one side rather than on the other. There is nothing to weight the scale, and if our numbers were sufficiently great, we might find in this consideration alone a solution of the problem so far as it depends on the inadequacy of our reports.

But in many cases our numbers are not great enough to justify us in trusting to the impartiality of chance. The probable error would be high, and we should often be unable to draw any inference at all. We therefore base no inference on small differences. The fact that a given custom is to be found, say in 55 per cent. of the instances obtained at a given level of culture, and an opposite custom in 45 per cent. must be taken as in itself insignificant. It can only mean that, roughly, there is no clear tendency to the one or the other at that stage. Such a proportion as that of 55 : 45 can be of value only if it is a link in a chain, *e.g.*, if, at a lower level the figures were 70 : 30, and at a higher one 30 : 70. It is otherwise when we have a 2 : 1 preponderance. This is not likely to be a mere chance. But even here it is well not to be content with the gross numerical result, but also to examine the constitution of our majority and minority. Such a check is desirable, not only in view of doubts as to the equal value of our units, but to obviate a second difficulty, which has now to be examined.

This difficulty is in a manner the exact converse of the last. It may be asked whether in any cultural area—in any territory, that is, where the conditions of life are very similar, and where, though it is too large for direct intercourse between its parts, there is opportunity for institutions to propagate themselves in the course of generations by social contact—we ought to reckon distinct cases at all. Institutions and customs tend to propagate themselves indefinitely, and if we find, say, a certain form of marriage all over a sub-continent, it may be that it has had a single origin, and ought on our principles to be accounted one case rather than many. Thus we find a certain amount of polygamy—very variable it is true—common apparently, with one doubtful exception, to all Australian tribes. Shall we count this as upwards of thirty instances, or is it in reality only one instance? The reply is that whatever the degree of cultural unity among the Australian aborigines, it did not prevent their marriage customs from differing in many essential respects from one another. If that is so it seems fair to take as a unit each area which observers have, in fact, recognised as homogeneous and interconnected, and if in the matter of descent, or of capture, we get a great variation of custom

as between one area and another, while in regard to the permission of polygamy we get uniformity, to let this result have its due weight by entering each instance of polygamy separately in our tables. The result at least shows that a certain degree of polygamy is suited to the conditions of Australian culture generally, while other incidents of marriage vary greatly within the limits of their culture. If an institution has, in fact, propagated and maintained itself over a great area, even though its origin be in some unitary cause, we cannot regard its extensive prevalence as unimportant or insignificant. The fact that it prevails so widely is evidence of its suitability to the conditions of life among the peoples in question, and this correlation is as suitably expressed as any other in the number of separate instances which will be counted.

If such an institution is found in all or most of the various regions of the world occupied by people of a certain industrial grade, we may fairly sum up the instances and treat the result as a measure of the correlation between that institution and the level of economic culture in question. But if all, or the great majority of instances in which it appears, are drawn from one region, it is different. To show how dangerous a simple enumeration might be in such a case we may pursue this particular instance taken a little further. When we compare the Australians with others of the same economic grade we find, for example, that the Wild Semang are monogamous. Now the Wild Semang are only entered in our table as one group. But they are very numerous and scattered, and they count as one only, because they are not sufficiently known for any one to make divisions among them. In order to compare the prevalence of monogamy and polygamy among the Lower Hunters, we cannot crudely set down the Australians as thirty cases on the one side and the Semang as one on the other. In such a case we must consider our figures from more than one point of view. We must cross-classify, and group them not only by the economic but by the geographical order. If all, or the majority of cases of any given institution come from one part of the world, we must note this fact and take it into account before drawing any inferences as to the correlation of that institution with any particular grade of culture as such. This necessity has been kept in mind, and while our geographical grouping has necessarily been rough in this experimental inquiry, we have throughout kept the different continents separate in our tables, and within these certain regions of culture contact are sufficiently apparent. Racial unity is a more problematical matter, which no doubt would explain many identities and differences if we could know all the facts, but to rely on this explanation would constantly have taken us into controversial questions, and we have been compelled for the time being to leave it aside. Meanwhile our plan is,

whenever we find an accumulation of instances in a particular area to note the fact as a deduction from any generalisation that might be founded on those instances, and, if necessary, to seek some alternative method of presenting the results. For example, in the particular case referred to above, we present the totals as to polygamy and monogamy arrived at, first by taking the Australians as so many separate instances, and then by treating them as a single cultural group equated with a corresponding cultural type in Asia and Africa. This method—the details of which must vary in accordance with the nature of the concrete case—yields upper and lower limits of error, which often express the nearest approximation that we can make to the truth.

We have then two difficulties to keep in mind. The first is the imperfect precision of our units; the second is the deduction from the value of separate units to be made on account of the influence of culture contacts. Fortunately these two difficulties tend to cancel one another, for the influence of culture-contact diminishes the value of the large area relatively to the smaller. But we cannot disregard them, and to guard against them we must refrain from basing any inference on small preponderances, while if we have large differences, we must first examine the constitution of our majority and minority. When these in combination have been observed we shall in fact find that various positive results emerge.

Our general method then will be as follows. We take as a unit each group which we find so treated in our authorities. Where the treatment is not clear or where different authorities dealing with the same area make different divisions, we are forced to deal with each case on its merits, deciding by the concrete evidence whether to enter one instance or more in our tables. What is "one instance" for one purpose is, of course, one instance for all,¹ and minor variations are met by the entry of "some" or "occasional" if one particular point is true only of certain members of a group.²

1. In a very few instances difficulties in identifying the references of different authorities have led us to enter different group names in different tables.

2. In comparison such instances are reckoned as $\frac{1}{2}$. The same value is given to cases which are entered with a query as probable though not quite certain. It might seem safer to omit such instances altogether, but it must be remembered that in our investigation we are generally comparing this frequency of institution A with that of institution B. If we were considering A alone we might well confine ourselves to the certain cases, but when we are comparing it with B to ignore several probable instances of A may be to exaggerate the preponderance of B. The least error therefore is to reckon the probable case on a reduced value. This has the further justification that the incomplete or imperfect statement will very often reflect a partial development or a decadent condition of the institution, so that the half value may be claimed as nearest to an accurate

But we do not break up a group which our authority reckons as one unless his own evidence compels us to do so by showing that it presents clear variations of type in the relation in which it is being examined.

There remains a technical difficulty which is much greater than would be supposed by anyone who has not actually tried to grapple with it—that of identifying and defining the reference of a reporter's statement. There is first the difficulty of knowing whether a statement is general or particular. When a writer tells us something of "the Australian native," are we to attach any importance to it, and if so, how are we to table the result? In this particular case the importance is probably very small. The writer most likely knows one or perhaps two tribes fairly well, and he generalises from them. If we can identify his tribes, we refer his statement to them and neglect the generalisation. When we have an observer like Grey, who travelled in South, West and North-west Australia, and makes all his statements in general terms, but seems to know quite clearly what he is talking about, we cannot ignore his statement, nor can we pin it down to a single tribe. In this case we have compared several authorities, and we formed for ourselves rough groups of West Australians, those about Perth, those inland on the Swan River, and those of King George's Sound, for each of which we have independent testimony. When we have an account which seems sound but lacking in definiteness of reference, we adopt the device of tabling as true of "some Victorian tribes," "some New South Wales tribes," etc. Sometimes we have general statements about a group which seem worthy of record, but are not borne out by individual cases within the group for which we have independent information. At first sight this may seem simply to discredit the more general statement, but it is also possible, and in some instances it appears to be the fact, that the detailed description lays stress on the exceptions to a rule, and if it is so, the existence of the rule ought not to escape recognition. In such instances we have preserved the general statement again by attributing it to "some" of the group in question.

One of the most serious difficulties in this connection arises from the want of fixity in nomenclature. Some writers refer to savage peoples geographically, others by a name given them by the whites, others by their own name for themselves. A single tribe may figure under half a dozen names which we identify with some difficulty, and sometimes after identifying them discover that

representation of the facts. It must be borne in mind throughout that a ? in these tables does not mean uncertainty, but either probable evidence for the existence of the institution or positive evidence of its partial existence.

there is a local difference. Thus while some writers seem to treat the Loucheux and the Kutchin as the same people under two names, we find a couple of articles in a single report which deal with them separately, and conclude that the Loucheux are a branch of the Kutchin, whose precise limits in the end we have not satisfactorily made out. In Australia the Narrinyeri spread from the mouth of the Murray over Encounter Bay. Yet in the same volume we have two writers treating of the Narrinyeri and of the Encounter Bay tribes as though they were distinct.¹ A margin of error in our identifications undoubtedly remains, and we should welcome detailed corrections on such points.

There must also be some overlapping. For example, the Kamilaroi occur in a group of New South Wales tribes which we enter. But they also occur independently because we have some information about them which does not wholly consort with the statement which we have as to the group. This fact, however, does not prove that the latter statements are untrue. They probably hold of some members of the group, and therefore are correctly recorded of "some" New South Wales tribes. In general the critic must bear in mind that it is more important for our purpose to note that some tribe of a given culture possesses a certain custom than to determine whether it is the Kamilaroi or another, and the statements when put together may give an approximately accurate account of a level of culture as a whole, although wrong in some of the details of reference. The greatest care has been taken under that head, but only criticism and revision can carry the matter further.

Such being our data our method of treatment must be such as to allow for the elements of uncertainty and irregularity which they present. As already mentioned we shall, to begin with, draw no inference from small variations. But if as we ascend the economic scale we find a continuous and marked increase in the numerical preponderance of a certain institution, if, for example, we find such an institution only in one case out of four at the lowest levels and in four cases out of five at the highest, we shall infer a true correlation between it and the level of economic culture. We should still bear in mind the constituent elements of which our groups are composed, and if all or the great majority of the cases on one side should be drawn from a single group, we should call attention to the fact and discount the result accordingly. In several cases we shall in fact see that when due weight has been given to all grounds of doubt, the broad fact of correlation may be fairly

1. In this case detailed comparison shows that the "Encounter Bay" tribes of the one writer correspond to four local groups of the other writer's "Narrinyeri."

taken as established. On the other hand, there are cases in which the proportions remain remarkably constant at all grades, and we may as fairly maintain that the frequency of a given institution is constant at all levels of industrial culture within our limits. Lastly, there are cases in which the variations are irregular, and no inference can be drawn.

II.—STAGES OF ECONOMIC CULTURE.

We pass now to the classification of peoples by their economic or industrial culture upon which the rest of our enquiry is founded. Our starting-point here is the work of Dr. Nieboer, to whom we must express our acknowledgments. But our object differs from his in that we are seeking to distinguish grade in economic culture, and for that reason we have had to depart in some essentials from his method.

Dr. Nieboer founds his classification primarily on the method of obtaining food, and in this we follow him for three reasons: (1) For peoples of simple culture the method of obtaining food is closely correlated with the whole method of life. For example, hunting and pastoral peoples seldom have fixed dwellings for any length of time, whereas if agriculture has reached a high development, nomadic habits must be restricted and finally abandoned. (2) Between the man who trusts to the gifts of nature, and the man who sets nature to work for him to supply his food, there is a far-reaching change in point of that which interests us most, the degree of intellectual advance and the consequent extent of control over natural forces. (3) Practically the method of obtaining food is capable of easy observation and is generally reported with fair definiteness by travellers, though some of the finer gradations are, as we shall see, less easy to distinguish.

As we advance along the economic scale the methods of obtaining food become less useful as a differentiating mark in proportion as other industries grow in importance. We carry our classification to the point at which men obtain food by a combination of the pastoral and agricultural arts, keeping cattle, ploughing the land, using irrigation, and practising a rude rotation of crops. Now all people, even the most civilised, gain their food ultimately by these means, and further differentiation along these lines would consist only in the development of more scientific breeding and more intensive agriculture, and so it must be, at any rate until synthetic chemistry makes some very new departure. We do not therefore suggest that the food supply could be fruitfully used for purposes of differentiation beyond the level to which we have carried it, the threshold of what is ordinarily called civilisation.

But even on the lower levels, though the food supply is our

starting-point, it is not the sole basis of our classification. The implements used in obtaining food, whether in hunting, fishing, or farming, may also be brought into the account. The nature of dwellings, the presence of other arts—sewing, plaiting, spinning, weaving, and pottery—the use of metal, the employment of canoes, boats, or ships, must also be considered if we are to estimate the position of a people in regard to its general powers of dealing with nature. The question then arises what relative weight we are to attach to each of these considerations. The method which we have followed is to take the food supply first and to grade peoples within the great classes so formed in accordance with their proficiency in other respects, setting down certain characteristics as the mark of a class and assigning to that class any individual which appeared to possess more than half of these characteristics.

That being understood, we take the people who live by gathering wild fruits and roots and hunting wild animals (including reptiles and vermin) as our lowest class. To this it may be objected that some of them, particularly those who are rather fishers than hunters, live upon the whole upon a higher level than many of the lower agriculturists. This is perfectly true, and it would be desirable to form a higher section of fishers and hunters who should be treated by themselves. This division, however, we have failed for lack of sufficiently comprehensive information to carry out completely, and the division which we have actually made within the class rests on different lines, as will presently be explained. But we must first remark that though it will be true that some hunting peoples are more advanced than some agriculturists, it is safe to deny this of hunting peoples generally. As a whole they are at a lower stage, and propositions true of them generally may be safely affirmed as holding of peoples at the lowest stage of culture.

We have, however, drawn two distinctions among them. In the first place, we class as Lower Hunters peoples who (1) live very largely by gathering fruits and nuts, digging roots, collecting shellfish, and devouring reptiles, insects and vermin; (2) have no permanent dwelling, but erect windbreaks, live in caves, or put up very slight and temporary huts of boughs or palm leaves; (3) have no spinning and weaving except in the form of plaiting, no pottery, no metal, and very poor canoes; (4) no domestic animals except the dog and possibly a few pets. People who have a good half of these characteristics are entered in this class, which includes, in Asia, some of the Malayan jungle tribes such as the wild Kubu; Semang and Sakai, the Veddas¹ and the Andamanese; in Africa, the Bushmen, Akka, Batua and other forest peoples; in South America, the

1. Most of the Veddas now known however practise a rude agriculture and are classed accordingly.

Botocudos and Fuegians; and in North America the aborigines of Lower California. With some hesitation we have included the whole of the Australians in this class, and have added three Central Californian tribes¹ and the Shoshones, though some of the latter were undoubtedly above it. The border line here is very difficult to draw, as there are, for example, other North American tribes such as the Tskekehne, who might well be candidates for the place, and we must not emphasise any results dependent on the distinction between these and the Higher Hunters without applying our cross classification and looking at the details. The chief value of the distinction is to enable us to see whether an institution attributed to the Hunters generally is pretty fairly distributed over its different grades or otherwise. In one or two instances we shall in fact find that a custom which is overwhelmingly preponderant among hunters taken as a whole is less so among the lower than the higher, and that caution and discussion are therefore necessary before we can say whether this custom is to be regarded as fairly characteristic of the lowest economic culture of mankind.

The Higher Hunters are formed by the possession of those arts in which the Lower fail. They live more by the chase than by the collection of food, have houses of a substantial character, or well built even if temporary tents of hide and skin. In some instances they spin, weave, and make pottery, are good canoe builders, and have the horse or other domestic animals. The highest branch of them, such as the inhabitants of British Columbia, were fishers, built large timber houses to accommodate joint families, with curiously carved posts, and had considerable wealth in blankets and in horses. These should, as we have said, form a class apart, but though we could find a number of individuals who would undoubtedly be referable to this class, we could not satisfy ourselves upon a general basis of demarcation, and have for the present made no division. We shall, however, point out cases in which the appearance of a custom among hunting peoples is mainly referable to individuals standing at this level. This, for example, is the case with slavery, which, as Dr. Nieboer has already shown, scarcely exists among hunting peoples outside those inhabitants of the

1. The Central Californians seem to us to have been on the border line of the lowest culture. Their arts were unusually primitive (Kroeber) and they were omnivorous, living mainly on acorns, roots and seeds. (Bancroft, p. 373.) On the other hand, they had more or less permanent winter dwellings, partly dug out in the ground, and built up with poles and branches covered with earth. Powers distinguishes 4 tribes as lower than the others. One of these—the Nishinan—he so stigmatises on account of their social institutions. These we leave with the rest of the number among the main mass of “hunters,” but the other three we have taken as falling below the line.

Pacific Coast of North America, who would all be referable to the higher class if it had been formed. For the present we content ourselves with the distinction between Lower and Higher Hunters, though aware that the latter should be broken up into Higher and Intermediate.

The majority of the peoples whom we have classed as Higher Hunters are found in North America. Many of them are exceedingly primitive, and we have doubted whether they should not rather be ranked among the lower. Thus the Tskekehne lived in huts made of branches constructed and abandoned at a moment's notice. Both they and the Nahane knew the horse only by name. They had no pottery or spinning, but they had learnt, probably from the coast tribes, a rude form of weaving, and they seem, like others of the Western Déné, to have had canoes and sledges.¹ The Eskimo we keep on the higher level on account of their good dwellings and canoes. The Kutchin had movable skin dwellings, knew no pottery, but had the bow and arrow, and used the sledge and snow shoes (Smithsonian Report for 1866, p. 351). These and many other North American tribes are on the border line, and this fact must in a measure discount some of the differences which we shall find between Lower and Higher Hunters. In South America we have only reckoned the Botocudos and the Fuegians on the lowest level, and we have several Higher Hunters. But as to some of them our information is scanty and we have put them among the Higher only because we mean by this the normal hunting type and do not rank any people among the Lower without specific ground. Even so, the Zaparos at least must be regarded as a borderline case. They are quite nomadic, have dwellings open on all sides and apparently no furniture but a hammock (Simson, J.A.I., vii, p. 507). Some of the South American hunters have the horse, as the Tehuelches and the Puelches, and in some cases, as noted below, we have difficulty in marking them out from pastoral peoples as they have acquired cattle from the whites. We have a few Higher Hunters in Asia, and one, the Kauralaig of the Western Torres Straits, who live largely by fishing, in Oceania. The African hunting tribes which we have distinguished are all of the lower type, with the exception of the Wagenia, a fishing people.

There is, however, another group of Hunters and Gatherers which we have distinguished, not as standing higher than others, but as occupying a peculiar position. These are the hill and jungle tribes, principally in India and the Malay region, who do not practise any agriculture, and cannot be called pastoral, though in many cases they may keep a cow or a few goats or pigs. But they

1. Morice. *Proceedings of the Canadian Institute*, 1889, esp. pp. 117, 135. cf. the same author in *Transactions of the Can. Institute*, 1893.

live on the outskirts of villages, come into the markets, sell jungle products, possibly serve the villagers in various ways, and sometimes are hunters rather in the sense in which thieves, gypsies and brigands¹ may be so called than in any other. The culture of these peoples is strongly marked by the influence of their surroundings, and indeed in many cases it is difficult to make out how far they can fairly be regarded as independent tribes, and how far they are classes, trades, castes, within a larger people. Thus the Niadis protect crops and rouse game for hunters (Rowney, p. 114). The Bhuiyars' usual work is that of cutting wood and collecting silk cocoons, lac, dyes, and other jungle produce (W. Crooke, ii, p. 97) which presumably they bring into the market. The Beriys are quasi-gypsies who, besides hunting on their own account, are mountebanks, conjurers, snake charmers and thieves, and it is difficult to say whether they should be described as a caste or a tribe (see Crooke, Vol. i, p. 242-3, and Risley, Vol. i, p. 83). The Kardars are employed by Government and by timber merchants and on shooting expeditions. They are also highway robbers (Fryer, J. R. A. S., 1868, p. 479). The Kurumbas collect jungle produce and work in the fields (Buchanan ; Thurston, iv, p. 163). Some of the Irulas work for other people—others collect and barter jungle products (Thurston, Vol. ii, p. 376-8). In many instances they are at least nominally subject to British rule or to the autocracy of a Hindoo rajah or Malay sultan, and they have been for many centuries in contact with a higher civilisation than their own. Probably, as far as Government and law are concerned, little weight should be attached to their customs as evidence for the condition of men at the lowest level of culture. Yet they often have a measure of self-government, and the manner of their internal administration has its distinctive characteristics. We group these people together² as Dependent Hunters, the name importing not so much that they are nominally or really subject to some civilised government as that their mode of life is intermixed with and partly dependent on that of higher peoples. This group then does not represent a distinct cultural level, but is, so to say, a by-path in the line of advance.

From the hunting peoples we proceed to the first stage of Agriculture. Here to begin with, we must apply the *maxim de minimis*. Some Australians had found out that if they put the heads of the yams which they collected back into the earth they would grow again. This is technically a beginning of agriculture,

1. Peoples described merely as brigands have been omitted from our tables.

2. We have enumerated about a dozen and might have extended the list, but considered that their cultural position was too ambiguous to be of any real service from our point of view.

but it would seem absurd to class these people as anything but hunters and collectors.¹ We must have evidence that some sort of clearing, digging and planting is the regular practice of some portion of the people for a part of the year before we class the tribe as agricultural. That being understood we constitute our first agricultural group, which we call that of incipient agriculture, or, after Nieboer, A¹, of those peoples "with whom agriculture holds a subordinate place, most of the subsistence being derived from other sources," and, following him, we contrast them with the second stage which we call agriculture without an epithet, or, to place it among the rest, A², in which the products of the soil are a main source of subsistence, though not of course to the exclusion of hunting and fishing. But beyond this, we depart in some degree from his method. To begin with he takes as two marks of the first stage the employment of women only in agriculture and the absence of fixed habitations. Both of them must be used with care. When we are told that both men and women work in the fields it is pretty strong evidence that agriculture is the main source of subsistence, for there is nobody regularly concerned with any other. But the converse does not always hold. Though women may do all the field work, we may be explicitly informed that the men are idle or that they do nothing but fight, or, finally, that they hunt for sport rather than for necessity. So again, when habitations are not fixed, it is pretty strong evidence that agriculture is rudimentary and that the people are following their main source of subsistence from place to place. Where they are fixed, as Nieboer himself remarks, it may be due to natural abundance in some spot rather than to continuity of cultivation. It must be added that there is an intermediate case in which a clearing is tilled for one year or possibly two or three and the camp moves on when the first fertility is exhausted. In some at least of these cases, though the cultivation is purely "extensive," it seems clear that it is the principal source of subsistence, and though the tribe is semi-nomadic it must be put above the level of incipient agriculture.

But we have also departed from our model in another way. An agricultural tribe may also derive part of its subsistence from trade, and it may be more or less advanced in other arts of life than those concerned with food. Dr. Nieboer duly notes this point, but deals

1. Similarly of the Goyanaz Martius (p. 299) says that their agriculture is "äusserst gering" while Eschwege (*Brasilien*, vol. i, p. 223) states that they live on wild fruits, hunting and fishing. The Goyatacaz, says Martius, p. 303, either have no agriculture or at most the cultivation of some roots, and Eschwege (*Brasilien*, vol. i, p. 220) says "nur wenige Früchte pflanzen sie, übrigens erhalten sie sich von der Jagd." We have classed these together with the Topanaz, whose bionomics are identified with those of the Goyatacaz, as higher hunters.

with it by distinguishing a people as $a+c$, *i.e.* agricultural and cattle-keepers, or $a+t$, *i.e.* agricultural and traders. We have sought to bring these points together in order to establish our successive stages in cultural advance and we have accordingly considered, besides the methods employed in agriculture itself and the degree of its importance in the life of the people, the extent of their advance in the other arts. Thus we inquire whether spinning and weaving are developed, whether substantial houses are erected, whether sheep, cattle or other domestic animals are kept, whether trade with other peoples is developed, and so forth. Taking these into account we have to make a third stage in which the people have developed trades and industries, including perhaps advanced methods of farming itself, which seem to raise them clearly above the level described simply as that of agriculture. Dr. Nieboer has such a class which he calls A^3 , his A^2 corresponding to our agriculture pure, and his A^1 with our agriculture incipient. But his A^3 is formed simply by proficiency in agriculture itself, *viz.*, by (1) manuring; (2) the rotation of crops; (3) the use of domestic animals in agriculture; (4) the export of agricultural produce. We should put in our third class, A^3 , people who show any marked advance in industry or commerce, even though their agriculture itself remained at a lower level. And on the same principle we should regard such an advance as a reason for raising a people from A^1 to A^2 , although their actual tillage might be very rudimentary. The arts that we use are those already mentioned, and the general description of our three classes runs as follows:—

(1) *Incipient Agriculture or A^1* . Subsistence still depends largely on hunting or gathering. Women do the field work. The digging stick is the chief implement used. Culture is nomadic. No animals except poultry, and perhaps a few pigs. No metal. Textile industries and pottery rudimentary, and houses very variable. No specialised trade, but some barter of natural products.

(2) *Agriculture-pure or A^2* . Main subsistence agriculture. Pottery, spinning and weaving but not as specialised industries. Substantial houses of timber. No large cattle or flocks, but pigs and small animals. Animals not used in agriculture. No trade except as above.

(3) *Highest Agriculture or A^3* . Flocks and herds and draught cattle. The plough. Irrigation, manuring and some rotation of crops. Specialised industries. Metal; woodwork; textile. Regular trade.

As before, the possession of a good half of these qualifications will fix the class. Thus a people may practise a meagre agriculture, living largely on fish or game, but the fish perhaps they export in return for corn, and they have good pottery, spinning and weaving. We should place them in our second

class. If, on the other hand, they had only one or two of these arts and little trade except in the barter, say, of some dye or some stone peculiar to their district, we should leave them in the lowest stage. As a rule we have not degraded any people living entirely by agriculture for lack of other arts, though perhaps on very close investigation such a step might be warranted. On the other hand, we have generally placed a tribe in the higher class where cattle are kept, in addition to substantial agriculture, and especially where the plough is used. The use of metal would also certainly justify inclusion in the highest class if it were independently developed. But here we touch on the whole question of the weight to be given to imported culture. Iron is used in almost every cultural division of Africa, but there are a good many tribes which we should class only as A². In these we have found no evidence that iron is smelted, or that any technical proficiency is shown in its use. And in the absence of any other development of industry we cannot regard the importation of this particular handicraft from other people as a mark of specific value. In instances like this we require at least two marks of the higher stage to justify promotion.

Naturally, in applying these considerations we come upon a large number of doubtful cases, and it must be admitted that the distinction between the first and second stages of agriculture on the one side, and the second and third stages on the other, is by no means so sharp as that between hunting and agriculture as such. A few illustrations will serve to show the general principles which have guided our classification in doubtful instances.

We will begin with some people of whose inclusion among agriculturists there may be some doubt. The Sioux and Dakota peoples are in the main gatherers of wild rice. We do not reckon this an agricultural employment, although there is undoubtedly some watching and tendance of the wild rice fields. On this ground the Assiniboins, who have no further agriculture, are classed among hunters. On the other hand, the Dakotas, who are said by Schoolcraft to cultivate from one-quarter up to two acres per family, are placed in agriculture,¹ while the Winnebagos, who are said by the same authority to live largely by agriculture and to have made considerable advances in civilisation, might be brought up to agriculture.² It is probable, however, that these advances are modern. In the seventeenth century the Jesuit relations deny agriculture to the Dakotas, and we may suppose the advances of the Winnebagos are recent.¹ They are therefore left in the tables at A¹.

1. Similarly the Omaha sub group are tabled as hunters, as we gather from a reference in *Hodge's Handbook* that their adoption of agriculture is subsequent to 1865.

Among the Algonquins, the Ojibways form a doubtful case. Sometimes their cultivation is spoken of as exceptional and slight. (Warren, p. 40.) Others deny them agriculture to any extent in the time before the missionaries. But in Hodge's handbook we find that some of them, at any rate, are mentioned as cultivating maize as early as the seventeenth century; and on the balance they come into our lowest agricultural group.

In South America a difficult case is that of the Guaycuru, who are pure hunters themselves, but hold the Guanas as tributaries and tillers of the soil. If the Guanas formed a definite servile caste, we should certainly have to regard the two peoples together as a single agricultural nation; but that does not seem to be the case. We gather that the regular employment of the Guaycuru is hunting, and they take certain agricultural tribute, of no very great importance from a less warlike people.¹

Of the Paravilhana, whose institutions are interesting, we have unfortunately very vague information as to their bionomics, but we have placed them in the lowest agricultural class because they figure in the list given by Martius of peoples who all, he says, practise some kind of agriculture, while, from his special account of them, they appear to be nomadic (p. 630), and therefore stand presumably on a low level.

The Coropos, whose only agriculture consists in potato-planting, might almost be excluded, but that they keep poultry and some pigs (Von Martius, p. 337). They also make pottery, though they have no spinning, and must be regarded as standing on the lowest level of the agricultural stage.

Among Asiatic tribes nearly the same may be said of the Soligas, who, according to Rowney (p. 113-114), had no domestic animals, and lived largely on roots and yams, but among whom agriculture was not wholly unknown, being done chiefly by women. They also hewed timber for sale, and are, in fact, in much the same category as our dependent hunters though a little in advance. The Bygas, again, have no tillage except the dhya clearing on the hillside, and they also exchange wild products with peripatetic traders. (Forsyth "Highlands of Central India," pp. 360, 365.) In the Malay region the Kubus, the Sakai, the Semang, and the Jakun are all in their natural state, hunters, and some of them among the lowest grade. But in all cases a sprinkling of these peoples have come under the influence of Malays or other more advanced peoples, and have taken to a rude agriculture.

1. See Martius, i, 226, ff. and cf. Serra 2. ser. *Revista Trimensal*. Tom. 6, p. 348, etc. Azara, Tom. ii, pp. 96, 111 seems to distinguish the Mbayas from the Guaycuru and make them more definitely a people living in part by slave tillage.

At the same time, their institutions seem to have been considerably modified, and much care has to be taken with these peoples in determining the reference of any particular statement.

Between peoples at this stage of incipient agriculture, and some of those at its upper level, there is undoubtedly a very marked difference. Indeed some of the tribes which we have included in this class might with almost equal propriety have been placed in Agriculture². Perhaps the most doubtful are the Iroquois, the Delaware and the Abnaki, about whom we have hesitated long. Among these agriculture undoubtedly played an important part, and they accumulated considerable stores of food. But we were in the end determined by Loskiel's account (*Geschichte der Mission*, pp. 85-87), which shows that a considerable part of the vegetable food of the Iroquois and Delaware consisted of wild plants, while in the winter they were often driven to live on roots and bark. Hunting he declared to be their principal and most necessary employment.

The Ipurina, again, are a legitimate subject of doubt. As to their food supply, Ehrenreich (p. 60) merely tells us that they live principally by hunting and agriculture, while they have some fishing. Our general rule when hunting and agriculture are thus mentioned is to place a people in the lower division unless we have reason for the contrary. In the case of the Ipurina, their house-building is of a high type; but, on the other hand, the only animals they are said to possess are dogs and poultry, while their industry is said to have been unimportant. There is a little spinning and weaving, and the women make pottery.

The peoples of British Guiana, again, were finally placed in A¹ on account of the importance which im Thurn attaches to hunting and fishing among them, pp. 227-8, but in view of the substantial houses erected by some of them and of the general development of trade, p. 269, etc., we cannot regard them as far from the second class.

In North America we place the Illinois in the second class on the basis of the account of the Jesuit relations, Vol. 51, which states that even at that period they took two crops yearly from the soil (*Jesuit Relations*, Vol. 51, p. 51), although it was principally tilled by women, and hunting remained one of their occupations, p. 47.

Among the Indian frontier tribes our information is often very deficient. We have classed the Kukis under A¹ as nomadic cultivators on the jhum system. (Shakespeare, J.A.I. 31, p. 171). We must, however, admit that some peoples who cultivate on this system appear, in the light of other accounts, to deserve a place under A². Thus the Dhimals (Hodgson, p. 154) are nomadic cultivators, but they keep goats, pigs, and poultry

(Hodgson, p. 157), and in some cases at present use the plough (Risley, p. 228). We do not think they can be put below A². The Chakmas again, who live by the jhum cultivation (Risley, Vol. I., p. 514), would seem to depend upon agriculture and not on natural products, and if so, notwithstanding the rudeness of their system of cultivation, must come into our second class. The Juangs (Dalton, pp. 153, 154), on the other hand, who have no pottery, spinning or weaving, and who, while cultivating rudely by clearings, are still largely dependent on collecting roots, etc., form a fairly typical instance of the lowest agriculture.

The bulk of the Melanesian and Polynesian peoples have been referred to the second stage in consideration of the nature of their food supply, whereas obviously there is considerable distance between the Samoans, for example, and some of the Melanesians. But we have not found definite grounds for raising any of the peoples in this division, except the Noeforesen, to the third class, nor for depressing any of them to the first, with the exception of the Baining and the people of the Western Torres Straits—the Eastern islanders of this region clearly belong to the second division.

These instances may serve to show the difficulties of precise demarcation as between the first and second stages. As to the third stage of agriculture, we have generally taken the combination of cattle-keeping with field work as a sufficient ground of inclusion. A doubtful case is that of the Miris of the Hills (Dalton, p. 33-4), who are very backward in the arts, but have oxen as well as pigs and poultry in addition to agriculture. The Padam Abors, again, whose agricultural implements are swords and pointed sticks (Dalton, p. 26), would not on this account be placed high, but they also forge swords, make musical instruments, and build cane bridges over a river (p. 26), points which seem to place them definitely above most of those peoples whom we have had in our second division.

In the Malay region several peoples, for instance the Kayans, are placed in this division on account of their metallurgy and other arts; while in Africa we have a very large group under this head, partly owing to the combination of cattle-keeping with agriculture, and partly to the working of metal.

The pastoral stage we regard as an alternative development from the hunting stage, not necessarily anterior or posterior to agriculture. We have only succeeded in making two divisions of pastoralists, one in which there is little or no agriculture and but a slight development of other arts; the other where agriculture is developed or is practised by a serf or tributary people, metal is in use, and war, trade, or handicrafts are well developed. The former stage we take as roughly parallel to that of Incipient Agriculture;

the latter, which we write as Pastoral², is about on a level with Agriculture³. In deciding whether a people shall rank with the Lower Pastoral, one of our chief difficulties has turned upon the question of the influence of civilised men. Many North American, and some South American, hunting tribes have acquired the horse from the white man. This alone would not remove them from the hunting stage,¹ but in South America we find sheep and cattle similarly acquired. Thus the Abipones, though spoken of as pure hunters, we also learn incidentally spun and wove garments from their flocks (Dobrizhofer, p. 130). These herds, however, appear to have been taken from the Spaniards, and we take it that if the Abipones were in the pastoral state at the time, they were only just entering thereupon, and their manners and customs may be regarded as those of a hunting people. The Aucas seem to be in much the same condition (D'Orbigny II., p. 259), and the same may be said of the Puelches. In the end we have classed all these as hunters.

The Tobas, on the other hand, are said by D'Orbigny (*L'homme Americain*, p. 99) to have been "pasteurs depuis la conquête," and occasionally agricultural. Thouar (*Exploration*, p. 66) also attributes to them numerous flocks of sheep, cattle and horses. With them the pastoral state seems, therefore, to have established itself.

The Navahos, again, in North America, became first pastoral and then recently agricultural under white influence. We think it should be clear that flocks and herds must be not merely stolen or kept temporarily by people, but that the rearing of them should be a definite part of their occupation if they are to be classed as pastoral, and for this reason the Tobas and the Navahos are the only American peoples whom we have placed in this group.

With regard to the higher pastoral peoples, our main doubt is whether some who have been regarded as cattle-keeping agriculturists and therefore placed in A³, might not with equal propriety have been regarded as pastoralists who have taken to agriculture as a secondary employment. It must frankly be admitted that our information has not always been sufficient to decide this point, but our aim has been to class under Pastoral² those whose mode of life, particularly the life of the richer or ruling classes, is determined by the movements of flocks and herds rather than by the sedentary requirements of agriculture.


A word may be added here upon the general problem of the treatment of borrowed culture. It may be said that an art borrowed from without is something purely external, which will not affect the customs of the tribe. We ought, therefore, in spite of the existence

1. On the other hand the domestication of the reindeer is taken as a mark of the pastoral stage, *e.g.*, for the Ostyaks.

of this art, to regard the customs as having been formed in a stage in which it did not exist, and to belong to that stage accordingly. Now it is quite true that a borrowed art is not of the same value as evidence of the mentality of a people as the same art if known to have originated at home, but if we are to pursue this argument too far, in how many cases shall we really be able to say that an art is ultimately of domestic origin? Culture contact, direct or indirect, is in fact the normal not the exceptional process throughout human history. And, on the other side, how long does it remain true that the importation of a new art is without effect upon the social customs of a people? We have clear evidence here and there of acquisitions which have revolutionised the life of a people—for example, the Comanche are a branch of the Shoshones, who, when they acquired the horse from the white man, migrated to Texas and became a vigorous and flourishing people of a distinctly higher grade. A more striking instance is that of the Blackfeet. We have to class them as a hunting people for they practise neither pasture nor agriculture; but they obtained from the European not only the horse but the gun, and, according to Mr. Grinnell (p. 178), this materially affected their mode of life, and, in particular, enabled them to build up a great conquering federation, almost unique among hunters. We have mentioned the Kubus, Semang, and the Sakai, and other peoples who have become agriculturists under foreign influence. Apparently some, at least, of their institutions, their methods of government, and their marriage customs have been materially affected by the same causes. Upon the whole, therefore, we must take people as we find them, whatever the causes may be which have brought them to their present level. We have, however, in cases of transition tried to satisfy ourselves that the new stage is at least a generation old, and if we are clear on this point we classify the people at their present level, while if the change appears to be more recent we treat them as being at their old level. We also, as already illustrated by our remarks on the Puelches, etc., disregard mere rudiments of a higher culture when they are thus manifestly imported, whereas if their origin had been domestic, we should have felt compelled to take them into account.

We take some hunters to have advanced on their own lines as far as the lowest agriculturists and pastoral people. We take certain advances in pasture or agriculture as equivalent though also divergent, and we suppose peoples who remained fundamentally pastoral to have advanced in the highest stage to that threshold of civilisation which is represented by our Agriculture³. It would seem that beyond this the line of material advance lies with that more sedentary life which has agriculture as its basis, so that the pastoral development, except in subordination to agriculture, represents, like the highest hunting culture, a blind alley.

Our conception of the relation between the different economic grades of culture may be roughly symbolised by a diagram :—



This classification does not depend on any theory of the order in time in which the several economic stages have arisen. It merely arranges the stages actually found—an order corresponding to the degree of control over nature and mastery of material conditions manifested in each.

Our table of peoples, separately printed (see Introductory Note), contains the list of those referred to each grade with abbreviated references to the principal authorities consulted on each. For the full references to the authorities see the accompanying bibliography.

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DARWINISM AND SOCIOLOGY.¹

Summary.—This paper seeks to supply evidence in the direction of showing (a) that it is illegitimate to deduce the nature and degree of the innate mental capacities of a people or person from the stage of culture which either occupies; (b) that all peoples and (soundly-born) individuals appear to be equally adapted by nature to the highest level of culture existing to-day; (c) that (a) and (b) are explicable by man's essential and unique dependence on socio-historically developed and preserved material and other inventions and discoveries, and by the fact that all species are virtually stable and uniform so far as innate capacities and short periods are concerned; (d) that if (a) to (c) be granted, sociology is provided with a virtually constant unit and with a basic explanation of social statics and dynamics; and (e) that it is highly desirable that systematic investigations be instituted into the influence of the cultural environment in producing the various individual and collective cultural characteristics and achievements.

DARWIN and his followers, believing that the two factors which accounted for the process of evolution in the animal and vegetable kingdoms were the selection by the environment of spontaneous and acquired structural modifications, tacitly assumed that the laws of human progress were those of animal progression. His *Descent of Man* is crowded with illustrations to this effect. Here are, for instance, some passages culled almost at random :—

We can see, that in the rudest state of society, the individuals who were the most sagacious, who invented and used the best weapons or traps, and who were best able to defend themselves, would rear the greatest number of offspring. . . . At the present day, civilised nations are everywhere supplanting barbarous nations, excepting where climate opposes a deadly barrier; and they succeed mainly, though not exclusively, through their arts, which are the product of intellect. It is, therefore, highly probable that with mankind the intellectual faculties have been mainly and gradually perfected through natural selection; and this conclusion is sufficient for our purpose. (p. 128.)

If some one man in a tribe, more sagacious than the others, invented a new snare or weapon, or other means of attack or defence, the plainest self-interest, without the assistance of much reasoning power, would prompt the other members to imitate him; and all would thus profit. The habitual practice of each new art must likewise in some slight degree strengthen the intellect. If the new invention were an important one, the tribe would increase in number, spread, and supplant other tribes. In a tribe thus rendered more numerous there would always be a rather greater chance of the birth of other superior and inventive members. If such men left children to inherit their mental superiority, the chance of the birth of still more ingenious members would be somewhat better, and in a very small tribe decidedly better. Even if they left no children, the tribe would still include their blood relations; and

1. A paper read before the Sociological Society, May 19, 1914.

it has been ascertained by agriculturists that by preserving and breeding from the family of an animal, which when slaughtered was found to be valuable, the desired character has been obtained. (p. 129.)

As the reasoning powers and foresight of the members became improved, each man would soon learn that if he aided his fellow men, he would commonly receive aid in return. From this low motive he might acquire the habit of aiding his fellows; and the habit of performing benevolent actions certainly strengthens the feeling of sympathy which gives the first impulse to benevolent actions. Habits, moreover, followed during many generations probably tend to be inherited. (pp. 130-31.)

Human progress is in this manner explained to be due to structural modifications passed on from generation to generation. Accordingly, Darwin encouraged the notion of improving the human race as we improve our cattle:—

With savages, the weak in body or mind are soon eliminated; and those that survive commonly exhibit a vigorous state of health. We civilised men, on the other hand, do our utmost to check the process of elimination; we build asylums for the imbecile, the maimed and the sick; we institute poor-laws; and our medical men exert their utmost skill to save the life of everyone to the last moment. There is reason to believe that vaccination has preserved thousands, who from a weak constitution would formerly have succumbed to small-pox. Thus the weak members of civilised societies propagate their kind. No one who has attended to the breeding of domestic animals will doubt that this must be highly injurious to the race of man. It is surprising how soon a want of care, or care wrongly directed, leads to the degeneration of a domestic race; but, excepting in the case of man himself, hardly anyone is so ignorant as to allow his worst animals to breed. (pp. 133-4.)

On this theme Darwinians have been incessantly enlarging. Professor Ridgeway, for instance, contends that "what is true of master races in relation to inferior races, is equally true of individuals in each community. The middle and upper classes are in the main sprung from ancestors with better physique, courage and morale" (*Proceedings of the British Association*, 1908, p. 845). And from this he characteristically concludes: "The legislator must not merely look to improved housing of the poor and the development of the physique of city populations. He must, as far as possible, conform to the principles of the stockbreeder, whose object is to rear the finest horses, cattle or sheep. . . . The legislator, on his part, ought similarly to favour the increase of the best elements in the State, and on the other hand discourage the multiplication of the worst" (*ibid.*, p. 846). So one of Darwin's sons: "If we tell the breeders of cattle that their knowledge of the laws of heredity is so imperfect that it is useless for them either to attempt or to avoid breeding from their worst stocks or to try only to breed from their best stocks, why they would simply laugh at us; and the number of those who now see matters as regards

mankind in the same light is steadily increasing" (Major Leonard Darwin, in *Problems in Eugenics*, 1912, p. 5). Or take a typical passage from another writer: "Man is an organism—an animal, and the laws of improvement of corn and of race horses hold true for him also. Unless people accept this simple truth and let it influence marriage selection," continues this prophetic author, "human progress will cease" (C. B. Davenport, *Heredity in Relation to Eugenics*, 1912, p. i). The Darwinian point of view, we see, was regarded as embodying a natural law to doubt which was mid-summer madness.

Taking this theory of progress at its face value, we should expect the innumerable cultural differences between peoples to be due to differences in native capacity, and the stages from the Australian aborigines to the English scholar to indicate the real path of the progressive development of the human species. This conclusion was therefore unhesitatingly adopted by Darwin and his followers, and every difference in intelligence, sympathy, and strength of will was referred to disparity in native outfit. Let us hear Darwin:—

As man is a social animal, it is almost certain that he would inherit a tendency to be faithful to his comrades, and obedient to the leader of his tribe; for these qualities are common to most social animals. He would consequently possess some capacity for self-command. He would from an inherited tendency be willing to defend, in concert with others, his fellow men; and would be ready to aid them in any way, which did not too greatly interfere with his own welfare or his own strong desires (p. 109).

Here obvious cultural factors are ascribed to hereditary influences. Again:

It is evident, in the first place, that with mankind the instinctive impulses have different degrees of strength; a savage will risk his own life to save that of a member of the same community, but will be wholly indifferent about a stranger: a young and timid mother urged by the maternal instinct will, without a moment's hesitation, run the greatest danger for her own infant, but not for a mere fellow-creature. Nevertheless many a civilised man, or even boy, who never before risked his life for another, but full of courage and sympathy, has disregarded the instinct of self-preservation, and plunged at once into a torrent to save a drowning man, though a stranger. . . . Such actions as the above appear to be the simple result of the greater strength of the social or maternal instincts than that of any other instinct or motive (p. 110).

Such was Darwin's theory of human progress. How far is it borne out by the facts? In a recent article in the *Sociological Review* (Oct., 1913), on "The Mentality of the Australian Aborigines," I endeavoured to show that the Australian native cannot be said to be, so far as the evidence carries us, especially that relating to education, in any assignable way lower than or

different from the European branch of humanity. If this be the case, then—since the uneducated Australian admittedly stands on about the lowest rung of the cultural ladder—the Darwinian interpretation of the relation of culture to culturability is proved to lack any kind of material support in fact. Startling as the conclusion may be that cultural influence alone accounts for culture, it is difficult to imagine how it can be avoided. Should further investigation uphold or strengthen it, Sociology will have calculable and verifiable factors of a universal nature—a scientific unit—for its basis. It is the object of this paper to supply a certain amount of evidence of this character.

(A) *The Senses.* Since the senses occupy an intermediate position between the body and mind it would be, on the Darwinian assumption, reasonable to believe that they are more or less highly developed according to the needs of a people. That considerable innate differences exist was taken for granted, travellers telling marvellous stories of the sensory feats performed by the least civilised peoples. Darwin unambiguously says on this point: "The inferiority of Europeans, in comparison with savages, in eye-sight and other senses, is no doubt the accumulated and transmitted effect of lessened use during many generations" (p. 33). Compare with this statement what three experienced psychologists write:—

The results of the Cambridge Expedition to the Torres Straits have shown that in acuteness of vision, hearing, smell, etc., these people are not noticeably different from our own. We conclude that the remarkable tales adduced to the contrary by various travellers are to be explained, not by the acuteness of sensation, but by the acuteness of interpretation of primitive peoples. Take the savage into the streets of a busy city, and see what a number of sights and sounds he will neglect because of their meaninglessness to him. Take the sailor whose powers of discerning a ship on the horizon appear to the landsman so extraordinary, and set him to detect micro-organisms in the field of a microscope. Is it then surprising that primitive man should be able to draw inferences, which to the stranger appear marvellous, from the merest specks in the far distance or from the faintest sounds, odours, or tracks in the jungle? Such behaviour serves only to attest the extraordinary powers of observation in primitive man with respect to things which are of use and hence of interest to him. The same powers are shown in the vast number of words he will coin to denote the same object, say a certain tree at different stages of its growth. We conclude, then, that no fundamental difference in powers of sensory acuity, nor, indeed, in sensory discrimination, exists between primitive and civilised communities. (Charles S. Myers, "On the Permanence of Racial Mental Differences," in *Inter-Racial Problems*, ed. by G. Spiller, 1911, p. 74.)

Dr. and Mrs. Seligman, in *The Veddás*, 1911, p. 399, say: "Comparison with the figures obtained in other countries shows that there is little difference between Veddás and other races" in

respect of visual acuity, though they perform feats in this connection which astonish the European visitor.

Professor R. S. Woodworth, who examined the many representatives of primitive peoples brought to the St. Louis Exhibition, concluded: "On the whole, the keenness of the senses seems to be about on a par in the various races of mankind" ("Racial Differences in Mental Traits," in *Science*, Feb. 4, 1910).

We may therefore take it for granted that even in respect of the senses the Darwinian theory of human progress appears inapplicable to the races of man.

(B) *Temperament*. According to Darwin and his followers the observable temperamental differences in races are expressions of innate dispositions. Speaking of races, Darwin says:—

Their mental characteristics are . . . very distinct; chiefly as it would appear in their emotional, but partly in their intellectual, faculties. Everyone who has had the opportunity of comparison, must have been struck with the contrast between the taciturn, even morose, aborigines of S. America and the light-hearted, talkative negroes. There is a nearly similar contrast between the Malays and the Papuans, who live under the same physical conditions, and are separated from each other only by a narrow space of sea. (pp. 167-68.)

Here again experimental psychologists have been at work, though not so assiduously. Mr. R. R. Marett says on this point:—

As judged simply by his emotions, man is very much alike everywhere, from China to Peru. They are all there in germ, though different customs and grades of culture tend to bring special types of feelings to the fore. Indeed a certain paradox is to be noted here. The negro, one would naturally say, is in general more emotional than the white man. Yet some experiments conducted by Miss Keller of Chicago on negroes and white women, by means of the test of the effect of emotion on respiration, brought out the former as decidedly the more stolid of the two. And, whatever be thought of the value of such methods of proof, certain it is that the observers of rude races incline to put down most of them as apathetic, when not tuned up to concert-pitch by a dance or other social event. It may well be, then, that it is not the hereditary temperament of the negro, so much as the habit which he shares with other peoples at the same level of culture, of living and acting in a crowd, that accounts for his apparent excitability. But after all, "mafficking" is not unknown in civilised countries. Thus the quest for a race-mark of a mental kind is barren once more. (*Anthropology*, 1912, pp. 91-2.)

And Dr. Myers, Lecturer in Experimental Psychology in the University of Cambridge, whom we have already quoted, states:—

In temperament we meet with just the same variations in primitive as in civilised communities. In every primitive society is to be found the flighty, the staid, the energetic, the indolent, the cheerful, the morose, the even, the hot-tempered, the unthinking, the philosophical individual. (*Op. cit.*, p. 74.)

So far as direct evidence has been collected, it leans therefore in the direction of pointing to the equality of the temperamental outfit in different races, the actual divergences being attributable to cultural circumstances. When one notes, for example, how French English people become who settle in France, and how English French people turn who take up their abode in England, especially the second and following generations, one is bound to ask for the most unexceptionable evidence before admitting that differences in temperament are inborn. In this connection it should be worth while studying the temperaments of those who were adopted as infants by men or women of a different class and living in a different part of the world to the parents who are never communicated with. The Jews, settled in different countries, offer the most striking exemplification of race adaptability, particularly where they do not live segregated socially, spiritually, and philologically.

Whilst corroborative evidence for the culture theory of temperament is desirable, there is little doubt in regard to the results of new investigations.

(C) *Variability*. Dr. Woodworth says on this point: "The dead level of intelligence which is sometimes supposed to obtain among lower races is not borne out by psychological tests, since individual differences are abundantly found among all races, and, indeed, the variability of different groups seems, from these tests, to be about on a par." (*Op. cit.*, p. 185.) The assumption of the existence of differences in variability receives, therefore, no support from experimental psychology.

(D) *Inhibition of Impulses, Concentration, and Originality*. Here also, so far as concentration is concerned, Prof. Woodworth's valuable investigations suggest that "if psychological tests are put in such form as to appeal to the interests of the primitive man, he can be relied upon for sustained attention." (*Op. cit.*, p. 180.)

We will further quote on these points, three short passages from Professor F. Boas' *The Mind of Primitive Man*, 1911, expressing at the same time regret that lack of space forbids reproducing his apposite and convincing illustrations:

It is an impression obtained by many travellers, and also based upon experiences gained in our own country, that primitive man of all races, and the less educated of our own race, have in common a lack of control of the emotions, that they give way more readily to an impulse than civilized man and the highly educated. I believe that this conception is based largely upon the neglect to consider the occasions on which a strong control of impulses is demanded in various forms of society (p. 106). Related to the lack of power of inhibition is another trait which has been ascribed to primitive man of all races,—his inability of concentration when any demand is made upon the more complex faculties of the intellect. I will mention an example which seems to make clear the error

committed in this assumption (p. 110). Originality is a trait which is by no means lacking in the life of primitive people (p. 112).

The available evidence points thus unmistakably to the cultural interpretation of whatever differences in practical capacity may be noticeable among various peoples.

(E) *Mental Capacity and Mental Modifiability.* If we look upon man as being just one among many animals, we are bound to assume not only that cultural differences presuppose innate differences, but that these innate differences can only be modified with difficulty and after the lapse of centuries. Thus the cultural influences acting on a particular generation should be virtually nil in effect because of the resistance of inherited aptitudes (see F), and if the cultural development contemplated be extensive, ages upon ages should, on this theory, pass before they are realised. To take a concrete case for example. The Australian parent being thousands of years culturally removed from the English parent, we should expect that the child of the Australian if sent to school would utterly fail in approaching in performance the English child. Or to be even more precise. In view of his parents not being able to count above four, the Australian's child should stop there in his arithmetic lessons. After a severe selective process lasting for centuries its distant successor might be able to count up to fifty. Yet, as was shown in the article mentioned on p.234, without the mediation of natural selection or the inheritance of acquired modifications, the attainments and mental powers of the children of the Australian aborigines appear to be, according to one officially published report, "age for age and opportunity for opportunity, equal . . . to the average white children."¹ And the modifiability does not extend only to the primary school; it reaches to the highest institutions—the law courts, the medical college, the engineering school, and the university. At the present moment about a hundred Africans are pursuing their studies in these abodes of learning in England, and if the social conditions in Africa be duly taken into account the number does not appear to be smaller than we should expect if the Africans were of English stock but were brought up as Africans in Africa. If we add to this that these young Africans appear to have neither more nor less difficulty than their European fellow-students in obtaining their degrees or diplomas, it follows that the Darwinian assumption of profound or even appreciable innate differences between races is in

1. This was true even of the Tasmanians: "'The master informs me that with some exceptions these aboriginal children are not inferior in capacity to European children.'" (H. Ling Roth. *The Aborigines of Tasmania*, 1899, p. 25.)

a very parlous state.¹ In fact, nothing of what should happen, according to the Darwinian theory, does happen, and nothing that does happen but is in flat contradiction with the theory.

The school and college form an excellent crucible in which to test race theories. The modifiability extends, however, to communities as a whole. Of the Torres Straits tribes Dr. A. C. Haddon (*Report of the Cambridge Anthropological Expedition to Torres Straits*, vol. 5, 1904, p. 272) says: "Thirty years ago the natives were absolutely naked and unashamed; now they have become a people suffering from an exaggerated prudishness." Whole sections of Indians who, according to the Darwinian theory, should have a mentality of a quite peculiar caste, have taken to European culture as a duck to the water, while at the same time they have lost all sympathy and understanding for their own native culture. (Consult, for instance, Dr. Coomaraswamy's *Essays in National Idealism*, where this is deplored.) The marvellous changes which Japan has undergone during the last two generations have startled the West. From an excessively peace-loving population it has transformed itself into a warrior race (J. Bertin, in *Sur le Congrès des Races*), while, as if by a magic wand, it has developed its intellectual side to the extent of making first-rate scientific contributions. More incredible still, that seemingly petrified, immovable colossus China bids fair even to outdo Japan in the cheerful readiness of venturously embarking on far-reaching political, educational, judicial, industrial, and commercial changes, to say nothing of a revolution in customs and manners. Here, if anywhere, we should have surmised immobility, and yet here in this oldest of modern countries we observe changes proceeding compared to which our European efforts at reformation appear dwarf-like and petty.

We may, therefore, regard it as abundantly attested, contrary to Darwinian and eugenic views, that the different races of mankind are for all intents and purposes indefinitely modifiable in their mentality, and that no known length of uniform environmental influence leaves the slightest traceable impress on the innate mentality of races. Evidently cultural antecedents alone count. It is these which lend a people its mental and moral outlook. As these antecedents are changed, so the cultural outlook freely passes into a new phase. But for man's culturability, geographical and economic influences are impotent to build up a civilisation.

(F) *Instincts*. Granted that man is indefinitely modifiable in

1. The contention that the frontal sutures of the so-called lower races close earlier, is emphatically called in question by J. Frédéric, "Untersuchungen über die normale Obliteration der Schädelnähte," in *Zeitschr. f. Morphologie*, etc., 1906, pp. 444-5.

his mentality, it follows that he cannot be supposed to be tyrannised over by his instincts. These are defined by Mr. McDougall (*An Introduction to Social Psychology*, 1907, p. 23) as "certain innate specific tendencies of the mind that are common to all members of any species, racial characters that have been slowly evolved in the process of adaptation of species to their environment and that can be neither eradicated from the mental constitution of which they are innate elements nor acquired by individuals in the course of their lifetime" (p. 23).

It may be accepted without demur that whilst an individual human being has the power of deciding whether he shall live or die, he must obey certain physiological and other demands if he chooses to live. He must breathe, he must have warmth, he must eat, he must exercise body and mind, and the like. But these, as well as all the human instincts mentioned by McDougall, taken as such, leave us emphatically on the animal or sub-human plane, *i.e.*, without any culture, whilst all but the most fundamental animal activities are in man easily modified or even suppressed. In this modifiability, indeed, as we have seen, lies the principal characteristic of human nature.

Such considerations, allowing that they can only be said to apply properly to man's imperfect animal instincts, make one feel that if nine-tenths in civilisation is a cultural product primarily, nine-tenths at least of the remaining tenth may be modified in any direction strongly desired by the community. It is therefore possible that various secondary instincts indirectly related to culture exist in man, but that they are so loosely rooted that the stupendous force of social culture, when concentrated, readily removes or controls them. Of the hereditary transmission of cultural acquisitions there is, however, no trace, as (E) has shown. Indeed, even so far as animals are concerned, "no instance of such inheritance is forthcoming." (J. McCabe, *Principles of Evolution*, 1913, p. 139. See also to the same effect Delage, *L'Hérédité*, 1903, pp. 236-7.) The plastic character of man's animal instincts and the absence of particular instinctive cultural needs, means, and methods can alone account for man's indefinite and unique modifiability.

(G) *Brain and Skull*. Even the difference in certain important physical respects appears to be minimal between races, for while, according to Deniker, the average brain of the ape weighs 360 grammes and that of the average European 1,360, the average Negro's weighs 1,316 (ranging from 1,013 to 1,587 grammes) and that of the average Annamese 1,341 grammes. Human brains appear to be extraordinarily variable in weight. "Virchow has found a brain weighing 1,911 grammes in a man without any specially high development, and the brains of some very able men have been found below the average weight." (*Chambers's Ency-*

clopædia, article "Brain.") The brain weight of one individual may thus be double that of another nearly without appreciable difference in mental calibre. As Prof. W. I. Thomas says:

Viewed from the standpoint of brain weight, all races are, broadly speaking, in the same class. For while the relatively small series of the brains from the black race examined by anthropologists shows a slight inferiority in weight—about 45 grammes in negroes—when compared with white brains, the yellow race shows more than a corresponding superiority to the white; in the Chinese about 70 grammes.

The existence of appreciable differences in the mental constitution of races cannot therefore be deduced from the known comparative facts relating to the brain. The ascertained variations in brain weight offer no standard for the measurement of innate mental and moral quantities.

It is the same, apparently, as regards the skull, the brain's bony shelter, for a study of ancient skulls suggests that primitive man—or man since he has been man at all—was practically as well furnished with brains as we moderns are. On this there seems to be a consensus of opinion, as the following quotations from recently published books show: "The cranial capacity of . . . some of the most ancient human skulls is not less than that of the average man of highly civilised race" (Ray Lankester, *The Kingdom of Man*, 1912, p. 13). "Probably this creature [the distant ancestor of paleolithic man] had nearly the full size of brain and every other physical character of modern man" (*Ibid.*, p. 12). "Some specimens of Neanderthal man in sheer size of the brain cavity are said to give points to any of our modern poets and politicians" (R. R. Marett, *Anthropology*, 1912, p. 87). "Early paleolithic man was furnished with a very adequate quantity of brain material, whatever its quality may have been. In regard to the amount, no symptom or sign of an inferior evolutionary status can be detected" (W. L. Duckworth, *Prehistoric Man*, 1912, p. 45). The above considered judgments are completely borne out by Dr. Arthur Keith's authoritative *Ancient Types of Man*, 1911.

(H) *The Individual*. If, as has been shown above, no conceivable circumstances seem to affect the innate intellectual capacities of a people; if every people is at any time ready to identify itself with the farthest point thus far reached by the stream of civilisation; and if the vast cultural differences between peoples are purely social products, what shall we say to the theory that every individual differs in regard to the mentality with which he started life? Manifestly, the same conclusion must be drawn, for if the Darwinian theory did apply to the special circumstances of individuals it would *ipso facto* apply to the general circumstances of peoples (who are composed of individuals), and if it is inapplicable to the latter it must be inapplicable to the former. It is difficult to see how we

are to escape from this magic circle, and it appears useless to attempt the impossible feat. And, after all, if the prodigious differences in the civilisations of various peoples leave them yet on the same level so far as native capacity is concerned, need we shrink from the obvious corollary that the enormous cultural differences observable between individuals are due purely and solely to social causes? 'But what of men of genius, men of talent, average men, and those below the average (leaving aside defectives who are, together with those diseased, plainly abnormal), and what of the differences noticeable in members of the same family, and . . . ?' The answer, according to the cultural view, is simple. Our classification of individuals has been as faulty as that of peoples. We have slurred over patent social influences in the one case as in the other. We have tacitly posited occult causes where diligent research would have revealed social explanations. We have been so possessed and obsessed by the Darwinian theory—a mere revival of an ancient guess (*e.g.*, *vide* Plato's *Republic*), so far as the problem of culture is involved—that we have ridden roughshod over every principle of scientific method, defying the most elementary demands of scientific exactitude when it was a question of explaining individual differences in mental, moral, and æsthetic achievement. Let us, however, touch on the classes of individuals recognised in current classifications.

(a) *Men of Genius*. Over and over again we find men of genius appearing in clusters: Æschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides; Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle; the age of Pericles; the Elizabethan period adorned by Shakespeare and a double score of first-class playwrights and innumerable poets; the host of eminent painters grouped round Raphael and Michael Angelo; the Renaissance generally; Bacon, Descartes, Locke, Leibnitz, Spinoza; Voltaire, Diderot, Rousseau, D'Alembert; the outburst of great men of science at the beginning of the nineteenth century; the grouping of Beethoven, Bach, and other eminent musicians, in one country and at one period; the German poetic group, Lessing, Goethe, and Schiller; the German group of philosophers, Kant, Hegel, Fichte, Schopenhauer; the English poets, Wordsworth, Byron, Shelley, and Keats; the English novelists, Scott, Thackeray, Dickens, Lytton, and George Eliot; and the English inventors, Watts, Arkwright, and Stephenson. Considering, therefore, that by far the larger majority of the most eminent men and women appears in groups, we must either posit showers of men of genius (William James, *The Will to Believe*, 1897, p. 243) mysteriously produced, or less picturesquely assume that social tendencies lead to "genius" rising to the surface. There can be no doubt which is the more likely explanation. We can thus easily understand how a growing interest in astronomy gave us the Copernican

theory, how continued interest in the subject focussed itself in Kepler and Galileo, and how increased interest of the same nature spread over the whole of Europe and culminated in the writing of Newton's *Principia*. Ignore this social attitude and the group of astronomers, as of poets, philosophers, and novelists, seems nothing less than a miraculous production. We must say, therefore, that, but for certain social causes, the groups referred to would not have existed, and the individuals composing them would have led uneventful lives leading to oblivion and not to fame.

Such is our first proposition. Our second is that the man of genius as such is also explicable socially. Read Brewster's *Life of Newton*, for example, and you will find it difficult to determine what portion of the gravitation theory could be legitimately and unequivocally attributed to Newton. As hinted above, this theory was rapidly shaping itself, thanks to the labours of innumerable workers in many countries, and Newton, one of the foremost of them, conceived, just when the time was ripe, the plan of philosophically summing up the whole of the work done on the subject. Or take the case of Charles Darwin. Already Sir John Herschell, in his *Discourse*, written by 1831, showed himself alive to the fact that the geological record proved that the series of extinct plants and animals embedded in the rocks were more and more highly developed the less ancient they were, the most recent resembling closely the living flora and fauna, and the most ancient, by a series of gradations, becoming strikingly different. Chambers's *Vestiges of Creation*, published first in 1843, ran in a very few years through numerous editions, showing that the day had come for the theory of evolution. Agassiz, again, by 1851, as is shown by his *Comparative Physiology*, was quite clear in regard to the appearance, though not as to the reality, of the evolution of species as recorded by the rocks; and Herbert Spencer had not a shadow of a doubt on the subject, and began to elaborate the doctrine of evolution several years before the *Origin of Species* was put on the book market in 1859. What is more, the "Darwinian" theory was simultaneously discovered by Alfred Russel Wallace, showing that the new view of the origin of life was inevitable. When Darwin then published his *Origin of Species*, all the world was, figuratively speaking, standing on tiptoe, ready to cry "I told you so" to anything he had to say. Add to this his, as well as Wallace's, indebtedness to Malthus for the causal idea, and it will be obvious that Darwin's greatness is altogether a social product and accident.¹ Instead of these men of genius being thus the creators of world-moving ideas,

1. Further research has called into question so many of Darwin's principal explanations of the evolutionary process that his claim to be a great discoverer is practically annihilated. (See especially Bateson's remarkable volume, *Problems of Genetics*, 1913.)

they prove to be philosophical summarisers and popularisers, and if they seem to stand immeasurably higher than the average of their fellows, it is because the hasty imagination attributes to them the labours of an exceptionally active period. Proof could be piled upon proof to demonstrate that this line of reasoning is correct, and that men of genius, whether found inside or outside a group, owe their pre-eminent position to social causes.¹

The theory of heredity is only strong so long as it is not analysed. Sir Francis Galton, for instance, in his well-known *Hereditary Genius*, quotes fourteen eminent musicians who, he alleges, had eminent relations. These fourteen might well be reduced to six—Bach, Haydn, Mendelssohn, Meyerbeer, Mozart, and Palestrina,—and of these only one, Bach, had relatives who might be said to have been eminent composers. Since, therefore, of the whole galaxy of first-rate composers, only one is shown to be a member of a musically-gifted family, it is obvious that in music hereditary genius plays a negligible part, the presumption being that Bach's fame was due to individual circumstances and social conditions. Galton's other lists cannot inspire confidence either. Raphael is cited as having one relative worth mentioning, namely, his father, who was "a painter whose powers were moderate, but certainly above the average"; Goethe's father and mother are given for scarcely as good a reason; and Isaac Newton is thus illegitimately introduced in one of the lists. Indeed, whether we analyse Galton's *Hereditary Genius*, Havelock Ellis's *British Genius*, or De Candolle's *Histoire des Sciences et des Savants depuis deux Siècles*, we are equally oppressed with a sense that the

1. Galton appropriately says: "It would seem that discoveries are usually made when the time is ripe for them, that is to say, when the ideas from which they naturally flow are fermenting in the minds of many men." (*Hereditary Genius*, p. 192.) M. George Sarton, the editor of *Isis*, an international review devoted to the history of science, expresses himself as follows: "C'est l'humanité tout entière, unifiée par l'enchevêtrement et l'interdépendance infinis des activités individuelles qui invente et qui progresse. Tout le travail intellectuel de l'humanité est comme le travail d'un être unique, infatigable et immortel." (*Congrès Mondial des Associations Internationales*, Brussels, 1913.) Dr. I. Ioteyko, Director of the International Faculty of Pedology, says: "Il est hors de doute à l'heure actuelle que l'inventivité est inhérente à l'esprit humain," and looks forward to "le développement du talent, voir même du génie." (*Le Pædologium*, January to March, 1913, pp. 22-3.) And Benjamin Kidd says in his *Social Evolution*, 1898, pp. 270-1: "Even the ablest men amongst us, . . . whose names go down to history connected with great discoveries and inventions, have each in reality advanced the sum of knowledge by a comparatively small addition. In the fulness of time and when the ground has been slowly and laboriously prepared for it by a vast army of workers, the great idea fructifies and the discovery is made. It is, in fact, not the work of one, but of a great number of persons whose previous work has led up to it."

authors were too fascinated with the Darwinian conception of human nature and human progress to consider the social factor adequately and impartially.

Whichever way, then, we regard the problem of genius, we reach the conclusion that there are no grounds for attributing extraordinary native ability to any individuals, and that there is good ground for explaining a man's position in the scale of social values to individual circumstance and to the social trend. Our suspicion has thus ripened into something like conviction that individual and racial genius equally owe their existence to cultural factors and favouring circumstances, and that the anti-evolutionary idea of vast innate differences between different races, nations, and individuals is untenable. We are thus spared the need of suggesting insanity (Galton), imbecility (Havelock Ellis), or abnormal development in the men and women who represent to us the crests of many an historico-social wave, and we are not bound any longer to think that the mass of humanity must for ever live in the swamps and lowlands of ignorance, pettiness, and superstition.

(b) *Talent and Mediocrity.* The problem of the origin of talent is not so simple as it might seem. "If each section of society showed a proportion of talent equal to its numerical importance the social factor would be necessarily irrelevant to our inquiry. As it is, not only is the talent contained in each social section in inverse proportion to its size, but, significantly enough, the more favourably placed a section is, the higher and more persistent are its achievements. Kings strike the ordinary student as being almost always immensely superior to peasants. The aristocracy in the Middle Ages really displayed a vast amount of talent. The gentry has flooded the positions just below those coveted by the aristocracy. And the well-to-do and educated classes show a surprising number of successes. Yet, depress the social position of these classes, or raise the social position of other classes, and astonishing changes as to capacity appear to come to light. Exactly what we should expect on the culture theory, and what we know to be true of peoples as a whole! It is undisputed that the overwhelming majority of our Royal Academicians, our leading lawyers, our members of learned societies, our captains of industry, and the majority of other men and women of talent come from the classes which command wealth and social position, whether hereditary or not; it is undoubted that, without wealth and social position, it is most difficult to rise, for the poor man cannot afford either the fees of the Inns of Courts or the universities, journeys to Italy for the study of art, or any other of the many expensive ways of mounting the social ladder, and therefore it seems reasonable to infer that, granted a wide range of individual circumstances (including enthusiasm

created for a certain pursuit owing to particular experiences and the existence of a good opening), we should encounter, as we do, the picturesque variety of talent in the socially favoured and its absence in the socially ill-favoured classes.

Actual differences in social standing should not deceive us on this point, for, to put it cautiously, "it is not certain that the average inherent mental and physical qualities of the majority of the wage-earning classes are not equal to those of the rest of the population," while "continued family success may be due, in at least a high proportion of the total cases, to the favourable environment of the children of the able, to their possession of all the means of training for success, and to the opportunities and the advantages secured by a public school and university career, as well as by the successful position of the father," and "the fact that the poorest are lowest in the social scale cannot be used as a completely satisfactory argument that . . . they are the poorest stock," since "the results, so far as they are concerned, may have been biassed by conditions that have thwarted natural competence" (A. News-holme, *The Declining Birth Rate*, 1911, p. 53, pp. 51-52). In this connection countries should be compared where the higher education is respectively cheap and dear and access to higher posts respectively easy and difficult.

The statistical method which Karl Pearson's school pursues does not seem to have yielded as yet any striking results. We will examine one series of figures to furnish the reader with an example of the method. The facts under consideration relate to the 2,459 students at Oxford between 1860 and 1892 whose fathers were educated at the same university, and are discussed in a paper by E. Schuster and Ethel M. Elderton on *The Inheritance of Ability*, published in 1907. Leaving subtlety aside, one would imagine, on the theory of heredity, that as an almost invariable rule the fathers of those who took first, second, third, and fourth class honours had themselves taken similar honours. Instead of this we find, to give but one illustration, that of the 149 who had been placed in the first class, 27 only, *less than one-fifth*, had fathers who had been themselves in the first class, and that of the 329 second-class men 52 had fathers in the first class. In short, "of the fathers of the first-class men, 36·2 per cent. obtained either a first or a second class themselves, and thus were on the whole slightly superior to those of the second-class men, of whom only 32·2 per cent. reached this standard" (p. 5). Now, if we remember that "family circumstances or family traditions influence a man when he decides on what kind of degree he shall become a candidate" (p. 11), and that many other social factors are involved, the difference in the figures, 36·2 per cent. to 32·2 per cent., is even smaller than we should have expected on the culture theory.

Allowing for individual experience and for social conditions, the culture theory seems, therefore, quite able to account for the existence of talent *en masse* in the socially-favoured classes and scattered here and there in the socially ill-favoured classes.

(c) *Members of the Same Family.* In the last section we have by implication dealt with the large body of untalented persons by suggesting that the lack of talent is not in themselves, but in their stars. It is, however, contended that the differences in the members of the same family, 'where the environment is demonstrably homogeneous,' prove beyond a doubt that birth, and not social advantage, counts. Yet this 'unanswerable' argument loses its virtue when we probe the assertion. In a society like ours, adults have so many opinions and examples placed before them that they necessarily differ widely. One of these adults becomes father, another mother; then there are servants, relatives, friends, acquaintances, and strangers, to say nothing of books, each with their slightly or considerably varied point of view. Manifestly, such an environment cannot by any stretch of the imagination be regarded as uniform for a child. If, then, we think of several children in a family, each of different age, the complexity increases. And to all this has to be added that since the child's thoughts are uncontrolled by the elders, and since the experiences, or even the physical constitution or health, of no two individuals can coincide, unrelieved uniformity is of necessity out of the question. The familiar family argument thus breaks down when examined. Moreover, if we notice how dirt, coarseness, brutality, superstition, and their companions flourished unchallenged not so many generations ago among us, and that within the last generation we have witnessed sweeping changes in these directions, it becomes obvious that the fatalistic argument of the home is plainly contradicted by the data of history. In fact, comparing different generations or different parts of a country, we observe certain customs rigidly universal in one age or district and rigidly unknown in another. On all points, then, it seems that the culture theory is not invalidated by the apparently divergent mentalities in one and the same family of children.

Summing up, therefore, our examination of the origin of the varying performances of individuals, we seem to be justified in concluding that individual experience and social circumstances offer an adequate explanation of the observable divergences, and that these divergences have been vastly exaggerated owing to the prevalent hero worship. To put this in the form of a definition: Man alone possesses the power of absorbing the substantial part of a highly developed civilisation, together with the ability of advancing this civilisation to an infinitesimal degree; or, stated more abstractly and broadly, the stock of humanity's acquisitions, divided by the number of human beings who have lived, allowing for actual

physical and social conditions, yields the intellectual, moral, and practical capacity of the individual. In other words, culture is a strictly collective product and the individual a strictly social being.

Conclusions. (a) The Darwinian assumption that the amazing differences in cultural level between the various peoples of the globe are due, wholly or mainly, to corresponding differences in innate mentality, and that these in their turn were caused by the selection of natural and acquired structural modifications, is, as we saw above, demonstrated by recent research to be as nearly as possible without any justification in fact. On the contrary, we see now that culture is solely explicable by culture, and that every people is innately prepared to adapt itself to any civilisation however high. This being the case, we are bound to agree that the known differences in the mentality of individuals not diseased are best accounted for by the same law of cultural influence, and that human progress can only be retarded or accelerated through retarding or accelerating cultural development. Indeed, what structural modifications are to the advance of animals, cultural modifications are to the progress of man.

(b) It may be asked, How are these conclusions to be reconciled with the theory of evolution? Without making the remotest attempt at a complete answer, the following sketch of a possible reply may be given. In the history of man's ancestor, himself the most advanced among animals, the time came when through untoward changes in his environment, he was threatened with extinction. The only method to save himself was reliance on unlimited collective thought instead of on a particular structural outfit determining needs, means, and methods, and thus a double process of change set in and continued until man replaced his specific inherited structural outfit by an acquired or cultural one. These two classes of outfits were in direct opposition to each other, as fixed heredity does not permit of free adaptability which is the very life-breath of culture. Accordingly, man came to differ fundamentally from all other life in that he was no longer guided by a series of inherited and fixed needs, means, and modes of procedure. This explanation is no doubt more or less laboured and incorrect; but the essential fact remains that man does differ from plants and animals in the manner specified. So far as culture is concerned, just because it is a new development, man is as far removed from the ape as from the fish or even the oak tree, and all attempts to compare human with animal communities are doomed to complete failure because of this. Of course, since man is a living being nearly related to the apes, he bears certain traces which connect him with life as a whole; but these traces represent his general or sub-human nature, and are entirely unconnected with his unique capacity for, and primary dependence on, culture. Yet all

this is precisely what we should expect to be the case on the theory of evolution, and if Darwin failed in his interpretation of human progress, it was only because he overlooked what was specific in man. The scanty knowledge and experience of his day relating to the different races of the world were mainly responsible for his being misled.

Moreover, not only does the Darwinian conception violently clash with the facts; but it is inconsistent with our knowledge of animal life and development. That is, if natural selection had caused in man the enormous differences observable in individuals, in groups, and historically, we should be bound to conclude that equally gigantic differences existed in all species. And yet outside mankind, in every species, almost complete uniformity and stability is seen to reign, when all but prodigious periods of time are focussed. The Darwinian explanation of the origin of culture must therefore be rejected, precisely because it is in conflict with the general process of organic evolution, whilst our account of the virtual stability and uniformity of human nature should commend itself, just because it harmonises with what we know of the whole of animal life and development. Similarly, granting the method of culture, we can see how adaptation through habits, customs, convictions, and ideals, replaces, and renders superfluous, structural adaptation. Thus the cultural, rather than the eugenic, theory is in accord with the fundamental facts of the evolution of living forms.

(c) Our new view presents man as a modified form of life which depends on culture so far as it is man. Consequently, without culture man may be said to be the most miserable and incapable of beings, and for this reason presumably, not one human being is known to exist outside the influence of some civilisation. This, too, implies that, so far as man is cultured, he has profited by the cultural inventions and discoveries of the whole of mankind, from pre-paleolithic times to our own. Furthermore, depending essentially on culture for guidance and for the satisfaction of his own specific nature, and culture tending through the ages towards the perfect in every department of effort, he himself is really only fitted for the perfect, and can only feel truly satisfied so far as he is an integral part of an ideal state of society. Moreover, seeing the composition of man's nature and the enormous cultural advance he has thus far made, it seems inevitable that—failing some stellar catastrophe—he should triumph all along the line and become, what he is alone fitted for by nature, a cultural being of the highest insight, refinement, and rectitude.

(d) The culture theory is not without powerful supporters in the present day. Professor Leonard T. Hobhouse, for instance, lucidly expounds the root principle of the meaning of human tradition :

The rudiments of instruction which an ape, a cat, or a bird can furnish to its young, are limited to a few acts of restraint and encouragement, supplementing, or rather, anticipating the lessons which individual experience would teach. In human society, on the other hand, tradition goes to the root principles of action, both as shaping the ends recognised as desirable, and as furnishing rules of methods of which but a few could be found out in the course of individual experience, and those only by exceptionally gifted or exceptionally fortunate persons. In a word, tradition as based on the Universal brings the experience of the race to bear on individual conduct in a new sense. If we are right in holding that instinct is due to heredity, while heredity works through natural selection, then, as we have already seen, there is a sense in which instinct itself utilises the experience of the race to guide the individual. What is performed at that stage by the constant elimination of the majority of individuals born, and by the stereotyping of the structure of those which survive, is executed at this higher stage by the organisation of the experience of those who have lived, and rests upon the plasticity of those who learn by it. In short, at this stage, we have organised racial experience largely taking the place of that hereditary structure which represents the result of an infinity of conflicting and chaotic experiences in past generations. In fine, in the highest animal species, instinct lays the ground plan of conduct, within which details may be remodelled by individual experience. In the human species, the ground plan is itself reconstituted by the organised experience of the race." (*Mind in Evolution*, 1901, pp. 319-20.)

Mr. McDougall says :—

Whereas animal species have advanced from lower to higher levels of mental life by the improvement of the innate mental constitution of the species, man, since he became man, has progressed in the main by means of the increase in volume and improvement in quality of the sum of knowledge, belief, and custom, which constitutes the tradition of any society. And it is to the superiority of the moral and intellectual traditions of his society that the superiority of civilised man over existing savages and over his savage forefathers is chiefly, if not wholly, due. . . . All that constitutes culture and civilisation, all or nearly all, that distinguishes the highly cultured European intellectually and morally from the men of the stone age of Europe, is summed in the word "tradition." National characteristics, at any rate all those that distinguish the peoples of the European countries, are in the main the expression of different traditions. (*Introduction to Social Psychology*, 1909, pp. 328-9.)

Professor Lloyd Morgan expresses himself as follows :—

Mental progress is mainly due, not to inherited increments of mental faculty, but to the handing on of the results of human achievement by a vast extension of that which we have seen to be a factor in animal life, namely tradition. (*Habit and Instinct*, 1896, p. 334.) Again : Intellectual evolution, whether of primary or secondary value, is no longer by increment of human faculty, but by summation and storage in the environment it creates. (*Ibid*, p. 334.)

These extracts, which could be easily multiplied, leave no doubt on the matter that well-known thinkers of our day have recognised the uniqueness of man and accordingly cut themselves adrift from the Darwinian tradition. Unfortunately, however, apparently not one of the innovators has gone beyond making a general statement, when what is required is a detailed examination of the whole problem and a systematic re-interpretation of human affairs in the light of present-day knowledge.

The basic error of Darwinian eugenisists (Galton and others, as quoted; also, among a number, J. A. Thomson, *Heredity*; R. C. Punnett, *Mendelism*; S. Herbert, *The First Principles of Heredity*; and W. Schallmeyer, *Vererbung und Auslese*) has been to assume that culture represents an artificial and unstable auxiliary, to be replaced without undue delay by permanent organic modifications, whereas, on the contrary, it apparently embodies an unique method of nature by which advance through structural change is rendered superfluous and is almost infinitely transcended. To this basic error must be attributed the uniform neglect of eugenists to examine the scope and fundamental significance of culture; their unsuspectingly regarding socially developed modes of thought and feeling as heritable; their readiness to take for granted that the cultural traits of families, classes, peoples, races, and the two sexes, primarily reflect innate differences; their almost invariable satisfaction, in good faith, with evidence of the flimsiest character, such as naïve references to 'every-day experience'; and their insistence that human progress is to be identified with the evolution of a super-man, when it is really a question of developing a super-civilisation. This unfortunate attitude of overlooking the emergence of a new turning on the evolutionary road, has been a disservice to the culture theory, for its establishment pre-supposes that it has successfully passed through the fire of ruthless criticism, an ordeal by which it has yet to be tested.

(e) Our whole thought relating to human problems is to-day vitiated by the unwarranted assumption of mental heredity. Leaving aside the larger social issues, such as the struggle for the emancipation of women, the placing on an equal footing of all races and classes, the substitution of international law for the appeal to the mailed fist, the subordination of the senses and the appetites to a life-ideal, the providing of the fullest opportunities for the children of all and sundry, which would be automatically solved by the culture theory, we find mental heredity adduced for the explanation of every kind of human characteristic. Is some one methodical or slovenly, pious or sceptical, honest or dishonest, tenderly parental or otherwise, able or stupid, liberal or conservative, or is a child eager or lax in his morals or studies,—whatever it be, mental heredity is supposed to explain it all. It is time, we say,

that Sociology should definitely clear itself of all complicity in the dissemination of bare statements involving a belief in mental heredity, and should settle down to trace cultural variations to definite cultural conditions before resorting to the theory of heredity.

(f) With the Darwinian incubus removed, Sociology may breathe freely at last. Its fundamental basis being unequivocally determined as human nature depending specifically and fundamentally on socially and historically developed culture for self-expression and self-realisation, it has done with occult, incalculable and non-social causes—with the innately and strikingly different mentalities and capricious instincts of different sexes, different races, different nations, different classes, and different individuals—and may boldly proceed on the assumption that man is strictly a social being, inconceivable and a nonentity apart from society. If it be also agreed that man is essentially fitted for, and therefore only truly satisfied with, the highest civilisation or efflorescence of culture, and that progress towards a humanity distinguished by the universal prevalence of the love of fellowship, science, and refinement, is a sober fact, sociologists may be said to possess a reliable guide in interpreting the past, in understanding and counselling the present, and in forecasting the future. Their labours will not be less arduous; but they will work with the consciousness that they are actively reducing a chaos into a cosmos, a mass of apparently intractable facts into a self-consistent and self-maintained system of reality. This will be the beginning of Sociology as a strict science, for a strict science with its primary unit—in this case the nature of man—scientifically undetermined, is inconceivable. If, against that, it be urged, with Gumpłowicz, that the social group¹ is the sociological element, or, with Durkheim, that even the mental categories of space, time, cause, etc., are social products, the answer is still that only the unique cultural nature of man makes civilised groups and universal thought possible, and that it alone explains the wherefore of collective effort and the whither of social development.

(g) Finally, the present writer ventures to suggest that the Sociological Society should institute an inquiry having for its object the determination of the precise sphere of influence of the collective or cultural, as distinct from the individual or hereditary, factor in all matters appertaining to the intellectual, moral, æsthetic, and practical capacities and attainments of individuals and groups

1. It would be more correct to say: Mankind; for as the individual is the culture-demanding unit, so mankind is the culture-supplying unit. The family, the mart, and the social group might be regarded as the principal culture-mediating units.

of individuals, the investigators to bear in mind the crucial importance of studying different peoples and members of different classes under the *same* cultural conditions (*e.g.*, in school and college), and *vice versa* (*e.g.*, by comparing the achievements of blue-eyed 'Aryans' in the mountains of Kurdistan¹ with those of woolly-haired Africans in the universities of Europe). Such an inquiry should yield invaluable insight into the causes, the nature, and the development of social institutions and activities.

G. SPILLER.

1 Felix von Luschan, *The Early Inhabitants of Western Asia*, 1911.



SOCIAL CHANGE IN AMERICA,¹

THE first thing to which the mind of the English student in America has to adjust itself is the fact of the many Americas of which, during even the briefest period of inquiry, he becomes conscious. And it must be realised that only a fragment of one region can be seen. The visitor may spend his time along a chain of the great cities, or in the academic groups of the East and Middle West, or among the men of business and action between the Atlantic seaboard and the Great Lakes; or he may keep, as I have done, within the long-settled area marked at its extreme points by Boston, Pittsburg, Washington and Philadelphia. And his journey will end, inevitably, in a chaos of memories and impressions and more or less unrelated facts. He will quickly learn that there are other Americas: the new West, with its wide spaces lately brought under the hand of man; the Pacific slope, with its people looking in profound misgiving across to the teeming lands of the yellow races; the old South, becoming here and there transformed out of recognition through its late conquest by modern industrialism. We are aware of the immensity of the United States, but we are apt to forget their extraordinary variety. There is here not a single problem of race or government or social structure, but many problems, every one of which is more than sufficiently baffling.

It is now more than two generations since the American Union lost its homogeneous character. Consider, for a moment, the significance of the population figures. In 1790, the year of the first census, the inhabitants of the new republic numbered not quite four millions (less than one-half of the then population of Ireland); in 1910 they were 92 millions. This immense total, of course, has not been reached by the multiplication of the original colonists, but chiefly through successive waves of immigrants from, in turn, almost every European country. First in order came the Irish, driven across the sea by the famine of the 'forties and its results, and the Germans, influenced by the upheaval of the revolutionary year 1848. At the crucial stage in the history of the United States, when the country was in need of men for the development of industry and the settlement of new lands, came the Civil War, with its estimated loss of a million and three-quarters of able-bodied citizens. Under the pressure of the incessant stream of immigrants the older American stock declined, until in 1900 only about one-half the total—or about 35 millions—were classed in the census as native whites. Of these many millions were the children of foreign-born parents, while of the remainder about 10½ millions

1. A paper read before the Sociological Society, March 31, 1914.

were born and brought up in Europe. The negro population at that time was about 9 millions. During the fourteen years that have gone by since this enumeration the stream of immigrants has been enlarged and accelerated. In 1906, for the first time, it brought over a million new citizens into the republic, and the number has been increased year by year until to-day. The population thus composed, to an ever enlarging extent of transplanted groups, is singularly scattered. Some 15 millions are concentrated in about a score of rapidly expanding cities; a further large portion is to be found in new, and hideous, industrial centres of smaller extent. There is still room for agricultural settlers, broad lands in the Western States calling for human labour and enterprise; but, as a young American writer says: "The great social adventure of America is no longer the conquest of the wilderness, but the absorption of 50 million peoples. . . . It means that America is turning from the contrast between her courage and nature's obstacles, to a comparison of her civilisation with Europe."¹ In endeavouring, therefore, to disengage and to estimate the social forces of the United States we find ourselves confronted with a situation hitherto unparalleled in the world.

Plato and Aristotle thought in terms of ten thousand homogeneous villagers; we have to think in terms of a hundred million people of all races and all traditions, crossbred and inbred, subject to climates they have never lived in before, plumped down on a continent in the midst of a strange civilisation. We have to deal with all grades of life from the frontier to the metropolis, with men who differ in sense of fact, in ideal, in the very groundwork of morals.²

There, then, is the first great mass of fact that we have to consider—the material out of which America is being made.

Mr. Zangwill has relieved us in part of the trouble of consulting the recent Blue Books by printing as an appendix to *The Melting Pot* the statistics of immigration during the twelve months ended June 30, 1913. The total is 1,427,227—practically a million and a half. The table contains several surprises. There is a common impression that Great Britain has ceased to contribute to the population of the United States, and that the stream of Irish immigration is drying up. Yet in the last completed year the English immigrants numbered 100,062, the Scotch 31,434, the Irish 48,103—altogether, with 3,922 from Wales, 183,521 from the British Isles. Scandinavia, with its small reserves of population, contributed 51,650; Germany, 101,764; Austria-Hungary, 144,790; Greece and the Balkan States, 70,561; Russia, nearly 100,000; Poland, 185,207; Italy, 318,519 (more than a quarter of a million of these being from the south); while the Hebrews numbered

1. Walter Lippmann, *A Preface to Politics*, p. 189, New York: Mitchell Kennerley, 1913. London: Fisher Unwin.

2. *Op cit.*, p. 104.

105,826. With the exception of the Jews the vast majority are of peasant stock, but all alike tend to be swallowed up in the cauldron of Transatlantic industrialism. The rough American classification divides them into North and South, white men and others¹—those from Northern and North-Western Europe, who come from comparatively free communities and are more or less of our family, and those of more pronouncedly alien blood and type, the overflow of Eastern and Southern despotisms, political and ecclesiastical. The Northerners generally, and the refugees from Russia and Poland invariably, go as settlers: they are cutting themselves off decisively from the past of their race. But this is not equally true of other peoples. Increasingly the Italians and Greeks emigrate in youth with the intention of going back with their gains in early manhood; most often they postpone marriage until their return. Their enterprise, therefore, need not in the end involve the depopulation and impoverishment of the south-eastern European states. Nor does it, apparently, mean the disappearance of nationality. At least 50,000 Greek soldiers in the Balkan War had come from America, and the inquirer in New England or Pennsylvania soon discovers, by talk with the barbers or drug-store assistants, how keen is the national feeling of the immigrant. Now, as we all know, the problem of the hour in America is the relation of this enormous alien population to the developing society and to the institutions of the American Union. The older and simpler policy was embodied in the conception of the Republic as the Mother of Refugees—the conception expressed, for example, in the motto chosen for the Statue of Liberty—some lines from a sonnet by a Jewish immigrant woman:—

Give me your tired, your poor,
Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free,
The wretched refuse of your teeming shore,
Send these, the homeless, tempest-tossed to me;
I lift my lamp beside the golden door.

There are still representative Americans—for example, ex-president Eliot of Harvard—who cling to the older view, that the United States may without misgiving continue to welcome the immigrant multitude and that the end is assimilation to the American nation; but it is abundantly evident that American opinion is seriously changing. The contrasted views of the question have recently been brought before us by two writers from our own side of the Atlantic. First, as I need hardly remind you, we have Mr. Zangwill, in the play that has lately aroused so much discussion in London,² with his insistence upon the unlimited, and entirely

1. The Southern Italian, said a member of the U.S. Immigration Commission, is not a white man; neither is the Syrian.

2. *The Melting Pot*. By Israel Zangwill. Wm. Heinemann, 1914.

beneficent, possibilities of immigration and settlement. I quote a typical passage :—

DAVID : "America is God's Crucible, the great Melting-Pot where all the races of Europe are melting and re-forming! Here you stand, good folk, think I, when I see them at Ellis Island, here you stand in your fifty groups, with your fifty languages and histories, and your fifty blood-hatreds and rivalries. But you won't be long like that, brothers, for these are the fires of God you've come to—these are the fires of God. A fig for your feuds and vendettas! Germans and Frenchmen, Irishmen and Englishmen, Jews and Russians—into the Crucible with you all! God is making the American. He is not yet arrived. He is only in the Crucible, I tell you : he will be the fusion of all races, perhaps the coming superman."

And again, in the last scene :

DAVID : "There she lies, the great Melting-Pot—listen! Can't you hear the roaring and the bubbling? There gapes her mouth—the harbour where a thousand mammoth feeders come from the ends of the world to pour in their human freight. Ah, what a stirring and a seething! Celt and Latin, Slav and Teuton, Greek and Syrian—black and yellow——"

VERA : "Jew and Gentile——"

DAVID : "Yes, East and West, and North and South, the palm and the pine, the pole and the equator, the crescent and the cross—how the great Alchemist melts and fuses them with his purging flame! Here shall they all unite to build the Republic of Man and the Kingdom of God. Ah, Vera, what is the glory of Rome and Jerusalem where all nations and races come to worship, and look back, compared with the glory of America, where all races and nations come to labour and look forward?"

Mr. Zangwill sees the new American society as a complete amalgam of all the peoples, at present separate and hostile, with all their prejudices and feuds, physical and spiritual repulsions, consumed and transmuted through the action of the Crucible. Not so, however, Mr. Alfred Zimmern, whose acute and powerful statement of the problem appeared in the *Sociological Review* of July, 1912. Mr. Zimmern rejects the idea of fusion. Transplantation, he argues, even transplantation to the New World, does not mean a fresh start, spiritually. You cannot make the Lithuanian, the Bulgarian, or the Levantine into an American, but what you *can* do is to kill in him his own little spiritual inheritance. If the earlier batches of immigrants tended to merge into the American population—which is doubtful, witness the Pennsylvania Dutch—the process is no longer going on now that each European race has sent enough men and women to form a community in America. The separate nationalisms are perpetuated; the chief thing the alien learns in the United States is the preservation of his own nationalism. The Crucible, Mr. Zimmern contends, is an illusion. "America is not a melting-pot, but a pot of varnish." The one unmistakeable product of the immigration process is a vast

proletariat, living in conditions which repeat and intensify the industrial serfdom of Europe.

I can make no attempt to decide between these two authorities. But it should be observed that Mr. Zangwill presents the problem in extreme form; indeed, his play—as is the way with thesis plays of this type—does not present the problem at all. He evades it by embodying the idea, or the process, of absorption in a musical genius, who is, to be sure, a Russian Jew, but concerning whom the essential fact is not his racial or religious tradition but his creative faculty. The destiny of such individuals is irrelevant to the issue, since they inevitably transcend the racial boundaries. There is, it will be admitted, much evidence in favour of Mr. Zimmern's view, even if we put aside the Jew, who has so far been thoroughly absorbed only in small numbers, and chiefly into the rich or aristocratic communities. We cannot, however, at present set a limit to the power of assimilation possessed by the United States, with their incalculable economic opportunities, nor to the influences exerted upon the younger generation of immigrants by the common life of the cities, the schools, and innumerable other cultural forces. We have, moreover, to consider the possibilities inherent in this unexampled situation with its gradual turning over of the controlling power in the State to an alien democracy becoming conscious of its destiny. These people have already the power of numbers, of physique, and reproductive capacity; and they take into the civilisation of America a fertilizing stream of intellectual and emotional force which will work out in ways that are impossible to forecast. They come from some of the oldest races of Europe; yet they are in reality among the youngest and freshest. Physically they are unbroken, and for the first time in their history they are free and provided with opportunity: in a position, therefore, to show of what they are capable. The outlook may be and is full of promise; but as to the industrial serfdom of to-day in the industrial centres of the Eastern States and the Middle West, there can be no doubt whatever:

Few older Americans, except politicians and settlement-workers, know this new proletariat. It lives in Ghettos of its own, or in industrial towns, such as Gary and Pullman, created and baptised by some capitalist employer. Those that know it best are either hardened into a callous indifference or sick at heart at its contemplation. "Go to Gary by all means," said a Croatian physician to me in Chicago, "if you would see the Sodom and Gomorrah of my race." Here, and in similar fortresses of capitalism (for they are strategically disposed like fortresses and sometimes even have walls and gates) the big industrial and trading corporations, who are the real rulers of America, keep their machines running by the aid of cheap south-east European labour. Thousands of

young workmen, mere ignorant peasant boys, form the raw material of some of the most highly protected and privileged American industries, while the most influentially protected of them all swallows up their still more ignorant sisters, at the rate of over a thousand a month, into the neighbouring large town. Here they are assimilated indeed into the New World, assimilated into American economic life, into its crude violence and naked brutality, without a taste of freedom or a hint of citizenship. Emerging, if they do emerge, as adults, and flung upon a world of which they know nothing except that it has robbed them of their birthright as human beings, they are the natural rank and file of a labour revolt which alike in its grievances and its methods, will soon put all our European squabbles into the shade.¹

So far, Mr. Zimmern. And we must agree that industrialism in America is more hideous and inhuman than in any European country: consider the labour wars of the last twelve months—particularly, the horrors of the coal-miners' strikes in West Virginia and Colorado. There is no federal regulation of labour, and in the matter of child labour the United States are to-day where we were half a century ago. Moreover, the contrast of the spectacle of luxury with the misery of labour is at least as glaring in an American city as it is in the Old World; and no observer can fail to note the significance of the contrast as it is presented, for example, in the unceasing movement up town in New York City. The peculiarity of the social structure of New York is the concentration of business in the lower end of Manhattan Island and the constant shifting of the frontier between the business and residential quarters. As the private houses are pushed further and further up town, the avenues become occupied by the manufacturer and warehouseman; the sweat-shop is planted alongside the store; and every day at noon you see Fifth Avenue swarming with the men and women released from the workrooms—thousands of workers, nearly all aliens, the as yet unknown and untried New Americans. A visit to the swarming East Side, or to the great forum of the Cooper Union on Sunday evening is sufficient to reveal the moral and intellectual character of this element, the material of the American society that is to be—its children, bursting with vitality, gathered by the thousand into the free common schools and in part further stimulated by the classes and clubs of innumerable social settlements run by the apostles of Uplift; its adults crowding into the libraries, club-houses, and debating centres, organised in fraternities, reading newspapers printed in strange tongues, absorbing in the same languages or in their newly acquired English the hot-and-hot gospel of Anarchism, providing the I.W.W. (Industrial Workers of the World), the American syndicalist organisation,

1. *Sociological Review*, vol. v, p. 207.

with continuous bodies of recruits, and consuming with astonishing eagerness the writings of Nietzsche and Bernard Shaw.¹

It is, of course, in the Eastern and Middle States that the alien has become the decisive factor. So far the European immigrants are not massed in their multitudes beyond the cities of the central industrial region, and it is therefore on the Atlantic side that the native-born are dying out. The older Americans cannot gain comfort from the assumption that the difference is merely relative, for the vital statistics show how vast is the gap between the fecundity of the new Americans and the stagnancy of the old. But there is one consideration which may in a minor degree encourage the older American. The yearly million and a half does not represent a net increase by immigration. As we have seen, some of the European countries at present contributing most largely to the stream of newcomers receive a considerable number of their own people back every year, and it is probable that the numbers of the home-returning peasants and artisans will grow as the power of America to absorb European labour begins, as it obviously must, to diminish.

For the older States, however, there is another important consideration which has been frequently dwelt upon. The East has been steadily depleted of native virility and initiative by the western drift of its more vigorous sons and daughters. A generation or more ago the Middle West was developed by the adventurous pioneers of the Atlantic States, and since then vast regions of the West have been in great part settled by the men and women of the Middle West.² Hence the real native America, once necessarily east of the Alleghanies, is now west of the Mississippi. This is the tract which furnishes for the student of to-day so large a crop of social and educational experiments, which is giving lessons to the world in varied developments of democracy, and is, among other things, demonstrating for the benefit of older communities the vitality of the association that may exist between city and university, laboratory and field or factory, government machine and cultural institution.

A central and highly significant feature of this new society of the Western States is the State University, consciously developed in relation to civic and social needs. The universities of America

1. On the economic aspects of the immigration problem an immense literature has come into being, especially since the U.S. Immigration Commission of 1907. A good survey is contained in *Immigration and Labor*, by Isaac A. Hourwich, Ph.D. Putnams, 1912.

2. See an interesting discussion of this aspect of the problem in *Changing America*, by Professor E. A. Ross, of Wisconsin. Fisher Unwin, 1912.

are of three kinds: the old foundations of the academic tradition, the newer institutions owing their existence to the plutocratic founder, and the State universities, which have shown most energy in the Western region. It is, as a matter of fact, these last which have shown the way in the new and constructive movement of relating the activities of the university to the needs of city, community, and State. There are in the West thirteen state universities, with over 3,000 professors and 35,000 students of both sexes, who are getting their education almost entirely at the public expense, many of them continuing after the first year to work themselves through the course by earning their livelihood in various occupations. The pioneer of the new order of universities, connected with city and state as intelligence departments, was that of Michigan at Ann Arbor, especially in its scheme of student endowment; but the example that has commanded most attention from inquirers in other parts of the world is the University of Wisconsin. It has developed itself as servant of the state—every one I believe, of its leading professors being directly associated with public administration through such bodies as the Conservation or Forestry Commissions, the scientific surveys, or the Board of Immigration. The professors administer or advise on a score of boards and commissions. The university has related itself not only to the cultural departments of the administration, but to the departments of finance and taxation, railways and labour, public health and agriculture. The public office and the public servant have acquired the habit of calling in the aid of academic authority. The university further enlarges its scope by means of extension courses, tuition by correspondence, itinerant teachers, travelling libraries, and local centres each with a staff of organisers and teachers. A bureau of general welfare answers thousands of inquiries on government, economics, public health, education, industry and every conceivable subject; a municipal reference bureau furnishes information upon civic subjects, while a discussion bureau handles every kind of query in relation to current events and controversies. Twenty years ago not more than four state universities in the country had as much money to spend on all their work as Wisconsin to-day spends on its extension side. This is the Wisconsin Idea, so frequently described and discussed, so eagerly and widely imitated and adapted.¹

Wisconsin, we are told by the thoroughgoing devotees of the new spirit of the West, has eliminated corruption and machine

1. See Ross's *Changing America*; and for a suggestive treatment of the whole subject, with special reference to Michigan and other American examples, Mr. Branford's *Interpretations and Forecasts*. (London, 1914: Duckworth and Co.)

politics and has rid itself of the Boss. That declaration, no doubt, reflects an excessive optimism. The state, we suspect, cannot be so entirely paradisaic; and if it were, the progress so far achieved has probably been due, as has been suggested, less to the improvement of the machine than to the happy accident of Wisconsin's producing leadership, social invention, and constructive minds, and a people endowed with the faculty of response. However that be, the most conservative among us may admit the pleasure and stimulus of meeting representatives of the new West, with their infectious belief in all the latest applications of the democratic principle. These take the form, in state after state, of direct Primaries, the Referendum, Initiative, and Recall, and, with accelerated momentum, a measure of women's enfranchisement. For the democrat from this country, commonly an opponent of the Referendum, it is instructive to talk with the Westerner on the subject. To him it is not an expedient of conservatism, a method of confirming the privileged in their vested interests, but a piece of pure democracy, a practical and effective check upon the political boss by a concentration of the common will. The experiments of yesterday and to-day are advanced enough; but it does not follow that the states which have adopted them are destined to become the most democratic in the republic. On the contrary, as Mr. Lippmann has pointed out, "the West may follow the way of all agricultural communities to a rural and placid conservatism," may be in time to come the heart of American complacency, while "the East, on the other hand, with its industrial problem, must go to far more revolutionary measures for a solution."

I come now to a criticism of the United States which is extremely familiar in the writings of European political theorists. America, we are constantly told, has no sense of the State. The American, says one daring generaliser, "adores the flag, but suspects the State." He clings to property, but is hostile to government. He has cherished an almost unparalleled contempt for the public service, and the disrepute into which he has allowed politics to fall is proverbial. There can be no doubt whatever that this feeling is breaking down, that the old American attitude towards public affairs and the public service is undergoing a profound change. The influences bringing it about are manifold. The vastness of the country has been, of course, the greatest obstacle to the creation of a unified political and social feeling: those immense distances which, for example, make it next to impossible that the United States should develop a national Press. The daily newspaper is of necessity regional; even the weeklies can influence only a more or less contracted area, and as a consequence the monthly magazines alone are national in scope and appeal. Nowadays to

some extent the press syndicates tend to alter this condition, and with developing communications the remoter states are drawn towards the centre. Far more powerful, however, than such material forces have been, within recent years, the influences wielded by great national figures, such as Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson. Quite apart from questions of personal merit or political ability, it is impossible to deny to Mr. Roosevelt the credit of having done pioneer work in rescuing the office of president from the toils of the political machine, in giving it actuality and making it embody the idea of national unity. This, coupled with the policy of conserving the national resources, may after all be the basis of Mr. Roosevelt's claim to the gratitude of posterity. And in regard to this movement towards making the State a reality, it is equally impossible not to recognise the remarkable position and tendency of President Wilson. By training and temperament he is a Whig, steeped in the knowledge of English law and constitutional history. "We Americans," he once said, "are to keep or lose our place of distinction among the nations by keeping or losing our faith in the practicability of individual liberty." Yet no one can fail to see that, despite this theoretical standpoint, Mr. Wilson has been attempting and accomplishing things which have carried him very far from the conceptions and practices of liberal individualism. He has taken counsel with representatives of all parties, and at every step has acted, seemingly, from a profound conviction of the power and beneficence of state action. And further, in this connection, it would be difficult to exaggerate the effect of the Panama enterprise upon the general American feeling with regard to the State, its powers and reality. The Panama Canal is the greatest single undertaking ever carried through by government agency. In America at this moment (the time of the practical test and of expert or other criticism has not yet come) the Canal is esteemed a triumphant product of engineering skill, administrative efficiency and purity, and the application of science to the destruction of disease and the maintenance of a high standard of life. The future may prove this view to be accurate, or may prove it to be an over-estimate. But in either case the American public has learned from the Panama Canal a lesson of incalculable import: the lesson that, as Colonel Goethals, the chief engineer and executive officer, put it a short time ago, a Government confronted with a task of this kind can command all the resources of technical experience and professional enthusiasm available for a private corporation, and can, moreover, beat the private corporation in the matter of economy. The result need not be, as Colonel Goethals was at pains to point out, an argument on an impressive scale in favour of socialistic schemes of government industry and control. But as to its psychological effect, in revealing to the American mind

the reality and power of the central Government and in strengthening the growing sense of the State, there can be no possibility of doubt.

English students of American society are given to complaining that in the United States the term sociology is commonly applied to matters of practice—to collective effort in social reform or social service. This is so, and if after coming in contact with America, the English observer is tempted himself to fall into the American way, his excuse must be that he cannot detach himself from a sense of the rapidity and challenging variety of the things that are being done on the other side. He notes, for example, the remarkable vigour of the civic revival; the fight, ever reorganised and renewed, against municipal corruption; the merciless exposures of conspiracy and "graft" which have brought into being a new journalistic industry; the schemes of city construction—not seldom, it must be admitted, disappointing in actual result though sufficiently grandiose on paper; the enthusiasm for public health, for the redemption of child life, for the systematic creation of moral equivalents for vicious activity. He watches the making of playgrounds, of park-ways and park-belts; the gradual emergence of the designed civic centre; the extraordinary re-creation of the great railway stations as buildings not only of convenience and efficiency, but of spacious dignity and an almost religious silence. He notes, again, the rapid spread of Commission Government in the cities—an expedient which, started at Galveston, Texas, as an emergency measure, has been adopted by hundreds of towns to the accompaniment of plaudits from the reformers. Civic administration by a paid commission is not what we in England understand by self-government: rather it is a confession of failure on behalf of the established forms of self-government; but it is not difficult to share the American reformist view that the commission may be made a powerful instrument for civic well-being. Allied with this, and with the broader movement for the redemption of politics, is that still more characteristic American enthusiasm for the redemption of business—the conception of business as the essential religion of the modern man. Mr. Lowes Dickinson was, I believe, the first English writer to call attention to this striking development of the American spirit, and he thought it so bound up with the crudest kinds of advertisement as to be almost wholly contemptible. So simple and harsh a judgment, however, is, to say the least, inadequate. The religion of business, as anyone can see, has its vulgar and vicious side, and some would contend that the modern American's rediscovery of Robert Owen's principle that honesty and generosity are the highest money power in commerce and industry is not to be reckoned an ethical advance. But the point is that the idea is working out in various new schemes of production and

distribution—witness the striking minimum-wage experiments by a growing number of manufacturing and retail firms—and from such schemes, apart from the vexed question of Scientific Management, there is reason to expect many valuable results. No one can say that the prospect for America is without peril. The complex race and colour problem, the vast concentrations of wealth and privilege, the might of the industrial and trading corporations, the delicate balance of international credit, the menace of insurgent Labour—these and innumerable other problems suggest incalculable possibilities of disaster. But on the other side, the bright side, how many and how encouraging are the signs of the hour!

America leaves upon the mind a multiform and extraordinarily stimulating impression. There is the keen personal delight of meeting crowds of eager and capable people, who show to the English visitor and inquirer a cordiality and helpfulness that cannot be described and that beggars all gratitude. There is the continual challenge of men and women working with gusto in innumerable avenues of study and thought and public service. There is the coming into view of a new ethic of government and people, of employer and employed, of city and citizen. There is a new sense of collective self-criticism and common effort, expanding from city to state, from state to nation; there is the pervading atmosphere of freedom from the shackles of the past and the outworn; the feel of a great community in the making, building the house of humanity on a finer design and with a broader span. "There are nations," says Professor Eucken, "whose problems and difficulties are greater than their ability to solve them; there are others whose human energy is sufficient for the most difficult problems because it makes them rise from overflowing life towards the unlimited." And of these nations, he adds, is America.

S. K. RATCLIFFE.

SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT.

REPLY FROM MR. F. W. TAYLOR.

I AM greatly interested in Mr. Edward Cadbury's article on "Some Principles of Industrial Organization." It appears to me that Mr. Cadbury has made a very earnest and impartial effort to represent fairly the principles of Scientific Management. It is my impression, however, that he has never taken the trouble to investigate personally a company which was actually running under those principles, and that he is, therefore, not competent to judge as to the practical results obtained from working under our system of management. I judge this from the criticisms he has made, particularly in the following paragraphs:—

"The incentive to the workman is supplied by higher wages, from 30 per cent. to 60 per cent. above the average rate being paid. In this connection it is suggested that too high a wage has a deteriorating effect on the workman—while 60 per cent. increase makes him more healthy, regular in his habits, and in attendance at work, 200 per cent. makes him shiftless and careless and he loses time at his work: a surprising assertion after what has been claimed for the moral effect of the system!"

"The essence of the system is the concentration of attention upon limited and intensive tasks. The work is minutely subdivided, and this must mean monotony and greater nervous strain. It is impossible to give specific proof of this, but the evidence offered on the other side by the efficiency engineers is too general to be satisfactory" (p. 102).

"It is still an open question whether the device of specializing workers by limiting each man to one minute section of work is a step towards economic progress from a national point of view, but I will leave this matter until I deal with the effect of scientific methods on personality and character" (p. 103).

"Even if monotony of work is not solely responsible for this condition of things it at least intensifies it and does nothing to counteract it. Therefore any sub-division of labour in the direction of eliminating any little judgment and initiative as to methods of work, valuable as it might be in its immediate results on production, would almost certainly in the long run produce effects which would lower the whole capacity of the worker. At the recent meetings of the British Association it was stated by the reader of one of the papers, that the gulf between the artisan and the unskilled labourer has widened in the last thirty years; while the artisan has progressed the unskilled labourer has remained stationary, if he has not deteriorated; and I believe the greater monotony of his work is partly accountable for this. And would not this tendency be accentuated by the Taylor system?" (p. 104).

"Undoubtedly there is great waste in the present slipshod methods, and great advances towards the scientific selection of

workmen, time-study of operations, recording of results, standardization of tools and equipment, and careful cost estimates, are necessary; but the reduction of the workman to a living tool, with differential bonus schemes to induce him to expend his last ounce of energy, while initiative and judgment and freedom of movement are eliminated, in the long run must either demoralise the workman, or more likely in England, produce great resentment and result in serious differences between masters and men" (p. 105).

"It seems to me that in the long run it will defeat itself for employers to consider a man merely as a tool. We must keep in mind that a man and his personality is always an end in itself, and working people in the future will have to be treated less as tools and more as men" (p. 106).

I am very certain that Mr. Cadbury would not have written the paragraphs referred to if he had made a sufficient investigation of the conditions which prevail under our system.

During the past four or five years our system of management has been minutely examined by some twenty or thirty of the most able and intelligent investigators in our country, with the object of arriving at the exact truth as to the effect of the system upon the prosperity, wages, health and contentment and satisfactory conditions of the men working under it. I may say that the majority of these investigators came to their task with a prejudice against what we were doing, and I think that the paragraphs which I have called to your attention in Mr. Cadbury's paper fairly represent the doubts and questions in the mind of the average investigator, as they existed before seeing our system. These men came, very largely, representing the magazines and the Welfare Associations of our country, and their object was to get at the exact truth. They represented as impartial a body of men as I think could be found in the United States and, without an exception, they arrived at the conclusion that the fears expressed by Mr. Cadbury are not justified.

To itemize: Mr. Cadbury fears that "the assignment of daily tasks to workmen may lead to a great nervous and physical strain," "the reduction of the workman to a living tool," and may "induce him to spend his last ounce of energy while initiative and judgment and freedom of movement are eliminated." The effect of assigning equitable and fair tasks (and fair tasks have been universally insisted upon in our writings) is just the opposite of what Mr. Cadbury fears.

These tasks guard against the possibility of over-driving and over-working the workmen. They are fixed only after the most careful study of the fatigue of the man, and are adjusted so as to prevent him from assuming an improper burden. We all know, on the other hand, that under the old method of assigning tasks by guess-work "nigger-driving" of the workmen was no uncommon thing. So certain am I that the tasks which are assigned in the companies running under our system of management are not improper, that I have a standing offer (which I make to every impartial investigator going into any machine shop in this country

running under our system) of \$50.00 which I will pay for every single workman who, in the judgment of the investigator is over-worked, or has been assigned a task which is too severe for him to carry out.

As a proof that the tasks which have been assigned under our system are just and fair: In the works of the Link-Belt Co. in Philadelphia, for example, 98 per cent. of the workmen, each day, successfully accomplish the tasks which are assigned them; and for this, these men receive from 30 to 100 per cent. higher wages than they would get elsewhere.

As to the intense monotony of the work under Scientific Management which Mr. Cadbury refers to: One of the cardinal principles of our system of management is that every man who comes into the employ of one of our companies (from the ordinary labourer to the most skilled mechanic) must be taught and trained to do a higher, more interesting, and better class of work than he was able to do when he came to us, and that when he has been trained to do a higher class of work he automatically, as it were, receives the higher wages that go with this work. Instead of limiting workmen to one particular job we insist that all of our workmen must learn how to do a variety of work. This is just the opposite of the old grinding system which held men down to a single job, and if Mr. Cadbury had investigated the facts more extensively he would not have made this error.

In several different places Mr. Cadbury implies that our system treats men as "tools and implements"—not as men. A personal investigation of our companies would have shown him that our workmen, far from being tools and implements, have greater independence and freedom to express their minds than the men in other companies.

One of the marked characteristics of the shop working under our system is that there are, every day, more complaints made on the part of the workmen that the management has failed to do its duty in some respect than there are complaints on the part of the management of failure on the part of the workmen. Every workman is perfectly free to complain of the smallest shortcoming on the part of the management, and such complaints must be immediately acted upon. The complaints, both on the part of the men and on the part of the management, are made in a friendly spirit. The word "demand" is unknown under Scientific Management. There never has been such complete democracy in the management of industrial establishments as exists in our shops.

The great characteristic of our management which Mr. Cadbury has apparently failed to grasp is, that for the first time, so far as I know, there has gradually been established in the industrial world a code of laws which are binding on the workman as well as on all those on the management side of the business. And these laws have been developed from the scientific side and through the most careful experiments, with the object of doing justice to both sides. This code of laws binds the President, the Board of Directors, and all the officers of the company, just as it does the smallest and least important labourer in the establishment. This

is the first instance of the rigid application of laws alike to the management and the workmen, and this, again, represents true democracy. Workmen, foremen, and managers trained under our system are in immense demand in this country; and yet, without any question, the workmen are so contented and happy that the average number of years they remain in the service of our companies is far longer than in any similar companies in this country.

FREDERICK W. TAYLOR.



PANAMA PACIFIC EXHIBITION.

THE SOCIAL ECONOMY DEPARTMENT.

THE Panama Pacific International Exposition, to be held at San Francisco next year, will have a department of Social Economy surpassing in completeness anything that has so far been organised in this direction. The plan of the Exhibition is contemporary rather than historical. It aims chiefly to present the progress of the world during the past ten years, the epoch of the Panama Canal—an achievement made possible only by the rigid application of discoveries in hygiene, alike for prevention and efficiency.

For two reasons in particular the Social Economy exhibit will be noteworthy: first, because the immense amount of experimental work and progress in this field during the last ten years, both in America and in Europe, makes a representative survey unusually valuable; and, secondly, because the organisation of the department is being conducted along lines which mark an interesting and instructive departure in the history of exhibitions—the idea, in brief, being to benefit the visitor rather than the exhibitor. Hitherto individual exhibitors have been allowed to show all that they had or did in detail, with resulting waste of material and space. Here each individual or organisation is to be confined to a particular specialty, to the thing in which they most excel, each exhibit being arranged to accomplish some definite purpose—to represent an idea or display a method and results. It is a sign of the times that exhibitions are becoming less conglomerate and more definite in scope. In the early stages of civilisation festivals and fairs were held for the purpose of exchanging goods. The modern international exposition has developed, as the scope of these fairs was transformed, from an exchange of goods to an exchange of ideas, and an important feature of this evolution has been the growing recognition of the educational value of exhibits. The museum, an outgrowth of the exposition, is no longer a mere collection of curios, but rather a presentation of exhaustive studies of special subjects. To-day in America, and increasingly in this country, a temporary exhibit is assembled at almost every congress and convention. At such gatherings the habitual thesis-reader is finding it more and more difficult to secure an audience, because the visitors feel that a study of the exhibit is more profitable as well as more interesting. Many national organisations now maintain permanent museums and travelling exhibits, and in some cases the local branches of the organisations have made such demands that it has become necessary to manufacture specialised exhibits and keep them for sale. Museums also have found it necessary to keep for exchange or sale special exhibits for the use of colleges, schools, or other museums. Several exhibit bureaus have been established throughout the United States for the purpose of determining exhibit values by experiment and furnishing free information and advice to exhibitors. The Panama Pacific Exposition, in keeping with this growing recognition, is making its exhibit selective, and the Department of Social Economy is carrying the educational idea still further by arranging exhibits according to subjects and subdivisions of subjects, and not by geographical localities.

In the world of American industry few things have been more remarkable of late than the rapid and systematised extension of what is called welfare work, the progress of which will be strikingly illustrated in the Social Economy Section. For example, one of the great electric lighting companies will have an exhibit on factory lighting. It shows model of the human eye, four feet in diameter with a section removed. In front is placed a picture of a tall building lighted from behind. The light from the picture passes through the pupil of the eye and gives an inverted image on the retina. The model is so constructed that when the light is dim the image is dim, when the light is properly adjusted the image is clear, and when the light glares the pupil contracts, the muscles adjust themselves and the image is again dim, illustrating the behaviour of the eye under similar conditions. Behind this exhibit are shown exterior views of two factories, one well and one badly lighted, and underneath is given the cost of plant and maintenance, together with the profits from each factory, showing that good lighting pays in actual dollars and cents. Statistics are also cited to indicate the number of dollars a year saved in threads alone, in textile factories, by improving the lighting conditions: there is, of course, no charity in any of this welfare work of the big corporations. There are also given statistics to show the condition of the eyes among the workers in the two factories, and models showing eye diseases caused by working in dim or glaring lights, dust, etc.

The United States Bureau of Public Health is preparing an exhibit on communicable diseases which is designed to be the finest exhibit in hygiene ever made. There are to be models of every insect-carrier of disease, and of the stage by which contamination is effected. Moving pictures will illustrate conditions of infection, etc., for every known communicable disease. Models of wells showing water pollution will be accompanied by exhibits of all preventive measures. The Rockefeller Foundation of the Inter-State Health Association will have an elaborate exhibit on hookworm or trichinosis, showing how one-third of the population of the world lives in the hookworm belts and is subject to its ravages. Models will show how the worm enters the bare foot from polluted soil in districts where sanitation is either bad or absent; how it gets from the blood to the lungs, to trachea, stomach, and intestines; how it tears the intestines, etc. Models of healthy and affected children and children after treatment, and of methods of prevention are shown, together with an exhibit of the work of the Rockefeller Foundation in going through affected rural districts, administering treatment, teaching prevention, and enforcing better sanitation. The Carnegie Institute of Washington will have an exhibit on Nutrition and Eugenics, and in connection with the former it will show machinery for testing food values, and the results of the institute's considerable researches along these lines. In connection with child welfare, the city of San Francisco is to turn over ten acres of ground outside the exposition for a model playground—not the most elaborate or expensive type that could be devised, but a standard type of playground within the possibilities of the ordinary city. A day nursery will be run in connection with it, and pure milk depôts such as have for several years been in operation in New York. There will be a Household Economy exhibit showing what the standard of living should be for families of varied incomes, with model homes and menus, shopping demonstrations, the exposure of fakes, and so forth.

Every city which has a contribution in household economy to make will

be represented, and the State Departments of Public Health will display their various methods of educating the public in matters of health. Collections of charts, statistics, etc., are being avoided as far as possible, but, inasmuch as there are two classes of visitors to be considered, the lay and the professional, the exposition will be arranged to show the lay visitor the whole scheme of an exhibit graphically, at a glance; while statistics and other detail for the professional will be there in folding cabinets for inspection, or shown by means of the lantern.

The classification of Social Economy is always difficult, owing to the differences of specialists. The scientists desire that the classification shall show the logical analysis of scientific subjects, while the social workers wish it to outline the sequence of their activities. The following list of groups will show, roughly, the manner in which the difficulty has been met by the organisers of the Social Economy Section at San Francisco:—

Agencies for the Study. Investigation and Betterment of Social and Economic Conditions—including public bureaus, commissions, societies (of every kind), private agencies, commercial organisations, museums; special educational agencies, literature, congresses; surveys and special community investigations.

Economic Resources and Organisations—including physical resources and characteristics; location and organisation of industrial enterprises, general industrial statistics; government promotion of industry; conservation of national resources.

Demography; Eugenics—including composition, characteristics, and movement of population; statistical methods, machines, and appliances; immigration; eugenic research and experiment.

Hygiene—including vital statistics; growth and nutrition, food; hygiene of infancy and childhood; care of the sick, nursing; communicable diseases; State and municipal hygiene, public health work, industrial hygiene, occupational diseases; special hygiene: traffic and transportation, military, naval, tropical, mental, sex, dental.

Alcohol, Drugs, and Tobacco—including physiological and other effects; statistics of consumption and economic cost; organised efforts for lessening intemperance.

Labour—including regulation and inspection; woman and child labour; organisation of employees and employers; wages and cost of living; industrial disputes; statistics of unemployment, treatment of unemployed; accidents and employer's liability.

Other groups include co-operative institutions, banks and provident institutions, charities and methods of correction, the machinery of legislation and electoral systems, public utilities, municipal enterprise, housing, town-planning, and recreation.



REVIEWS.

THE SCIENCE OF CHARACTER.

THE FOUNDATIONS OF CHARACTER : Being a Study of the Tendencies of the Emotions and Sentiments. By Alexander F. Shand, M.A. Macmillan. 12/- net.

MR. SHAND has written a very charming book, full of original and most interesting suggestion, and easy and delightful to read. In case this sounds like the facile compliment of a friend, or raises the suspicion that it may be the prelude to some subtle attack, I hasten to add that the book consists of more than five hundred closely printed pages, that its subject is ethology or the science of character, and that it enunciates this science in twelve dozen separately formulated, distinct laws, which it claims to have discovered. This might lead us to expect a dry-as-dust research, but we have on the contrary a book of intense human interest. Indeed the wonder is when the subject of human character can be presented in this form, that we should have any demand for that jam-concealed but to me unpleasant powder, the psychological novel. Mr. Shand illustrates his work with abundant references to classical authors, but his illustrations never run away with him, never overbalance his argument, never weary the reader. Take for example the analysis of Scott's Lucy Ashton, pp. 165-168, at once admirable in itself and perfect in its elucidation of the principle the writer is mainly concerned to establish. He never allows us to forget the serious intention and strict scientific form of the inquiry, yet there is complete absence of pedantry, and there is no attempt to build up the laws into a rigid architectonic system.

Mr. Shand's book comes out at a fortunate moment, for at the present time there is everywhere a keen and intense interest in Psychology. We are living in a kind of Columbus age of this new and rapidly expanding realm. New worlds are being discovered, new regions of reality, whose existence has been until recently not merely unknown, but unimaginable. Like the old mariners who never felt at ease when out of sight of the shore, the old psychologists never dared to speculate concerning a reality which was not in plain and obvious relation to the material organism. How different to-day! The science of a new spiritual reality, variously named the unconscious, the sub-conscious, the co-conscious—terms which seemed formerly to involve a logical absurdity in the idea they sought to express—is making rapid progress, and completely revolutionising both the theory and the practice of our mental science. Profound problems of personality are being revealed and the material organism instead of being regarded as the *fons et origo* of conscious experience, is being recognised as the part only, albeit the central and essential condition of activity, of a whole reality which overflows it infinitely. The body with its wonderfully contrived nervous system is for the new psychiatry the effective instrument of a spiritual activity. Character is the quality of a person. It gives colour and individuality to actions. A study of character must therefore assume a peculiar importance for contemporary thought.

It is not psycho-analysis, however, that has led Mr. Shand to this study. His friends know that this book is the result of work that he has been

engaged upon for, I suppose, the greater part of his life, but which took definite form and direction some twenty years ago. The first idea of it was, I believe, formulated in papers read to the Aristotelian Society, and published in *Mind*, which journal at that time (1895-1900) was receiving most of the Society's papers. One of these is the article entitled "Character and the Emotions" in the 1896 volume, and another is "Types of Will" in the 1897 volume. The Editor of *Mind*, Mr. G. F. Stout, was one of the first to recognise the value of this work and he invited Mr. Shand to write the chapter on "Emotions" in his own *Groundwork of Psychology* published in 1905.

The kind of inquiry on which Mr. Shand embarked involved hard work and continual application. I remember in particular—I think as a preparation for his paper on "Types of Will"—receiving from him a set of most carefully compiled instances, written out in his own hand and manifolded for his friends, with separate questions on each instance and an invitation to offer comments or remarks. I have forgotten what my own reply was, but I do not forget that Mr. Shand expressed so much interest in it as to make me suspect that I had revealed to him character as well as circumstance.

The science of Character as Mr. Shand presents it to us in this book is an entirely new method. It is an attempt to analyse character into simpler component elements and to discover the laws which underlie their relations. But there is no attempt to present these elements as separate as well as distinguishable entities, nor to define them with the nice precision of mathematical equations. The laws are discoveries of uniform tendencies, and their formulation is always tentative.

There are two methods by which we may analyse anything. One is to separate out the elements which constitute a whole, to hold them apart, and study the elements separately and the conditions which bring about their combination. The other method is to distinguish within a whole the characters or qualities that belong to the whole. The elements so distinguished have no separate existence from the whole and if they seem to be able to exist separately they are thereby shown to be together less than and not equal to the whole, which is always more than its separate parts. The first is the ideal of scientific analysis, the second is the method of philosophy. Now it is obvious that however practically useful, and precise, and clear, the method of scientific procedure is, it can never give us the same grasp that a philosophical analysis gives. It seems, indeed, ideally perfect; it is in reality exceedingly limited and incomplete. Take a quite familiar example. Water consists of two atoms of hydrogen combined with one atom of oxygen; for science this is an exhaustive analysis, for whenever the conditions of combination of these elements are fulfilled the result is what we call water, and whenever the conditions of the dissolution of water are fulfilled the result is the separate elements symbolised as H_2O . But is it not evident that a study of hydrogen and oxygen gas prolonged to eternity would not reveal the qualities of water which are a *more* that only exists in the whole? Now in a general way it may be said that whenever we try to establish a new science, a new "ology," we have the analytic method of physical science in our mind as an ideal. But what we find is that the more richly organised our material and therefore the more real and concrete our subject matter, the less amenable it is to scientific treatment, and the strictly quantitative method of scientific analysis breaks down completely when we apply it to the realities of life and mind and will.

We cannot analyse a character as we analyse a chemical substance for the simple reason that we cannot synthesise a character. The elements are dissociated by us in an organic whole, and except in relation to this whole they have no existence.

Here, it seems to me, is the true departure of Mr. Shand. He rejects Mill's suggestion that a science of character should be "founded on the laws of psychology" (a suggestion Mill himself never followed out), on the ground that it was dominated by the Association Psychology of his time. Entirely appreciative as he is of Mill's aims and achievement, he sees that in this matter he was completely blocked by an atomistic conception of psychology, the science of which could aspire to nothing higher than the establishment of a kind of mental chemistry. Mr. Shand agrees that the discovery of empirical laws is necessary as the indispensable data of a science of character, but he holds that these laws are organic and not, as the laws of association, mechanical. These organic laws are described as the laws of our instincts, our emotions, and our sentiments. This three-fold division is fundamental in Mr. Shand's scheme. Instinct and emotion are used in practically the same meaning that Mr. McDougall gives to them in his *Social Psychology*, although Mr. Shand differs in an important respect from Mr. McDougall in his view of their relation. Sentiment is the term he prefers for what used more generally to be called passion, such as love and hatred. It is used to denote a higher system than the emotions and one that is more completely detached from the instincts. Character according to this view is constituted by two kinds of forces or systems, the lesser systems of the emotions and the greater systems of the sentiments. The problem of character is to discover the laws of action and interaction, of growth and decline of these systems. The highest systems are the most subject to change, the lowest the most constant; consequently the primary emotions are relatively constant in comparison with the systems of the sentiments.

Perhaps what will most strike those who are familiar with the new psychoanalytic psychology is the entire absence of any discussion of the nature of complexes. There is a theory—I believe it is Dr. Mott's, though I do not know whether he has yet set it forth in writing—that character simply is a complex. It seems to me this would be difficult to sustain, but what strikes me very forcibly is that there must be an intimate relation between the formation of complexes and the formation of character. It would be interesting to know Mr. Shand's view on this question, but it is possible it will fall naturally into the inquiry yet to come, for the present volume deals only with instinct and emotion and leaves over sentiment to be dealt with in another volume.

The present work is divided into three books. The first deals with the general conception of character, and sets forth very clearly and ably the conditions that make possible the foundation of a science. We have noticed already the reason for rejecting Mill's suggestion. Equally interesting, though of less importance, is the criticism of the older idea that he describes as the classical doctrine of the temperaments, according to which the distinction is not in the emotions which sway the individual but in the temperamental types—such as the sanguine and the bilious, the nervous and the phlegmatic, etc. The modern attempts to revive this doctrine are reviewed and criticised and rejected. The real work of establishing the principles of the new science is entered on in Book ii on "The Tendencies of the Primary Emotions." Here is the manifest intention and hope of

the author that students will not be content to read and accept his conclusions but will themselves be drawn to join in the investigation and assist in advancing and carrying on the work. It begins with a chapter which probably will be regarded as the most important of the book, or at least is the one that will arouse the most controversy, on "Instinct and Emotion." Mr. Shand does not lay great stress on a theory of the nature of instinct. So far as his subject is concerned it seems to him indifferent what theory of the nature and origin of instinct we accept. Whatever our instincts are they are there as a kind of basis or material, and the main factor in the formation of character is the primary emotion which is the active principle and which gathers up the instincts into the system which constitutes personal character. Mr. Shand appears therefore to differ widely from the Freudian school who derive all instincts from one general all-pervading instinct which they name sexuality, and who see in this instinct the one driving force of which all the manifestations of outward behaviour are in the last resort the expression. Also he seems to disagree entirely with Mr. McDougall's views that there are certain distinct and well-defined principal instincts at the basis of our nature to each of which is attached its special emotion—for instance, the instinct of flight and the emotion of fear, pugnacity and anger, etc. For Mr. Shand the emotion is primary, and also it is independent of the instinct; it can and does attach itself to, or detach itself from, any instinct, and its activity is manifested in the power it exercises over instincts, forming them into what he calls lesser systems, to distinguish them from the greater or more constant systems that are formed out of these by the sentiments. And Mr. Shand points out in opposition to Mr. McDougall's view, that there are numberless fragmentary instincts not connected exclusively with any particular emotion. Also that the same emotion may include a variety of instincts in its system. And further that the same instinct may be connected with the systems of different emotions. On the other hand Mr. Shand declares that what is inseparable from every instinct as the affective aspect of its excitement is not an emotion but an impulse. Consequently his doctrine is that the system of a primary emotion is more comprehensive than the system of an instinct and immensely more important. "The activity of an instinct, though, in normal cases, it has some psychical impulse complementary to it, has not, therefore, a distinctive emotion complementary to it."

The best way to understand Mr. Shand's distinction between emotion and sentiment is, I think, to take a definite example of it, such as is given in the chapter on Fear. Mr. Shand distinguishes eight primitive varieties of fear, all of which are concerned with the lower instinctive behaviour of creatures, and all of which differ only as varieties of conduct directed to a common end. But when we come to the higher motives that organise and sway intelligent behaviour we have the same emotion of fear, but directed no longer to a common end but to special and individual ends. We may fear, for instance, not danger, menace or destruction to our common life, but loss of power, injury to a beloved object, escape of a hated foe and so forth. It is here therefore that the sentiments, such as love and hatred play their part. They adapt to their purposes the systems of the emotions, —fear, in our example,—and the law of the behaviour of Fear is formulated thus: (34) Fear throughout its varieties strives to avoid aggressive behaviour.

The primary systems with which Mr. Shand deals at length and with concentrated attention and analysis in this second division of his book are

Fear and Anger; Joy and Sorrow; Disgust, Repugnance, Surprise, Curiosity and Wonder. These systems all not only include primary emotions, but are fundamental forces of character and have laws of action that constantly reappear in the most complex systems into which they enter. Also primary emotions that are in the original conception of them, directly opposite, are often in the higher systems complementary. All this is worked out with careful detail and infinite pains.

In the chapter on Surprise, Mr. Shand has given an interesting account of the theory which Adam Smith prefixed to his *History of Astronomy*. Mr. Shand seems to agree that surprise is not to be classed with emotional systems and that if it is a distinct emotion it has neither impulses nor an end, but he holds that it may be complete in itself and has in its own nature characteristic tendencies and effects. We wonder how Mr. Shand would class the case of the man who could never be made to evince any surprise or wonder. When expected to admire the mighty rush of water at Niagara he only remarked that he could see nothing to stop it. Curiously enough Mr. Shand ends his account of the systems of the emotions with the two emotions which according to Plato and Aristotle are the beginning of philosophy,—curiosity and wonder. It is an illustration of the familiar paradox of philosophy, that what is first in the order of knowing is last in the order of being.

In the third and last division of the book we are invited to consider the System of Desire. This Mr. Shand regards as neither a primary emotion nor a sentiment, but as more important than any emotion in the organisation of the sentiments. It is in fact, he tells us, a very complex emotional system which includes, actually or potentially, the six prospective emotions of Hope, Anxiety, Disappointment, Despondency, Confidence and Despair. It differs then from the primary emotions such as fear, anger, curiosity, etc., in this, that it is not aroused simply by sensations and perceptions actually present; the emotions of desire are prospective, aroused only by ideas, and referred to ideal objects.

This is as far as we are carried in the present study. It is only the beginning. At the same time it is not *a* beginning but *the* beginning. It is only by first comprehending these systems of the primary emotions that we can hope to discover the laws of those higher, more constant systems of the sentiments in which they are organised, and which give stability to character. Mr. Shand's conception of character therefore is that of a dynamical science of human nature. This science is not attainable by a classification of qualities, popularly thought of as isolated, and regarded as either good or bad, which we meet with in individual conduct. It is built up out of an interplay of systems ever growing in complexity and organic unity.

H. WILDON CARR.

HISTORY: ITS MEANING AND ITS METHODS.

NOTES ON POLITICS AND HISTORY. By Viscount Morley, O.M. London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1914. 2s. 6d. net.

THE MEANING OF TRUTH IN HISTORY. By Viscount Haldane, K.T., F.R.S. (Lord High Chancellor of Great Britain). University of London Press, 1914. 1s. net.

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS to the International Congress of Historical Studies, London, 1913. By the Rt. Hon. James Bryce, O.M. (Viscount Bryce). With introductory and supplementary remarks by A. W. Ward, Litt.D. Oxford University Press. 1s. net.

THE first of these works is an address, now amplified and recast, given by Lord Morley as Chancellor of the University of Manchester. The second is the Creighton Lecture delivered by Lord Haldane before the University of London. The third was written by the British Ambassador at Washington to be read before a Congress of historians. The occasions and the audiences were thus somewhat similar, and the three authors have this in common that, belonging to the same party and even sitting for a time in the same Cabinet, they have retained, amid all the distractions and excitements of a political career, an interest in history, in philosophy, and in the deeper principles that underlie political action. There is, however, sufficient difference in their standpoints to give variety to their treatment of similar subjects. Lord Morley and Lord Haldane belong to different schools of philosophy. Lord Bryce, inferior to Lord Morley in breadth of philosophic outlook, has lived and travelled in many lands. All three have much to tell about the meaning and methods of history, even in the short space at their disposal.

Lord Morley's brilliant and suggestive notes range over a wide field. The changes that are gradually, and sometimes silently, creeping into our political institutions, the misuse of political terms, the meaning that continues in party names, even when distorted from their original purpose, the power of books and principles apt for the occasion, such as Rousseau's *Social Contract*, Paine's *Common Sense*, or the "Survival of the Fittest" as enunciated in the works of Darwin, all these with studies of Rousseau and Mazzini, with comparisons between German and French genius, and with many other illuminating comparisons and contrasts, form a whole of surpassing interest, with no definite plan obtruded, and yet so closely knit together that each section seems to follow its predecessor by inevitable necessity. Yet partly from narrow limits of space, partly owing to the balanced mind of the author, it is difficult to leave this most interesting book without a sense of disappointment. Problems are stated, questions asked, difficulties squarely faced, pleasing fictions disregarded, slovenly thought condemned, but at the end we have not reached firm ground. We have been warned against some errors, but we have not been shown the way to the truth. The whole is suggestive, but inconclusive.

Bismarck, Lord Morley tells us, in finding fault with the historical portrait of one he had known well, said: "It is not in diplomatic materials, but in their life of every day that you come to know men." Here is one of the difficulties of the new school of history which, discounting all generalisations or even general views, seeks to reduce historians to mere collectors of facts. On this, Lord Haldane puts forth some pertinent considerations. In his view, "the historian will fail hopelessly if he seeks to be a mere recorder." It is doubtful if he can avoid "placing himself at some particular standpoint for the purposes of his review." He goes on to say: "The very width of his field of research must necessitate the selection of his facts and their relation to each other and to the particular system in which alone they have their meaning. For meaning is the foundation of system in history." But Lord Haldane, in considering whether history should be considered as an art or a science, is hardly justified in accepting the view of M. Langlois and M. Seignobos, that if it be a science, "its main object should be accuracy in recording." The main object of every science must be the discovery of laws, the reduction to order of the facts, whose accuracy is not an object, but a condition. You cannot have science without true facts, but no accumulation of true facts will

constitute science. Nor if history be a science, can it dispense with the making of hypotheses—under the same restriction as other sciences. In a daring aphorism, Comte declared that for investigation even an erroneous theory was better than no theory at all. It may be true, as Lord Haldane asserts, that Bossuet allowed his view of history to be distorted by his conception of the Providential government of the world; yet by means of that general conception, however inadequate, he got nearer to the recognition of the unity and true course of civilisation than any of his contemporaries.

In this discussion on truth in history, and the position of history as science or art, it is curious that two important points are ignored by all three writers. In the first place, the remark of Bismarck, quoted by both Lord Morley and Lord Bryce, referred to the character of an individual, and for individual actions and motives we must rely largely on state-papers, private letters, and other doubtful material; but the actions of large bodies of men can generally be interpreted more directly. In the words of Professor Béesly, "The thoughts and actions of individuals may baffle our scrutiny. But nations and societies, and even parties, act in obedience to simple motives and broad general principles. The footsteps of the solitary traveller may be easily lost. But he who would follow the track of army has only to use his eyes." Secondly, in the discussion whether history is science or art, there is a third possibility, that its scientific function is to collect or select material for Sociology. This last is perhaps what Lord Morley means by "inductive political science," but whether we are, or are not, near the definite creation of such a science, or whether it has been already created, does not depend on the truth of the analogy between the body politic and the body natural. If Sociology uses terms, such as embryos, germs, organisms, borrowed from Biology, it must be with careful limitation of their meaning. Yet it may be useful to point out that in the body politic as in animals there is an organic relation of the parts to the whole, even though it is not exactly the same relation in the two cases. Sociology must be based on Biology, as Biology on Chemistry, but it can never be a mere department of Biology.

Some of the most eloquent passages in the "Notes" deal with "the debt of all to each," the particular share of each nation in the glories of our common civilization:

How disastrous would have been the gap if European history had missed the cosmopolitan radiation of ideas from France; or the poetry, art, science of Italy; or the sciences, philosophy, music of Germany; or the grave heroic types, the humour, the literary force of Spain; the creation of grand worlds in thought, wisdom, knowledge—the poetic beauty, civil life, humane pity—immortally associated with the past of England in the western world's illuminated scroll.

Or take this sketch of the intellectual services of the great Frenchmen of the nineteenth century:

French writers conspicuously engaged the attention of mankind. They turned thought and interest and curiosity and search for intellectual pleasure into new channels. They led the great changes in mood, standard, and point of view during the three generations after Napoleon Bonaparte, and typified ideals of an active and aspiring age. De Maistre, Proudhon, Saint-Simon (. . . . the earliest name in the socialistic ferment a hundred years ago), and Comte unapproached by any of them in the power, originality, and intellectual resource with which he wove together

the strands of knowledge into the web of social duty—were all effective writers as well as fresh thinkers. There was Guizot, founder of new historic schools, and one of those who by force of personality apart from literary contribution exercise a potent influence on their time. Renan brought wide learning and infinite fascination of form to a theological dissolution that science and the widening of men's minds by the widening of the known world, made so inevitable. Victor Hugo, amid a thousand colossal extravagances, sounded to an enormous public all over the world a rolling thunderblast against the barbarities of recorded time, and was inspired by a glorious muse, the genius of Pity.

So, too, Lord Bryce :

As historians, we know that every people has had its characteristic merits along with its characteristic faults. None is specially blameless, each has rendered its special services to humanity at large. We have the best reason for knowing how great is the debt each one owes to the other, how essential not only to the material development of each, but also to its intellectual and spiritual advance, is the greatness and the welfare of the others and the common friendship of all.

Another subject of crucial importance to our view of history, is discussed by Lord Morley. He reminds us how late is the recognition of human progress, and he proceeds to ask whether civilised communities are necessarily progressive and whether progress necessarily increases the sum of human happiness. In thus posing the question, there are surely two fallacies. In the first place, even if the Western world as a whole has progressed, it does not follow that every community has kept up with the general movement, or that no community has fallen back ; for the progress of each community depends in part on the general movement in which it shares, in part on the circumstances of its special environment—historic and material. It has thus come about that now one, now another nation has been in the van, that the torch has passed from hand to hand, and the progress of the West has continued, even if particular communities have retrograded. Secondly, happiness is subjective ; it depends in part at least on adjustment of organism and environment, always difficult in times of rapid change. Progress in happiness must always be an elusive conception. We know, however, that there has been scientific and material advance. There has also been moral advance in this direction at least, that whereas our moral relations were once confined to narrow circles, these are continually growing wider, till they have, now in this direction, now in that, embraced the whole human race. Surely here is a threefold progress which may well console us for the temporary, or even for the recurring throes of mal-adjustment to a changing environment.

One view of history, generally ignored, is suggested, rather than expressed by Lord Bryce in a single sentence. Referring to the obliteration of old records and memories with the passing away of the more primitive civilisations, he remarks : " It was a past the like of which can never recur." But is not this true of the whole period covered by the historic record, or rather of the whole story of the development of Western civilisation, and more especially of the transition which commenced with the rise of abstract science among the Greeks and has continued down to our own day. That development has given the thread, sometimes the very narrow thread, of meaning amid innumerable irrelevancies. With the unification of the world and the extension of scientific method to all fields of enquiry, Man enters on a new phase.

S. H. SWINNY.

DR. WESTERMARCK'S MOROCCAN STUDIES.

MARRIAGE CEREMONIES IN MOROCCO. By Edward Westermarck. Macmillan, 1914. 12/- net.

CEREMONIES AND BELIEFS CONNECTED WITH AGRICULTURE, CERTAIN DATES ON THE SOLAR YEAR AND THE WEATHER IN MOROCCO. By Edward Westermarck. Helsingfors, 1913.

As a social act marriage possesses supreme significance, for, whatever its forms, it links the generations together, and is the primary junction of individuals from which further social developments continuously radiate. This social significance has been impressive in all ages among all peoples; no race has failed to recognise it and to express it in that social language which we call ceremony. Ceremony may be defined as a dramatic echo of a social happening, a symbolistic explosion of sympathetic emotion.

In this detailed and analytical collection of Moroccan folk-custom relating to marriage, Professor Westermarck does not aim at a philosophy of the subject. That will come, we hope, in the future. He presents us with a wonderful collection of social facts, and analyses them in a masterly fashion, but the ultimate inferences on marriage ceremonial and on ceremonial in general are deferred. The book is charming not to the sociologist only but to the general reader. There is an abundance of human feeling, humour, pathos and hope, to be found in these multitudinous customs. The magical idea preponderates; and it is expressed both positively and prophylactically. The interesting couple,—and who are more interesting than a bridegroom and a bride?—are deluged with forms and riddled with rites. Van Gennep has well styled a wedding a *perturbation sociale*. Prof. Westermarck equally well compares the ritual observed when the parties have not been previously married and that which is carried out when one or other has been in the holy state. A first wedding is a luminous case of a *rite de passage*. It may be doubted whether, as Sir James Frazer and the present writer have suggested, there is much mystical danger suspected by the early mind in the sexual act itself. It seems to me that interest and fear are rather concentrated on the "change of state," as Van Gennep holds. Prof. Westermarck refers again with confidence to his theory of the prohibition of incest, as a case of natural selection. It is possible that we have not reached the precise meaning of this prohibition. And until we see it working as it actually was meant to work, we cannot indulge in large inductions. Possibly Mr. J. J. Atkinson's ideas go nearer the mark than most. To get all he has done out of the customs of one small people, the Berbers, is a credit to the extensive sociological method of the author. He describes the book as a supplement to *The History of Human Marriage*. It is more than that; it opens a new volume of a new work.

THE connection between agriculture and the beginnings of physical science has been illustrated by Prof. Frazer and his precursor, W. Mannhardt. Mr. Warde Fowler has illuminated it. But there is still a vast amount of unexplained and unexplored ceremonial, where magic and mummary, agriculture and altitude, can with difficulty be resolved into their elements. The early calendars are a constant crux, their primary dates being overlaid by others in the course of ages, while the whole business is complicated by the retardation of the relative motion of earth and sun.

The ideas of *l-bas* (evil) and *baraka* (holiness), also of *l'ar* (conditional curse), which last is a most fluctuating medium between the two, or swing

of a mystical pendulum, are very strongly developed in Morocco, as indeed they are throughout the Muhammadan world. What is the connection between them and the primitive farmer's calendar? On the face of them there is a similarity between Moroccan and the ancient Italian agricultural ritual and religion, and between these and the Central European system, as described by Mannhardt and Frazer. As against these investigators Professor Westermarck argues for a theory of negative magic, "purificatory," to use his term, and in the matter of the so-called sun-charms, fire-wheels, and the like, he seems to prove his point. But the idea of purification itself, as applied to the soil and the crops, is an extraordinary one. We need an *a priori* analysis of it in order to visualise its reality and sense its meaning.

There is abundance of interesting and new material in Prof. Westermarck's monograph. He must indeed be a prince of observers to have seen and collected all he has, on this and other subjects, in a space of time not exceeding six short years.

The question arises from a general perusal of all these noteworthy details, as it has arisen before from others, whether the superstitious ideas and practices are *ex post facto*, a sort of ceremonial after-glow or not. I incline to think they are the former. This question the author does not touch upon. Here he is at one with Professor Frazer. But if all these infinitely various customs could be shown to be merely ceremonial reactions to the continuous human needs, their importance would be minimised, and they would emerge from the examination as mere curiosities of the human mind in its social aspect.

The fire and smoke ceremonies certainly look as if originally intended to counteract the *l-bas* of the weather. The idea that magic force is present in various forms of vegetation is new and interesting. The rites practised for the purpose of influencing the weather should be most instructive to a people like ourselves, whose national church still prays for rain or fair weather. The fact that games of hockey, or something resembling it, should be played, especially by women, and with kitchen-ladles instead of the usual hockey sticks, is a new and delightful problem. This is a weather-charm; the principle, already known, is that the winning side represents the desired weather. But the scheme is new. The author well argues that the idea of motion, as influencing change, is at the root of such customs.

A. E. C.

PROFESSOR DRIESCH ON INDIVIDUALITY AND VITALISM.

THE PROBLEM OF INDIVIDUALITY. By Hans Driesch, Ph.D., LL.D., Professor of Philosophy at the University of Heidelberg. Macmillan. 3/6.

THE HISTORY AND THEORY OF VITALISM. By Hans Driesch. Translated by C. K. Ogden, B.A. Macmillan. 5/- net.

THE interest of the philosophical public is at present centred upon the problem of Individuality, and these lectures by Professor Driesch will interest a wide circle of readers. The first two are a condensed revision of his Gifford Lectures on the Science and Philosophy of the Organism, and on these it is unnecessary to dwell, since they are devoted to the proof of vitalism by arguments already stated at length in the earlier work. We are, too, already familiar with the theory of "Entelechy" as the autonomous non-mechanical agent at work in vital processes. In discussing its

bearing upon the doctrine of the conservation of energy, Professor Driesch perhaps concedes more than is necessary to the universality of the principle.

It is in the third lecture that he breaks ground new to the British public. "The Logic of Vitalism" is a part of Professor Driesch's general theory of Becoming, as expounded in his *Ordnungslehre*, and it is not easily intelligible without a knowledge of the previous work. For vitalism individuality is *wholeness*; hence its logic is the logic of wholeness, logic itself being "essentially *the theory of order*." The standpoint is purely solipsistic. Objectivity is "everything that is consciously possessed, or rather—to use a very neutral expression—*had by myself*" (p. 41), and is thus not equivalent to Nature or Reality. Signs of order in this objectivity are discovered by the Ego's introspection. By this means I find that I am enduring and becoming. But I am not able to formulate what endures in all objectivity; all I can do is to form "a special concept of limited validity on the foundation of all immediate objectivity" (p. 45). This concept is the concept of Nature which is defined as "a something *which satisfies the postulates of a rational theory of becoming*, and which behaves at the same time *as if* it were independent and self-persistent in itself." We are then able to deduce the possible forms of becoming and to see that "unifying causality is the type of becoming encountered in the organic world" (p. 52). This is just such a whole as is required by vitalism, which, consequently, is justified "on the basis of logic and ontology."

But there is still another point of view from which to regard the problem of wholeness. Can we not pass from the dualism of organic and inorganic, Nature and order to a "true *monism of order*"? This question Professor Driesch answers in the last lecture which is, he tells us, to form part of a work on metaphysics not yet published. As already stated, the theory of order is founded purely upon solipsism, which Professor Driesch seems to regard as a non-metaphysical theory. If we go beyond this standpoint, he argues, we raise metaphysical questions that we are unable to answer, owing to the imperfection of human knowledge. He concludes, therefore, that it is not possible to assert that the monism of order is true, since it is impossible to deny the actual existence of contingency, hence the apparent violation of order. The dualistic hypothesis must be provisionally, at least, accepted. But while the ultimate problem of the philosophy of wholeness is "a matter of belief," Professor Driesch considers that the merit of vitalism is to have proved "the existence of factual wholeness in Nature, the existence of something that is certainly more than a mere sum" (p. 81). This is true, and it is to be regretted that Professor Driesch has added so much quasi-metaphysical speculation coupled with hasty, and often superficial, criticism of the great monistic systems.

Mr. Ogden's translation of Professor Driesch's *History and Theory of Vitalism* has been revised by the author, while the theoretical part has been completely rewritten for the English edition. Part I gives an historical sketch of vitalistic theories from Aristotle to Professor Driesch himself. This is a useful piece of work for reference, but it is marred by some quite unjustifiable misstatements of opposing theories, notably in the case of Darwin whose theory, having been described as one "which explained how by throwing stones one could build houses of a typical style," is said to be reducible to "the self-evident proposition that what was not capable of existence could not exist" (p. 138). This is a mere travesty which entirely neglects the point, viz., in what does the *capability* of existence consist?

It is in his answer to this question that Darwin's contribution to science is found.

Part II, the *Theory of Vitalism*, is designed as a supplement to the lectures which proceed in an inductive manner from facts to concepts, whereas now Professor Driesch reverses his method and descends from a logic of possibilities to the facts. Two points especially call for notice. First, the definition of entelechy as "the bearer of individualising causality," and second, the restatement of the principle that a natural system cannot increase in the degree of manifoldness from within. We find the most important case of such increased manifoldness when a group of atoms arranged as a mere sum is transformed into a totality of some kind. In this transformation, it is contended, there is more than mere mechanical reconstruction, that is to say, a non-mechanical factor must be postulated. Further, if we follow the *signs of wholeness* not only in biology, but also in history and especially in the development of moral consciousness in man, we are led to the hypothesis that "mankind is a supra personal unity in evolution" (p. 220), but, as was pointed out in the Lectures, we cannot, in the present state of knowledge, go beyond this to the assertion of an Absolute Monism. The point that appears to us to be established beyond reasonable doubt is that no purely mechanical theory is able to explain the purposiveness of life.

The translation is for the most part well done. Its value would have been increased by the addition of an index.

L. S. STEBBING.

A NOTABLE SOCIOLOGICAL ACHIEVEMENT.

LE PROGRÈS : ANNALES DE L'INSTITUT INTERNATIONAL DE SOCIOLOGIE. Publiées sous la direction de René Worms. Tome xiv. Paris, Giard et Brière, 1914. 10 francs.

It is now nearly two years since the Conference of which this volume tells the history took place; and in less than a year the body of sociologists whose deliberations it records will be holding their ninth Congress, of which the scene is to be Vienna and the subject "Authority and the Social Hierarchy." The triennial period which elapses between these international gatherings is none too ample for the revision of the work which was done at the last one and the preparation for that which has been sketched out for the next. Since the Rome Congress five well known men who took part in the discussions—Eugène Fournière, Albert Gobat, Ch. Gide, Jacques Novicow, and Lester Ward—have died. Their contributions to the debates were among the best. But all are so good and all represent such extensive labours and ripe knowledge in the field of sociology that one cannot range them in classes and call some of them superior and others inferior. Moreover, they are all written from a distinctively individual point of view which makes the comparison of one with the other difficult.

The report is divided into two parts. In the first the facts of progress are set forth under the headings of Anthropology, Economics, Politics, Psychology, Epistemology, Ethics and Æsthetics. In the second the theories of progress to which the facts lead up are enunciated. In spite of this orderly arrangement the student is bewildered by the multiplicity and originality of the conceptions of progress to which the various debaters gave expression. There are four great ideas, however, which manifest themselves in almost every paper—that in the time to come progress will

be not fortuitous but purposive, that education must be universalised, that the future government of the world is to be democratic, and that the hopes of the people are being centred in meliorism instead of supernaturalism. The other valuations of progress which the articles present are so numerous and varied that only a few of the most remarkable, chosen at hazard, can be mentioned in a short review.

Novicow pointed out that if some Montessori were to discover a method of teaching which enabled children to acquire certain kinds of knowledge three times as quickly as they did before, we should reckon that an advance in education had been achieved. All progress was of the same nature. It was a constant and accelerative movement towards omniscience, which would establish complete equilibrium between the mind that knows and the world that is known. No one believed, in the present day, that the sun moved round the earth. The thoughts of men had become perfectly adapted to the world as a planet that circled round the sun; and to the question, "Which of the heavenly bodies is the centre of the system to which the earth belongs?" all sane men would give the same answer, immediately and without hesitation. Similarly, if nobody, in the twentieth century, put any faith at all in collectivism, economics would be entirely individualistic, and every man would quite agree with every other man that collective action could not promote the welfare of mankind. Again, if prices were equalised throughout the world all questioning about them would cease, and everyone could turn his attention to other matters. If they were constantly bringing about balance and concord between different human interests and between these and the universe, all members of society would ultimately be at peace among themselves, and they would derive from this globe the greatest amount of wealth which it could possibly yield. The idea is fantastic, but no one will say that it is uninspiring.

M. Kochanowski claimed that progress was accomplished in two ways—by aristocratic and creative action on the part of individuals whose character and ability deviated from the norm; and by democratic and distributive action on the part of the multitude struggling for power. The heroes and the masses corrected each other's extravagances, and without the perpetual conflict of the two parties progress could not be effected.

M. Duprat improved the formula as to the greatest happiness of the greatest number by defining progress as a movement which tended to secure "the greatest number of satisfactions for every member of society which is compatible with the satisfactions required by every other member of society."

"Social progress consists in satisfying the legitimate wishes alike of utilitarians and altruists, of men who are lovers of order and men who are lovers of liberty. It ought to reconcile all the political and economic parties, and religious and philosophic sects of the most divergent views, without having recourse to Hegelian argumentation. It ought to show the futility of systems of philosophy the authors of which want to stop the sun in its course and maintain the present state of both knowledge and ignorance by making 'Nothing changes' their motto. It incessantly reshapes old materials, belonging to the remotest antiquity, by exhibiting them in forms which do not noticeably differ from immediately precedent forms but which, surveyed after the lapse of a few years or a few centuries, give one the impression of ceaseless alteration."

Not a few of the disputants argued that the notion of progress was purely subjective and that it never realised itself in all departments of

thought and action at once. M. Roberty maintained that it belonged to the domain of practice rather than of knowledge. In the sphere of industrial technique progress took place continuously, because there inventors and innovators worked scientifically according to the formula, "This thing is good and useful, therefore I desire it"; whereas in the sphere of social technique progress fluctuated because there men worked empirically according to the formula, "I desire this thing, therefore it is good." M. Michels said that whatever they were called—revolution, reaction, free-thought, liberty aristocracy, democracy, or what not—all social conditions and changes entailed losses for some people, and therefore might just as well be termed regress as progress. The prolongation of human life was accompanied by the increase of degeneracy, and the spread of enlightenment by a dearth of great men. Dante was represented, in the modern world, by d'Annunzio, Molière by Rostand, Goethe by Sudermann, Shakespeare by Shaw. Progresses there might be. But progress in a large and general sense there was none. "Like all grand words which are empty or are overcharged with meaning, the word 'progress,' if it is to be fitted for scientific use, must be subjected to the cold douche of relativism." M. Papillaut contended that the idea of progress was the outcome of a confusion between practical and speculative thought. Teachers commonly held egalitarian doctrines, and believed that progress consisted in improving the environment, not because ability is actually augmented by education, but because they would have to deem their work futile if they thought otherwise. In the same way the English individualists had accepted the theories of Darwin with alacrity because it justified their good fortune. They considered that heredity had marked them out for a high position in society, and that if a man failed in the battle of life he was unfit to succeed. M. Papillaut's conclusion was that a statistical method of inquiry was the only one which would enable sociologists to determine accurately what the individual owed to ancestry and nurture respectively.

Two of the most attractive papers in the book are "Progress in Consumption," by M. Charles Gide; and "Progress in Music," by M. Léon Philippe. They both set forth feasible doctrines as to the appreciation of works of art and the determination of what really promotes the common weal; therefore they should receive careful consideration from everyone who thinks that the people at large ought to be well educated for the governmental tasks they will have to perform in the future.

The volume as a whole is a great sociological achievement; and all who read it will be grateful to M. René Worms for the work he has done for it as editor, and for the admirable way in which he conducted the business of the Congress in the capacity of General Secretary.

M. E. R.

SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT AND WOMEN'S WORK.

MAKING BOTH ENDS MEET: THE INCOME AND OUTLAY OF NEW YORK WORKING GIRLS. By S. A. Clark and Edith Wyatt. Macmillan, 1911.

THIS book is slight in texture and somewhat ineffective in style, but it is nevertheless of interest in connection with some of the problems that are now being discussed in works of greater power and significance. The facts given here in relation to the overwork and under-payment of women workers, for instance, are a striking commentary on Mr. Hobson's theory

of the social cost of labour, recently developed in "Work and Wealth." Money wages in America (high as they may appear to us) are evidently insufficient to cover the insistent demands upon the workers' health and strength, and the revelations here made of the desperate strain and drive in some of the New York factories are the more remarkable in that the authors themselves appear to be anything but revolutionary in outlook. It is not easy to see precisely what their point of view is, but judging from p. xi of the preface, they have no great hopes of improving the condition of women's work either by legislation or by trade organisation. Scientific Management appears to have impressed them as a more promising remedy, and the concluding chapter is devoted to a consideration of the methods of Mr. Taylor and others as applied to women's work. Scientific Management has lately received so much attention in the *Sociological Review* that it is unnecessary here to recapitulate the experiments in brick-laying, pig-lifting, and so on which have by this time become well known. Miss Clark and Miss Wyatt describe some experiments which have been tried on corresponding lines in regard to women's work. In work on tentering machines in a certain cloth-finishing factory, under the new methods the girls had a twenty minutes rest after 80 minutes work, spare hands being introduced to take charge of the work. The speed of the machines was increased, the output increased by 60 per cent., and wages by 50 per cent. Other instances given have impressed the authors favourably. But Miss Clark and Miss Wyatt are careful to distinguish between the ideal of Scientific Management and its imperfect practice in certain cases where the principles are not understood. If Scientific Management means the conservation of human energy, the adaptation of industrial tasks to the human bone and muscle, nerve and brain that are exerted in the accomplishment thereof, it ought to be welcomed as a step onwards in civilisation. The authors evidently so regard it, but they candidly record instances where "misunderstanding" has caused Scientific Management to degenerate into mere drive and pace-making. It is notable that near the end of the book they record the view that the adjustments necessary for the workers' health are likely to be "more rapid and effective" if the women workers' difficulties are represented through trade organisation. Probably this is the root of the matter. Scientific Management can evidently effect an enormous increase in output, and may effect great improvements in working conditions, but to attain this last the working class needs representation and some voice in the control of industry. B. L. H.

WOMAN IN PRIMITIVE TIMES.

THE POSITION OF WOMEN IN PRIMITIVE SOCIETY. By C. Gasquoine Hartley (Mrs. Gallichan). Eveleigh Nash, 1914. 3/6 net.

To argue from the fact of maternal descent and certain indications of female predominance connected with it to a "matriarchate," which is regarded as one of the first great stages in civilisation, in which, that is, the male was forced to accept the social idea—this is the hazardous thesis of Mrs. Gallichan. Her book is an eloquent appeal for a recognition both of woman's importance in social evolution and of her claim to a higher position in an andro-centric world. According to the author, society would never have been set going had not the women combined against the sexual jealousy of man, the "old male" of Mr. J. J. Atkinson, the boss of the primal horde.

Secondly, it is argued that, man being a destroyer and woman a preserver and a worker, she was also a creator and inventor.

Certainly she looked after agriculture and the useful arts to some extent. But the facts of savage life and of human nature in general do not bear out these hypotheses. In the first place, the importance of women as property-owners and so forth in communities where maternal descent is the rule or where the husband is an appanage of the wife's kin, is not necessarily intrinsic. It is far more likely to be a mere aspect of the dominance of the kin. It is to the kin, not primarily to the woman, that the man is subject. As for Mr. Atkinson's patriarchal Solomon, everything is against his real existence. It is well known that the sexual appetite of the lower races is exceedingly small, that an enormous amount of stimulation is required to produce erethism. And, where we find sexual jealousy as well as where we find some diminution of it, the marriage system has evidently been settled after a process of give-and-take on the part of the men, even in communities where maternal descent is followed. All the Australian evidence, for instance, is to this effect. As for the creative and inventive powers of woman and her supposed contributions to early science and discovery, in spite of Mr. O. T. Mason and others, the case is not proved. It is rather the feminine type of man who is to be looked at in a working hypothesis of the origin of material culture.

That woman should ever have been a form of property is a disgrace to humanity; that, where she is not normal, but super- or sub-feminine, she may not follow the particular bent of her energies, is a pity. But the suffragist movement is not assisted by describing it as a crusade to recover a lost feminine empire. Woman's empire is the family; she has done much to consolidate society by her connexion with the family. Of course it is much more than "connexion"; the wife *is* the family; and it is this eternal fact which precludes the majority of women, the essential women, from development in other spheres.

A. E. C.

INTERMEDIATE TYPES.

INTERMEDIATE TYPES AMONG PRIMITIVE FOLK. By Edward Carpenter. Geo. Allen, 1914. 4/6 net.

In this stimulating and brilliant study Mr. Carpenter has gone far towards establishing the existence of a new factor in early social evolution. "Between the normal man and the normal woman there exist a great number of intermediate types—types, for instance, in which the body may be perfectly feminine; while the mind and feelings are decidedly masculine, or vice versa. . . . That they might possibly fulfil a positive and useful function of any kind in society is an idea which seems hardly if ever to have been seriously considered." Incidentally Mr. Carpenter shows the extraordinary prevalence of sexual inversion among early peoples, a fact well known to anthropology. In connexion with this there should be noted that tendency to convergence of the physical morphology of the two sexes which is common among primitive races. Thus, Mr. Cyrus Thomas has remarked of the Indians of North America "the prevailing feminine physiognomy of the males. . . . Two thirds, if not a greater proportion, show feminine faces." The first induction made by the author is that the very general connexion between homosexuality and divination, prophecy, sorcery—in a word, the functions of the medicine-man or primitive priest, who is more often than not a feminised or effeminate man—is based upon a real organic fact. The homosexual temperament is actually

gifted with unusual psychic powers. Again, while the normal man was the warrior and hunter, the feminine man sought new outlets for his unwarlike energies. He became a student of life and nature, an inventor and teacher of arts and crafts as well as a wizard and sorcerer. Thus, men of this temperament laid the foundations of not only the priestly régime but of science, literature and art. "We may almost think that if it had not been for the emergence of intermediate types . . . social life might never have advanced beyond these primitive phases" in which the men fought and hunted, and the women attended to domestic work and agriculture. Further, there are types that may be termed in men ultra-virile, as well as sub-virile, and in women ultra-feminine, as well as sub-feminine. To the first belong many of the most dominant personalities in history. A very interesting account of the Samurai of Japan balances that of the Dorian Greeks, in both of whom the "love of comrades" was combined with the ultra-virile temperament. A. E. C.

A GALTONIAN TEXT-BOOK.

HEREDITARY GENIUS: An Inquiry into its Laws and Consequences. By Francis Galton, F.R.S. New Edition. Macmillan. 5/- net.

SCARCELY had the statement appeared in the April number of the *Sociological Review* that a new edition of Sir Francis Galton's "classic of science and literature" was in preparation, than Messrs. Macmillan sent out this reprint. When Galton wrote his remarkably interesting preface to the edition of 1892 he noted that the book had for several years been unobtainable, except secondhand and at fancy prices. A similar fate befel the volume after the second edition, for some unexplained reason: it is probably true that *Hereditary Genius* is the only great book of its century which, though in constant demand, has been twice out of print for long periods. Its fortunes, we may assume, have now decisively changed. The present reissue, reasonably cheap, has a large public awaiting it, and as *Inquiries into Human Faculty* has been for some time obtainable at 1/- in Everyman's Library, the student of Galtonian heredity may count himself well provided for.

The results of Galton's original researches were first published in *Macmillan's Magazine* so long ago as 1865, the book itself appearing in 1869. When, twenty-three years later, it went to a second edition, the author announced that as revision would have involved a greater labour than he could undertake, he was compelled simply to reprint the book as it stood. Dr. Saleeby, in the last number of this *Review*, expressed the hope that the family histories might be brought down to 1914 by some competent genealogist: but this, we must conclude, the publishers have judged to be impracticable. *Hereditary Genius*, therefore, must be regarded as distinctively a book of its time, the first systematic contribution to a science which has already moved far beyond the scope of its founder. Assuming, however, that its continuation on an adequate scale was out of question, we may regret that the expansion of the tables, within the limits of time and classes set by the author himself, has not been undertaken. Those tables, as one glances down them to-day, are seen to be strikingly imperfect—so imperfect, indeed, and so casual, that you are left wondering how Galton could have allowed them to stand in 1892. Omissions of a glaring kind will occur to every reader. Thus, Walter

Scott does not appear in the list of poets or men of letters, nor does Tennyson. The Trollopes are there, but not the Thackerays. The Arnolds are only two, and so are the Lawrences. In the entertaining chapter on the Divines ("as regards health, the constitutions of most of the divines were remarkably bad"), there is no mention whatever of the Wesleys—an astonishing slip, all the more inexplicable when we remember the close relationship between Wesleys and Wellesleys and the variety of genius exhibited through generations. Galton, however, did not put forth his tables as complete: on the contrary, he was prepared to recognise that they were to a large extent haphazard, and it is fair to remember that he had not the *Dictionary of National Biography* to draw upon. One little service might have been rendered to his memory—the correction of small and obvious errors. But when all is said the reprint is to be most heartily and gratefully welcomed.

DEMOCRACY IN NEW ZEALAND. By André Siegfried. Translated by E. V. Burns. G. Bell & Sons. 6/- net.

SOCIAL WELFARE IN NEW ZEALAND. By Hugh H. Lusk. Wm. Heinemann, 1913. 6/- net.

NOR the least of the valuable services now being rendered by French students of social movements and public administration has been the writing of a number of critical monographs on different parts of the British Empire. Among these, M. Siegfried's book on New Zealand, commended to the English public by Mr. W. Downie Stewart, deserves an honourable place. It contains a short survey of geographical and political conditions (the latter dealing largely with the results of the Seddon Government in social legislation), social life, and the later tendencies of colonial Imperialism. The whole book is brightly written, but since the aspect of New Zealand that is comparatively well known on this side is the one associated with democratic experiments, the English reader will find M. Siegfried most illuminating in the section devoted to society and life. At Auckland (pop. 67,000) he is led to the reflection that "nowhere is the difference between the English and American civilisations more striking": the traveller on landing might believe himself "transported into some lost and old-fashioned province in old England," such is the peace of the little town, with its attractive suburbs. M. Siegfried is gently ironical at the expense of the New Zealander's snobbishness, as he calls it—being French, he does not perhaps quite realise the offensive significance of the word which our neighbours have borrowed. The King, he says, enjoys at the Antipodes "a prestige which we run no risk of exaggerating," and he suggests that in Europe we can form no idea of the "mysterious and enchanting charm" which colonials at the other end of the earth see in the Court of England. The colonial loves ceremony and display. In short, M. Siegfried concludes, New Zealand democracy has "allowed itself to be a little seduced by the ostentation of aristocratic England." There are brief informing chapters on the woman's movement, the temperance campaign, and other matters in which the dominion has shown initiative.

Mr. Lusk, not being a Frenchman, but a former member of the New Zealand Parliament, is less concerned to make an entertaining book out of his account of the social legislation and experiment undertaken during the past twenty years. He merely puts down in unpretending shape the salient facts in regard to the various departments—land, industrial disputes, the

regulation of labour, finance, woman's suffrage, and so forth, and endeavours to draw out the lesson of New Zealand for such immeasurably greater and more complex communities as Great Britain and the United States. The book, which is a useful summary, would have been better without the first forty pages, an irrelevant sketch of commercial civilisation from Carthage to the modern world.

S. K. R.

A HISTORY OF PENAL METHODS: CRIMINALS, WITCHES, LUNATICS. By George Ives. London: Stanley Paul & Co. 10/6 net.

THIS volume, which, as the author repeatedly states, is the fruit of years of study, is of no great value to the sociologist, the criminologist, the lawyer, or the legislator, for whom it was probably never intended, though it will undoubtedly appeal to a certain section of lay readers. It contains hardly one original idea or suggestion, rhetorical efforts and appeals to the emotions taking the place of argument throughout its pages. Again, in the presentation of the subject, witchcraft, lunacy, punishment of inanimate things, of animals, and of corpses, suicide, and homosexuality are unduly enlarged upon at the expense of the more important subjects,—not, however, without a definite end. For one of the main theses is this: "Punishment is a survival of savagery" (p. 266). The title really applies only to the first portion of the book, and even with this limitation it is somewhat misleading. For the writer restricts himself almost entirely to English penal methods. His reading of history is unfortunately much distorted by too powerful an imagination. To give but one example, when treating of outlawry, he introduces a sylvan idyl and wishes us to believe that the forest was in those days a sort of earthly paradise in which the strongest led "a life of danger and romance" (p. 97-99).

In the second part, in which the problem of crime in its modern aspect is approached, the author adopts the well-known division into "crimes of circumstances" and "crimes of impulse." But inasmuch as he regards human nature as entirely plastic ("Average people are but creatures of conditions, and will be moulded as surroundings shape them," p. 325), he arrives at the conclusion that "most criminals are made rather than born" (p. 327); and whilst recognising "four potent crime-causes," *viz.*, want, waste, drink, and competition (p. 332), the last-named factor is regarded as the most important one: "Prisons will stand while unrestricted competition is the foundation of our social order" (p. 323). Before the greater criminals of the world the writer is prepared to fall to the ground in Nietzsche-inspired worship; they "belong to Nature's aristocracy of strength" (p. 326). As regards the smaller fry, the principle which he recommends is "mend or end," whilst as against the parasites of society he assents to the deterrent view of punishment, or rather of treatment.

Mr. Ives pleads guilty, in his preface, to the omission of "a number of works of reference which would have been valuable." Whilst making every allowance for this conscious self-limitation, it cannot be said that his list of authors, however long, represents a very good selection. It seems almost incredible that a writer who places himself entirely at the standpoint of the modern criminological school should entirely ignore Lombroso and should know Garofalo only through a quotation in Whiteway (see p. 335, foot-note 3).

H. OPPENHEIMER.

THE FATE OF EMPIRES. By Arthur John Hubbard, M.D. Longmans, Green & Co., 1913. 6/6 net.

THE successive methods of maintaining life are ranged thus by Dr. Hubbard: (1) Reflex Action; (2) Reflex Action + Instinct; (3) Reflex Action + Instinct + Reason; (4) Reflex Action + Instinct + Reason + Religious Motive. But to the terms "Reason" and "Religious Motive" he gives a curiously narrow meaning. Properly "Reason" is not itself a motive, but a means of satisfying motives which may be either individual, social or racial—to adopt Dr. Hubbard's distinction between *society*, the sum of the individuals co-existing at any given time, and *race*, the sum of the generations as yet unborn; and obviously social and racial motives have a survival value. This Dr. Hubbard ignores. He considers that Reason only ministers to individual motives; "purely rational conduct will be dictated solely by the prepotent interest of the Individuals. . . ." It is thus that, under the influence of Reason, the two great stresses of life are mitigated by socialism, in which the interest of the individual becomes identical with that of society, and by restraint of population*—phenomena which, however superficially diverse, generally appear together. These two errors can only be avoided by adding the method of Religious Motive to that of Reason, and Religion, to be useful, must be cosmo-centric and not geo-centric. In face of thousands of instances to the contrary, Dr. Hubbard declares that the former alone can inspire self-sacrifice. In the second section of his work he attempts to support his thesis by a historic comparison between the instability of Roman civilisation with its geo-centric religion, and the stability of the Chinese, in which religion is cosmo-centric. Under this influence, the Chinese have enjoyed the blessings of unlimited competition and an unrestrained birth-rate, so that "the social stress that obtains in China is terrible." Terrible or beneficent, it can hardly be put down to "cosmo-centric" religion; for the religion of China, in spite of Dr. Hubbard's testimony, cannot be thus classified. The worship of ancestors, which he considers its core, is less concerned with the origin of life than with the succession of generations, especially in the immediate past and future; while Confucius, as is admitted, is characteristically human in his moral teaching. Both are essentially geo-centric. S. H. SWINNY.

ROUND THE WORLD FOR GOLD. By Herbert W. L. Way. (With illustrations and maps.) Sampson, Low, Marston & Co., 1912. 21/-.

THE quest for gold is not only of interest to the schoolboy and the adventurer; it is of fascination to the sociologist. We may hesitate to say with Professors Ward and Dealey in their excellent text-book on Sociology, that "the love of money" is "the root of all the good there is in material civilization," but we must recognize that this superpreservative social force is something more than the moralist would have us believe "the root of all evil." The volume before us is not written for or by the sociologist. It is, however, an interesting record of what man will undertake and endure in the search for gold; and it affords another illustration of a well-known sociological maxim that it is not so much the end we pursue which gives us the most satisfaction, but the means we adopt and the efforts we make in attempting to arrive at that end.

* The Death Duties, under which "the death of a father" is regarded "as an opportunity for plundering his children" are "a direct incitement to the commission of racial suicide."

Mr. Way set out in search of gold; but only in one place does he appear to have made a satisfactory find. In West Africa, in particular, he seems to have been most unfortunate, and his story of the Nduadoon concession from Mr. W. H. Boyle—exactly one-fortieth of the area claimed—is both amusing and instructive. In his travels through America, Australia, Africa, and China, however, the author found many other avenues of wealth than that of gold, and had time to make a few observations which are of interest to the sociologist. His method of recording a custom or a phenomenon is indeed crude, but it is refreshing when contrasted with an ultra-scientific attempt at interpolation. Thus, in recording the position of the barber in China, he makes no effort to discover the cause, or to suggest a solution, he merely states the fact:—

“The barber is the most necessary man in China, for every self-respecting Chinaman has his head shaved each day, and yet barbers are considered to belong to the lowest caste in China, and no one is ever punished for doing an injury to a barber.” (p. 234.)

Many customs have changed, however, since the author of this volume was in China; and this is one that has undergone modification. He tells us nothing new regarding the various peoples he met, and his denunciation of West Africa, and description of Freetown as a poverty-stricken place is altogether misleading. One of the most interesting pages of the book is that in which he describes the famous and most sacred mountain of the Buddhists, Mount Omi, a hill full of mystery rising to 10,000 feet with a sheer precipice of 6,000 feet. “From the summit is seen the glory of Buddha. Each pilgrim stands on a certain spot with the sun at his back and sees an enormous shadow of himself cast on the white clouds below, while the sunshine makes a halo round the shadow. This is believed by Chinese pilgrims to be a vision of Buddha.” Students will recall a similar phenomenon in the spectre of the Brocken. The author also describes another phenomenon seen on Mount Omi on bright frosty nights: “As you stand and look down the precipice lamps appear like large electric arc lights on the top of every peak and jutting rock.” This phenomenon is seen in the Alps where the lights are called “the fires of St. Peter and St. Nicholas.” Sailors have also noted it on the masts of ships when the atmosphere is charged with electricity, and Longfellow has adopted the sailors’ name for the phenomenon in his “Golden Legend”:—

“Last night I saw St. Elmo’s stars

With their glimmering lanterns all at play.”

H.O.N.

LA FORMATION SOCIALE DE L’ANGLAIS MODERNE. By M. Paul Descamps.

Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1914. 4 francs.

To this work M. de Rousiers writes an introductory preface in which, after drawing attention to the history of the English people and their remarkable power of recovery in social and political crises, he states that it is precisely this power which the author has set himself to discover—the secret of these reserves of energy. The author in his search deals with two aspects of the life of the English people, their work and their system of education. Self-control and one of its corollaries—attention to work—are the two factors he notes as supremely characteristic of the race.

The book itself—a volume of some 380 pages—is divided into three parts. Part I describes the workman at his workshop and in his home. Part II

deals with education in the schools. Part III deals with "La Hierarchie des Classes."

The study of the artisan class in Part I is practically confined to that of the skilled worker in the woollen industries in Yorkshire. In Parts II and III the author no longer confines himself to a study of a single class but gives a brief survey of the whole educational system including the nursery, elementary school, secondary school, grammar school, public school and university. These schools he describes in five groups as catering respectively for five social classes—the working class, the lower middle class, the middle class, the upper middle class, and the upper class. In Part III he passes on to describe the social life of these various classes, their points of view and social customs.

The author has only treated this comprehensive subject in outline. His book is the record of an intelligent visitor with a large notebook staying in various places, making appointments with typical persons, describing what he sees and jotting down the replies to his questions. Therein lies a difficulty, for the subject with which the book deals cannot possibly be adequately treated in this fashion. The book, however, is stimulating and vividly written. It covers, moreover, ground which has not been treated from this point of view by any English writer and this constitutes its peculiar value to the student.

F. G. D'ARNT.

THE KING'S GOVERNMENT. By R. H. Gretton. G. Bell & Sons, 1913.
2/- net.

MR. GRETTON'S little book is a study of the growth of the central administration. The centralising of government was a Norman principle, and accordingly the study begins with the Conquest. The evolution of the system as we know it to-day is divided into three periods—the rise of the secretaries (1377-1688); ministerial responsibility (1688-1800); and the development of the departments during the nineteenth century. In spite of his meagre space (only 138 pp.) Mr. Gretton succeeds in giving a clear and interesting account of the national government, but he does not bring out all the most important points in the great changes effected in the eighteenth century—for example, the emergence of the Cabinet (a word he applies, historically, at too early a date) from the Privy Council. He should, we think, have expanded the volume by adding a chapter explaining the existing Cabinet and departmental system, and another describing the machinery of a typical administrative office. Nevertheless, what he has done is good and useful.

SCHOOL AND LIFE: A Brief Record of the Life and Work of Maria Elizabeth Findlay. London: George Philip & Son.

VARIOUS hands have co-operated in this little memorial to Miss Findlay, who was well known to many members of the Sociological Society. Her brother, Professor J. J. Findlay, gives a short statement of her aims in education, while several other colleagues contribute chapters on her training and her work at the Froebel Institute and elsewhere. Perhaps, for teachers, the most interesting pages will be those which describe the experiment initiated by Miss Findlay at Mayland Mill, the settlement for small-holders in Essex founded by Mr. Joseph Fels eight years ago. Among the many attempts to apply the methods of the New Education in occupational training, rural and urban, Mayland Mill should be remembered. Three of Miss Findlay's own papers on educational subjects are included.

PERIODICAL LITERATURE.

GERMAN.

Was kosten die Minderwertigen dem Staat? asks Professor Kaup in the ARCHIV FÜR RASSEN- u. GESELLSCHAFTS-BIOLOGIE for June. He states that in Hamburg each pupil in the common schools for normal children costs the public authorities every year between £6 and £7; whereas each pupil in the schools for abnormal children costs between £12 and £13. There are at least 120,000 children in Germany who ought to be attending special schools. If they were actually doing so the State, therefore, would be spending something like a million and a half every year on them. As a matter of fact it is providing suitable education for only 30,000 of the army of juvenile weaklings. Dr. Kaup tells us that amongst the Prussians in 1905 there were as many as 191,130 defectives, who constituted 54.0 per 10,000 of the population of the province; that in the same year the Kaiser had 33,000 deaf-mute subjects, of whom 8,600 were children whose defects, in one case out of every two, were congenital; that expenditure on the maintenance of paupers, half of whom were suffering from hereditary maladies, increased by 50 per cent., in the German Empire, between 1901 and 1911: and so on through a woeful catalogue of prodigious length. At the end of his paper he urges that the inferior children should be trained in public institutions at the expense of the parents, who should be compelled to make the requisite payments by means of forced labour if necessary. The suggestion is feeble enough considering that quite half the parents are themselves unfit to bear responsibility. But one does not see what other measures he could have recommended. He states that at present public opinion in Germany would not sanction the sterilisation or the permanent segregation of incapables. Under the circumstances he can do no other than advise eugenicists to teach their doctrines to the people at large. To this expedient, accordingly, he persuades them to resort. The first article in this number, *Über die Minderwertigkeit der erstgeborenen Kinder*, is the work of Dr. Sören Hansen. He gives a table showing that of 994 patients who were treated at a Copenhagen lunatic asylum in twenty years 234 were firstborn children, 159 secondborn, 149 third, 114 fourth, 100 fifth, and 72 sixth. If their position in their families had had nothing to do with their mental weakness the numbers would have been 167, 161, 148, 130, 108, and 88. Another table displays two similar sets of figures which Dr. Weeks noted down after enquiring the position in their families of 391 epileptics—90, 81, 65, 39, 40 and 23; 62, 59, 55, 49, 42 and 34. The doctor sets forth other tables from which one gathers that the eldest child—and in some cases the three eldest—is more likely to be still-born or short-lived, or to be tuberculous, or myopic, or imperfect in various other ways, than the younger ones. The cause is, he thinks, innutrition, particularly of the brain.

More news about the Cologne law school is given in the POLITISCH-ANTHROPOLOGISCHE REVUE for May. There we are told that no fewer than twenty-seven students—judges, barristers and solicitors—attended the first courses of study; and that during the summer session special attention is to be given to juvenile crime and to industrial questions. In order that

the students may learn how to adapt the law to the economic needs of the people excursions have been arranged to some steel works, a colliery, a cement factory, an electric light station, a ship dock, and a glass manufactory.

In the April issue, under the heading *Krankheit und Auslese*, Dr. Ludwig Müller combats Dr. Chatterton-Hill's doctrine that in order to secure the health of the race large numbers of individuals must be sacrificed, and that as the death rate goes down the illness rate goes up. He argues that if the weeding out of the unfit were a sovereign remedy for degeneracy, the Manchester industrialism of the early part of the 19th century would have been the best experiment in eugenics which had ever been tried. In the manufacturing districts of England at that time deaths among men of twenty were as frequent as deaths among men of forty elsewhere; and among the wool-spinners, who worked from fourteen to sixteen hours a day, nine generations died while only three passed away in the rest of the country. On the other hand, a British maker of chemicals had reduced the cases of illness in his works by 5.02 per cent., in 1889, by decreasing the hours of labour from twelve to eight; and a Swiss embroidery firm, in which an eleven-hour day had been the rule, had brought down the absences for sickness by 25 per cent. in the same way. Giving people sufficient air, light, food and rest, does not constitute what Dr. Chatterton-Hill calls "an artificial manipulation of the environment." "Hygiene is merely an assimilation of the requirements of civilisation to the natural conditions of human life."

The May and June issues both contain a vigorous article by the Editor on *Die Beherrschung der Massenenergien* in which he contends that only by a strong monarchy can both the stability and the progress of a nation be promoted: and these two numbers and the April one each includes a paper by Dr. Hauser on *Der physische Typus der deutschen Dichter des 19 Jahrhunderts*.

Also received:—*Le Musée social, Annales* (March, April, May); *Le Musée social, Mémoires et Documents* (March, May); *Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie und Soziologie*, xxxviii, Jahrgang, Neue Folge xiii, 1 Heft.

FRENCH.

In the *BULLETIN DE L'INSTITUT DE SOCIOLOGIE SOLVAY* for April M. J. M. Marx writes on the *Modification profonde de la jurisprudence par les tendances nouvelles d'opinion*. He recalls three occasions, between 1903 and 1906, on which, at Bordeaux, Epernay, and Lille respectively, an employer failed to substantiate the claim put forward in a court of law, that he was free to refuse work to trade-unionists. The comments which the author makes on these cases are important in view of recent judicial decisions and legislative measures in England, and of the dispute as to the employment of trade-unionists which brought about the dissolution of the Australian Parliament last month. Turning to page 629 of this number of the *Bulletin*, the reader will find another indication of the changes that are taking place in the theory and practice of the law. There he will see a list of the lectures on psychology and psychiatry for lawyers which were given for the first time, in 1913, at the School of Communal and Social Administration at Cologne. Among the most interesting subjects of study are the Psychology of Officialism, the Psychology of Giving Evidence, and the Social Causes of Crime. This kind of teaching will surely give rise

to a revolution in legal proceedings, all the world over, which can only be compared to that which has been effected in England by the "Rules of the Supreme Court (Poor Persons), 1914." This number of the *Bulletin*, like all the rest, is a mine of well-classified facts. In addition it contains nine excellent articles. Sociologists will be particularly pleased with one by M. Ansiaux on the fixation of prices and the collective emotions of the stock exchange; another, by M. de Leener, on the factors which determine alterations in the methods of retailing goods: and a third, by M. Denucé, on the geographical conditions of progress in ancient civilisations.

Further evidence of the new movements that are taking place in the legal profession is furnished by M. E. Laskine in the *REVUE DE MÉTAPHYSIQUE ET DE MORALE* for March and May. His articles are entitled *Les transformations du droit au XIX^e siècle*, and they show that many authorities are turning the philosophy into a sociology of law. Thus M. Franz von Liszt's conception of law is criminological, M. Césaire Vivante's socialistic, Signor Benedetto Croce's economic and M. Kohler's ethnological. M. Laskine warns his readers not to let all these discordant notions betray them into a "sort of cinematographic enthusiasm." The new developments are moments of one juridical process. They are not creating so many different kinds of law. Nor do they prove that law is becoming either collectivistic or individualistic. On this point two of the best writers on the subject, M. Léon Duguit and M. Wilhelm Hedeman, are at issue. It cannot be denied, however, that judges and legislators have come to many decisions of late which favour the theory of the former—that everybody, in virtue of the gifts and the goods that he possesses, has definite social duties to perform, and that these can be transformed into rights only in so far as he fulfils them. Judicial views of responsibility and of property are certainly different now from what they were in the 19th century. It is no longer deemed permissible that a man should neglect to educate his children, or, in some countries, that he should leave his land undeveloped or build houses that project over the public footways. But these modifications of old beliefs and practices do not justify M. Duguit in saying that the ideal of social service has actually replaced that of sovereignty; and the only truth about these ideas which can at present be arrived at is, that they are in a state of transition. The papers form a temperate and careful study of ancient and modern valuations of justice that sociologists will appreciate highly. The same characteristics are to be found in a paper on *Politique extérieure et démocratie* which M. G. Guy-Grand contributes to the May number. He gives full weight to the difficulties that the representatives of democracies have in maintaining a dignified self-assertion in their dealings with foreign powers; but he shows that these difficulties are not insurmountable, and that educating commoners to meet them is no harder than training anyone who has the necessary ability for the civil service.

It is with some disappointment that the readers of *L'ACTION NATIONALE* will turn the pages of the current issue, for the magazine has been converted into a quarterly, and the *résumés* of the legislative proceedings of the chief countries of the world which used to be one of its most attractive features have been excluded from it. We may hope the Editor will see his way of restoring the summaries, for sociologists will miss them. Professor Adams promised to give the public something of the sort in the *Political Quarterly*, but has not yet done so, and no other journal supplies this very useful information. In other ways *L'Action nationale* is much the same as it used to be, except that the matter is less abundant and is

arranged in column style. Among the noticeable contributions to the January-May number is one called *L'Angleterre se transforme* in which M. Paul Louis discusses the significance of the Trades Disputes Act, the Old Age Pensions Act, the Parliament Act, the Insurance Act, and the Home Rule Bill. He points out that Marx and Engels regarded England as a test country for social legislation, and asserted that if British conservatism in business and industry were once broken down, the vestiges of the feudal system would vanish in every country in the world.

LA SCIENCE SOCIALE for April is a study of Russian society by M. Joseph Wilbois, who shows how climate and social system alike deprive both the leaders and the masses of initiative. The squire is like a wolf, the peasants like sheep. The former is an individualist who is incapable of making common cause with other members of his class; the latter are communists who have no individual responsibilities whatever: and there are no effective middle classes. Hence the agrarian revolution of 1905 turned the gentry into meek servants of the bureaucracy, and broke down the local government under which the moujiks had lived without putting an adequate authority in its place. M. Wilbois looks to the intellectuals to supply the guidance which the people need. He sees hope for the country only in the progress of the zemstvos, and the creation of individual property in land which is going on under the Stolypin law. The essay is valuable both as literature and science; and it contains a particularly good sketch of the lazy, good-natured, and bearish country gentleman living amidst a large family of unruly children and ill-disciplined servants, and spending his time in dreamy absolutist thought that issues in strange extremes of reactionism and revolutionism, idealism and realism.

Additional data for new theories as to the nature of legal duties and rights are afforded by the REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE SOCIOLOGIE for March, for it contains reviews of nine books no fewer than eight of which treat of that subject. A very favourable account is given of Professor Cosentini's *La réforme de la législation civile*, in which he discusses the relation of the sociology to the philosophy of law and continues the arguments of his *Socialisme juridique*. Two of the other books that are criticised deal with trade-union law, three with international law and two with the philosophy and sociology of law.

The chief contents of the *Revue* for March are:—N.-K. Mikhaïlovsky, *sociologue*, by M. Maxime Kovalevsky; *Le problème de la dénationalisation*, by M. A. D. Xénopol; and *Sociologie générale et sociologie spéciale*, by M. Raul Orgaz: for April they are *La religion de l'avenir*, by M. A. Bochart; and *Le système dramatique des problèmes de sociologie*, a fantastic and exciting paper on method by M. Otto Effertz: and for May *Le rôle de l'instinct dans la vie sociale*, a chapter from Professor Ellwood's "Principles of Social Psychology." In all these numbers reports are given of the debates on *Le libéralisme politique* which are taking place month by month at the Paris Sociological Society.

The special study in the BULLETIN DE LA STATISTIQUE GÉNÉRALE DE LA FRANCE for last quarter is notable because the writer, M. Dugé de Bernonville, makes a useful comparison of Le Play's monographic, intensive, or typological with Ernest Engel's representative, statistic or extensive method of investigation, and of the questionnaire method with that of housekeeping notebooks. From his inquiry as to family expenditure he draws two or three conclusions of pretty general application—that as income rises the money spent on food increases in absolute, but not in relative

value; that more meat is consumed and less bread and potatoes : and that rent remains the same while the outlay for clothing and for intellectual need grows larger. The greater the number of children the smaller is the consumption of food per head; and the higher the wages the more determinate is the tendency to indulge in alcoholic drinks. M. E. R.

ENGLISH AND AMERICAN.

THE ROUND TABLE for March contains an interesting article on "Education and the Working-Class," in which the efforts of the Workers' Educational Association are graphically described, and great stress is laid on the importance that education should be an interpretation as well as a description of life and that theory should be as often verified by experience as experience is tested by theory. The writer's definition of the true function of education is well worth attention and his insistence on the fact that education must grow from the bottom and not be imposed from the top is probably as true socially as it is individually. Education and economics are no doubt more closely connected with ethics and philosophy than we yet realize, and even the efficient "economic" man does not depend entirely for his efficiency on the technical school.

In THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY for May Mr. Gillin has a good article on "The Sociology of Recreation." The writer complains that neither Spencer's nor Gross's theories of play are of real psychological value, since the former fails to show why the surplus energy should express itself in play rather than work, while the latter is often contradicted by the fact that many kinds of play form mentally a bad preparation for after-life. Professor Patrick's theory of the survival of racial habits in play is an interesting aspect of the question, and the fact that many enjoy the mere watching of games is not perhaps as contradictory to the theory as Mr. Gillin supposes. It is probable that mentally, and even physically, the watchers of the game often go through the same process as the players, and if play is studied in terms of emotion this is probably even more true. In the last section of Mr. Gillin's article there are several interesting suggestions. Crowds, sounds and colours no doubt play a considerable part in stimulating play activities and the fact that play is an excuse for shaking off reserve is also probably an important fact in its survival. The theory that religion, art, and politics are all partly kept alive by the element of play which they contain seems to be supported by the fact that as their play elements disappear popular attention turns increasingly to games and sports.

The March Supplement of THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW contains an excellent paper and discussion on Syndicalism. In the paper Mr. John Graham Brooks deals with the tendency of Syndicalism to shut out the masses, with the perpetual see-saw of anarchy and socialism in the popular mind, and with the dangers both of too hasty and too tardy appreciations of progressive change. Yet in spite of many clear and well-balanced statements we cannot help feeling that Mr. Brooks is still hampered by some old-fashioned and false distinctions between "capital" and "labour." The power which the possession of savings gives is not felt alone by those whom we usually term capitalists, nor is the manipulation of these savings something too high or too low to be included in the term labour. The savings from labour may go to the wrong people, but

the implication that the interests of capital and labour are fundamentally opposed shows a rather shortsighted and narrow view. In the discussion these false distinctions are less obvious, and many well-expressed yet widely different views form a most interesting collection of practical and theoretical opinion. Most readers will gather from the discussion that Syndicalism is a fashion rather than a permanent tendency and that a number of deeper questions, which lie beneath, will soon come to light. The advantages and disadvantages of mass, as opposed to individual, rule are questions which cut right across the problems of Syndicalism and many class antagonisms are far deeper than the feelings for or against this rather cut and dried theory. The employer is often a scapegoat for the politician, and there is a general feeling throughout the discussion that the lower classes of the United States have a desire for law and order, a keenness for bargaining, and a love of opportunism rather than of revolution which will delay any general and wholehearted adoption of Syndicalism until some other scheme of social improvement captures the popular mind. In the United States the quantity of land available is becoming less and less and co-operation is becoming necessary, but a strong survival of individualistic feeling balances this tendency and no universal system of regulation is likely to be long tolerated. There is an irresponsible wealth on one side and an irresponsible hunger on the other, but between the two is a mass of public opinion which moves slowly and hesitates to adopt any exaggerated scheme of Socialism or of Individualism.

In *THE MONIST* for April Mr Bertrand Russell, dealing with "The Nature of Acquaintance," makes a careful and interesting investigation into the validity of Neutral Monism and its attempts to establish a reality, neither psychological nor physiological, of which dualistic statements are merely inadequate descriptions and the knower and the known nothing more than terms. Many monistic philosophers who are little more than modified Idealists or modified Materialists are ignored and the article deals chiefly with those monists who adhere more faithfully to their principles and who, like Professor James in his later years, limit the existence of consciousness to a function and deny its reality as an entity. The difficulties of Neutral Monism are great, but since Mr. Bradley wrote his "Appearance and Reality" there have been many who have thought that such an attempt at separation merely postulated two appearances or two realities and who were inclined to agree with Professor James that "experience has no such inner duplicity and the separation of it into consciousness and content comes not by way of subtraction but by way of addition." The construction of Monism is, however, not so easy as the destruction of dualistic theories and it is difficult to find in the "I think" of Kant nothing more than a description of a function of which the "I breathe" is only a different aspect. As Mr. Russell suggests, there exists even in the very word "experience" strong traces of its idealistic ancestry and of a postulation of an experiencing subject. Among orthodox philosophers Professor Stout is quoted as accepting the doctrine of Neutral Monism as regards sensation and it is true that space is no longer a criterion to distinguish the physical from the mental. But Professor James' theories of relativism have to face more serious difficulties; he leaves no place for judgment or belief and if there is no unreal there is no false, and therefore no such thing as an erroneous judgment. If belief is the same as sensation and presentation then all illusions of judgment are realities or else the same as illusions of sense.

What the Neutral Monist calls knowledge of objects is often only a knowledge of their descriptions and no real unity is established between subject and object. Neutral Monism seems to base the relation between what I am aware of and what I am not aware of on a late and elaborate method of reasoning, while many will regard the distinction of these two classes of phenomena as one of the most intuitively evident parts of knowledge impossible of proof because there is nothing more evident. Yet whatever the ultimate fate of the theory of Neutral Monism may be we must agree with Mr. Russell that it performs at present a useful service in emphasizing the fact that matter and space are not more obviously given and unambiguous than anything else and also that it undoubtedly exists as a useful check on the opposite theory that external objects exist only in the medium of "ideas." Neutral Monism often shares some of the defects of both Materialism and Idealism since it was born of both, but to both in their turn it will act as a corrective even if it fails in its present form as a constructive philosophy.

THE HINDUSTAN REVIEW for April contains the first of a series of essays on "Nietzsche as a Thinker" by Mr. Suryanarayanan, and although the first article consists largely of quotations it is a conspicuously clear and interesting prelude to Nietzsche's collected works. The doctrine that man must rise as high above his present self as he already transcends the beast has been the subject of much recent literature, but there have been few European writers who have been able to adopt such a fair and objective standard of criticism as Mr. Suryanarayanan, and there is great value in such external reflections on European philosophy. The view that the oppressive intrusion of self-consciousness is a phase of to-day rather than a permanent standard by which to measure progress is important and it appears to be gaining ground among many writers who in other respects do not adopt Nietzsche's theory of the three stages of the spirit of man.

C. B. A.

Also received :—*Town Planning Review* (April); *Scottish Geographical Magazine* (April, May, June); *Eugenics Review* (April); *International Journal of Ethics* (April); *Political Science Quarterly* (March); *Progress* (April); *Man* (April, May, June); *Positivist Review* (April, May, June).

ITALIAN.

RIVISTA INTERNAZIONALE DI SCIENZE SOCIALI E DISCIPLINE AUSILIARIE. (Published by the Italian Catholic Society of Scientific Studies.) March.—Signor Valenti contributes an article on the Sicilian sulphur trade. Sig. Grilli sends a paper on colonial experiments in Neo-Latin Africa. Sig. Pasteris continues his account of his mission to the Baltic.

April.—Signor Vuoli contributes an article on the housing question in modern legislation. Signor Piovano writes on liberty in education. Signor Valenti continues a paper on the Sicilian sulphur trade.

May.—Signor Vuoli continues his paper on the housing question. Signor Piovano resumes his study of liberty in education. Signor Grilli continues his monograph on colonial experiments in Neo-Latin Africa.

RIVISTA ITALIANA DI SOCIOLOGIA. January-February. This is a number of unusual and varied interest. Sig. Puini leads off with a short but powerfully written paper on the social value of Buddhism, and concludes that Western nations have inadequately appreciated the power of

Buddhism as a stimulus to socially useful action. Professor Xenopol contributes a paper on the relation of great men to social development. Sig. Salvadori has a long paper on grief, or sadness (*il dolore*) in Greek life; he thinks the gaiety and serenity of the Greek character and temperament have been unduly emphasised by Renan and other writers, and that there is in fact a profound pessimism in the Greek view of life; the article is finely felt and expressed and well worth study. Signor Maroi contributes a sympathetic article on feminism. He considers that the industrial revolution has radically altered the relation of woman to society, that new paths and opportunities must be opened, and that the right of the married woman to her own earnings must be recognised and established by law.

March-April.—Professor Formichi contributes an enthusiastic article on thought and action in ancient India. Signor Luzzatto sends an article on recent tendencies of commercial policy. Professor Gini contributes the results of an enquiry among Italian professors which tends to shew that a large proportion of these highly selected individuals are first born. So far as it goes, this investigation does not justify the theory of certain eugenists that the senior members of families are less capable than the junior ones. Professor Solari sends an article on the philosophy of law as an independent science. Professor Resta has a paper on history and moral education.

SOCIAL TRAINING COURSE AT OXFORD. The report on the first year's working of the scheme for training in social work organised by the Social and Political Studies Association of Oxford University has just been published. The object of the scheme is to provide for men and women who have taken a systematic course of social and economic study at the University with a supplementary practical training in the personal observation of social and economic conditions. The special advantage claimed for Oxford, as compared with the great cities where similar courses for social study and training are organised, is that it is a centre both of city and county local government, and offers facilities for the study of rural problems and the special problems of small towns, old and undeveloped centres of manufacturing industries. The course of study includes three years' investigation, under supervision, in Oxford; and a special inquiry and report made during vacation, away from Oxford. A small number of students, likely however to increase considerably in future years, has been attracted to this course, and two reports in the results of special inquiries have been submitted, one on Housing Conditions in the Waltham Cross Urban District, and one on the operation of the Trade Boards Act as it affects home workers in the tailoring trade.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY.

ON May 5, at an evening meeting of the Society, Mr. Edward A. Fileffe, of Boston, U.S.A., read a paper on "Coming Social and Business Changes." Sir Albert Rollit was in the chair.

ON May 19th, at an evening meeting, Mr. G. Spiller read the paper on "Darwinism and Sociology," which appears in this number. Sir Edward Brabrook was in the chair.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

- Shand, A. F. "The Foundations of Character. Being a Study of the Tendencies of the Emotions and Sentiments." Macmillan. 12/- net.
- Wallas, Graham. "The Great Society: A Psychological Analysis." Macmillan. 7/6 net.
- Freud, S. (trans. from the German by M. D. Eder), with a Preface by Dr. W. Leslie Mackenzie. "On Dreams." Heinemann. 3/6 net.
- Meumann, E. "The Psychology of Learning" (translated from the third edition of "The Economy and Technique of Learning," in German by J. Wallace Baird). New York and London: Appleton. 7/6 net.
- Münsterberg, Hugo. "Psychology and Social Sanity." Fisher Unwin. 5/- net.
- Prince, Moreton. "The Unconscious: the Fundamentals of Human Personality, Normal and Abnormal." New York: The Macmillan Co. 8/6 net.
- Galton, Sir Francis. "Hereditary Genius. An Inquiry into its Laws and Consequences." New edition. Macmillan. 5/- net.
- Fuller, Sir Bampfylde. "Life and Human Nature." Murray. 9/- net.
- Driesch, Hans. "The Problem of Individuality." Macmillan. 3/6.
- Driesch, Hans. "The History and Theory of Vitalism" (trans. by C. K. Ogden). Macmillan. 5/- net.
- Sutherland, John. "The Bonds of Society." Heath, Cranton. 10/6 net.
- Veblen, Thorstein. "The Instinct of Workmanship." New York: Macmillan. 6/6 net.
- Brailsford, H. N. "The War of Steel and Gold." Bell. 5/- net.
- Perris, G. H. "The War Traders." National Peace Council. 1/- net.
- Hobson, J. A. "Work and Wealth: A Human Valuation." Macmillan. 8/6 net.
- Clark, S. A., and Wyatt, Edith. "Making Both Ends Meet." New York: Macmillan Co. 6/6 net.
- Stebbing, L. Susan. "Pragmatism and French Voluntarism." Girtor College Studies, No. 6. Cambridge: University Press. 2/6 net.
- Salcey, C. W. "The Progress of Eugenics." Cassells. 5/- net.

- Westermarck, Edward. "Marriage Ceremonies in Morocco." Macmillan. 12/- net.
- Westermarck, Edward. "Ceremonies and Beliefs connected with Agriculture, Certain Dates of the Solar Year, and the Weather in Morocco." Helsingfors : Akademiska Bokhandel, 1913.
- Carpenter, Edward. "Intermediate Types among Primitive Folk." Geo. Allen. 4/6 net.
- Poincaré, Henri. "Service and Method" (trans. from the French by Francis Maitland, with a preface by B. Russell). Nelson. 6/- net.
- Gide, Charles. "Political Economy" (trans. from the French by C. H. M. Archibald). Harrap. 10/6 net.
- Day, Henry C. (Preface by the Cardinal Archbishop of Westminster.) "Catholic Democracy, Individualism and Socialism." Heath, Cranton. 6/- net.
- "The Practice of Christianity." By the author of "Pro Christo et Ecclesia." Macmillan. 4/6 net.
- Fowler, W. Warde. "Roman Ideas of Deity in the Last Century before the Christian Era." Macmillan. 5/- net.
- "School and Life: A Brief Record of the Life and Work of Marie Elizabeth Findlay." Various Writers. Philip & Son for the Froebel Institute.
- Badley, J. H. "Co-education in Practice." Cambridge : Heffer. 1/- net.
- Pelham, Rev. H. S. "The Training of a Working Boy." Macmillan. 3/6 net.
- Morgan, B. S. "The Backward Child: A Study of the Psychology and Treatment of Backwardness." New York and London : Putnams. \$1.25 net.
- Egerton, F. Clement C. "The Future of Education." Bell. 3/6 net.
- Clodd, Edward. "The Childhood of the World." New edition, enlarged. New York : Macmillan. 4/6 net.
- Hartley, C. Gasquoine. "The Position of Women in Primitive Society." Nash. 3/6 net.
- Geddes, P., and Thomson, J. A. Home University Library. "Sex." Williams & Norgate. 1/- net.
- Austin, Mary. "Love and the Soul Maker." New York : Appleton. \$1.50.
- Spiller, G. "The Meaning of Marriage." Watts. 1/- net.
- Vickers, Kenneth H. "A Short History of London." Macdonald and Evans. 2/6.
- Woodroffe, Joseph F. "The Upper Reaches of the Amazon." Illustrated. Methuen. 10/6 net.

- Picht, Werner. "Toynbee Hall and the English Settlement Movement" (trans. from the German by Lilian A. Cowell). Bell. 3/6 net.
- Orage, A. R. "National Guilds. An Enquiry into the Wage-System and the Way Out." Bell. 5/- net.
- Tawney, R. H. Studies in the Minimum Wage. No. 1. "Minimum Rates in the Chain Making Industry." Rattan Tata Foundation. Bell. 1/6 net.
- Kennedy, J. C., and Others, for the University of Chicago Settlement. "A Study of Chicago Stockyards Community. III. Wages and Family Budgets in the Chicago Stockyards District." Chicago: University Press; Cambridge: University Press.
- Mavor, James. "An Economic History of Russia." 2 vols. Dent. 31/6 net.
- Ashley, W. J. "The Economic Organisation of England." Longmans. 2/6 net.
- Harvard Economic Studies. Vol. x. "Corporate Promotions and Re-organisations." A. S. Devening. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. \$2.50.
- Johns Hopkins University Studies. Series xxxii. No. 2. "Slavery in Missouri: 1804-1865." H. A. Troxler. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press.
- Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. No. 142. "State Regulation of Public Utilities." Baltimore, May, 1914.
- Salt, H. S. "The Life of James Thomson ('B.V.')." Revised edition. Watts. 2/6 net.
- Bridges, J. H. (Edited by H. Gordon Jones.) "The Life Work of Roger Bacon. An Introduction to the *Opus Majus*." New edition. Williams & Norgate. 3/- net.
- Durrant, W. (Foreword by Sir R. F. Fulton.) "The Lawyer: our Old-Man-of-the-Sea." Kegan Paul, Trench, 1913. 7/6 net.
- Canadian Department of Mines. Guide Books. Ottawa: Government Printing Bureau, 1913.
- Canadian Department of Mines. "The Archæological Collection from the Southern Interior of British Columbia." Harlan I. Smith. "Memoir 43. St. Hilaire and Rougemont Mountains." J. J. O'Neill. Ottawa: Geological Survey.
- Bibliothèque Sociologique Internationale. "La Russie Sociale." Maxime Kovalevsky. Paris: Giard et Brière. 2 fr. 50.
- Coudert, P. "La Bourgeoisie et la Question Sociale." Paris: Giard et Brière. 3 fr. 50.
- Roux, Paul. "Précis de Science Sociale." Paris: Giard et Brière. 3 fr. 50.
- Viолlette, M. "Commentaire sur la Loi . . . la Garantie . . . des Employés et des Ouvriers." Paris: Giard et Brière. 0 fr. 50.

"Statistique Internationale du Mouvement de la Population. . . . Vol. 2. 1901-10." Paris: Ministère du Travail, etc., de la République française, 1913.

Instituts Solvay. "Recherches sur les Sociétés d'Enfants." fas. 12. J. Varendonck. Brussels: Misch et Thron. 6 fr.

Sakellarios, P. D. "Les Cruautés Bulgares en Macédoine orientale et en Thrace, 1912-1913." Athens.

Müller-Lyer, F. "Soziologie der Leiden." Munich: A. Lagen. M. 3.

PAMPHLETS.

Grant, Dr. Lachlan. "Motherhood." Glasgow: J. Smith & Son. 2d.

Marsden, E. L. "Some Religious Terms Simply Defined." Watts. 3d.



THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

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THE MOBILISATION OF NATIONAL CREDIT.

THE natural and almost inevitable tendency in discussing the internal social problems raised, or intensified, by the war will be to emphasize the economic and statistical, financial and philanthropic aspects. But the essential aim of a sociological inquiry should be to press forward and emphasize the social aspects of the whole set of internal war problems. As well as labour, unemployment, and short time, we must consider the reduction of the income of professional, scientific, literary, artistic and other classes, the effect on trades and industries that serve these classes, and the reaction of diminished cultural activity on all classes, a reaction affecting a whole generation and more. From this point of view, the problem is one of maintaining the civilization of the community while at war; and further, there is the problem of utilizing the awakensness evoked by war to direct attention to problems of civilization relatively dormant in peace times. How, for instance, to use the artistic and literary classes largely unoccupied during war, not only for maintaining but even for raising the standard of education and popular taste.

The suggestion of course is not to abandon the conventional standpoint, but, starting from this, to see how as sociologists we are inevitably led on to further issues. Let us then make our approach by two stages, (1) economic and statistical, and (2) social proper.

I. *Economical and Statistical Problems.*

(a) How maintain as near as possible at its normal that flow of goods and services which constitutes the aggregate income of the nation?

(b) How estimate the amount and distribution of unemployment and distress, actual and prospective?

(c) How relieve existing unemployment and distress? How prevent their increase?

(d) How effect such relief and prevention by constructive or educational work rather than by eleemosynary aid or merely by occupational makeshifts?

As regards the problems (c) and (d) above, these have been treated with great fulness and clearness by Mr. Sidney Webb in

his statesmen-like paper, "The Workers and the War" (Fabian Society, 1d.), which is doubtless already in the hands of many members of the Sociological Society.

As regards (b), that investigation is in the hands of a Statistical Committee appointed by the Government, under the able and devoted chairmanship of Mr. Seeborn Rowntree.

We fall back, therefore, on the first of the problems:—How to maintain the flow of goods and services that make the national income. The core of this question has been recognized by business men and by the Government as essentially a matter of credit. The home trade depends for its continuance upon the payment of goods in advance of manufacture, and the foreign trade on payment in advance of delivery. In the former case the intermediate operation of converting bookkeeping debits and credits into money is effected by the banks and discount houses, in the latter by the accepting houses. All three institutions are alike in that their business consists in the simple operation of buying debts and credits of others and selling their own credit, which credit is by custom convertible into cash. When war broke out people became afraid that the custom of converting the credit of banks, discount houses and accepting houses would not hold and a certain paralysis of trade was threatening. Government aid was invoked and various measures were taken. The chief and essential measure was a national guarantee of certain debts and credits on a wholesale scale. This was a new and unprecedented proceeding, and important questions arose. Whose debts and credits were to be guaranteed? The selection rests in the last resort on the governors of the Bank of England. This means that the Bank has been endowed with a power of selection, determining the economic survival of many firms and individuals in the present time of storm and stress. The wise exercise of this power of economic selection and determination of survival by the governors of the Bank of England will not be questioned. On the contrary, the social observer notes it as an instance of the sociological law that economic power tends to replace political power, and he asks—would it not be well consciously to extend it still further? Do not the needs of the hour demand that the national credit be used to maintain the productive activities beyond the inner circle of great bankers, merchants and manufacturers? And if so in whose hands should be placed the authority to wield the power of economic selection? Where can be found the experience, the wise counsel and judicious administration which in the delegation of national credit could serve the outer economic circles as the governors of the Bank of England serve the inner? Or, putting the question in another way, what administrative machinery exists or could readily be created for extending these new national functions of the Bank of England to the confines

of the economic circle? How can we secure that no producer, however humble, be deprived of his morsel of national credit, if he needs it and can prove to his peers that its use would raise his economic potential?

Though this is hardly the time to invoke the example of Germany, so often appealed to by social reformers, yet there are signs that one of the staying factors of Germany in the present crisis is the organisation of credit for small people. Thus, for example, a writer in the *Westminster Gazette* of September 21st, in an article on the internal condition of Germany, said: "Everywhere throughout Germany credit banks are projected or being established with the idea of helping the small man. The capital is guaranteed by the commune, or a co-operative society, supported by the larger firms. The amount of credit which these banks are prepared to advance is amazing. At Frankfort, for example, it is proposed that credit to the amount of ten million marks shall be advanced on a cash deposit of 1-20th of that sum." The writer then went on to explain that "the experiment is only possible because the German mind, as revealed in the German press, up till ten days ago was full of confidence owing to the advance of the army in France." A deeper explanation may be found in the fact—apparently unknown to the *Westminster Gazette's* contributor—that in Germany the social use of organized credit has long been understood, and its application to the linking up of small people to the great banking system has long been practised.

The beginnings of a similar social use of credit exist in Great Britain and Ireland. One should say Ireland and Great Britain, since the pioneer in this movement has been the Irish Agricultural Organisation Society, founded by our foremost rural statesman, Sir Horace Plunkett. There followed the (English) Agricultural Organisation Society, whose general secretary, Mr. Nugent Harris, is one of the ablest disciples of Sir Horace Plunkett, and then the Scottish Agricultural Organisation Society. The Rural Housing Organisation has applied co-operative principles in another field, and here again control of capital is most desirable; and most recently has been founded, on lines similar to the Agricultural Organisation Society, the Fisheries Organisation Society. The Co-operative Banks Association, the pioneer of co-operative credit in England, was long ago merged in the Agricultural Organisation Society, but its offshoot, the Urban Banks Association, continues, though fitfully, the effort to apply the principles of co-operative credit in the towns and cities. These organisations, along with other bodies, such as the Urban Co-partnership Tenants Societies, constitute a group in which may be found the elements of that administrative machinery needed to make a similar application of the national credit to the outer economic circles which the Bank of England

and its governors is now, under pressure of the war, making to the inner circles. Initiatives towards this already exist. Through their operation, the national credit has already been used to divert large capital sums to the financing of *petite culture*, or to the building of artisan dwellings in towns and rural labourers' cottages. From a social banking point of view, the problem is to co-ordinate these too sporadic initiatives towards the financing of small people, and deliberately incorporate them into that great system of joint-stock and private banks which the present crisis has revealed as resting in the last resort on national credit.

Now the banking point of view comes very close to the sociologist's outlook, for, of all economic operations, banking is the most generalized. Thus the sociological importance of the banker was recognized by the founder of Sociology, though since overlooked by most sociologists. The concentration of selective control, which we are to-day witnessing in the Governor's Court of the Bank of England, is suggestive of the "triumvirate of bankers," which Comte foresaw at the apex of the temporal power in the modern state.

*The new Council of State sitting in Threadneedle Street represents the private and joint-stock banking system. Can we not supplement it by a similar council representing the co-operative credit system; or more simply and more directly, can we not introduce into its counsels a leaven of co-operative credit? If so then the activities of the new Council of State would be notably advanced. We should be on the way towards achieving the systematic extension of national credit to the small people outside the ordinary banking circles, and thus aid not only in maintaining their economic potential in wartime, but even raising it to higher levels. And simultaneously would a deliberate step be taken towards the long overdue "socialising of finance."

II. *Social Problems.*

The whole set of organisation societies we are considering associate themselves with business enterprise, not in order to make other than a limited profit, but primarily to improve the quality of business, and this alike in its economic and social aspects. They organise to retain the stimulus of competition, while replacing its waste and friction by the economies of a humanising co-operation. They organise to ensure that business enterprise shall result in a real betterment of environment. Expressing the genius of the Irish Agricultural Organisation Society, there runs as a refrain through the writings of Sir Horace Plunkett the saying, "Better business, better farming, better living." The practical results of this combination of business and statesmanship are revealed to the traveller in Ireland by the sight of renovated villages and their

prospering inhabitants. In England the public is familiar with the reconstruction of environment resulting from the activities of societies, trusts or associations which, though calling themselves by such appellations as co-partnerships, garden city, or garden suburb, are essentially housing and town-planning organisation societies.

To ensure the continuance of all such efforts, at once commercial and social, during the crisis of war is manifestly a matter of no small national concern. There is reason to fear that not a few may be in jeopardy, notably, for instance, many of the *petite culture* societies, created with such painstaking industry during the past decade. The collapse of any considerable number of these would not only be a disaster to the rural revival movement but would also react on the national food supply. All that is needed to ensure the survival of these and other similar societies, so hopeful for the future, is an application of national credit wholly insignificant in amount in comparison with that extended to the mercantile community, and pound for pound, certainly not more attended by risk. But on other grounds also the plea is advanced, for the initiative would constitute a banking reform of first-rate social significance.

The organisation societies are concerned with the transformation of environment. Add to their work a spiritual and æsthetic leaven, and there follows not only that ennobling and dignifying of life which inspires genuinely creative work, but also a positive increase of economic efficiency. A friendly critic of the present thesis denies all value in war time to the man of artistic capacity who can neither fight nor make crude material. The immemorial tradition of regimental music sufficiently counters that argument; and stories such as that of the Russian tenor—veritable reincarnation of Tyrtæus—maintaining and heightening the spirit of troops in the trenches, show how the same principle might advantageously be extended even on the field of battle. But the question is as to its organised application to the secondary purposes of war. The social evils inevitably emerging in the new military camps are already clamant for artistic leadership in providing the finer in place of the coarser pleasures. The higher military efficiency that would ensue is surely matched by the higher economic efficiency that would result from a due introduction of artistic leadership in internal problems, industrial and social, of a people at war. Hence the plea of mobilising credit for the maintenance at full and even enhanced activity, not only of the organisation societies but also those of a recreational and æsthetic order. And above all, perhaps, is there need in the supreme national crisis of war alike to ensure the survival of those marginal organisations which devote themselves to the high tasks of co-ordination, and also to call upon

them for guidance and thus utilise for the nation their accumulated experience. Were the credit resources of the nation adequately utilised under the direction of bankers with the gift of far-seeing statesmanship, it would be recognised that there are not a few societies, endowed with some vision of unity, which are capable of giving invaluable aid in the distribution of credit.

Among the varying types of such societies there exist a few, which, by reason of their scientific grasp of national wealth as something concrete and definite which can be planned ahead in orderly development of the present for the future, have particular relevance to the subject of credit. For in credit there are three main factors. The first is the honour and the instinct of workmanship, of the labouring and professional classes, which assures the future supply of goods and service. The second is the skill of accountants in devising and applying abstract notations for the accurate record of debts and credits, and their periodical balancings. The third is the practical wisdom of banker-statesmen in assessing the present value of unliquidated debits and redistributing that value as credits. Now the planning of home, village, suburb, town, city—each as a unit in itself but also as collectively integrated into the larger units, regional, national and international—is the pre-occupation of that rising profession whose representative organisation is the Town-Planning Institute. The legitimate specialism of these new students and practitioners of co-ordination is the whole material environment of society and its orderly transformation. But may there not be also a legitimate specialism in the foresight and purposive planning of human life, in its individual phases, domestic, parochial, suburban, civic, regional, national and international, each and all in due correlation with the corresponding transformations of the material environment? At any rate such is the problem towards which studies have for long been accumulating, with some modest initiative of practical endeavour, among the students of Civics as practical sociology in Edinburgh and elsewhere, of which the central concept of realisable ideals as regional Utopias is becoming widely known.¹ The suggestion is that it belongs to the accountant to think out and apply to such specialised activities the appropriate notation for record of their debits and credits and the balancing of their long-distance periodicities—that it belongs to the banker-statesman practically to recognise and estimate the corresponding present values with due allocation of that credit which means control or direction of capital. And here, in such practical recognitions, is, it is contended, a deep selective factor in the struggle of nations for survival in war and peace.

1. See Branford's *Interpretations and Forecasts*. (Duckworth, 1914.)

The business of the banker is to allocate credit (which in the last resort we know to be national credit) to approved types of society (such as joint stock companies) or individuals. The banker is thus one of the most potent agents of social selection, and it becomes important to inquire into his criteria of approval. To what extent is the making of the fortune of the more complex and lasting societies we call village, town, city, nation, on all fours with the making of the fortune of individuals and commercial societies (such as joint stock companies) approved by bankers? There is a gathering feeling that too many individuals and joint stock companies make their fortune to the deterioration of nations, the detriment of cities and the decay of villages. The banker's criteria of social selection manifestly need revision from time to time, and that by a more continuous and searching criticism than the customary process of fortuitous amendment. To discuss this sociological question alike in its general bearings and in reference to the needs of certain betterment societies and organisations in the present crisis would be a natural topic of the proposed conferences.

In considering the relation of banking to betterment let us not forget the third term of Sir Horace Plunkett's triad. Better living implies a bettered environment, but it implies more. And so in supplement to societies for the organisation of betterment, there is a growing host of secular societies for the direct uplift of life. The instruments of the former are the sciences; of the latter the arts. Now, the economic value of (say) good mural decoration is obvious enough. Less so that of drama and pageant, song and dance, because the productive returns of these, like those of afforestation, have to be looked for not in annual balance-sheets, but in the improved social values of the coming generation.

It should surely be recognised as a definite part of the policy of such co-operative associations as we have mentioned or their affiliated societies, that they put aside part of the profits for the promotion of this fullness of life among their members. This is to some extent a tradition of the co-operative movement, but it required development and leadership. To provide that leadership was one of the purposes with which Octavia Hill founded the Kyrle Society. Its offspring are seen in many local betterment and embellishment associations. It would be a fitting movement to the memory of Octavia Hill if all these and other cognate societies could be given organised support and recognition as part of a general policy of social uplift designed to provide work at the present time for unemployed painters and musicians, actors and writers who, too proud to ask or even accept charity, would joyfully give of their best creative work for a subsistence wage. All these have to be maintained in some way or another during war

time. It is surely uneconomic to the last degree that these, the natural leaders in any organised effort for the general uplift of life, should be numbered amongst the unemployed. Such wastage could be converted into a great national asset if the organised associations concerned were encouraged to address themselves to the problem. And as a suggestion of financial method we may take the analogy of certain loan funds for starting needy but clever young professional men on their career, by making advances repayable in subsequent prosperity. This is a principle capable of extension not only to individuals but to many kinds of societies organised for betterment or uplift through long-distance returns. Such principles and their practical application are aspects of those problems of social finance which call for investigation by sociologists.

V. V. BRANFORD.



THE CASE FOR SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT.

AN interesting and significant feature in the discussion of Scientific Management which has appeared in this Review is the contrast in the conclusions arrived at by the four types of men who have taken part in the discussion. From Mr. Hobson, a sociologist and economist of well-deserved reputation, we have a fair and impartial view of Scientific Management as it appears to him from the writings of Mr. Taylor and Professor Münsterberg. While acknowledging its obvious social advantages, his habit of thought leads him to forecast its probable or possible future developments as they affect society, with reference to which he raises two important questions: First, is the social benefit sufficient to outweigh the possible disadvantages of increased specialization? Second, are the methods of Scientific Management compatible with collective bargaining, and therefore with trade unionism?

Mr. Cadbury, a practical and highly successful manufacturer, with a humanistic point of view, is bound to admit the industrial advantages of Scientific Management, but tends to the belief that the system at work in his own plant, developed by him through years of experiment, has all the advantages and none of what seem to him to be the disadvantages of the Taylor system. The disquieting bearing of his troubles with piece rates on this conclusion does not seem to have struck him. Then we have the expression of the trade unionist, Mr. Cole, the source of whose knowledge of Scientific Management is difficult to determine, but whose opposition to it on the score of its "premium bonus rates" is clear enough. And finally we have the cautious but definite endorsement of the Taylor system by Mr. Renold and Mr. Jackson, who speak from an intimate knowledge of its working in their own plant.

The writer of this article may be pardoned for pointing out that he occupies a position which synthesizes to some extent the varying points of view illustrated above. By training an economist and sociologist, by profession a practitioner of the Taylor system (to whatever slight degree of accomplishment in each), he is perhaps able to see and to sympathize with varying points of view more fully than others whose experience, though longer and fuller, is perhaps not so extensive. While recognizing fully the validity of economic

and sociological thought on the subject, he proposes to check its conclusions from practical experience.

The criticisms urged against Scientific Management in the discussion thus far may be grouped under the following heads :—

- I. That it is a system of driving.
- II. That its increased specialization enhances the monotony of the individual workman.
- III. That it tends to destroy the initiative, skill and judgment of the individual workman.
- IV. That it does not solve the problem of the inequitable distribution of wealth.
- V. That its existence is incompatible with that of organized labour.

I. The criticism that the Taylor system is a driving system is not supported by any facts given in the discussion, nor by anything within the writer's experience. It is apparently based on a conviction that, in spite of Mr. Taylor's explanations and assertions to the contrary, the productive feats described by him must necessarily involve an excess of effort. It does not look as though a labourer can raise his output of pig-iron handling from 12 to 47 tons a day without great strain, nor that 35 girls can do the work of inspection which formerly required 120 without considerable increase of activity. The answer to the first case is that Schmidt, the pig-iron handler who established the task, did not handle merely 47 tons, but 54 tons, for years without injury, until his increased prosperity got the better of him and he took to drink. In the case of the inspectors, the increased output was the result of the scientific selection of girls best adapted to that type of work, to wit : those with quick reactions. Fast work is easier for such a person than slow work. For the trained pianist with talent, it is easier to play scales at the rate of 800 notes per minute than it is for the tyro without talent at the rate of 150 notes per minute. Scientific Management aims at securing a worker with talent for the job in hand (which is what Mr. Taylor means by the " first-class man "), to make his conditions such that his work is facilitated to the greatest extent possible, and to provide him with all the training and managerial assistance necessary to secure the greatest effectiveness from a normal expenditure of energy. The results in Scientific Management are attained not by doing the same thing faster, but by doing a different and easier thing to achieve the same end. To confuse this method with driving is to mistake strenuousness for efficiency.

II. Monotony is one of those elusive sensations which we all fear greatly but seldom experience. The more active the mind, the less possible it is for it to feel monotony, for the reason that the succession of events which is expected to be monotonous arouses and keeps in play a train of associations and interests which counteracts the anticipated feeling. The inactive type of mind which might suffer from monotony is protected from that result by the very fact of its inactivity. Can one reasonably say that the life of an oyster is monotonous? If the oyster had Mr. Hobson's mind, it would be,—were it not that with such a mind the oyster would become a revolutionist. The writer hastens to add that by this comparison he does not mean to suggest that human beings are like oysters in all respects, any more than Mr. Taylor means that the ox-like man is the typical man or the best type for the well-being of society.

Attentive observation of a day's work on a job of a highly specialized and repetitive type shows that a feeling of monotony appears coincidentally with the feeling of fatigue, and it would seem that monotony is but another term for the lack of interest which comes with mental weariness. The obvious remedy for this, then, is so to regulate the hours of work and of rest that mental fatigue cannot supervene. This is not only good humanity, but good business, as every practitioner of elementary time-and-motion study knows. The specialization of the operation has practically nothing to do with it. The most specialized operation you can find turns out on analysis to be a rather complicated matter, involving from 20 or 30 to several hundred elementary units. No practical degree of specialization can go below this minimum, and at such a minimum there is in reality a great deal of variety for the type of mind that wants variety and knows it when it has it. For the other type of mind the question does not exist.

As an illustration of this, take the trade commonly cited as an example of the worst form of monotony,—machine sewing. According to the usual descriptions of it, the girl sits in a hard chair in a cramped position before a little machine whose purring needle in the midst of the insistent din of hundreds of similar machines drags the life out of her all day as she feeds piece after piece of cloth into its insatiable little jaw. To heighten the dramatic effect, it is usually added that the needle is making 2,500 to 4,000 stitches per minute, leaving one to infer that the girl has the added strain of keeping track of the count. What are the real facts for the girl who is adapted to this type of work? As to the din, anyone

who has worked continuously in a factory is perfectly well aware that it soon sinks below the threshold of consciousness and becomes practically non-existent. As to the number of stitches per minute, the girl thinks not of this, but of the rate at which the cloth passes under the needle, which under proper conditions is neither so slow as to be nerve racking nor so fast as to be unsafe. As to the monotony of the work, she has a series of pieces which she must select and fit together, requiring the exercise of judgment, skill, and discrimination of form, color, and texture. She must make the necessary adjustments of the foot, the needle, the thread, the bobbin, and the starting mechanism of the machine; any one of which involves a wide variety of motions and interests. She must keep track of the work she is doing, for pay-roll purposes—which usually means the injection of a small amount of clerical activity. She is always getting rid of old jobs and getting new ones. She is talking with forewomen and inspectors and repair men about the numerous contingencies that arise in the day's work. When everything is going smoothly, the action of her hands and arms is practically automatic, and her mind may be wherever its natural inclinations take it. In the absence of long hours, dingy and insanitary conditions, and a nagging management, girls and women doing this sort of work are in the main as happy and contented in it as they would be at anything else. Experience has shown that if they are capable of conspicuous achievement due to superior aptitude or training, their satisfaction is far greater than it would be at anything else. The maid-of-all-work who starts the fires, gets the breakfast, does the washing, mends the clothes, tends the baby, gets the dinner, does the ironing, sweeps the house, polishes the furniture, gets the supper, makes the beds, and tidies up generally, cannot complain of monotony; but if there is any rush from the factories to the maid-of-all-work jobs it has escaped the notice of most observers.

Finally, with reference to monotony, it must be admitted that such as there is was not introduced by Scientific Management, but has been with us for some time. On the other hand, it must be admitted that if Scientific Management continues to accomplish what experience has shown it to be capable of, *i.e.*, higher wages and shorter hours for the workers, it provides the opportunity for the best possible antidote to monotony; namely, more leisure and opportunity for the cultivation of other interests.

III. Scientific Management lays the greatest emphasis upon the

ascertainment of the one best way for the performance of each operation, the reduction of the method thus ascertained to writing, the instruction of the workmen in this method, and the provision of all the necessary managerial assistance and an incentive in the form of a bonus for the workman's adherence to the method until a better is found. This is standardization of work as that term is used in the Taylor system. It is quite natural that one acquainted only with the published descriptions of the process of standardization should infer that it leaves no place whatever for the initiative, the skill, and the judgment of the operator; and there is unquestionable ground for this conclusion in the statements in Mr. Taylor's books. It must be said, however, that the practice as outlined by Mr. Taylor eleven years ago and developed by him during the preceding 20 years, has undergone considerable change since, and that the present attitude and practice of the Scientific Management group with reference to the training of workmen is much more accurately represented in Mr. H. L. Gantt's *Work, Wages, and Profits*, particularly in the second edition, published in 1913. A careful perusal of this book is earnestly recommended to those who are deriving their knowledge of Scientific Management mainly from its literature.

In practice the facts are these: In the first place, the "science" of the industry is worked out not by the Scientific Management expert, but by those of the workmen in the plant under reorganization who by reason of their knowledge of their own industry and their susceptibility to training in methods of scientific time and method study are selected for that job. In the plants now under Scientific Management in the United States there are hundreds of exceptionally capable workmen occupying responsible positions as supervisors of methods, time-study men, instruction-card clerks, etc., exercising their initiative, skill, and judgment every day, who never before had the opportunity to display these qualities, notwithstanding they have had them from the beginning.

If by initiative is meant the power to extend the limits of knowledge and to combine known facts in new and productive ways, involving the exercise of imagination, ingenuity, foresight, and courage, all but the most hopeless sentimentalists must admit that it is a rare quality. Its possession in any marked degree makes the Edisons, the Bells, the Diesels, the Marconis. Its possession in even a minor degree makes the progressive executives, whose discovery and development is the hardest problem the manager usually has to face. The truth is that what people usually mean

by initiative is the inability or the unwillingness to accept advice and instruction; and there is no question that Scientific Management does not encourage this type of initiative. If Scientific Management is wrong, then we should close our schools and colleges and our churches, and abolish parental and governmental authority; for we are all in common proceeding on the assumption that liberty is best conserved under law, and that that personality reaches the highest development which is most fully acquainted with the restrictions of the conditions under which it works. Scientific Management, therefore, teaches the workman the laws it is ascertaining in regard to his work, and trains him in the best method of accomplishment within those laws. So far from making him less a man by the process, it endows him quickly with all that anybody knows about his work, and enables him to start from this vantage ground toward the discovery of better methods and processes. If originality consists in the discovery of something new rather than the laborious rediscovery of something old, Scientific Management gives the workman scope for originality as never before.

The criticism that the skill of the workman is supplanted by the skill of the Planning Department, as represented in instruction cards, scarcely calls for refutation. Any plant where Scientific Management is practised is conspicuous by the skill of its operators. The whole object of the Taylor system is to make the unskilled skilled, and the most skilled the teachers of all. The methods evolved by scientific study can be practised only by the exercise of skill. The results attained in scientifically managed plants are the evidence of a higher degree of skill in planning and execution than can be found in plants managed in the ordinary way.

It is said, however, that the exceptional skill developed by the Taylor system is too highly specialized and onesided. The criticism might be justified in fact if it were the practice of Scientific Management to train an operator in one operation and keep him at that for ever. This, however, is not the case. On the contrary, it is only in scientifically managed plants, so far as the writer has been able to discover, that systematic effort is made to train operators in a variety of operations; not primarily, to be sure, in the interest of the operator's breadth, but in the interest of more efficient administration of the plant. In every industrial concern of any size there are wide fluctuations of relative demand between departments due to conditions in the trade. By the ordinary methods the department in which the demand is declining lays off

some of its operators and the department which is short-handed hires new ones. The economic and social disadvantages of this must be apparent. Under Scientific Management operators are trained in advance to meet just such fluctuations, so that they may be transferred from department to department as their relative requirements vary. This is the actual practice of every concern in which the Taylor system has taken root. The result is that the workmen are not only exceptionally skilled in each operation with which they are familiar, but in addition they are trained to a wider variety of operations than is usually the case in ordinary plants.

The Taylor system is said to eliminate the judgment of the operator. If by judgment is meant the combination of memory, association, and guess which is so frequently substituted for knowledge of facts, the soft impeachment must be admitted. Piece rates are usually set by the rate setter's "judgment," and so in the most advanced plants there are committees sitting all the time revising these rates. There was a time when sword-makers used their judgment about the constituents of the steel from which their blades were forged. To-day, however, railroad managers who consider the safety of their passengers and the life of their equipment, and governments interested in defence against invasion, no longer leave the constitution of the steel they use to the judgment of even the most skilled operator. Something is known to-day about the special requirements of steel for special purposes, and progress consists in the substitution of knowledge for judgment.

If by judgment, however, is meant the rare faculty of choosing accurately and quickly between possible alternatives without the necessity of going through the laborious process of reasoning or the accumulation of knowledge which will give a sure answer, then Scientific Management has place for at least as much judgment as has any other type of organization. The unfortunate truth is that it cannot find enough of it, even in the ranks of its own practitioners and of the managers and executives with whom and through whom it has to operate. When it finds a man with really good judgment, it holds to him as a brother; and from him that hath it not it takes away the temptation to use the little that he hath, and attempts to provide him with that which is safer for most mortals—knowledge.

From the foregoing it will be seen that the customary charges of driving, monotony, and destruction of initiative, skill and judgment brought against Scientific Management are due partly to misunderstanding of what has been written on the subject, partly to

failure to define and discriminate clearly in the meaning of the terms, and partly to lack of acquaintance with the facts as developed in actual practice. To all these charges, the answer of experience as well as of careful thought and reason is a verdict of Not Guilty.

IV. Two other points thus far raised in the discussion remain to be considered. It has been pointed out by Mr. Hobson and many others that even if Scientific Management is a new, potent, and socially unimpeachable factor in production, it does not solve the problem of the equitable distribution of the product. The fact that this is still a problem raises a suspicion that Scientific Management is not the only form of industrial organization that has failed to solve it. The criticism is really a compliment, in that it shows the high hopes of the critics.

It must be admitted that Scientific Management does not give a complete solution of this problem. It helps towards a partial solution, however, through two things. In the first place, it increases the sum-total of the wealth to be distributed, and to that extent makes easier a fair distribution. If you and your fellow are hungry and have but one apple to divide between you, it requires all the force, physical, moral and spiritual, that you can both bring to bear to assure an equitable division; but if you have a barrel of apples between you, you can both have enough and there is no occasion to quarrel. The other contribution that Scientific Management makes to the solution of this problem lies in its accurate determination of what should constitute a fair day's work, *i.e.* a degree of accomplishment which may reasonably be expected of the workman adapted to his job and which he can keep up without injury to himself year in and year out. The labour problem to-day arises from the fact that neither term of the equation—"a fair day's pay for a fair day's work," which is rolled off so glibly as the ideal to be sought—is a known quantity. Space forbids a discussion of the meaning of a fair day's pay, which could only end in the negative conclusion that no one knows or, in our present state of knowledge, has any means of determining. All students of the Taylor system, however, know that the other factor, a fair day's work, is subject to accurate determination. The realm of the known is thereby extended at least to that extent, leaving the way clear for concentration upon other factors thus far unknown.

It is to be noted further that, accepting the basic wage rate as a given factor beyond its control, Scientific Management insists that the worker shall be paid a substantial increase over the rate for his acceptance of the improved conditions and training offered him.

This is not merely from a sense of expediency, though experience has shown that the workman will not accept these conditions and training in the absence of such increased remuneration; it is due also to a conviction that justice requires that the workman should share in the increased product to which he has made at least a partial contribution (of willingness and ability); the other contribution having been made by what is collectively known as the management. This conviction may of course be wrong. There may be some other principle of distributive justice which is ethically, socially, and economically better. If there is, there is no apparent agreement on the formulation of the principle, and Scientific Management cannot be blamed for doing the best it can according to its lights.

It may be urged that any conscious social development should be judged with reference to the end at which it aims. Scientific Management was developed by Mr. Taylor primarily as a solution of the problem of factory organization and management, and that it has succeeded in this no one familiar with the facts can deny. That it has not succeeded in solving the most difficult social problem confronting modern life is not to its discredit, while the fact that it contributes towards the solution of that problem incidentally and as a by-product is something vastly in its favour.

V. It is one of the most curious ironies of history that the real points of contact between Scientific Management and the labour problem at which Scientific Management is really doing the most for society are precisely those which the labour unions, presumably the incarnated interest of working-men in the solution of the labour problem, have chosen to attack. Scientific Management says: Let us by all legitimate means increase the sum total of consumable wealth. The labour unions say, either officially or tacitly in practice: Let us not as individuals produce too much, lest society be satisfied too soon and some of us be left out of work. Scientific Management says: We believe in a fair day's pay for a fair day's work, and we will at least try to find out what a fair day's work is and we will encourage any effort to ascertain what is a fair day's pay. The labour unions say: A fair day's pay is what we can get, and nobody knows what is a fair day's work, and we will, if possible, prevent anyone from finding out. (This at least is the writer's interpretation of the opposition of certain American labour unions to what they have christened "Stop Watch Premium.") Scientific Management says: We will accept the basic wage rate current in the community as the customary compensation for an

ordinary day's accomplishment; and for the achievement of what we have determined to be the possible extraordinary day's accomplishment we will pay a bonus or premium. The labour unions as represented by Mr. Cole say: "It will be very difficult for the unions to resist the new processes; the bonus systems they can resist. If they are driven to accept increased mechanization of their daily work, they must secure at least that their wages are raised directly, and not on any bonus system. All such systems have been clearly shown to be fatal to effective trade unionism."

For readers of this Review it is not necessary to point out the fallacy of restriction of output and of opposition to the accurate determination of a reasonable day's work. Both of them are sincerely believed in by many working men, and this belief is the outcome of limited but in many cases discouraging experience. Sudden changes in methods have in fact resulted in throwing men out of work until the necessary economic adjustments have been made, and the period of maladjustment looms larger in the experience of the individual who suffers by it than the succeeding period of greater social benefit. The remedies for this are caution in the application of new methods, and conscious direction and shortening of the period of readjustment.

The objection to the accurate determination of a reasonable day's work is based not really upon the method by which the determination is made, but rather upon the fear of abuse of the knowledge thus secured. In the past and unfortunately in most cases in the present, the workman's chief protection against the avarice and unscrupulousness of his employer is the employer's ignorance of what a day's work really is. Knowledge here is power, and it may be power to cut rates and to drive. The only answer is a change in the mental and moral attitude of employers; or where this is not possible or reasonably to be expected, organization on the part of the employees.

The objection of trade unionists to premium and bonus systems is largely in their fear of the effect of such systems, dealing as they do with the individual capacity of each workman, upon the solidarity of the union. Common Rules seem to most unionists to be necessary to the existence of their organization. The difficulty comes with the interpretation of the Common Rules. Are they standard minimum conditions of hours, wages, sanitation, safety, and number of apprentices, leaving free scope for such improvement over these conditions as individual cases may warrant? Or do they mean standard conditions from which no departure may be per-

mitted either way, thus obviating the possibility of adjustment to individual requirements? If the former, there is no possible conflict between them and Scientific Management. Scientific Management aims at the same things in the main as trade unionism, namely: better working conditions, shorter hours and higher wages, and in practice it has succeeded in attaining these far more easily and more effectively than has been possible for unionism. If, however, the latter is meant, standardized and crystallized conditions from which no departure may be permitted, there can be no agreement between labour unionism and Scientific Management, or for that matter between labour unionism and the current conditions of industry under any system whatever, or in fact between labour unionism and the social welfare. The history and present status of unionism in England and America is ample demonstration of the truth of this.

Assuming, however, that labour is organized in trade unions for the purpose of securing by its combined strength minimum conditions in regard to hours, wages, environment, etc., for the workers, there is no reason why the improvements upon these conditions brought about by Scientific Management cannot be made the basis of collective bargaining and worked out by mutual agreement. No unionist save one who makes his living out of strife can object to further co-operative progress along the lines for which trade unions presumably are working. On the other hand, no employer save one who assumes some divinely appointed exclusive right to determine the conditions of life for his work-people can object to consulting those people about improvements in their conditions.

It is unfortunately true that the chief exponent of Scientific Management, Mr. Frederick W. Taylor, does not see this. An autocrat by birth, training, and experience, who has had to fight the most bitter, unscrupulous, and ignorant representatives of American trade unionism, it is not to be wondered at that he cannot accept collective bargaining practically, no matter what his feelings may be in regard to its historic usefulness. To some extent, but without equal reason, this feeling is shared by some of his disciples; but not all of them. It is within the writer's knowledge that the very point upon which Mr. Taylor has insisted there is no possibility of collective agreement, *i.e.*, the establishment of a task, collective agreement has been invoked successfully. In the highly unionized screw-machine department of a large plant in which Scientific Management is now highly developed, the task deter-

mined by time study required the operator to attend one more automatic machine than had previously been assigned him. When the representative of the union objected to this task, the management opened the records of time study to him, went over the entire matter in detail, discussed the amount of the bonus, which was satisfactory, and finally agreed to try out the new arrangement. After trial, the union representative, convinced that the new task involved no undue strain whatever, and that the increased compensation was all that was warranted, secured the official sanction of his union for it. This was nothing but the triumph of common sense, accurate knowledge, fairness, and mutual regard over a little difficulty such as has arisen daily for the last hundred years and has been met daily in the same way. It is safe to say that under Scientific Management there is at least no smaller place for these qualities than there has been before.

If the effect of Scientific Management were to destroy the organization through which the workman secures the strength of combination, it would be a reasonable question whether in the long run society would not lose more than it benefits by its introduction. Fortunately, however, this is not the necessary result of Scientific Management. It rests with the working men and particularly with their leaders to say whether there shall be war to the knife between labour organization and this new type of industrial organization, or whether they shall recognize their community of aim and by mutual respect, co-operation and knowledge, work together for the benefit of society as a whole.

Finally, a plea for fairness in regard to the possible abuse of Scientific Management. That it can be abused no one knows better than those who have had personal experience with its introduction and development. Mr. Taylor has pointed out this fact and has given illustrations of how it can be done, and even those who do not care for his teachings will admit that he has given these illustrations as warnings and not as examples. Scientific Management becomes actualized and realized through human beings, and its practice is therefore subject to all the infirmities to which humanity is heir. Religion has been abused, liberty has been abused, democracy has been abused, and even trade unionism has not had an absolutely unimpeachable career. Do we on this account solemnly meet and consider whether religion, liberty, democracy and trade unionism shall have our approval? No. Society has put its seal upon them, in the main and with reference to the ultimate gain derived through them. It has done the same with machinery;

it is doing the same with Scientific Management. Our business is not to condemn, but to learn; not to stand aside and criticise imaginary evils, but to get inside and help extend the demonstrated good.

C. BERTRAND THOMPSON.

MR. CADBURY'S REPLY.

I have to thank the Editor of the *Sociological Review* for offering me space in which to reply to the points raised in the discussion of my paper on Scientific Management. There is no necessity for my reply to be a long one. I do not desire to take up any dogmatic attitude, and my purpose is achieved in eliciting the interesting and instructive discussion on the points raised.

Mr. C. G. Renold and Mr. W. H. Jackson agree with me that Scientific Management is bound to become general in time, and that it is our business "to study how to turn it to the best use of the community." They also agree that specialization will be carried much further than it has been in the past, and one result will be that the work that skilled men used to do will be given over to semi-skilled or unskilled men. On the other hand, the skilled men, so displaced, tend to be absorbed in the ranks of inspectors, machine-setters, time-study men, etc. But Mr. C. G. Renold himself says—and I agree with him: "Whether this relative redistribution of men and work will in the long run meet the objection (of increasing monotony and lessening skill and initiative) it is yet too early to say." It seems, however, that on the whole, the tendency is to develop semi-skilled men who will occupy a better position than that now occupied by the unskilled labourer, but which will be much inferior to that of the skilled artisan of the present day; and while it will always be possible for an unskilled labourer to rise even to the ranks of the inspector, etc., yet the general result will be a class of semi-skilled workers, whose work will be highly specialized and monotonous, and which demands little or no initiative, since thinking and initiative are the function of the management. We must remember that the trained skill and initiative which distinguishes an artisan from an unskilled labourer has a money value, and under Scientific Management this capital passes away from the workman to the management.

Further, as Mr. Hazell points out, there are large fields of employment which "are so monotonous that there is not sufficient scope for individual brain power in them."

Mr. Hobson and Mr. Cole also emphasize another important point that must be kept in mind. Excessive labour and other damages to workers may in some cases be profitable to employers. "Under Scientific Management there is no guarantee that only those economies which involve no increase in human costs will be adopted." It must be admitted that in any wages system there can never be complete identity of interest, between employer and employed.

In dealing with the question of wages, Mr. Jackson and Mr. Renold emphasize an important point, when they show that the standardization of processes, operations and detailed cost systems will make the free and open discussion of wages easier. The question is, however, whether employers generally will recognize the expediency of making use of this fact by dealing with the workers collectively in the settlement of wages rates. If the employers do adopt this attitude, I agree that probably there will be a general and permanent increase of wages among the lower paid, since the workers would not be satisfied otherwise. But this involves a great change in the opinion and methods of employers. Mr. G. D. H. Cole, for example, doubts if under the present competitive system, such a policy is possible for more than a minority of employers, and this, I think, is probably the case.

Mr. F. W. Taylor makes an interesting contribution to the discussion. He states that, as a matter of fact, fears are quite groundless "that the assignment of daily tasks to workmen may lead to great nervous strain," or that the system "reduced the workman to a living tool, and may lead him to expend his last ounce of energy while initiative and judgment are eliminated." In practice, says Mr. Taylor, in the shops where the full system of Scientific Management is in vogue, the very opposite is the reality. To this I merely wish to reply that as yet, according to Mr. Taylor himself,¹ there are only some 200,000 people working under this system in the United States—a very insignificant number when compared with the total workmen of the country. Further, under any system giving a premium on output, the average workers, especially in the case of women, tend to overdrive themselves. I stated in my paper that both Mr. Taylor and Mr. Gantt point out

1. *Journal of the Efficiency Society*, New York, September 19, 1914, p. 22.

that it is essential that over-work of the employee must be avoided, and that the system must aim at the best interests of the employee as well as that of the employer. But Mr. Taylor himself emphasizes ¹ the difficulty, if not impossibility, of persuading the average board of directors to appreciate the point of view on these matters adopted by himself. Again, I was quoting Mr. Taylor himself when I said that "the most prominent single element in modern scientific management is the task idea."² The task of every workman is fully planned out, and each man usually receives written instructions describing in the minutest detail the work which he is to accomplish, as well as the means to be used in doing it. It is stated that, even in crude and elementary unskilled work, the science and method are quite beyond the man who is doing it. And this is equally true of the skilled mechanic. Taking the handling of pig-iron as an example of unskilled work, we are told that one of the first requirements of a man for this work is that "he shall be so stupid and so phlegmatic that he more nearly resembles in his mental make-up the ox than any other type."³ Again, it is stated that "It is only through *enforced* standardization of methods, *enforced* adoption of the best implements and working conditions, and *enforced* co-operation that this faster work can be assured."⁴

I would also like to point out that Mr. Taylor did not discuss the relation of his system to trade-unionism. There is a difference between English conditions and those of the United States. The policy pursued by Mr. Gantt and Mr. Taylor, of dealing with the workmen one by one, would be foredoomed to failure. Already the unions are beginning to discuss the problems raised by various aspects of Scientific Management. It is not merely the question of wages that interests them, but the status of the worker and the trade-union under the system, and such questions as the control of the workshop. In the *Workers' Union Journal* (Midland Edition), for example, there has been running in recent issues a series of articles on Scientific Management and the workers' attitude towards it; and as I stated previously, the Amalgamated Society of Engineers voted against the premium-bonus system, by a majority of six to one, and a committee of the Trade Union Congress has also condemned the system without qualification. I mention these facts to show that we cannot argue

1. *Journal of the Efficiency Society*, New York, September 19, 1914, p. 22.

2. *Principles of Scientific Management*, p. 39.

3. *Principles of Scientific Management*, p. 59.

4. *Ibid.* p. 83.

that what obtains in the United States could necessarily be done here.

I have read with interest the article by Mr. Bertrand Thompson, the proof of which arrived immediately after I had written the above reply. He has stated the case for Scientific Management most ably, but after careful reading I do not see that he has raised new fundamental points; I had already seen the 1913 edition of Gantt's *Work, Wages and Profits*.

I quite appreciate the difference between "strenuosity and efficiency" which is Mr. Thompson's first point. But as above stated, it is impossible to prevent workpeople, especially girls, at times over-driving themselves. And the problem in front of us is not merely the system of Scientific Management applied under more or less enlightened control, and dealing with a very insignificant amount of the total output of the country, where its limited application gives a kind of monopoly profit, but the system extended into all works, with competition pressing keenly upon all those engaged in it.

Men and women cannot be divided into the clean-cut divisions that Mr. Thompson suggests when discussing monotony. There are extreme cases where a person is so mentally sluggish that he would not feel the monotony of the most specialized and automatic task. But my experience with the average unskilled labourer, both boys and girls, is that they show a decided power of mental development when their education proceeds on good lines. It is just because I refuse to accept the division of the workpeople into types of mentally alert and mentally inactive, that I do not agree with any argument based upon such a supposed division. And any system that tends to make such types is anti-social. The instance quoted by Mr. Thompson, *i.e.*, of machine sewing, does not strike me as the most extreme example of monotony. There are many jobs even more automatic, *e.g.*, the picking out of the spoilt balls by the girl inspectors,¹ and many operations with light presses in metal work. We must not so readily discount the nervous effect of such things as extreme noise. It is true that the din sinks below the threshold of consciousness at the time, but one has hardly the right to make the assumption that the nervous organism is so adaptable that there is no strain and no deteriorating effect upon the nervous system. I agree that it is a remedy to regulate the hours of work so that mental fatigue cannot supervene, but the fact that there is

1. Taylor's *Scientific Management*, p. 86.

a remedy does not disprove the existence of the evil, but rather the opposite.

In respect of Mr. Thompson's third point, I have already given the reasons why I think that the system, unless carefully watched, will tend to destroy the skill, initiative, and judgment of the individual workman. The ground need not be covered again. That it is possible to introduce methods which will tend to alleviate this evil is obvious, as we have proved to some extent in our own factory. And the instances given by Mr. Thompson of training men to do different specialized jobs, in turn, deserve most careful consideration.

I agree with his fourth point, that it is no criticism of the system to assert that it does not of itself solve the question of the distribution of wealth, and that on the other hand, there is this to be said, that the system is an advance in efficiency and therefore means larger output and increased national dividend. If I may say so, that was not the line of my criticism. It cannot be expected that industrial engineers developing the principles and methods of industrial organization and output can keep in view all the aspects of the larger and more complex problem of social and political organization. But at the same time, any system of industrial organization must be questioned how far it coincides with, or runs counter to, definite social and political tendencies that are developing. I have pointed out above (and in this I am dealing with Mr. Thompson's last point) that Mr. Taylor and Mr. Gantt have been definitely hostile to trade-unionism and collective bargaining, and that they seemed to imagine that their system would result in the elimination of trade-unionism, for the simple reason that they provided a stronger motive of self-interest for the workman. That this is a correct description of their attitude Mr. Thompson admits, and when he points out that in some instances the policy and ideas of Mr. Taylor on this point are not followed, and that the system is not necessarily antagonistic to collective bargaining, he does not answer my criticisms of Mr. Taylor, but justifies them. I see no reason why the system, possibly modified on certain lines, should not be developed with and through the assistance of the trade-unions. My opinion is, that any other policy pursued in this country would be foredoomed to failure.

EDWARD CADBURY.

THE MATERIAL CULTURE AND SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS OF THE SIMPLER PEOPLES: AN ESSAY IN CORRELATION.

CHAPTER II.

GOVERNMENT AND JUSTICE.

I. GOVERNMENT.

The first question that we ask is : how people are governed at the various levels of economic culture which we distinguish, how is order maintained, and justice administered? We distinguish first between the question of the form of government and the administration of justice.

(1) *The Form of Government.*

The simpler societies, particularly those of hunters and gatherers and the lower agriculturists and pastoralists, for the most part live in small communities, varying in number of inhabitants from perhaps a score to two or three hundred. Information on the question of numbers is unfortunately too often vague and uncertain to admit of the construction of any table on this point. But among the lower gatherers we generally hear of quite small groups, 2 or 3 to 5 or 6 families in the usual sense of that term, making 1 or perhaps 2 "enlarged families" of brothers or possibly cousins with their wives, children and grandchildren. It may be remarked that if we suppose an old man and his wife, two sons and their wives with 3 or 4 growing children apiece to be living together, we get a group of 13 people. Two such households would form a group of 26, which is as large as many of the groups of jungle tribes seem to be. Two pairs of such groups would be 52, which seems to be about the average of an Australian local group, and in many cases, though we are not unfortunately able to say in how many, the little society appears in fact to be constituted by people thus nearly related, the elder males being brothers or cousins.¹ But

1. The "wild" Semang live in groups of this kind. It is not clear that they are always composed of one "enlarged family" alone, but at any rate the settlement seldom exceeds 2 or 3 huts (Martin, pp. 859-60). The largest group known to him contained 27 persons. Among the Kubus we hear of 3-5 and also 10-12 huts (Hagen, 93-95). It would seem possible that an alliance of 2 distinct kindreds might be temporary but under the conditions if it became permanent it would involve fusion by inter-marriage.

often, especially as we go a little further up the scale, we hear of small villages or bands, and sometimes of numbers such as two hundred or more, and often we learn nothing definite about the relationships or affinities connecting their members. But there are two possibilities which affect the question. The group may be exogamous. If so, it is because there is a real or supposed relationship between its members. Or there may be no bar to marriage within its limits, and in that case the small number of the families will secure that all are connected over and over again by ramifying intermarriages. In fact the actual relationships will be closer and more numerous than in the former case, though even here it may be pointed out that the total population of the contiguous groups within which marriage is practicable probably does not exceed that of a very small town, so that the fictive relationship of gens or totem is backed by a very real amount of actual consanguinity. Though these little societies often cannot be identified each as a definite kindred, they in fact have ties of kinship and affinity at their back and are fortified by magico-religious ideas of the totem, the clan, or the matrimonial class, in which a sense of kinship is expressed.

Little communities of this kind form the effective social unit in the lowest economic stages. They are in a measure self-dependent. They own a definite area of land. They join, more or less effectively as the case may be, in repulsing the assaults of any other group; and again, in varying degrees of energy and community of feeling, they will protect their members against others. They may have a chief or a council, formal or informal, of the older men. They may have little or no formal government.¹ But in the main they are self-dependent, owing no allegiance to anyone beyond their limits. Yet they do stand in social relations to neighbouring groups. A number of such groups probably speak the same dialect, and call one another by the same name, intermarry freely, perhaps meet at certain times for religious or ceremonial purposes, are generally on friendly terms, and perhaps are ready to co-operate for mutual defence. Such an aggregate of groups is generally known as a tribe, even if it possesses no common government or corporate individuality.

1. The Roucouyennes supply a good illustration of the informal, almost casual, manner in which a chieftainship may arise. A man who makes a clearing and founds a settlement is a tamouchi. He gives his daughters in marriage to men who become his peïtos, who do a certain amount of work for him and are in semi-dependence but might leave him and found a new settlement, while he himself becomes a peïto if he lives with his father-in-law. The tamouchi, having however established himself, may nominate his successor, or be succeeded by his son, so that the institution becomes permanent. (Coudreau, *Chez nos Indiens*, 258—9)

Our tables will show that as we ascend the economic scale, tribal unity becomes more clearly defined. We more and more often find a definite tribal chief or council to which all the constituent groups own a measure of allegiance. Where there is no such common government it becomes a question—and one which for certain purposes of classification is of no small importance—whether we should regard the tribe or the local group as the true social unit. The group is the more valid and effective unit, but the ties that relate it to other groups cannot be ignored. If local exogamy is the rule, the group is never a self-sufficient community. If without being the rule it is a very frequent practice, the same verdict must be passed, though in a weaker form. The only safe course for us is to pay regard to both points of view. When the various groups that compose a tribe live in habitual intercourse with one another, practising intermarriage, owning a common cult, and accepting a common name, we must speak of them as forming, under certain aspects, one society, though they have no common government. We must also bear in mind that under another aspect they form several societies, and in considering our results we must allow both aspects to pass under review.

As far as concerns government, the main result of these considerations is that we must distinguish between smaller and larger groups. If we speak of a chief or a council, we must know whether it is the chief or council of a local group or of a tribe. But we must remark further that a tribe may be divided, not so much into locally distinct groups as into totems or clans, that pervade its whole area but yet have a semi-independent organisation of their own. To use the most general expression possible, therefore, we have distinguished primary and secondary social groups. The primary group is the smallest organisation above the simple family which has a recognised unity and a measure of self-government. The secondary group is an aggregate of primaries. The primary group may be an enlarged family; it may be a clan recognising common descent or a totemic band; or it may be a local band. Moreover, these divisions of a tribe may coexist, and there may be more than one group which might deserve the name of primary. In such cases we give the primary to the group which exercises most of the functions of government. Often we shall, in fact, find that there is something analogous to government fairly well developed in the primary group, while there is little or nothing of the sort beyond it.¹

1. Sometimes the chief of the primary group is an important person while the chief of the tribe is a shadowy figure. Thus, among the Nootka, the chief of the sept is alone allowed to hunt whales, to give potlatches, and offer prayers. But there is no true tribal chief, though the chief of the highest sept has a limited authority over the tribe and the chiefs col-

As we ascend still higher in the scale there arise societies which we should no longer call tribal. The limits of the conception of a tribe have never been clearly laid down. We take it that when government becomes so far centralised that local divisions have lost their independence and local chiefs have become or are replaced by heads of districts appointed by a ruling individual or council, a more regular form of government has arisen. We have called such governments national and have not sought to correlate them further in detail with the simpler kinds, as a new nomenclature would be necessary which would not run on all fours with the old.

We have then inquired (1) whether government is confined to the primary or extended to a secondary group, or is of the national kind. (2) Within each group whether it is based on the power of a chief or council, and whether it is so vague and circumscribed that it may be regarded as "slight or nil."¹ If there is a chief, is he hereditary, or does he owe his position to election, or to prowess in war or the hunt, or to wealth?² Such methods of obtaining his position would be grouped in antithesis to the hereditary as "personal." We should have liked to discover how often he is identical with or distinct from the shaman or medicine man, but our results have not been sufficiently numerous or clear to tabulate. We note, however, whether the power is inherent in the office or depends on personal ascendancy and the influence which he can in fact bring to bear. We note also whether his power is mainly in war, whether it is confined to judicial matters, and whether the war and peace chief are distinct. The same questions repeat themselves for the secondary group.

The following table summarises our results for the primary group:—

lectively form a council. (Boas, B.A., 1890, p. 585.) Sometimes, as might be expected, the chief of a small community extends his influence over others, thus, among the Miris of the hills each community has an hereditary chief, who, in some cases, has obtained acknowledgment from a cluster of communities.

1. A typical instance would be that of the Central Eskimo, where, according to Boas (B.A. 1884-5) there is a kind of chief in each settlement who decides *e.g.* when it is time to shift the huts. But the families are not bound to follow him. Among the Western Eskimos there is sometimes, according to Bancroft, a hereditary chief, but his authority is nominal (p. 65).

2. Or to wealth combined with liberality? *e.g.*, among the Kenai, the chieftainship is acquired by giving feasts. (Bancroft, p. 134.)

	Total	Hereditary	Personal	Power	Influence	Power in War	War and Peace distinct	Council powerful	Government slight or nil
L.H.	36	8	6	3	10	0	0	5½	17
H.H.	75	20½	17	13½	32½	1	2	9	19
D.H.	8	1	1	4½	0	0	0	3	1
A¹	37	7	10	7	13½	4	5	8	10
P¹	16	1	4	2	8	0	1	4	2
A²	119	34	22	20	34½	9	4	24	12
P²	16	2	5	1	6	0	1	3½	0
A³	96	16½	14½	7	23	2	0	19	0
	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
TOTAL	403	90	79½	58	127½	16	13	76	61
	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—

They show (1) that upon the whole hereditary and personal qualifications count equally in determining chieftainship. We have 90 cases classed as "hereditary" and 79½ as "personal." On this point the stage of industrial culture seems to have no influence.

(2) In 58 cases the chief has "power," while in 127½ he has influence merely. Roughly it is only in one case out of three in early society that the chief's power is of a formal and decisive character. Here again there is on the face of the figures no clear correlation with economic status. But on this point it must be borne in mind that in the higher economic grades, as will presently be shown, the tribal government becomes more and more often effective, with the result that in the primary group the powers of the chief become subordinate. There are thus two opposite factors at work in the different grades. In the lower it is the frequent absence of all effective government, in the higher it is the presence of a superior government which reduces the powers of the 'primary' chief. Taken by themselves therefore these figures are not significant.

(3) The cases in which the chief has marked power as a war-leader without having general power are few—only 16 in all. There are nearly as many—13—in which the peace and war chief are distinct.

(4) There are 76 cases in which a council is noted as an important factor, but there is a vagueness in the accounts which we get of councils which reduces the value of this figure. It may, however, be noted that this heading appears in all the grades, and that the total number of instances exceeds that in which the chief has power, indicating that in the simplest societies government by discussion is as familiar as government by the "strong man."

(5) Far the most interesting result under this head concerns the existence of government as such. In 61 cases out of 403 we

have entered "government slight or nil."¹ These are cases in which we find no really coercive authority, whether exercised by a chief or a council. The distribution of these cases is significant. The following list gives the number in each grade, and assigns the fraction which that number constitutes of the total cases recorded at that grade:—

Name.	Cases.	Fraction of total.
L. Hunters	17	·47
H. Hunters	19	·25
Dep. Hunters	1	·125
A ¹	10	·27
P ¹	2	·125
A ²	12	·1
P ²	0	0
A ³	0	0

The dependent hunters here, as in most cases, stand apart from the rest. Omitting them we find an almost uniform fall from the lowest to the highest stages; the only exception being that the proportion in the lowest agricultural stage is rather high. It may be remarked that the proportion among the lower hunters is probably underestimated, as in the case of the Australians we record cases where there is any definite statement about the government of the local group, but many instances have been omitted owing to the indefiniteness of the account. It is probable that in many of these the indefiniteness is due to the absence of any real authority and that the number of instances of "government slight or nil" ought to be increased. We have then clear evidence of an advance in organised government accompanying economic development.

1. The cases are:

Lower Hunters:—Swan River, Powell's Creek, Kabi and Wakka, Herbert River, Lower Californians, Miwok, Shoshones, Kubu, Semang (44), Sakai (44), Negritos of Angat (3), Negritos of Alabat (39), Andamans, Punans, Botocudos, Batua, Bushmen.

Higher Hunters:—Thompson River, Greenland Eskimo, Labrador Eskimo, Western Eskimo, Central Eskimo, Atkha Aleuts (33), Koniaga, Tsekehne (26), E. Nahane (26), Luisenos, ? Carriers (26), ? Chilcotin (26), Nishinan, Ghiliaks, Tuski, Sakai of Kuala Kurnam, Guaycuru, Charrua, Payuga, Tehuelches.

Dependent H.:—Nicobarese.

Agricul. I:—Baining, Yuracares, Roucoyennes, British Guiana, Ité, Mataguayo, Canea and Antioquia, Negritos of Zambales (35), Sakai of Kuala Kurnam (44), Veddahs.

Pastoral I:—Navaho, Toba.

Agricul. II:—Nicobarese, Mocétené, Moxo, Campas, Wanyaturu, Yaunde, Fang, Waga Waga, Gazelle Peninsula, Bogadjim, Mafulu, Savage Islands.

A similar correlation appears when we consider the government of the "secondary" group. In the Appendix we set out all the cases in which we find evidence of some form of government for the "secondary group," including what we here call "national" government. The first group consists of cases in which a superior chief is mentioned, though we do not know how much power he possesses. The second gives additional cases in which he is recorded as possessing some definite power. The third consists of those where we find a chief of unspecified or slight power and a council, and the fourth those of a powerful chief and council. The last group gives the cases in which the council is the predominant factor in our accounts, little or nothing being said of the chief. Added together these constitute the total of the cases in which we find evidence of effective government extending beyond the "primary" group. The results are as follow:—

GOVERNMENT OF TRIBE.


	All cases of government	Tribal chief	Tribal chief with power	Tribal chief with power and council	Tribal chief with power and council	Council Powerful	Totals	
L.H.	36	4	1	1	0	3	9	25
H.H.	75	14	5	3	0	1	23	31
*Dep. H....	8	2	0	1	0	2	5	62
A ¹	37	2	2	3	1	0	8	22
P ¹	16	4	2	4	0	0	10	62
A ²	119	15	26	9	1	2½	53½	45
P ²	16	3	6	1	2½	0	12½	78
A ³	96	13	37	11	10	3	74	77

Apart, again, from the dependent hunters, the table shows an almost continuous increase with the advance of economic status. The only serious exception is the low figure for incipient agriculture. It will be seen also that the pastoral stages are relatively more advanced in this respect than the agricultural, P¹ being higher than A², while P² is slightly higher than A³. It may also be mentioned that the figure for the lower hunters probably overstates the case for the same reason as before—through want of definiteness—the instances in which there is no tribal government do not get adequately recorded.

The decline in the proportion of cases of "government slight or nil" and the rise in the proportion of cases where "tribal government" is found as we ascend the economic grades may be shown in the following diagram:—

* If we include the Dependents among the Higher Hunters we get the fraction $\frac{34}{77}$ for the whole.

The penultimate column gives the total of the five preceding columns. The last column reduces this total to a fraction of all cases of government in our record.



We may then conclude that there is a tendency both to the consolidation of government and to the extension of the area of organised society as we advance in the economic scale. In the lowest societies there is in nearly half the cases no organised government at all, and in three out of four cases no government at all beyond the primary group. In the highest pastoral and agricultural societies there is organised government in all cases, and in three cases out of four the organised government includes more than one "primary" group, and extends to a large village, a tribe, or perhaps a "nation."

II. JUSTICE.

All societies recognise certain customary rules as binding their members, and at least within the society custom alone has a sufficient power to secure observance in normal cases. Differences arise in the nature of the rules themselves and in the definite measures taken to secure their observance by punishing a breach. It is the latter point which is considered under the present head. Here three main questions arise:—

1. To what extent or in what cases does society act as a whole or through its heads or through some definite institution to restrain or punish the wrongdoer?

2. What methods of punishment are in use?
3. What procedure is employed?

(1) *Private and Public Justice.*

In the first place there may be no regular action on the part of society as a whole. Murder, theft, abduction, or adultery may be treated as injuries to the individual affected, and they may seek redress either of their own strength or with the aid of their kindred or friends. Justice in such a case is a private matter. Redress may be sought by retaliation in like manner to the wrong done or simply by killing or beating the aggressor. Or it may take the form of a demand for compensation in goods. Or there may be a regular fight under conditions prescribed by custom;¹ or, lastly, without fighting, the aggressor may be required to stand a cut or thrust. Custom and sentiment may support the injured party, but unless the neutral public would actually come to his help at need we should regard this as a case of private redress. Similarly, in the Regulated Fight, custom certainly imposes limits as to methods of redress, but redress itself is left to the strength and skill of the parties. These cases are placed in our tables under the heads of (1) Retaliation and Self-help, (2) Compensation, and (3) Regulated Fight. The case of a ceremonial cut or thrust, which is peculiarly frequent in Australia, is classed as an "Expiatory Fight." Very often no bloodshed occurs, and it is then more like a composition in that it is a form of satisfaction given by the wrongdoer to the injured party. It is certainly held to wipe out the murder and end the feud. Either retaliation or composition may be collective or vicarious, *i.e.*, may attach to the whole family of the aggressor or to any one of its members. We take these cases together under our third head. But this is not universal. It is just as likely that redress is sought at the expense of the wrongdoer alone.

At the other extreme justice may be a public function, regularly exercised by a chief, a council, or a special court for the punishment of all serious offences. This we call Regular public justice. But between the two extremes are gradations which are often very difficult to classify. To begin with, the public authority, be it what it may, may concern itself only with offences held to injure the whole community, *e.g.*, ceremonial offences, breaches of the tribal marriage laws, witchcraft, and especially murder by witchcraft, indiscipline, treason, cowardice, violation of the rules of the

1. Among the Central Esquimaux a murderer settles in the house with the relations of the murdered man, and after some weeks' residence with them is challenged to a wrestling bout. If defeated, he suffers death; if victorious he may kill one of the family. (Boaz, *op. cit.*, p. 582.) In many cases the regulated fight is less serious, thus, among the Western Esquimaux, quarrels are often settled by a boxing match. (Bancroft, p. 65.)

hunt. These we class as "Tribal or Sacral offences," and we find in fact a large number of instances in which such offences are punished by some public effort and no others. Thus among the Bellacoola, a Salish group, we find that for transgressing the laws of the Kusiut ceremony, *e.g.*, by performing a dance to which a man has no right or making a mistake in dancing, the penalty is death, adjudged by the assembled chiefs. The execution is by a shaman, who bewitches or poisons the offender, but if the offender recovers he is not molested further, and a relative may, if willing, be substituted.¹ There is no account here of the treatment of other offences, but of the Salish, Kwakiutl, Nootka, Tsimshian, Thlinket, and Haida peoples, Niblack (*Smithsonian Reports*, 1888, p. 253) says: "In cases such as witchcraft or offences of medicine men, sentence of death or of fine is adjudged by the leading men of the village after trial. In most instances, however, the law of blood revenge, an eye for an eye, leaves little need for other than family councils, as they are purely totemic offences and are arranged by the injured gens." These are clear cases of the distinction between sacral offences deemed to concern the tribe, and private matters. More doubtful instances are those from the Makh-el-chel, a Californian tribe among whom, according to Powers (p. 214), we are told that a woman could be put to death by the chief for marriage or adultery with a white man. So again among the Nishinan, a very low Californian tribe according to the same authority (pp. 318, 320), kidnapping was punished by the community, but the leading case is that of a chief who sold a woman to the Spaniards. Probably both these instances are to be regarded as acts of quasi-treason to the community. Among the Seri, again, there was a kind of ostracism which might culminate in outlawry for associating with aliens, deformity, incurable indolence, disease, mental aberration, decrepitude, and a certain breach of the marriage law. Of these indolence was an offence against the clan, because it had to support each of its members; and the marriage regulation was that a bride should for a year be at the disposal of the bridegroom's clan fellows. If he exercised his own rights during that time, he offended them collectively. All these therefore we should class upon the whole as of the nature of public offences. Sometimes again, breaches of order in the hunt might be punished by a special Hunt police, as among the Omaha,² while among many Australian tribes, it is well known, breach of the marriage rules was the most definite occasion for the intervention of the collective force of the group. Next, the community may intervene irregularly or in special cases. It may avenge the death

1. Boaz, B.A., 1891, p. 417.

2. Dorsey, Omaha Sociology. Smilie, iii., pp. 288, 363, 367.

of a chief or popular man.¹ It may expel or kill a man who has killed two or three others in cold blood or who has made himself generally unpopular.² This sort of public justice falls far short of any regular rule assigning definite punishment to a specific offence. It is more like lynch law, or the exceptional act of a civilised government in troubled times. We class such cases as acts of "Occasional" public justice.

Next a public authority may deal with some cases of private wrong and not others, *e.g.*, with homicide and not theft, as in some Australian groups; or with theft and not homicide, as in some South American instances. These come under our heading "Public justice in some private offences."

Again, the system we find may be one in which private and public elements are intermingled. The injured party may, for instance, get the chief or some officer to help him, to find the stolen goods,³ or to arrest and confine the murderer of his brother. But he initiates the proceedings. He decides whether he will forgive or accept compensation or exact life for life,⁴ and he executes the

1. Thus among the Shoshones, according to Bancroft (p. 435), a murderer may be left to vengeance, "or if the sympathies of the tribe are with the murdered man, he may possibly be publicly executed but there are no fixed laws for such cases."

2. Thus among the Esquimaux of Labrador (Turner, *Smithsonian Reports* 11, p. 186) a man of very bad character may be boycotted, and if, under these conditions, he were to commit a murder, several men may combine to put him to death. So too among the Central Esquimaux (Boaz, *Smithsonian*, 1884-5, p. 582 and appendix), if a man has made himself odious, *e.g.*, by murder, and especially by repeated murders, any man may ask the consent of his neighbours separately to his death and may kill him without fear of vengeance. A transition to more regular law may be illustrated from the Campas, who had no regular government and habitually practise vengeance, but of whom Urquhart (*Scottish Geogr. Magazine*, 1893, p. 349) states, in the case of a man who had murdered his mother, "Not an Indian but would kill him upon sight." Lynch law is here becoming as effective for certain purposes as public justice, but we should still, on the whole, class the case as "Occasional."

3. *E.g.*, among the Karayaki and Sambioa, the chief's function is to help in bringing offenders to account, but not to execute punishment, which is for the injured party or kin. (Ehrenreich, *Beiträge*, p. 29.) Among the Kalmuks there is no death penalty but a murderer refusing to pay the fine might be surrendered to the relatives. (Liadov, *J.A.I.*, i, p. 414.)

4. Thus, among the Gallino-mero of California, Powers (*Contrib. to N.A. Ethn.* iii, p. 177) states that the avenger of blood has his option between vengeance and composition, "but he does not seem to be allowed to wreak on him a personal irresponsible vengeance. The chief ties the criminal to a tree while a number of people "shoot arrows into him at their leisure."

sentence.¹ Possibly there is even a regular trial, but sentence is left to the accuser to execute, and if he cannot enforce it there is no further means of redress. Again, it may be wrong for him to exercise revenge until he has obtained a judgment in his favour which states what the revenge ought to be. Or it may be that he can avenge himself on the spot, but if time has elapsed he ought to go to a court.² In all these cases there is a blending of opposite principles. We class them as cases in which private justice is assisted or controlled, or both. The difference between Assistance and Control is difficult to assign in general terms, but we have placed each concrete case under one head or the other according to the details given.

How far to extend these heads is one of our most difficult questions. At the lower limit we demand something more than custom or public sentiment as the force supporting (or controlling) the avenger. To take a concrete case. Among the Geawegal in Australia we are told that custom requires a man who has injured another to expose himself to spears thrown by him. This, Rusden³ says, is never refused, but if it were it would be enforced by the collective power of the people. Taking this as literally true, we class it as a case of Assisted Private Justice.⁴ Among the Bangerang, according to Carr, there is a similar custom. But if the aggressor declined the result would probably be that he would be killed some time or other by the injured man and no one would avenge him. We leave this among cases of private justice. Other cases of expiation, where we are not told what would happen but

1 E.G., among the Ojibways, according to Jones (*Hist. of the Ojibway Indians*, p. 109), murderers were brought to trial before the council, and if the relatives required it, the punishment was usually death, executed by the next of kin.

2. Thus, among the Bataks of Palawan, in cases of murder, theft, or adultery, the relations may exercise vengeance on the spot, but if the matter is reported the old men intervene and prescribe punishment. (*Venturillo, I.A.E.*, xviii, p. 138.)

3. Fison and Howitt, *Kamilaroi and Karnai*, p. 282.

4. A doubtful and peculiar case is that of the Greenland Esquimaux. An injured man, according to Nansen, will challenge another to a drum dance, in which each party sang satirical songs at the other, and the losers might be "fairly driven out of their homes and settlements by this means" (*Nansen, First Crossing of Greenland*, ii, p. 328). It would be absurd to call this Public Justice, as we are told that the winner was the man who could secure the laughter of the audience on his side; though it may be held to involve a certain public intervention. It has been brought here with some doubt, under the head of "The Regulated Fight." Vengeance by relatives also occurred among these peoples, a murder being no "business of the community." Yet bloodshed was abhorred (*Id. Eskimo Life*, p. 162-3).

merely that it is the custom, we have entered separately. Generally when we find either (1) that a man can get the help of a chief, but that there is no account of any trial, or (2) that there is something of the nature of a trial, but that the accuser has in the end to act for himself, and can accept any satisfaction offered him, we class the case as one of Assisted or Controlled Private Justice, as the case may be.

Apart from punishment for wrong done, the chief or the community may intervene to settle disputes. This is the rudiment of civil justice, and nothing is more common than to hear that it is the business of the chief to "settle disputes." But if we read further of the functions of the chief we are quite likely to find that he has no definite power, that he trusts to his influence, that this depends on his character and circumstances, or that he rules by persuasion rather than authority. We cannot, then, regard him as a civil judge with powers to execute his decisions.¹ Very probably his decisions are, in fact, accepted as a rule, but unless there exist means of coercing the recusant in the last resort we cannot speak of civil justice in the full sense. We class all such cases under "Arbitration," a heading which will include at the one end the simple settlement of disputes by an impartial person, and at the other an award which is formally given but is not enforced on the parties.² It would be useful to subdivide these cases, but this has not been attempted on the present occasion.

In some cases our information takes the form of a denial of any regular method of redress, rather than a positive description of self-help. We gather that there is very little regular govern-

1. We should hesitate to attribute anything more than powers of arbitration in a case like that of the Manthra, where the chief is said to settle disputes, including questions of theft, but no information is given about the punishment. One would suppose in such an instance that if the chief inflicted punishments, a statement to that effect would have been added. (Borie, *Tijd. voor Indische taal land en volkerkunde*, x, p. 407.)

Sometimes the arbitrator might be changed. Thus, among the Tagals, the dato administered justice but, if not satisfied with him, the parties might go to an arbitrator. We must infer that his authority was not executive, though among these people there was a death penalty for tribal offences and a scale of composition for others. (Blumentritt, *Z.E.*, 25, j. 16.)

2. As among the Hupa of California, Goddard (*University of California, Explorations*, vol i, p. 59) shows that there was a regular system of arbitration which was wholly voluntary, and if it failed, vengeance, which might be vicarious, was the resort. Among the Ghiliaks all we hear of the maintenance of order is that the elder men would adjust disputes, the alternative being a duel, in the presence of witnesses, terminated by a slight wound. (Deniker, *R.E.*, ii, p. 309.)

ment, no regular law, no courts, etc.¹ In such cases, if the evidence is sufficiently positive, we may infer that if a man wants redress, he must get it for himself. But it would be going beyond our warrant to say that self-redress actually exists. The evidence is negative and as such must be received with caution. Where we decide to accept it we class the case as one of "No Law," meaning by that there is no stated method by which the collective force of the community is brought to bear upon a wrongdoer.

In some instances the reason for the lack of this function is that happily it is not needed. Grave crime is so rare that no provision is made for dealing with it, and the question what would happen if it occurred can only be answered hypothetically. Thus the sixteenth century Jesuits found the Tapuya people to be such lovers of peace that none of them had any remembrance of "balterie" or quarrelling among themselves, while they even treated their enemies humanely. Though the Tuski have no assignable methods of dealing with crime, it may be, as we have seen, because it is too rare to have given occasion for any such institution. Among the Dodonga we are told that murder, theft, and adultery are almost unknown, and similar accounts are given here and there of other peoples. We class these happy communities, of which there is a sprinkling in most of our grades, as "Crimeless."

Lastly, there are cases in which public punishments are spoken of, but the nature of the offence which would provoke them is not given. These are tabled as "Unstated."

(2) *Methods of Redress.*

As to methods of redress something has already been said. But it should be noted that there are several points which are distinct in idea but may in practice be combined or entangled with one another.

(a) When an act is regarded as a private wrong, the desire of the injured party may be for physical vengeance. Or he may be satisfied with some form of compensation. In the case of vengeance he is apt to exact as much as he suffered, for otherwise he is left with a feeling of inferiority, and his pride must be reckoned with as well as the instinctive impulse to "take it out" of the man who has hurt him. Anything like "exact talion," therefore,

1. Thus, among the Koniaga, the information collected by Bancroft gives no clear account of the manner in which any offences would be dealt with; we are only told definitely that "authority is exercised only by heads of households" (p. 80). So again, according to the same authority, the Chepewyans have no laws or government (p. 121). Among the Tuski, it is clear from Nordenskjöld's account (*Die Umseglung Asiens*, Bd. ii, p. 123), that there is no definite method of maintaining order, but here crime appears to be very rare, if not quite unknown.

even when inflicted by a public body, is suggestive of underlying private redress, and this is still more the case where talion takes the form of the satisfaction of one family group at the expense of another. If one of family A has killed one of family B, it has weakened it, and equality demands that A should be weakened proportionately by the loss of as good a member.

(b) When an act is regarded as a public wrong the leading idea is the defence of society. Hence in grave cases the object is to exterminate the offender; exile may be sufficient but death is surer and it rids society of a centre of danger. In less grave cases society, like the individual, may be satisfied with atonement. This is (a) a way of punishing the offender,¹ (b) if the wrong is an offence against an individual of satisfying him, (c) of enforcing on the offender an admission of his wrongdoing, possibly of placating supernatural powers (*e.g.*, by a sacrifice or feast at the expense of the offender), and also of re-establishing harmony and good relations by a payment to the chief or to the community. There is a very clear notion in early society, as in our own childhood, that many, if not all, offences may be wiped out by a certain sacrifice on the part of the doer. This is not true compensation. It is atonement.

We class as Composition only cases where payment of some sort is made to the sufferer. Where this is clearly made by the judgment of a court we class it under Public Justice as "Fine to injured party" and contrast it with the "Fine to Court" (*i.e.*, to the chief judge, or possibly the community), which in practice often goes along with it.² We class under "Atonable" cases in which

1. Where expiation is the prime motive, the penalty may only come upon the offender in a roundabout fashion. Thus, among the Padam Abors, no free man may be put to death, and if a crime is committed the community must expiate it by a sacrifice. For this purpose it takes the first animal that comes to hand, the owner thereof being free to recover as best he can from the original offender. (Dalton, *Eth. of B.*, p. 24.)

2. While we are frequently told that offences are compoundable, it is not always easy to make out whether the fine is inflicted by a chief or court, or exacted by the injured party. Thus among the Patawat in California, Powers (*op. cit.*, p. 98) tells us that murder is punished by a fine of shell money—10 strings for a man and 5 for a squaw, but he does not state definitely by whom it is imposed. From his general account of the Californians we may assume that it is a case of composition for vengeance, and we have entered it as such with a query. Sometimes, when it is clear that a fine is inflicted by a court, it is not certain to whom it was paid; thus, in Flores (Riedel, *Rev. Coloniale Internationale*, 1886, p. 69), the chief and elders are charged with the settling of disputes, and we are told that adultery, arson, wounding and larceny are punished by fines in default of which the offender may be sold into slavery, but we are not told to whom the fines go. We have therefore had to enter the case under "Crimes Atonable," not under "Composition," though very probably the latter head would be justified.

we are told that all or most grave crimes can be made good by payment, but without learning more precisely the form in which this payment is imposed. Our figures tend to show that the principle of atonement rather extends than restricts itself as we ascend the scale. It is only in Australia that the form of atonement which we call the Expiatory Combat occurs in any large number of instances, and if we omit these the cases of atonement among the Hunters would be very few. This result is what we might expect from the economic development.

(3) *Procedure.*

In the lower societies information about procedure is often very defective. We sometimes hear of a man being "found guilty," but with no indication of any trial which precedes the verdict. Often an Australian group holds definite consultation on the question whether a man should be killed, but on what grounds the decision is taken we do not know. Here and there, as in N.W. Central Queensland, we hear specifically that the camp council enquires whether a man who has slain another in a fight had just reason for so doing, and, if not, puts him to death. This seems to be at least a rudimentary trial, but unless we have a clear statement that the accused is heard, or that some regular process is gone through by which justice is established, we hesitate to give it the name. We table as cases of Public Justice "With Trial" those in which the evidence points to a formal investigation, and we have numbered the instances in which the Oath or Ordeal is used.

The bald results in each grade will be found in the tables in Appendix II. To interpret them we must in the first place group them together; and, in the second place, consider them in relation to the actual structure of society in different parts of the world and in different economic grades.

THE RESULTS GROUPED.

In order to ascertain whether there is any real advance in the public enforcement of justice as we ascend the scale, we have brought our headings together in three columns, representing stages in the transition from unorganised to organised justice. The task of so grouping them presents considerable difficulties and we have accordingly formed two classifications, referred to as A and B, in order to check our results at the principal points of doubt.

CLASSIFICATION A.

In the first place we form three columns :—

In column 1 we place cases of Retaliation, No Law, Regulated or Expiatory Fight (where we have no reason to regard this as a

penalty enforced in the end by the community). We do not remove a case from this group, because it also comes under "Occasional Public Justice," "Public Justice in Tribal offences," "Composition," or "Arbitration." We regard this as the lowest normal level of organisation.

In Column II we place cases of Assisted or Controlled Private Justice, and those in which some Private Offences are publicly punished. These may be combined with Retaliation or Composition. We add to this column the numerous cases in which there is a definite system of Public Justice covering all or most ordinary offences, yet self-help is still a recognised institution—the two in fact existing side by side.¹

In Column III we have only those cases in which Public Justice is the regular system, although Composition may be allowed.

We are able to bring most cases under one or other of these groups and to find material differences as we pass from one stage to another. One point, however, remains to be explained, before we consider our results.

It will be seen that in some cases the letter E is entered in place of a cross under Retaliation. This means that injuries by anyone alien to the community are redressed by the sufferer. This seems at first sight to have nothing to do with internal justice but to be

1. The intermixture of private and public justice is due to various causes. It may be that the ties of kinship are too strong for the nominal authority of the chief. That would seem, from Ling Roth's account (*Natives of Sarawak*, vol. ii, p. 228), to be the case with the Sea Dyaks. Similarly, among the Munda Kols, we are told that cases of divorce and adultery were brought before the village meeting and the offending man might be beaten, but this was often not carried out owing to the power of the kindred. (Sellinghaus, *Z. f. Ethn.* iii, pp. 370, 371.)

Sometimes we see a transition due to the contact with the higher civilisation, thus, among the Araucanians of Chile, the older system is one of pure retaliation while now, according to Latcham (*J.A.I.*, xxxix, p. 355, 6), crimes are tried by the chiefs and elders of a clan but the condemned man may still resist, and if he belonged to another clan would do so, with the result that a tribal feud might arise. Among the Sonthals again, disputes were formerly decided by duels, "but of late time, as equitable remedies have been brought near them, this remnant of a barbarous age has departed." (Man, *Sonthalia*, p. 90.)

Sometimes a criminal if caught may be killed on the spot. This is the case with a murderer among the Yao (Werner, p. 264), where, nevertheless, a regular system of public justice is found. Among the Wadschagga, along with the regular system of justice, blood revenge for murder seems to be fully recognised. (Kohler, *Z.V.R.*, 15, pp. 53, 62.) And among the Ova Herero the chief does not interfere with vengeance for murder unless moved to do so. Moreover, if the injured party is not satisfied with the decision of the court, he will take vengeance on his own account. (Dannert, pp. 10, 11.)

more of the nature of irregular warfare, and it is true that the line between family vengeance on an outside clan, and inter-clan feuds merging into tribal warfare is not easy to draw. But war proper is a collective act, and the characteristic of the vengeance in question is that it is instituted and executed by the aggrieved party and his kin without reference to the community as a whole.¹ It is therefore true retaliation, true private justice. But it is compatible with a high development of public justice within the society, and it must therefore be distinguished from self-redress within the community.

But here arises a difficulty which affects our classification a good deal. In many cases the question whether self-redress is classified as internal or external depends on the classifier's selection of the social unit. In the case of the ordinary Australian tribe we could produce solid reasons for taking the local group as the unit, and solid reasons for taking the tribe as the unit. On the former view we could produce a large number of cases of partially developed public justice or of assisted and controlled private redress—e.g., in North and N.W. Central Queensland, among the

1. Thus among the Australians, we are often told that any natural death is attributed to a member of some other tribe or local group. It may then be the duty of the whole group to which the dead man belongs to avenge him. This gives rise to a tribal war or a feud between groups, which is often settled by a ceremonial fight. But it may also be avenged by the relatives. Thus, on the Darling River, if a corpse makes a movement in the direction of the guilty sorcerer's camp, some months afterwards a brother or other relation takes other men with him and finds the murderer, wounding and perhaps killing him. (Bonney, *J.A.I.*, 13, 134.) This seems to be primarily an affair for the relatives and friends, and in any case is mere vengeance upon an individual. Similarly, according to Le Souef (in Brough Smyth, ii, p. 289) any death is avenged by the relatives killing the first man of another tribe whom they meet. Again, among the Watchandee, while an aggravated case of real murder would lead to the invasion of a hostile tribe by all the males and indiscriminate massacre, a magic murder is dealt with by a single man who tracks the foe to his camp, where he is hospitably received though his errand is known, and he presently assassinates his man. (Oldfield, *Trans. Ethnol. Society*, 1865, p. 246.) This we should treat as External Retaliation. Sometimes the line is hard to draw. Thus, among the Paharias, according to Dalton (*Ethnology of Bengal*, p. 265) a man who has a claim on one of another village, gets his chief to assemble the vassals, plunder the village, and seize the offender, who would be detained until his relations paid up. As the chief acts in this case, and with his followers takes the plunder, we treat it as war, though it is mainly a matter of private redress. A clearer case is the custom which we find among the Bontoc Igorottes, according to which if a man is killed by a member of another village, he may be put to death by his own community or it may offer compensation; failing this there is war. This is clearly not a case of private redress but of the action of the community. (Jenks, p. 170.)

Narrinyeri, in West Victoria, among the Dieri, and so forth, and the cases of self-redress, at least as far as the murder of an adult male is concerned, could not be very numerous. The feuds, regulated fights, and expiatory fights between different groups of the same tribe would then all be regarded as external matters irrelevant to domestic justice and pertaining to the province of war. On these lines we should regard the typical Australian community as very small, consisting often of not more than 20 to 40 or 60 individuals,¹ as maintaining justice among its handful of members through the council of elders and as living on terms of friendliness, chequered with frequent charges of magic murder, with other groups speaking the same dialect, quarrels between groups being settled by real or ceremonial combats. The society would figure as tiny but as relatively well organised internally.

On the other hand the whole tribe might with equal appropriateness be regarded (in the sense explained above, p. 308), as a single, larger, but less well organised society,² between whose divisions party quarrels were frequent and were settled by fighting, more or less serious according to the nature of the case and the feeling between the groups. So treated an Australian tribe would be analogous to some more advanced society, comprising clans, villages, or other divisions. Within the clan of such a society, there is very possibly impartial justice, while between the clans there is only collective self-redress.³ In this case, however, we are too likely to hear nothing of the justice within the clan. It is between clans that trouble arises and with this trouble that the code of the tribe is concerned.⁴ Such a society therefore is apt to figure

1. Though occasionally extending beyond 100.

2. Thus throughout the Boulia district, according to W. E. Roth (p. 41), the natives can make themselves mutually intelligible, and possess in common trade-routes, markets, hunting grounds, customs, manners, and beliefs. They intermarry and would make common cause against an enemy. Mr. Roth describes them as messmates. His statement defines very fully what we mean when we speak of a single society in the absence of a common government.

3. Thus, among the Wyandots, who had a well developed gentile system, there is a clear distinction between offences within the gens, dealt with primarily by the gentile council, and offences between gentes, which are matter for compensation or, in the alternative, of vengeance by the kin. Though the tribal council in either case might intervene (at least in a question of murder), the distinction of principle is clear. (Powell, *Wyandot Government, Smithsonian Reports* i, p. 67.) Among the Ossetes, there was vengeance and later composition as between family groups, while within them the head might fine and even excommunicate an offender.

4. Thus, among some of the Igorottes, we have clear accounts of vengeance exercised upon members of other villages and leading to prolonged blood feuds (Blumentritt, Dr. Pet. p. 28), but we have no statement as to the relations within the village. The existence of ordeals (p. 30) would

in our Column I, as an instance in which self-redress by the kinsfolk is the regular method of obtaining justice, for there is no doubt that it is one society, and that self-redress exists as between its constituent parts while of the internal regulation of the parts we hear nothing.

It will be seen that unless we are careful to compare like with like as nearly as the conditions allow our classification may give a topsy-turvy result. The very fact that a society has grown beyond the primary group, and in its wider form is sufficiently compact to make it clearly recognisable as a unity, will also lead to recognised internal self-redress as one of its institutions, and it gets into our Column I in consequence. Were the society still better organised no doubt it would have public justice throughout. But the serious point is that if it be less organised, so little organised that we do not easily recognise it as a unity, it again escapes column 1 and gets back into the highest column on account of the justice found in its

seem to point to some public regulation but we can assert nothing with any definiteness. Among the Bagobos, again, blood revenge is said to exist to the fullest extent, but the description appears to refer to different villages, and of offences within the village we learn only that they are compoundable without being told how the composition would be enforced. (Schadenberg Z.E. 17, p. 28.)

In other cases what we hear is incidental and vague, but often sufficient to show that quite different ideas are at work. Thus, among the Thlinkets, we learn from Swanton (*Smiths. Rep.*, xxvi, p. 427) that as between clans, there is retaliation, which may be vicarious, or composition; while within the family any disgraceful act is so keenly felt that the offender may be killed for it. Among the Shushwap, an interesting case is related by Mr. Teit. A bad man is slain by his relatives on the ground that he has conducted himself in such a way that someone will kill him, "and then we shall have to avenge his death." The deed is done in a large lodge but no one interferes until his slayers begin to challenge the others. (*Jesup Expedn.*, vol. ii, p. 560.)

Among the Creeks, in the time of Hawkins (*Trs. American Eth. Soc.*, 1853, pp. 66, 67) murder was primarily an affair for the relatives but the tribe might interfere if it thought itself likely to be affected, and then might seize either the murderer or the next of kin, hence the relations sometimes put the guilty man to death in self-protection.

According to Loskiel's account referring mainly to the Iroquois and Delaware, murder was avenged if not compounded, but if a man had killed his own relation, he escaped without much difficulty, for the family—who alone had the right to take vengeance—did not choose to deprive themselves of two members at once. (*History*, vol. i, p. 16.) Such illustrations tend to show how the very fact that men rely on the kin mainly for protection implies a different attitude, whether more or less severe, to offences within the kindred. The system moreover involves the virtual autonomy of kin in a code of customs recognised by the whole community, and therefore likely to impress a visitor.

smallest groups. We should thus get the paradox that societies of very low organisation (we are not speaking here of their economic grade) would tend to rank it with the most highly organised societies and above those which are really intermediate.

We avoid this pitfall by tabulating our societies twice over. With this object we form the heading "Primary group alone," under which we enter those societies in which we find some element of public justice, but only within what we have called the Primary Group. Of these we have two cases :—

(1) Among the Asiatic forest peoples the Primary Group is the only society that there is. Within it the elders may maintain order and punish offenders, and this is "public justice" in the only sense in which the term can be applied among such peoples. But beyond the group there are no regulated relations at all, so that such a people is really of lower social organisation—has on the whole less provision for the maintenance of order and redress of wrongs—than a tribe recognising a common head, but consisting of a number of such groups practising self-redress as against one another in accordance with a recognised code, for in such a tribe as has been observed there may be "public justice" within the kinsfolk though not as between one set of kinsfolk and another. Our first case, then, consists of those instances in which the enlarged family or family group and society are identical.

(2) Our second case comprises societies which have subdivisions, often but not always coincident with a kindred, protecting their own members and exercising some internal justice.

Including these two cases within the meaning of the term "justice within the primary group," we proceed, so far as our evidence allows, to distinguish the instances in which public justice extends so far but no farther, and on the basis of this distinction we make two tables. The first recognises "public justice" when confined to the primary group. The second ignores it when so limited, requiring (a) that it should be extended to a society wider than that of the family group, and (b) that it should cover the relations of any divisions which such a society may comprise. In other words, in the first table we take the narrower of the available views of what constitutes the social unity, while in the second table we take the broader. Thus in the case of the Australians—numerically the most important body concerned in this question—we take first the view that the local group is the society, and reckon all retaliation beyond it is "external"; while in the second table we take the view that the tribe is the social unit and that feuds between groups constitute a form of internal self-redress.¹

1. The difficulty in applying this definition in Australia is that the term tribe is differently used by different writers (*e.g.*, in the passage quoted above Mr. Roth uses it of the several "messmates" separately) and

Of the two tables the second gives the fairer basis of comparison between societies of different grades. For, as already remarked, in the larger societies we are often left without information as to the conditions obtaining within the primary group, whereas in the lower societies it stands out as the effective social unit. Hence in the first table many societies will figure as practising self-redress alone, although there may in fact be quite as much "public justice" within their constituent groups as is found in lower societies which do not extend beyond such groups. Moreover, this table involves the placing of justice between the nearest neighbours and kinsfolk on a level with justice as between distinct groups, and it is, in fact, precisely the difference between these two applications of justice which constitutes the principal distinction in the organisation of the simpler societies in relation to the maintenance of order. Nevertheless, it is desirable that both points of view should be exhibited, and our first table acts as a check on our second, indicating (as will be seen on comparing the two) the existence of elements of justice penetrating down to the lowest levels of social organisation.

There is, however, just this difficulty to be met. Among higher peoples it is barely possible that the cases marked as External Retaliation would in some instances be really analogous to self-redress, as between groups in, for instance, an Australian tribe. We have therefore made a third table, in which all cases of external retaliation above the Lower Hunters are reckoned under Column I, while among the Lower Hunters retaliation is not reckoned unless it be known to be between groups of the same tribe. This is done to avoid the danger of exaggerating the preponderance of retaliation among the Hunters. A comparison of Tables II. and III. shows that the discrepancy is not great, and as undoubtedly most of the "external" instances are truly external, and not comparable to the inter-group relations, the error, if any, in Table II. cannot be large.

that the limits of the tribe in the wider sense are often vague. We have no doubt that the local group is normally a member of a wider society in our sense. But we cannot always identify this society. In that case we have no alternative but to treat all dealings beyond the group as external or "foreign." But often there is clear mention of a "tribe" to which the group belongs and in general we may roughly identify this tribe with our wider society. In so doing we are on the safe side for in point of fact close social relations often extend beyond the tribal limits.

* As to the local group it is not always identical with a kindred or enlarged family—though it seems to be so in many cases—for it may contain kindreds within it. But though not identical it is in relation and tribal government closely analogous to the kindreds or clans of other peoples. Our first table emphasises the differences, our second the agreement, so far as affects justice.

The full list of peoples on which the tables are based is given in Appendix C, together with a discussion of certain difficulties and doubtful points in the classification, subject to these we arrive at the following results :—

CLASSIFICATION A.

TABLE I. JUSTICE WITHIN THE GROUP.

	Col. I.	Col. II.	Col. III.
L. H. ...	23	13½	½
H. H. ...	53	5	3
Dep. H. ...	1½	6½	1
A¹ ...	16	7	6
P¹ ...	5½	5	3
A² ...	36½	30½	23½
P² ...	5	3	7½
A³ ...	13½	38	37½

Expressing the figures in each column as a fraction of all the cases in each grade we have :—

	Col. I.	Col. II.	Col. III.
L. H.62	.36	.01
H. H.87 (.78)	.08 (.16)	.05 (.06)
[Dep. H. ...]	.17	.72	.11]
A¹55	.24	.21
P¹41	.37	.22
A²40	.34	.26
P²32	.19	.48
A³15	.43	.42

The Dependent Hunters should either be passed over or reckoned in with the Higher Hunters. The figure in brackets shows the result of the latter method.*

From Table I. we form Table II. for Justice beyond the Primary Group by taking from Cols. II. and III. cases in which public intervention in private offences is confined to the primary group. These are added to Col. I. if we have direct evidence of self-help. Otherwise they are merely deducted.¹

1. Where the conditions within the group are too vague for entry but there is clearly no organisation beyond it, *e.g.*, among the Veddas we get in Table ii an addition to col. i. In the case of the Wyandots justice within the group falls under col. iii, beyond it under col. ii.

TABLE II. JUSTICE IN THE SECONDARY GROUP.

	Col. I.	Col. II.	Col. III.
L. H. ...	$34\frac{1}{2}$	4	0
H. H. ...	53	5	3
Dep. H. ...	$1\frac{1}{2}$	$6\frac{1}{2}$	1
A ¹ ...	17	$6\frac{1}{2}$	6
P ¹ ...	$5\frac{1}{2}$	5	2
A ² ...	$36\frac{1}{2}$	$31\frac{1}{2}$	$21\frac{1}{2}$
P ² ...	5	3	$7\frac{1}{2}$
A ³ ...	$14\frac{1}{2}$	37	$36\frac{1}{2}$

Or in fractions of all cases :—

	Col. I.	Col. II.	Col. III.
L. H.9	.1	.0
H. H.87 (.78)...	.08 (.16)...	.05 (.06)
[Dep. H. ...]	(.17)	(.72)	(.11)]
A ¹58	.22	.20
P ¹44	.40	.16
A ²41	.35	.24
P ²32	.19	.48
A ³16	.42	.41

Finally, we subjoin for comparison Table III., in which above the Lower Hunters cases of external retaliation are reckoned as affecting justice.

TABLE III. JUSTICE, RECKONING EXTERNAL RETALIATION.

	Col. I.	Col. II.	Col. III.
L. H. ...	$34\frac{1}{2}$	4	0
H. H. ...	56	5	3
Dep. H. ...	$1\frac{1}{2}$	$6\frac{1}{2}$	1
A ¹ ...	18	$6\frac{1}{2}$	6
P ¹ ...	$5\frac{1}{2}$	6	1
A ² ...	$37\frac{1}{2}$	$33\frac{1}{2}$	$19\frac{1}{2}$
P ² ...	5	3	$7\frac{1}{2}$
A ³ ...	$16\frac{1}{2}$	38	$35\frac{1}{2}$


Or in fractions of all cases :—

	Col. I.	Col. II.	Col. III.
L. H.9	.1	.0
H. H.88 (.79)...	.08 (.16)...	.05 (.05)
Dep. H.17	.72	.11
A ¹59	.21	.20
P ¹44	.48	.08
A ²41	.37	.22
P ²32	.19	.48
A ³18	.42	.39


The Dependent Hunters, being either reckoned with the Higher Hunters or omitted, it will be seen that in Table I. the first column descends steadily from the Lower Hunters to A³, except for a sharp rise in the Higher Hunters. Col. III., regular justice, at the same time rises from '01 to '48 in the highest pastoral, which is slightly above the higher agricultural stage in this respect. Col. II., on the other hand, is irregular, as it gains from Col. I. but loses to Col. II. through the advance of justice. The only serious deviation from the correlation of justice with the economic grade in this table is the excess of the Higher over the Lower Hunters in Col. I. In the second table this disappears, and the only interesting irregularity here is the somewhat high figure in Col. III. for the lowest agriculture.

As explained above, the safest measure of the correlation between justice and economic development is to be obtained by taking the fraction derived from Table II., Table III. indicating the narrow limits of any possible error that may have arisen by classing retaliation among the higher peoples as external, which might, perhaps, correspond to the inter-group retaliation of the Australians.

The results of Tables I. and II. may be shown in graphic form :



JUSTICE IN THE WIDER SOCIETY. I.



Dotted lines show the effect of including Dependent with Higher Hunters.

CLASSIFICATION B.

Perhaps the only serious element of uncertainty in the above tables concerns the borderland between Cols. I. and II. Some slight amount of "public assistance" may be given or "public punishment" inflicted in a system which is mainly retaliatory, and a reference to Appendix C will show the difficulties which we have met in classifying certain societies on this account. In fact, it is hardly likely that a small and homogeneous society could be wholly indifferent to wrongs done among its members, with all the possible consequences to internal peace. It is perhaps only when strongly organised kinsfolk are found within a community resolute to act for themselves and capable of resenting interference by others that redress is, as a matter of principle, left in their hands. We may suspect that if we had fuller information we should find some form of public intervention more frequent than appears in our tables. Further, there is a measure of intervention implied in regulated fights and expiatory ordeals, and in what was called "arbitration." We have therefore checked the above tables by a slightly different arrangement. We now make a fourfold classification by dividing our first two columns into three.

Col. I. contains the cases in which we have no evidence that private wrongs are treated as matters for public intervention. Thus

it includes instances of Self-redress and No Law (whether with or without public punishment for Sacral and Tribal offences and "Occasional" Public Justice).

Col. II. is that in which self-redress appears as the real basis of Justice but is qualified by some measure of public intervention. We refer to this column (1) cases of regulated or expiatory combats, (2) cases of Arbitration combined with evidence of self-redress, (3) cases of public assistance to, or control of self-redress, or of the public punishment of some "private" offences *when these are combined with the existence of pure self-redress*.

Col. III. is that in which public intervention is, in as far as our information goes, the leading feature, but is not complete. Here we have two subordinate groups, (a) those in which there is public assistance or control or the public punishment of some private offences *with no mention of any pure self-redress*; (b) those in which a regular public system is established but self-redress is still tolerated as a more or less admitted practice. These cases are removed from Column II. because in them Public Justice has become a complete system independent of the private avenger, although his irregular proceedings may still be countenanced. For the same reason these cases stand nearer to full Public Justice than those of group (a), though they have not been formed into a separate column to avoid too much subdivision.

Column IV. contains the cases in which Public Justice is the regular system.

The following Table gives the number of peoples in each column for each economic grade. The lists on which the numbers are based will be found in Appendix C. The decimal in brackets after each figure shows what fraction it is of all cases in its grade.

	I.	II.	III.	IV.
L. H. ...	10 $\frac{1}{2}$ (.29)	19 (.53)	6 (.17)	$\frac{1}{2}$ (.01)
H. H. ...	38 (.62)	18 (.30)	2 (.03)	3 (.05)
Dep. H.	1 $\frac{1}{2}$ (.17)	1 (.11)	5 $\frac{1}{2}$ (.61)	1 (.11)
A ¹ ...	13 (.44)	6 (.21)	4 (.14)	6 (.21)
P ¹ ...	3 $\frac{1}{2}$ (.26)	4 (.30)	3 (.22)	3 (.22)
A ² ...	31 $\frac{1}{2}$ (.35)	15 (.17)	20 $\frac{1}{2}$ (.23)	23 $\frac{1}{2}$ (.26)
P ² ...	3 (.19)	3 (.19)	2 (.13)	7 $\frac{1}{2}$ (.48)
A ³ ...	9 (.10)	14 $\frac{1}{2}$ (.16)	28 (.31)	37 $\frac{1}{2}$ (.42)

Combining the first and second columns in which self-redress

preponderates, and the third and fourth in which public justice preponderates, we get the following fractions:—

	I. & II.		III. & IV.	
L. H.8218
H. H.92 (84)*08 (.16)*
Dep. H.2872
A ¹6634
P ¹5644
A ²5149
P ²3961
A ³2674

* The figures in brackets show the effect of including the Dependent Hunters with the Higher Hunters.

To obtain the corresponding figures for justice beyond this group we transfer from a higher to a lower column cases in which the elements of public justice are found within the group alone,

The principal effect is to include all the Asiatic Lower Hunters in column I., to transfer several Australian tribes from column III. to column II., and to add several more Australians to column II. Above the Lower Hunters alterations are few. Details are given in Appendix C.


The figures are:—

	I.	II.	III.	IV.
L. H. ...	18½ (.40)	27 (.58)	1 (.02)	0
H. H. ...	38 (.62)	18 (.30)	2 (.03)	3 (.05)
Dep. H. ...	1½ (.17)	1 (.11)	5½ (.61)	1 (.11)
A ¹ ...	14 (.48)	6 (.21)	3 (.10)	6 (.21)
P ¹ ...	3½ (.28)	4 (.32)	3 (.24)	2 (.16)
A ² ...	31½ (.35)	16 (.18)	20½ (.23)	21½ (.24)
P ² ...	3 (.19)	3 (.19)	2 (.13)	7½ (.48)
A ³ ...	19 (.11)	15½ (.17)	27 (.30)	36½ (.41)


Combining Cols. I and II. and Cols. III. and IV. we have:—

	I. & II.		III. & IV.	
L. H.9802
H. H.92 (.84)08 (.16)
Dep. H.2872
A ¹6931
P ¹6040
A ²5347
P ²3961
A ³2971

JUSTICE IN THE SMALLER GROUP.



JUSTICE IN THE WIDER SOCIETY.



Dotted lines show the effect of including Dependent with Higher Hunters.

It will be seen in these tables that if we take the first two columns together there is a pretty uniform decline from the lowest to the highest culture, indicating a falling off in self-redress, while conversely, if we take the last two together, and still more if we take the last column alone, there is a nearly uniform increase, showing the development of public justice.

The only serious exception to this uniformity is the preponderance of the Lower Hunters in Col. II. This is due to the development in Australia of the method of mitigating vengeance by ceremonial encounter, etc. The Higher Hunters have also their method of mitigating vengeance, viz., composition. We have 25 cases of composition among those classes of Higher Hunters, 15 of which fell under Col. I. If we transfer these 15 from Col. I. to Col. II. we should have 23 cases in Col. I. and 35 in Col. II., nearly the same proportion for each column as among the Lower Hunters. We do not do this because composition does not suggest the same amount of Public Interference, but it is an alternative method of making peace.

The Australians, with no economic development, desire personal expiation as a method of avoiding vengeance. The American Hunters, of a slightly higher economic level, begin the practice of composition, which undergoes a material development in later stages.

As a still further test we have taken these four columns by continents in order to see whether the correlation repeated itself in all parts of the world. On this method some of the groups naturally are reduced to very small numbers, so that some irregularity is inevitable. Nevertheless, the correlation is clearly marked in each geographical division.

The figures are given in the following table:—

ASIA.

	I.	II.	I. and II. as Fraction of Total.	III.	IV.	III. and IV. as Fraction of Total.
L. H. ...	9	—	(1.0)	—	—	—
H. H. ...	2	2	(.67)	0	2	(.33)
A ¹ ...	3	2	(.43)	1½	5	(.57)
P ¹ ...	1	3	(.80)	0	1	(.20)
A ² ...	7½	2	(.42)	8½	4½	(.58)
P ² ...	2	1	(.5)	1	2	(.5)
A ³ ...	2	5	(.28)	12	6	(.72)
Dep. ...	1½	1	(.78)	5½	1	(.22)

AFRICA.

L. H. ...	2	—	(1.0)	—	—	—
P ¹ ...	2	1	(.5)	3	0	(.5)
A ² ...	3	7	(.37)	7	10	(.63)
P ² ...	1	2	(.32)	1	5½	(.68)
A ³ ...	4	9	(.24)	16	25	(.76)

OCEANIA.

H. H. ...	—	1	—	—	—	—
A ¹ ...	—	1	—	—	—	—
A ² ...	15	5	(.69)	5	4	(.31)
A ³ ...	—	1	—	—	—	—

NORTH AMERICA.

L. H. ...	3½	—	(1.0)	—	—	(.01)
H. H. ...	29½	14	(.94)	2	1	(.06)
A ¹ ...	7	1	(.89)	1	0	(.11)
P ¹ ...	½	—	—	—	—	—
A ² ...	2	2	(.73)	0	1½	(.27)
A ³ ...	2	0	(.27)	0	5½	(.73)

SOUTH AMERICA.

L. H. ...	1	1	(1.0)	—	—	—
H. H. ...	6½	1	(1.0)	0	0	—
A ¹ ...	4	2	(.80)	½	1	(.20)
A ² ...	4	1	(.77)	0	1½	(.23)
A ³ ...	1	0	(.5)	0	1	(.5)

Considering the small numbers which these subdivisions reach, it will be seen that the correspondence with the economic grades is remarkably close. The only groups actually out of their order are the two Pastorals in Asia, consisting of five and six members respectively, A³ in Oceania consisting of a single member and P¹ in North America a single doubtful case. On the other hand, the Dependent Hunters are quite out of their place, and if combined with the other Hunters in Asia bring the Higher Hunters just to the level of A¹. With these exceptions the subdivision is singularly even, and while we should draw no inference from results resting on small numbers when taken by themselves, we may fairly say that the correlation indicated by the two previous tables does not depend on any single region. It is, on the whole, independent of regional influences, and extends to the whole area of survey.

To sum up. Of the Lower Hunters there are three main groups. There are forest tribes in the Malay region and Borneo and some

scattered tribes of similar life habits in Africa and South America. All of these appear to be of the nature of family groups, with very little organic relation to one another. The name of public justice is not really suitable in these cases, but it may be used for purposes of comparison and applied to those instances in which the older people keep internal order. Understanding it in this sense, we find that even within these little groups it is by no means regularly developed. There are cases of self-redress even in this primitive cell of the social organism. The next group is that of the Australians, where the primary groups are in some cases more extensive, and are loosely united in tribes; and here, too, there are many cases of self-redress within the group, as well as many of collective justice, though there are very few where public justice extends to the tribe as a whole. Lastly, there are the Californians and one or two North Americans, where the primary group is not clearly differentiated. Here again self-help predominates as far as our accounts go.

Of the Higher Hunters, far the largest number are to be found in North America, though there is also a sprinkling in South America. Here we can seldom differentiate the primary group from the little society, which is certainly more than a family group, as a rule, though perhaps less than a tribe. Throughout this area self-redress heavily predominates.

When we pass to peoples of higher culture we are, as a rule, dealing with something distinctly more than the primary group, though there may be some cases in which the contrary is true at the level of Incipient Agriculture, and this perhaps explains the somewhat high number of apparent cases of public justice or semi-public justice at this level. But, apart from these, our societies are now enlarged, and include at least a village, and often an aggregation of villages. Thus, as we ascend the scale, our social organisation is extending in two senses. First, in the most literal sense, it is including a larger population, with greater variety of groups within it. Secondly, it is extending in the sense of becoming more complete, taking on itself more and more the function of the redress of wrongs and the maintenance of order. But in appearance these two movements tend to some extent to counter one another. For order is first established, it would seem, within the little group, and then extends itself to the wider society, which contains several such groups. The consequence is, as already pointed out, that in the intermediate stages, where several groups are sufficiently alike to constitute a loose unity, we have retaliation as between them strongly developed, while the same relations between corresponding groups at a lower stage will be thought of rather as feuds or as war between separate societies than as juridical relations between members of the same society. When we guard against the difficulties

arising from this peculiarity we see that the sphere of the collective maintenance of justice, viewed as a whole, marks a steady advance from the primary group outwards. We see also that even within the primary group public justice advances upon the whole though less regularly with the advance in material culture in the tribes that we have before us, and we therefore seem justified in regarding pure self-redress as the initial stage of development, and public control as superimposed by successive stages upon that method of maintaining order. In corroboration of this view, it may be pointed out that in the Australian instances, which are the most notable of those where public control within the group is brought to bear upon private offences, the object seems clearly to be that of preventing the extension of blood vengeance. Thus in Queensland a man may avenge his own wrongs, but if he does serious injury to the offender the camp council inflicts equal injury upon him or sees that it is so inflicted. It acts in restraint, that is to say, of unauthorised aggression or of excessive vengeance. There is no question here of the suppression of homicide as such, for parents may put their children to death without question, and if a man kills his wife he only at most exposes himself to the vengeance of her relations. So again with the Yuin; deliberate murder of another man is punished, but if a man is avenging himself, no steps will be taken against him. The expiatory combats and the regulated fights of the Australians are also all of them palpably means of ending a quarrel, or marking a point beyond which it is not to go. They do not seek to punish a wrong but to arrest vengeance for wrong at a point which will save the breaking-out of a devastating fight.

The punishment of sacral and tribal offences has an important bearing upon these issues. Steinmetz and others have held that these are the first offences that were publicly punished, excepting in so far as public punishment has been adopted as a means of restraining vengeance. We have tested this theory by enumerating cases in which tribal offences are the only ones for which we have any evidence of public punishment and comparing them with the number of cases in which we have evidence of the punishment of private offences, but not of those which are tribal in character. The result is shown in the following table, which gives, in each grade of culture, the number of cases of public punishment (*a*) of tribal offences without others; (*b*) of others without tribal offences, and exhibits each number as a fraction of the total formed by the two. The numbers are small, so we have grouped (*a*) the two sets of Hunters,¹ (*b*) Agriculture¹ and the Lower Pastoral, and (*c*) the

1. The Dependent Hunters, as in other cases, stand outside the normal order, but even if we include them with the other Hunters we still have a preponderance of cases in which Tribal Offences alone are given as punishable.

Higher Pastoral and Higher Agriculture together. The result is to show that among the Hunters, the number of cases in which tribal offences alone are publicly punished is overwhelmingly greater than the number in which private offences alone are so punished, while in the higher grades the relation is reversed. This result seems to corroborate Steinmetz's view.

PUBLIC PUNISHMENT OF TRIBAL AND PRIVATE OFFENCES.

	Tribal but not Private Offences Punished.	Private but not Tribal Offences Punished.
L. H.	3	0
H. H.	11	3
Dep. H.	0	6
A ¹	3	5
P ¹	0	3
A ²	8	17
P ²	0	1
A ³	2	14

Grouping which cultures we have :

H.	14	3
Dep. H.	0	6
A ¹ and P ¹	3	8
A ²	8	17
P ² and A ²	2	15

We should not interpret the cases in which private offences alone are tabled as punishable as meaning that in reality no sacral or public offences are recognised, but rather as implying that they have ceased to play the prominent part in judicial arrangements which they occupy among the Hunters, so that they pass unrecorded.

METHODS OF PUNISHMENT.

The various forms of punishment seen in our tables reveal three methods of dealing with crime. The first, treating it as an aggression to be revenged; the second, as a trespass (whether against an individual or the community or the gods) that may be atoned; the third, as something wrong that must be put down. It may be well to compare the numbers under each of the heads specially representing these methods. For the first we take the head of Retaliation only; for the second we combine Composition and Atonement, and we include under them the ceremonial and expiatory fights of the Australians. For the third we take Public Justice alone, eliminating cases of composition and atonement. We subjoin instances of the collective or vicarious principle which tends slightly to expand with the practice of composition. The results are :—

	Retalia- tion.	Compo- sition.	Atone- ment.	Total.	Collective or Vicarious.	Public Justice.	
L. H.	44½	6	21	27	10	½	(.01)
H. H.	50½	25	1	26	10½	1	(.02)
Dep. H.	2½	2	0	2	0	1	(.11)
A ¹	17	14	1	15	9	3	(.10)
P ¹	9	10	0	10	5	2	(.16)
A ²	59	43	8	50	17	13	(.14)
P ²	8	9	1	10	5	4½	(.29)
A ³	43½	49	13	61	34	21½	(.24)

PROCEDURE.

Our information about procedure is somewhat scanty, particularly among the lower peoples. Here, wherever there is anything of the nature of public justice, our informants are generally satisfied with stating, for example, that, if the accused is found guilty, such-and-such a penalty is exacted. But what sort of enquiry is held, and by what means the guilt is ascertained, we are not informed. In Australia, indeed, the spear-throwing ordeal may be regarded as trial and punishment in one, but if we restrict the conception of a trial to something which must precede punishment, we shall omit this. There still seem to be four pretty clear, and one more doubtful, cases of something like an investigation mentioned among the Australians. With this exception, trials are hardly mentioned, until we reach the Agricultural stage, as shown in the accompanying table. The list would be very much enlarged if we included, under trial, all cases in which the use of an ordeal is recorded. We have not done this because an ordeal may be of the nature of a challenge between two parties, rather than the regular part of a procedure of a duly constituted court. On the other hand, it is probable that most of the cases of regular public justice really have trials, though they happen not to be mentioned in our authorities. Thus it is pretty certain that our table understates the extent to which judicial procedure advances in the higher stages. On the other hand, the figures as to ordeals and oaths show that the direction of this advance is towards the adoption of supernatural tests rather than of rational procedure. In this respect the higher barbarism resembles the archaic civilisation:—

	Trial.	Ordeal.	Oath.
L. H.	5	0 ¹	0
H. H.	2	1	0
Dep. H.	0	1	0
A ¹	2	3	0
P ¹	1	1	1
A ²	7	26	7
P ²	6	4	3
A ³	20	35	8

1. Australian spear-throwing ceremonies omitted.

JUSTICE AND GOVERNMENT.

Lastly, we have sought to investigate the relation between the development of justice and that of government in general. Our main difficulty here has been that government may be exercised by a council whose powers are often so loosely described that we have great difficulty in deciding whether they should be regarded as an original form of government or not. We have therefore ended by leaving the council out of the question and confining ourselves to the power of the chief alone. We have taken those cases in which the chief, whether of a smaller or larger group, is described as possessing real power, and we enter in the following table the number of cases in which a powerful chiefship is asserted at each grade in the development of justice:—

CORRELATION OF CHIEF'S POWER AND JUSTICE.
CHIEF POWERFUL.

	Col. I.		Col. II.		Col. III.
L. H. ...	0	2	0
H. H. ...	7½	2	2
Dep. ...	0	3	1
A ¹ ...	1	3	3
P ¹ ...	1	1	1
A ² ...	5	9	13
P ² ...	1	½	7
A ³ ...	2	16	27
<hr/>					
Total ...	17½ (.16)	36½ (.34)	54 (.50)

The result is to show a certain correlation, but not so much as might have been anticipated *a priori*.¹ It must, however, be

1. In some cases it is clear that, notwithstanding the despotic power of the king, he does not exert himself to suppress vengeance. Thus, among the Baquerewe (Hurel, *Anthropos*, vi, p. 94), it is distinctly stated that the king has nothing to do with justice and that the blood feud is in full vigour. More often we find the chieftainship struggling to exert its power in the suppression of disorder, thus Dorsey (*op. cit.* p. 370) speaks of punishments for drunkenness inflicted by the chief of the Omaha, but Fletcher and La Fleche (*Smiths.* xxvii, 619) show that this was due to the efforts of a single half-breed chief, and was in the end tolerated by the tribe. Among the Creeks Caleb Swan, at the end of the 18th century (*Schoolcraft*, v, p. 281), describes the introduction of whipping for horse-stealing, by a chief named McGillivray, presumably either a white man or a half-breed, who appears to have had some power as he is said to have appointed young men to punish whom he would, but yet was afraid to decide disputes for fear of vengeance. As to the whipping, Swan adds that "as in other cases" the punishment depends "at last" on the superior force of the injured clan.

remembered that we are only dealing with one organ of government, and if we were to ask how far does the general organisation of government affect the organisation of justice, the answer would certainly be: more closely than this table shows, but how much more closely we have not the means of telling in numerical terms.

Upon the whole matter we conclude that, both in extent and in internal quality, the development of social order is roughly correlated with advance in economic culture. The lowest societies are very small, and even within the smallest groups there is very often no provision for the maintenance of justice. As we advance from the Lower Hunters, we get always larger societies, and by degrees provision for the maintenance of justice within these extended groups. At our highest point we get a large proportion of the cases in which public justice is fully developed over the whole of an extensive group, and this brings us to the threshold of civilised order just as economically we have come to the point at which civilisation is usually held to begin.

L. T. HOBHOUSE.
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THE UNIVERSITY OF LOUVAIN.

Few place-names are calculated at the present time, in England at any rate, to stir up more emotion than that of Louvain. In that name is summed up so much of tragedy and loss, so much of high cultural ideals shattered by brute force, so much of scientific progress stayed by an almost incredible onslaught of apparently insensate fury, that it stands by proxy for all of valiant Belgium. And yet how many people are there at home or abroad, save in academic circles, to whom the word Louvain was, a few weeks since, little, if anything, more than meaningless? Those who have voyaged in Belgium, perhaps, will know of the quiet university town, with its treasure of sculptured monuments of the past, smiling peacefully upon the banks of the many-channelled Dyle. They will have visited the University Church of St. Peter—that beautiful, unfinished, Gothic edifice, built in the form of a cross, housing carvings, reliquaries, paintings, and most wonderful of all, the pinnacled and fairy-like structure of the Sacrament House standing to the left of its high altar. They will have admired the exquisitely carved choir stalls in St. Gertrude's—the church of so many treasured English memories; or the renaissance façades of St. Michel and the Collège du Pape. And they will remember—for it could not be forgotten—the Hôtel de Ville, that most perfect example of late Gothic architecture to be found in Europe, exquisite in the grace and elegance of its details and in the subtle harmony of its design. They will have carried away with them an image of the university buildings proper—the ancient *Halles* of the Guild of Clothworkers—frowning, sombre and ponderous, the heavy stone arches of its vast vestibule supporting the old timbers of the main storey. They may even have penetrated to the University Library above, a handsomely housed collection of some 150,000 works and hundreds of priceless manuscripts; and to the *Salle des Promotions*, in which aspirants for the highest academic honours held public disputations, defending their *thèses* before all-comers.

But even of these, to whom Louvain meant something more than a mere geographical term, few could have had the opportunity of penetrating into the intimate spirit of the place, of entering into

the palpitating life of the great university, of understanding its lofty aims and high ideals, of appreciating the part that it played in the intellectual and cultural development not only of Belgium but of the world as a whole.

Now that the venerable university buildings are undoubtedly destroyed and its library burnt; now that all which symbolized, in its highest form, the culture, the learning and the scientific progress of the Belgian people has been wantonly laid waste; now that Louvain is no longer a name known only in academic circles; it may be of interest to give a brief account of the history of the university and of its position and achievements as one of the great learned bodies of the world.

The University of Louvain was founded by Pope Martin V, on the petition of John IV of Burgundy, Duke of Brabant, in 1425. The Bull of its foundation as a *Studium Generale* prescribes that its princely patron should confer upon it those privileges and advantages which were due to an institution of the kind: and this, doubtless, he was ready enough to do; since it was in order to restore the ancient splendour of the capital of his duchy by creating there a centre of the highest learning that his petition to the Pope was originally made. In the early part of the fifteenth century, universities still had the power of drawing to themselves great numbers of scholars; and the new foundation which, in its character of *Studium Generale*, was privileged to receive and admit students from any part of the world and to create doctors who had the right to teach anywhere, quickly fulfilled its purpose. The ecclesiastical and secular authorities emulated one another in enriching the institution with privileges, property and endowments, so that it took its rank, almost from the outset, as one of the great places of learning in Europe.

The first period of the history of the university dates from its foundation in 1425 to the year 1797, when it was suppressed:—the Netherlands having been occupied two years previously to this by the French Republican troops and formally annexed by the Convention. During this period the faculties (after the creation of the faculty of theology by Pope Eugenius IV in 1431) included those of canon and civil law, medicine and arts; the last covering the ground of natural science, mathematics and philosophy, as well as that of philology, literature and history. This was the faculty of the *trivium* (grammar, rhetoric and dialectic) and the *quadrivium* (arithmetic, geometry, astronomy and music) of the mediæval

world in the broadest sense, comprehensive and encyclopædic.

But it was in law that the ancient University of Louvain first attained to pre-eminence in strongly influencing and shaping the national institutions of the country. The university law school did not, indeed, show any marked originality or departure from the texts and traditions of Roman law; but the close contact of its jurists with the courts and the administrative councils of the land had an immense effect upon the development of the national law of the realm.

Not until the rise of humanism, however, did the most brilliant day in the history of ancient Louvain dawn. If the university was justly celebrated for its jurists, it came to be reputed among the illustrious institutions of the world on account of its humanists. It was one of the chief centres of the renaissance of history and letters. Its scholars had world-wide fame, in the midst of an international culture which bound all literary Europe closely together. Our own countryman Thomas More took refuge from the persecution in England in this congenial atmosphere. Towards the close of the sixteenth century the high place occupied by his university is marked by the name of Justus Lipsius.

Nor did the ardent pursuit of the "new learning" that shed so great a lustre upon the University of Louvain exhaust its work in other fields. Rather, the spirit of humanism penetrated to the other faculties as well, and the whole university benefited by it. The mathematical sciences and philosophical disciplines found able representatives at Louvain. Natural science, medicine and surgery flourished. Minckelers, Vesalius, Van Helmont and Réga are names on the roll-call of the historic university.

As to the faculty of theology, Louvain has always been famous among the great academies. Though Baius and Jansenius threatened the calm of its tradition from within in the seventeenth century, yet the great productive activity of its members made always for an enlightened orthodoxy. Its principles were those of the schoolman and especially of St. Thomas Aquinas. Of its many famous teachers one of the most illustrious, Adrian Floris, was elevated to the papal throne in 1522 as Adrian VI.

This very rough and necessarily curtailed sketch of what may be called the first period of the University of Louvain will give some indication of the ideal set before them by those who, after the suppression of the university by the French, reconstructed it in 1834. It was an ideal of the past; but an ideal to be realised in

the future : and therefore the ancient glories of the university were to be revived in the new circumstances of the nineteenth century, which all the advance of learning and of science had made possible.

As it was founded in 1425 by Papal Bull, so in 1834 it was reconstituted by a Pope. The Bishops of Belgium, taking advantage of the constitutional freedom of education which obtains in that country, approached Pope Gregory XVI and obtained his sanction for the creation of a free Catholic institute for higher education. The establishment was first made at Malines; but shortly after this the municipality of Louvain invited the incipient reconstructed university to return to its ancient home, and handed over to it the old buildings and libraries for its use.

By dint of heroic devotion on the part of Belgian Catholics, who supplied and continued to supply the necessary funds for its establishment and development—for, it must be remembered, the university had at this time no endowments whatever—the great undertaking became an accomplished fact. From 1834 to 1914 it steadily grew and as steadily prospered. In 1834 there were only 86 students in residence. Twenty years later 600 were upon the books. This number was nearly doubled during the next twenty years, and nearly trebled by 1894. The numbers ten years later (1904) were 2,148; and last year 2,900. There were then 120 professors.

This rapid and steady expansion indicates that the Catholic University of Louvain met a very real need on the part of the country, and kept pace with the increasing demands of the Belgian people for intellectual development and scientific progress. As a university, the degrees and diplomas granted at Louvain were recognised by the State as a qualification for the exercise of those learned professions, admission to which was regulated by civil enactments. The examinations qualifying for the degrees of doctor of medicine, surgery and obstetrics, doctor of law, of philosophy and letters, of natural sciences, mathematics and civil engineering are based on programmes of courses settled and fixed by the law. To such programmes the two State universities of Belgium (Liège and Ghent) must conform. Louvain, in order to secure State recognition for its graduates, naturally complied with the existing regulations. Up to the year 1876, the degrees were conferred after examination by a *jury central*, or general board of examiners, or by a board consisting of members both of the central and of the university boards; but after that date the university board had the

power conferred upon it of giving the legal degrees without reference to the central jury.

But it did not follow because a certain minimum of study and qualification was required for the legal recognition of the degrees, that the university was in any sense tied down to the mere letter of the law. Beyond the minimum required, it was free to organise its teaching and research work to the best advantage of its students. And this was done with conspicuous success. As a free university the fuller organisation of its work in the recognised faculties was conducted on the broadest lines; and its thorough and exhaustive courses of study and instruction, together with the facilities afforded for original research, gave a quite special *cachet* to its graduates.

Besides this, a number of special schools were established leading to diplomas and degrees of a distinctly university character, which were neither regulated for nor recognised by the State. The faculty of theology was also free in the sense indicated.

But freedom from the control of State legislation in this matter by no means meant laxity of work or poverty of result. On the contrary, the conditions required of candidates for the doctorate in theology were particularly arduous. The aspirant to the *laura doctoralis*, after finishing his complete training in the seminary, was required to spend six years of study as a pupil in the faculty, and was only promoted to the degree after a series of searching examinations in the many subjects comprised in the theological course, and after having in addition presented original published dissertations and defended them before the university. It was only every two or three years or so that a doctor was created in this faculty; and the coveted distinction is one of the highest academic honours that can be reached in Europe.

The same thoroughness and exhaustiveness were characteristic as well of the special schools as of the recognised faculties. The university conferred degrees in the social and political, the political and diplomatic, the moral and historical, and the commercial and colonial sciences, as well as in higher philosophy, Oriental literature and languages, archæology, natural science, and mathematics. Diplomas were also given in agriculture, engineering, arts and manufactures, architecture, electricity, and other branches of applied science.

All these special schools and departments of the university, for the most part possessing distinct buildings, were amply provided

with appropriate libraries of standard works and periodical literature; and, in the case of the scientific branches of study, with well equipped laboratories for demonstration and research. Indeed, perhaps the most important feature of the training at Louvain consisted in the original work planned and carried out by the students, under the direction of the professors, in these schools. As nearly all the higher degrees were conferred on the merits of published and publicly defended dissertations, as well as examinations, the candidate was careful to see that he gave of his best. Public criticism is always an incentive to good work. The student worked, as has been said, under the direction of the professors of his school; and was generally obliged to submit an original written (not necessarily published) thesis as a part of his preparation for the licentiate—the degree immediately preceding the doctorate. By this means he became familiarised with methods of research and presentation of results, often several years before he presented his doctoral dissertation. In his preparation he had further the advantage of frequent *seminars*, or semi-private study circles, presided over by a professor, at which special conferences were given and papers read and discussed. The conferences were given either by professors or students of the university or by guests specially invited from other seats of learning. The papers were as a rule prepared by the students, and so arranged by the director of the *seminar* as to fit in with the courses taken by them.

All this made for the development of individuality and personal grasp on the part of the students: and much valuable published work has resulted from the system. Even if we neglect the dissertations published for the obtaining of the higher degrees, a very considerable amount of matter found its way into print in this manner.

Thus, in connection with the various schools, some thirty journals and reviews came to be founded for the publication of original research work carried out by the professors and students. Besides these periodicals, larger works, monographs, text books, and "collections" were issued from time to time; and a very considerable number of scientific and literary articles appeared in French, German and Swiss reviews and bulletins.

It would be invidious to select any one school of the university for special mention on the ground of excellence; but as Louvain is perhaps best known to scholars outside Belgium for its strongly marked neo-scholastic movement, it may be permitted to enlarge

slightly upon the work of the Higher Institute of Philosophy from which this takes its rise.

The institute is one of the special schools. It was founded by Professor—now Cardinal—Mercier, at the express wish of Pope Leo XIII, in order to prosecute the study of philosophy, and adjust the relations of scholasticism with the more modern expressions of philosophical speculation and the actual position of experimental science. The programme of studies is varied, embracing the sciences of physics, chemistry, general biology, anatomy, physiology, and psychology, as well as an exceedingly comprehensive number of courses in philosophy and the history of philosophical thought. The thoroughgoing character of this instruction will be apparent when we find in the syllabus no less than four general, two special, and a preparatory course in psychology alone, given by three professors. Here again students are greatly aided by study-circles, and have access to special libraries and laboratories—of which the psychological is one of the best equipped in the world.

The institute has its own printing works, from which is issued the extensive literature already produced by its members, noteworthy among which are the numerous volumes on philosophy by its eminent founder and his colleagues, many of the dissertations of its doctors and fellows, as well as no less than four periodical reviews, and a "collection" of the ancient philosophers of Belgium. Works coming from the psychological department are published in a series of *Travaux du Laboratoire*; and a handsome volume of *Annales de l'Institut*, consisting of some 700 pages of philosophical articles is issued year by year. The complete works of Aristotle were also in course of translation, with the addition of commentaries.

All this, which recounts but a part of the activity shown by the members of the institute, may be taken as typical of the output of the other schools.

But neo-scholasticism is in an emphatic sense the speciality of Louvain. Catholic as the university is, it was almost inevitable in such a *milieu* that the ancient heritage of scholasticism should flourish anew, in contact with current thought and adjusted to modern science. For it must not be forgotten, in any consideration of Louvain, that it is pre-eminently a Catholic university:—Catholic, as Oxford in Newman's day was Anglican; yet representative of a Catholic country in a far more complete and real sense than Oxford could ever be representative of an Anglican one. That

is an aspect of the university the neglect of which would effectually bar any insight into its life and ideals, and obliterate the very close and intimate connection that obtained between it and the life and ideals of the Belgian people as a whole. Nevertheless it was not only representative of their religious aspirations. In quite as true a sense it represented, as it helped to develop, the general culture and practical aims of a thriving industrial and commercial nation. Louvain was in every way a national university. If the Belgians could look to its faculty of theology for a scientific treatment and exposition of their religious beliefs, they could also look to its school of Brewing for a scientific exposition of the art of making their national beverage. There was scarcely a phase of national life that had not its reflection in the university, and hardly a movement in the university that did not in some way affect the life of the nation.

The English visitor to Louvain would probably be struck most by the separate colleges scattered here and there throughout the town; and his thought would naturally turn to our own ancient universities of Oxford and Cambridge. But he would be wrong if he imagined that there was any very great similarity between them and the Belgian university in manner of life or system of study.

The great majority of Louvain students did not live in the colleges, but in lodgings in the town. Some even dwelt so far away as Brussels or Malines, or even Antwerp, coming thence every day to the university for their work. As to the Louvain system of study, that has already been outlined. But it may be said that it was more like that of a German than of an English university:—with the exception, perhaps, of post-graduate work done here. Always under the direction of the professors, but none the less always aiming at the development of distinct originality on the part of the students, individual work was everywhere encouraged. And, while societies and clubs, no less than the community of their academic interests drew the members of the university closely together, the serious character of the work was never lost sight of.

Louvain had an *ethos* peculiarly its own—social and academic: an *ethos* of culture, a spirit of scientific investigation and, above all, of supreme self-reliance. This, of course, must have been experienced to be fully appreciated. But its influence is to be felt even in the publications issuing from the university, of which the extraordinary output will compare favourably in number, variety of subject, and excellence, with that of any other learned body.

We may trust and hope that the virility and the vitality of the Belgian people will rise once more to strenuous effort when this lamentable war has come to an end; and that from its fires and devastation the University of Louvain will be reborn, to labour once again in the indomitable spirit of the past at its work of learning, progress and culture with its old high ideals and the same conspicuous success.

F. AVELING.



THE DUBLIN SCHOOL OF CIVICS.

The past summer, stormy and momentous for all Europe, has been so in a peculiar degree for Ireland, and particularly for Dublin. Although, before the War, nation and city were at a crisis of their history—indeed, largely because of this—Dublin organised its first Civic Exhibition, and within the exhibition the first Summer School of Civics.

The School opened on July 27, the day after the tragedy of the shooting in Dublin streets; war was declared with Germany at the beginning of its second week; and in the third week students were attending three or four of its meetings a day and drilling with National Volunteers and ambulance corps in the intervals. Nevertheless the School not only completed its advertised three-weeks course, but continued through a fourth week.

The School of Civics was under the direction of Professor Patrick Geddes, and was organised by co-operation between Dublin and the Outlook Tower, Edinburgh. Financial grants were made to it by the Civic Exhibition and the Irish Department of Agriculture and Technical Instruction (which also sent many students, paying their fees), while the Irish National School Board sent students during the fourth week. Many notable lecturers, of Dublin and elsewhere, gave their services freely in order to make the syllabus as complete as possible.

The first week's course, arranged by the Edinburgh Committee, was concerned with the approach to Civics in education by means of Regional Survey. The lectures of Professor Geddes and Dr. Fleure (of Aberystwith) were combined with discussions on subjects of the present school curriculum, opened mainly by English and Scottish teachers. These were supplemented by an excursion for the synthetic study of the Liffey Basin, from a point on the Dublin Mountains. The landscape was described and interpreted: geographically and geologically by Mr. C. B. Fawcett (Southampton); botanically by Professor Houston (Dublin); anthropologically by Dr. Fleure, Professor Geddes, as sociologist, summing up. During the first week also Professor Grenville Cole lectured on the geology of the region; and Miss Hardy gave an example of an advanced survey, geographic and civic, in a lecture on Salisbury. Mr. Valentine Bell followed up a description of the Lambeth survey by organising the work on Dublin, making a comprehensive beginning of a survey on lines suitable for use in elementary schools.

During the second week the regional study was extended, Professor Geddes lecturing daily upon Occupations and their ethics, from primitive times to the industrial age. The third week was devoted to the ideals and responsibilities of citizenship, the studies receiving both stimulus and definite direction from the course of recent events and the official revelation of conditions in the city. Public health, housing, and questions of food supply were dealt with by Dublin experts, and lectures on Co-operation were given by members of the Irish Agricultural Organisation Society. Professor Geddes's lectures on Regional and City Survey were continued during the fourth week. During the whole period frequent conferences were held, some of them jointly with the Conference for City Promotion organised by Dr. Ratzel and other American visitors. At the conference of August 14, with Her Excellency the Countess of Aberdeen in the chair, the School of Civics formed itself into a committee for the School of Civics 1915. This committee proceeded to take steps for the carrying on of regional surveys and the practice and teaching of Civics in centres all over Ireland. Lady Aberdeen is president, Professor Geddes chairman, and Mr. W. Scott honorary secretary.

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Material Culture and Social Institutions of the Simpler Peoples

BY

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AND
M. GINSBERG

CLASSIFIED LIST OF PEOPLES
AND
BIBLIOGRAPHY

LONDON
SHERRATT AND HUGHES
Manchester : 34 Cross Street

CLASSIFIED LIST OF PEOPLES.

The full list of the peoples referred to each grade of culture is given in the left-hand column. In the right-hand column will be found the short titles of the principal authorities relied upon for each people. For the full titles of authorities, see Bibliography. Authorities used for groups of peoples collectively are not entered unless they make special reference to one or more of the names in this list.

ASIA.

LOWER HUNTERS.

Peoples.	Authorities.
Kubu - - -	Forbes, Hagen.
(1) Semang - - -	Skeat and Blagden, Martin, Annandale.
(1) Sakai - - -	Skeat and Blagden, Martin, Annandale.
Negritos Camarines -	Blumentritt.
Negritos Negros -	Blumentritt.
Negritos Angat -	Meyer.
Negritos Albay -	Blumentritt.
Negritos Dumagat -	Blumentritt.
Negritos Alabat -	Meyer.
Andamans - - -	Man.
Punan - - -	Hose.

NORTH AMERICA.

Lower Californians -	Bancroft.
Guaycuru - - -	Bancroft.
Cochimis - - -	Bancroft.
Pericui - - -	Bancroft.
Miwok - - -	Powers.
Wintun - - -	Powers.
Patwin - - -	Powers.
Shoshones - - -	Bancroft, Remy.

SOUTH AMERICA.

Botocudos - - -	Keane, Ehrenreich, Hartt, Tschudi zu Wied.
Fuegians - - -	Hyades and Deniker, Garson.

AFRICA.

Batua - - -	Hutereau, H. H. Johnston, Stuhlmann, David.
Bushmen - - -	Stow, Fritsch, Passarge, Lichtenstein, Burchell, Moffat.
Mucassequeres -	Serpa Pinto.

AUSTRALIA.

Swan River - - -	Salvado.
N.W.C. Queensland -	Roth.
Bungyarlee - - -	Bonney.
Dieri - - -	Gason in B. Smyth, Howitt.
Yerwaka & Yantrawanta - - -	Howitt.
Goulburn - - -	Le Souëf in B. Smyth.
Narrinjerri - - -	Taplin in Woods.
Kaiaabara - - -	Howitt.
Turra - - -	Kühn in Fison and Howitt.
Maryborough - - -	Howitt.
N.S. Wales (Some) -	Fraser.
Kamilaroi - - -	Fraser, Howitt, Fison, Ridley.
Geawegal - - -	Howitt, Rusden in Fison and Howitt.

AUSTRALIA.

Peoples.	Authorities,
Euahlayi - - -	Parker.
Port Jackson - -	Collier.
N.S. Wales (Some) -	Ridley.
Perth & W. Australians - - -	Grey, Bates, Brown.
Powell's Creek -	Fraser, J. R.
Port Lincoln - -	Wilhelmi in B. Smyth, Schürman in Woods.
Port Darwin - -	Cranford, Foelsche.
Tongaranka - -	Howitt.
Turbal - -	Howitt.
W. Victoria - -	Dawson.
Kurnai - -	Howitt, Bulmer in B. Smyth.
Waimbaio - -	Howitt, Bulmer in Fison and Howitt.
Wiradjuri - -	Howitt.
Wotjobaluk - -	Howitt.
Mukjarawint - -	Howitt.
Yara Yara - -	Howitt.
Wurunjerri - -	Howitt.
Wudthaurung - -	Howitt.
Bangerang - -	Curr.
Yuin - -	Howitt.
Riverina - -	Beveridge.
King George's Sound	Jones.
Gringai - -	Howitt.
Chepara - -	Howitt.
Central Australians -	Spencer and Gillen.
Northern Australians	Spencer and Gillen.
Ngumba - -	R. H. Mathews.
Kabi & Waaka - -	Curr, J. Mathews.
Herbert River - -	Lumholtz.
Tasmanians - -	Ling Roth.
Queensland - -	Lang.
Buntamura - -	Howitt.
Watchandee - -	Oldfield.
Ngurla - -	Curr.
Newcastle - -	Curr.
Wayook - -	Curr.
Ballardong - -	Curr.
Koynup & Etecup -	Curr.
Yerkla Mining - -	Howitt, Curr.
Warburton River -	Paul in Curr.
Milya Uppa - -	Reed in Curr.
Belyando River - -	Curr.
N. Queensland - -	Roth.
Jupagalk - -	Howitt.
Narrangi - -	Howitt.
E. Victoria - -	R. H. Mathews.
Darling River - -	Bonney.
Gournditchmara -	Dawson, Stähle in Fison and Howitt.
Encounter Bay - -	Howitt.
Mycoolon - -	Meyer in Woods.
Tatuthi - -	Palmer.
Theddora - -	Howitt.
Wolgal - -	Howitt.
Wallaroi - -	Howitt.
Wakelbura - -	Howitt.

AUSTRALIA.

Peoples.	Authorities.
S. Queensland -	Howitt.
Wide Bay -	Howitt.
Bunalong -	Howitt.

NORTH AMERICA. HIGHER HUNTERS.

Coast Salish -	Niblack, Hill-Tout, Boaz.
Kwakiutl -	Niblack, Boaz.
Nootka -	Niblack, Boaz, Bancroft.
Tsimshian -	Boaz, Niblack.
Thlinket -	Bancroft, Swanton, Boaz, Niblack.
Haida -	Niblack, Harrison, Bancroft, Boaz.
Unalaska Aleuts -	Wemiaminov in Petroff, Bancroft.
Athka Aleuts -	Yakof in Petroff.
Loucheux -	Hill-Tout, Hardisty.
Kutchin -	Hill-Tout, Bancroft, Strachan Jones.
Chepewayans -	Hill-Tout, Bancroft, Ross.
Tsekhene -	Hill-Tout, Morice, Bancroft.
E. Nahane -	Hill-Tout, Morice.
W. Nahane -	Hill-Tout, Morice.
Chilcotin -	Hill-Tout, Morice, Boaz.
Carriers -	Hill-Tout, Morice.
Similkameen -	Allison.
Luisenos -	-
Lkungen -	Hill-Tout, Boaz.
Lilooct -	Hill-Tout, Teit.
Halokmelen -	Hill-Tout.
Blackfeet -	Grinnell, Macklean, J., Wilson.
Etechemins -	"Jesuit Relations" (esp. vols. 2 & 3).
Micmacs or (Souriquois) -	"Jesuit Relations," vol. i.
Montagnais -	"Jesuit Relations," vols. i and iv, 6.
Ottawa -	"Jesuit Relations," vol. 51.
Eskimo (Greenland) -	Nansen.
Eskimo (Western) -	Bancroft.
Eskimo (Pt. Barrow) -	Murdoch.
Eskimo (Behring Straits) -	Nelson.
Eskimo (Central) -	Boaz.
Eskimo (Labrador) -	Turner.
Kenai -	Bancroft.
E. Shushwap -	Boaz, Teit.
W. Shushwap -	Boaz, Teit.
Nez Percés -	Maclean, J.
Kariaks -	Bancroft.
Malemutes -	Bancroft.
Other Koniagas -	Bancroft.
Sarcees -	Maclean, J., Wilson.
Tsitsaut -	Boaz.
Kowitchen -	Boaz.
Bellacoola -	Boaz.
Niska -	Boaz.
Heiltsuk -	Boaz.
Kootenay -	Chamberlain, Boaz.
Klamaths of Oregon -	Gatschet.
Kiowa -	Mooney.
Seri -	McGee.

NORTH AMERICA.

Peoples.	Authorities.
Kiskakong - -	"Jesuit Relations," 52.
Crees - -	"Jesuit Relations," 66 and 68, Hodge, Schoolcraft.
Apache - -	Loew, Schoolcraft, vol. 5, Bancroft.
Comanche - -	De Cassac, Tenkate, Bancroft, Schoolcraft, 2.
N. Mexicans - -	Bancroft.
Thompson River - -	Teit and Boaz.
Assiniboina - -	Dorsey, Macklaine.
Omaha - -	Dorsey, Fletcher.
Karok - -	Powers, Kroeber.
Yurok - -	Kroeber.
Tolowa - -	Powers.
Hupa - -	Powers, Goddard.
Petawet - -	Powers.
Pomo - -	Powers.
Gallino Mero - -	Powers.
Gualala - -	Powers.
Wappo - -	Powers.
Shastika - -	Powers, Kroeber.
Pit River - -	Powers.
Nishinan - -	Powers.
Yokuts - -	Powers.
S. Californians - -	Bancroft, Kroeber.
Kelta - -	Powers.
Yuki - -	Powers.
Makh-el-Chel - -	Powers.
Lassiks - -	Powers.
Modoks - -	Powers.
Kombo - -	Powers.

SOUTH AMERICA.

Auca - -	Azara, D'Orbigny.
Puelches - -	D'Orbigny.
Abipones - -	Dobrizhofer.
Coroados - -	Hensel, Featherman.
Puri - -	zu Wied, von Martius.
Zaparo - -	Simson, Markham.
Guaycuru - -	von Martius, Azara, Serra, Church.
Charrua - -	D'Orbigny, Heusser, Azara, Featherman.
Goyatacaz - -	von Martius, Eschwege.
Mura - -	von Martius, Wallace.
Macovi & Vilela - -	De Brettes, Gonzalaz, Hutchinson.
Tehuelches - -	Musters, D'Orbigny.
Minuare - -	Azara.
Payuga - -	Azara.
N. Chaco - -	De Brettes.
Topanaz - -	Eschwege.
Paumaris - -	von Martius, Wallace.
Goyanaz - -	von Martius, Eschwege.
Akkek - -	De Brettes.
Pitagoa - -	Eschwege.

ASIA.

Ghiliaks - -	Deniker.
Tuski - -	Nordenskjöld.
Nicobarese - -	Svoboda.
Manobos Rio Bay - -	Blumentritt.

ASIA.

Peoples.	Authorities.
Italmen - - -	Steller.
Gold - - -	Laufer.
Perak Sakai - -	Skeat and Blagden.
Keddah Semang -	Skeat and Blagden.

OCEANIA.

Kauralaig - -	Haddon.
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AFRICA.

Wagenia - - -	Coquilhat.
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ASIA.

DEPENDENT HUNTERS.

Yanadi - - -	Thurston, Shortt.
Beriya - - -	Crooke.
(3) Bhuiyar - - -	Crooke.
Korwa - - -	Crooke.
Niadi - - -	Rowney.
Kardar - - -	Fryer.
Bataks of Palawan -	Venturillo, Miller.
Katodi - - -	Wilson.
Chenchu - - -	Newbold.
(Atkwar & Nundail) -	
Bonthuks - - -	
Korumba - - -	Thurston.
Irulas - - -	Shortt, Thurston.
Villee - - -	Shortt.

ASIA.

AGRICULTURE I.

(16) Ainu - - -	St. John, Batchelor, von Brandt, Hol- land.
Bheels - - -	Hunter, Crooke.
Lushai - - -	Lewin, Shakespear.
Other Kuki - - -	Dalton, Lewin, Shakespear.
Soligas - - -	Rowney.
Jakun - - -	Favre.
Negritos of Zambales	Reed, Blumentritt, Meyer.
Manobos Agusan -	Blumentritt.
Zambales or Tinos -	Blumentritt ("Versuch einer Ethnog.")
Paniyans - - -	Thurston ("Anthropology").
Arunese - - -	Rosenberg.
Orang Bukit - - -	Knocker, Grabowsky.
Mantra - - -	Borie.
Marea - - -	Dalton.
Juang - - -	Dalton.
Kubu - - -	Forbes, Hagen.
Candios - - -	Moura.
Perak Sakai - - -	Skeat and Blagden.
Central Sakai - - -	Wilkinson.
Kuala Kurnam Sakai -	Knocker.
Birhor - - -	Dalton.
Veddah - - -	Seligmann.
Abkhases - - -	Chantre.
Bygas - - -	Forsyth.
Santals - - -	Risley, Hunter.
Keddah Semang - -	Skeat and Blagden.

NORTH AMERICA.

Mohave - - -	Kroeber.
Delaware - - -	Loskiel, Heckewälder, Brinton.
Iroquois - - -	Loskiel, "Jesuit Relations," Morgan, Heckewälder.

NORTH AMERICA.

Peoples.	Authorities.
Ojibways - - -	Warren, Jones.
Algonquins of Quebec - - -	"Jesuit Relations," vols. 2, 3, 5, 6.
Hurons - - -	"Jesuit Relations," vols. 10 and 28.
Abnauqui - - -	"Jesuit Relations," vols. 25 and 67, Maurault.
Dakota - - -	Schoolcraft, Riggs, Dorsey.
Hidatsa - - -	Dorsey.
Iowa - - -	Dorsey.
Mandan - - -	Dorsey, Lewis and Clarke.
Isthmians - - -	Bancroft, Featherman.
Guaymi - - -	Pinart.
Winnebagos - - -	Schoolcraft, vol. 4.

SOUTH AMERICA.

Guana - - -	von Martius, Azara, Serra.
Lengua - - -	Grubb, Hawtrey.
Yuracares - - -	Halten, von, D'Orbigny.
Paravilhana - - -	von Martius, Sampaio.
Mauhes - - -	von Martius.
Marana - - -	von Martius.
Ucayali - - -	von Martius.
Mbevaera - - -	Dobrizhofer.
(4) Karayaki - - -	Ehrenreich.
Ipurina - - -	Ehrenreich.
Mataguayos - - -	D'Orbigny.
Roucoyennes - - -	Coudreau.
Charantes - - -	von Martius.
Coropo - - -	von Martius.
Manao - - -	von Martius.
Matacco - - -	D'Orbigny, Pelleschi, Thouar, Gon- zalaz.
Shingu - - -	Steinen.
British Guiana - - -	Im Thurm.
Macusi - - -	von Martius.
Ité - - -	D'Orbigny.
Arecuna - - -	von Martius.
Canea & Antioquia - - -	White.
Miranha - - -	von Martius.
Arawak - - -	von Martius, Im Thurm.
(5) Paumaris - - -	

OCEANIA.

W. Torres Straits - - -	Haddon.
Baining - - -	Parkinson.

ASIA.

PASTORAL I.

Aeneze - - -	Burchhardt.
Kurds of Eriwan - - -	von Stenin.
Yourouks - - -	Bent.
Toda - - -	Metz, Rivers.
Samoyedes - - -	von Stenin, Featherman.
(18) Abakan Tartars - - -	Radlov.
Chewssures - - -	Seidlitz, Erckert.
Kabards - - -	Chantre.
Buriats - - -	Melnikow.
Shahsewenses - - -	Radde.
Ostyak - - -	Pallas.
Biloch - - -	Crooke.

NORTH AMERICA.

Peoples.	Authorities.
Navahos - -	Schoolcraft, Mindeleff, Bancroft.

SOUTH AMERICA.

Tobas - -	D'Orbigny, Thouar, Gonzalaz.
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AFRICA.

Beni Amer - -	Munzinger.
(13) Massai - -	Hollis.
Colonial Hottentots -	Fritsch, Kohler.
Khoi-Khoi - -	Wanderer in Steinmetz, Kohler.
(7) Batauana - -	Passarge.
Dinka - -	Seligmann, Sullivan.
Ovaherero - -	Dannert, Hartland.
Mundombe - -	Magyar.
Wambugu - -	Kohler.
Korana - -	Fritsch.

AFRICA.

AGRICULTURE II.

Bageshu - -	Roscoe.
Basoga - -	Cunningham.
Wafiomi - -	Baumann.
Wambugwe - -	Baumann.
Bateke - -	Guiral.
Warega - -	Delhaise in Overbergh.
Mayombe - -	Overbergh and Jonge.
Mangbetu - -	Overbergh and Jonge.
Bangala - -	Overbergh and Jonge.
Bali - -	Hutter.
Mandja - -	Gaud in <i>Overbergh</i> .
Tuchilange - -	Wissmann.
Mundombe - -	Magyar.
Azande - -	"Annales du Musée du Congo."
Baquiri - -	Leuschner in Steinmetz.
Bondei - -	Dale, Kohler.
Wanyaturu - -	Baumann.
Wawira - -	Stuhlmann.
Maravis - -	Peters.
Banyai - -	Livingstone.
Ouissama - -	Price.
Angoni - -	Wiese.
Lendu - -	Stuhlmann.
Latuka - -	Stuhlmann.
Kunama & Barea -	Munzinger.
Fang - -	Bennett, Lenz.
(12) Yaunde - -	Zenker.
Niam Niam - -	Schweinfurth.
(15) Ba-yanzi - -	Torday and Joyce.
Banaka & Bapuku -	Oertzen in Steinmetz.
Wadoc - -	Stuhlmann.
Baluba - -	Wissmann.
Adio - -	"Musée du Congo."
Abandia - -	"Musée du Congo."
Gallinas - -	Harris.
Waheiei - -	von Schele.
Bakongo - -	Ward.
Azimba - -	Angus.
Wajiji - -	Hore.
Banyang - -	Hutter.
Bakundu - -	Hutter and Conrau.

AFRICA.

Peoples.	Authorities.
Mabum - - -	Hutter and Conrau.
Batom - - -	Hutter.
Oupoti - - -	Ward.
Mpongwe - - -	Buchholtz.
Monbutu - - -	Schweinfurth.
(13) Masai - - -	Hollis.

NORTH AMERICA.

Seminole - - -	Maccauley.
Pawnees - - -	Farrand, Grinnell.
Creeks - - -	Bartram, Hawkins, Caleb Swan.
Woolwa - - -	Wickham.
Natchaz - - -	"Jesuit Relations," vol. 68.
Illinois - - -	"Jesuit Relations," vol. 51, Charle- voix, de.
Wyandot - - -	Powell.
Porto Rico - - -	Fewkes.
Towka - - -	Bancroft.
Continental Caribs - - -	Bancroft.
Caribs - - -	de Rochefort.
Tarahumare - - -	Lumholtz.
Tepehuanes - - -	Lumholtz.
Huicols - - -	Lumholtz.

SOUTH AMERICA.

(4) Sambioa - - -	Ehrenreich.
Guarayo - - -	von Martius, D'Orbigny.
Mundrucu - - -	von Martius.
Uaupe - - -	von Martius, Wallace.
Chiquito - - -	D'Orbigny.
Moxo - - -	D'Orbigny.
Bororo - - -	Fric and Radin.
Jivaro - - -	Simson, Markham.
Apiaca - - -	von Martius.
Jumana - - -	von Martius.
Chambioza - - -	Castelnau.
Chiriguano - - -	D'Orbigny, Church.
Gagua - - -	Castelnau.
Manctaneres - - -	Markham.
Tapuya - - -	"Jesuit Letters."
(10) Yonca & Boni - - -	Coudreau.
(6) Ges - - -	von Martius.
Icanna - - -	von Martius, Wallace.
Guato - - -	von Martius, Castelnau.
Campas - - -	Ordinaire, D'Orbigny, Urquhart.
Tapui - - -	Thouar.
Cureto - - -	Wallace, Markham.
Paressi - - -	Steinen.
Uanambua - - -	Wallace.
Miranha - - -	Castelnau.
Mocetenes - - -	D'Orbigny.
Senci - - -	Smith and Low.

OCEANIA.

Murray Islands - - -	Haddon.
S. Melanesians - - -	Codrington.
Florida - - -	Codrington.
Bugotu - - -	Codrington.
S.E. Solomons - - -	Guppy.
Saa - - -	Codrington.

OCEANIA.

Peoples.	Authorities.
Malo . . .	Denian.
Koita . . .	Seligmann.
Roro . . .	Seligmann.
Mekeo . . .	Seligmann.
Waga Waga & Tubi- Tubi . . .	Seligmann.
Bartle Bay . . .	Seligmann.
Trobriand Island . . .	Seligmann.
Marshall Bennett . . .	Seligmann.
Woodlark Islands . . .	Seligmann.
Louisiades . . .	Seligmann.
New Hebrides . . .	Codrington, Williams, Agostini.
New Caledonians . . .	Atkinson, Moncelon, de Vaux.
Gazelle Peninsula . . .	Parkinson.
Sulka, Neu Pommern . . .	Parkinson, Hahl.
N. New Macklenburg . . .	Parkinson.
S. New Mecklenburg . . .	Parkinson.
Moanu . . .	Parkinson.
Motu . . .	Turner.
Mowat . . .	Beardman.
Naaibui . . .	d'Albertis.
Bogadjim . . .	Hagen, Hoffman.
Macklay Coast . . .	Miclucko, Macklay.
Mafulu . . .	Williamson.
Jabim . . .	Vetter.
Caroline Islands . . .	Christian, Gräffe.
Marshall Islands . . .	Kohler.
Peleu Islands . . .	Kubary.
Gilbert Islands . . .	Parkinson.
Maoris . . .	Tregear, Taylor, Meinicke, Brown.
Rotumians . . .	Gardiner, Meinicke.
Tongans . . .	Meinicke, West.
Rarotongans . . .	Meinicke.
Hawaiians . . .	Marcuse, Meinicke, Ellis.
Tahitians . . .	Ellis, Meinicke.
Marquesas . . .	Meinicke.
Fijians . . .	Williams, Fison.
Savage Islands . . .	Thomson, B.
Torres Group . . .	Rannie.
St. Christeval . . .	Vergnet.
Samoa . . .	Turner, G., Krämer, Meinicke, von Bülow.

ASIA.

Paharia . . .	Dalton, Rowney.
Kandhs . . .	Dalton, Hunter.
Kachari . . .	Dalton.
Limbus & Korantes . . .	Dalton, Risley.
Chackma . . .	Risley, Lewin.
Kols . . .	Rowney, Man, Crooke.
N. W. Kols . . .	Crooke.
Kharwar . . .	Crooke.
Majhwar . . .	Crooke.
Gonds . . .	Crooke, Forsyth, Rowney.
Dhimals . . .	Hodgson.
Maghs . . .	Risley.
Kaupui Nagas . . .	Watt.
Kolya Nagas . . .	Watt.
Ao Nagas . . .	Godden.

ASIA.

Peoples.	Authorities.
Lhota Nagas	- Godden.
Soma Nagas	- Godden.
Lahupa Nagas	- Godden.
Sea Dyaks	- Ling Roth, Hose and McDougall.
Land Dyaks	- Ling Roth.
Nicobarese	- Man, Svoboda, Solomon.
Waralis	- Wilson.
Dodonga	- Zollinger.
Mentawez	- Rosenberg.
Arunese	- Rosenberg.
Irulas	- Thurston, Shortt.
Kiangans	- Blumentritt.
(17) Teleuts	- Radlov.
Red Karens	- Colquhoun.
Samales	- Schadenberg.
Bontoc	- Schadenberg, Jenks.
Tagals	- Blumentritt.
Subanos	- Blumentritt.
Dophla	- Dalton.
Oraons	- Dalton, Hewitt.
Pani Kocch	- Dalton, Hodgson.
Santals	- Risley, Hunter.
Tharu, N.W.	- Crooke.
Tharu, Bengal	- Risley.
Khonds	- Rowney, McPherson.
Kei	- Rosenberg.
Flores	- Riedel.
Engano	- Rosenberg.
Italones	- Blumentritt ("Versuch einer Ethnog.")
Catalanganes	- Blumentritt ("Versuch einer Ethnog.")
Calingas	- Blumentritt.
Lepcha	- Dalton, Risley.
Toungtha	- St. John, Lewin.
Tipperah	- Lewin.
Guinane	- Schadenberg.
Milanau	- Ling Roth, Hose.
Orang Bukit	- Knocker.
Muruts	- Ling Roth, Hose and McDougall.
Badjus	- Posewitz.
Boksas	- Stewart.
Pathan	- Crooke.
Kami	- Lewin.

ASIA.

PASTORAL +.

Larbas	- Geoffroy.
Uzbegs	- Vambéry.
Midhi	- Dalton.
(2) Turcomans	- Featherman, Stein, Hagenmeister, Moser.
Kazak Kirghiz	- Radlov, Levschin, Hagenmeister.
Kara Kirghiz	- Radlov.
Yakuts	- Summers.
Altaian Kalmucks	- Radlov, Köhne, Pallas.
Mishmis	- Dalton.

AFRICA.

Ama Xosa	- Fritsch.
Amazulu	- Fritsch.
Bechuana	- Fritsch.
Baquerewe	- R. P. E. Hurel.

AFRICA.

Peoples.	Authorities.
Makololo -	- Livingstone.
Wataturu -	- Baumann.
Gallas -	- Paulitschke.
Bogos -	- Munzinger.
Beduan -	- Munzinger.
Somal -	- Paulitschke, Featherman.
Danakil -	- Paulitschke.
(9) Bahima -	- Roscoe, H. H. Johnston.

AGRICULTURE III.

AFRICA.

Banyoro -	-	Cunningham.
Ondonga -	-	Rautanen in Steinmetz.
Basutos -	-	Casalis.
Alur -	-	Stuhlmann.
Amahlubi -	-	Marx in Steinmetz.
Washambala -	-	Lang in Steinmetz, Kohler.
Basoga Batamba -	-	Condon.
Wafipa -	-	Thomson.
Sereres -	-	Dr. Corre.
Kuku -	-	Varden Plas.
Warangi -	-	Kannenbergh, Baumstark, Kohler.
Akamba -	-	Hobley.
Nandi -	-	Hollis.
Takue -	-	Munzinger.
Wakikuyu -	-	von Höhnel, Hobley.
Marea -	-	Munzinger.
Nosse bé -	-	Walter in Steinmetz.
Marutse -	-	Holub.
Bambara -	-	Featherman.
Segoo -	-	Featherman.
Calabar -	-	Featherman, Hutchinson, Walker.
Foota Torra -	-	Featherman.
Foota Jalon -	-	Featherman.
Bushongo -	-	"Musée du Congo."
Bambala -	-	"Musée du Congo."
Duallas -	-	Buchholtz, Kohler.
(14) Bahuana -	-	Torday and Joyce.
Basonge Meno -	-	"Musée du Congo," Torday & Joyce.
Basonge -	-	Overbergh.
Mbengas -	-	Duloup.
Waniaenwesi -	-	Kohler.
Anyanza -	-	Werner, Stanuas.
Yao -	-	Werner.
Ababua -	-	Halkin in Overbergh.
Wapokomo -	-	Kraft in Steinmetz.
Baganda -	-	Roscoe.
Bamsalala -	-	Desognies in Steinmetz.
Wagogo -	-	Cole and Beverley in Steinmetz.
Diakite Saracolays -	-	Nicole in Steinmetz.
Jekris -	-	Granville and Roth, Miss Kingsley.
Bawenda -	-	Gottschling.
Warundi -	-	Burgdt, Hartland.
Tshi -	-	Ellis.
Ewe -	-	Ellis, Zundel, Herold.
Yoruba -	-	Ellis.
Baronga -	-	Junod.
Bambala -	-	Torday and Joyce.

AFRICA.

Peoples.	Authorities.
Geges & Nagos	- Hagen.
Bahote	- Coquilhat, Featherman.
Bukoba Natives	- Richter.
Suaheli	- Niese.
Bongos	- Schweinfurth.
Fanti	- Finsch, Featherman.
Ba-yaka	- Torday and Joyce.
Wanyakyusa	- Fulleborn.
Woloff	- Tautain, Featherman.
Sese Islanders	- Cunningham.
Wachagga	- Kohler.
Wadigo	- Baumann, Storch.
Bihenos	- Capello and Ivens.
Indikki	- Hoesmann.
Kilwa	- Eberstein.
Kimbunda	- Magyar.
Wasinja	- Baumann.
Wapare	- Storch, Kohler, Conrau, Baumann.
Cazembe	- Peters.
Wasiba	- Hermann.
Benin Natives	- De Cardi in Miss Kingsley's "West African Studies."
Chevas	- Peters.
Kioko	- Pogge.
Mabode	- Burrows.
Lunda	- Pogge, Schütt.

ASIA.

Kasias	- Dalton.
Kayans	- Hose and McDougall.
Kayans, Mindalam	- Nieuwenhuis.
Kayans, Mahakam	- Nieuwenhuis.
Singpho	- Dalton, Parker, Wehrli.
Padam Abor	- Dalton.
Munda Kols	- Dalton, Selinghaus.
Dusun	- Ling Roth.
Bungians	- Blumentritt.
Singkel	- Rosenberg.
Nias	- Rosenberg.
Passumahians	- Junghuhn.
Malays of Padang	- Junghuhn.
Alfures	- Junghuhn.
Java	- Junghuhn and Rosenberg.
Timorese	- Forbes.
Kafirs	- Robertson.
Badaga	- Metz, Rivers, Thurston.
Sonthals	- Man.
Osettes	- Morgan, Klaproth.
Bagobos	- Schadenberg.
Igorottes	- Blumentritt ("Ethnographie").
Suanes	- Bodenstedt.
Adighe	- Bodenstedt.
Battas of Sumatra	- Junghuhn.
Tjumba	- Junghuhn.
Miris of Hills	- Dalton.
Miris of Plains	- Dalton.
Garos	- Dalton, Austin.
Tinguiane	- Blumentritt.
Kharrias	- Dalton, Risley.

ASIA.

Peoples.	Authorities.
Daians - - -	Junghuhn.
Balinese - - -	Junghuhn.
Angani Nagas - -	Woodthorpe, Godden.
Kenyah - - -	Hose and McDougall.
Mukassares - - -	Junghuhn.
Bugis - - -	Junghuhn.
Maguindanaos - -	Blumentritt.
Khiva - - -	Wrangell.
Karo Bataks - - -	Müller.

NORTH AMERICA.

Pima - - -	Bancroft.
Moqui - - -	Schoolcraft, vol. 4, Bancroft.
Tao - - -	Schoolcraft.
Zuni - - -	Stevenson, Smiths. rep. 12.
Guatemala - - -	Bancroft, Stoll.
Papago - - -	Bancroft, Lumholtz.
Zapotecs - - -	Bancroft.
Mayas - - -	Bancroft.
Hopi - - -	Goddard, Farrand.
Sia - - -	Farrand.
Apalachites - - -	De Rochefort.

SOUTH AMERICA.

Araucanians - - -	Musters, D'Orbigny, Ochsenius, von Bibra, Latcham, J.A.I. 39.
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OCEANIA.

Neuforezen - - -	von Hasselt.
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NOTES.

1. With regard to the Sakai and Semang the distinction between the tribes living wild in the jungle and others is sufficiently clear. The former are classed among the Lower Hunters. The latter, who mainly practise some rudimentary agriculture, comprise numerous peoples of Semang, Sakai, Jakun, Mantras and others, with regard to whom we have a number of accounts by Martin, Skeat and Blagden, Wilkinson, Annandale and Robinson and others. It is impossible to form a satisfactory grouping of these peoples. The list given aims at enumerating as fairly as possible the different representative types.

2. *Turkomans* :—Population nearly one million in Russian, Persian and Chinese Empires (Stein, *Dr. Petermans*, 1880, p. 332). Original occupation seems to have been mainly war and robbery (p. 337). The majority are pastoral; some also practise agriculture (pp. 229, 337), while some live by fishing. The general statements of our authority do not distinguish the institutions of the different parts of the population and they are all entered here under “Pastoral.”

3. *Bhuiyar* :—These are in large measure Hinduised people, presumably dependent on the Indian Government or on Rajah's Government. The name Bhuiyar, Bhuinhar, and Bhuiya are used by different authors, and it is not always clear whether the same or different people are referred to.

4. *Karayaki* and *Sambioa* :—Two tribes of the Karayas, of whom Ehrenreich gives the same general account except that the second have distinctly more developed agriculture than the first. (Ehrenreich, *Ver. König. Museum für Völkerkunde*, Bd. ii, p. 8.)

5. *Paumaris* :—As described by Wallace (*Amazon*, p. 514) practised a little agriculture, though von Martius (*Beiträge*, p. 419) describes them as having had practically none—a very doubtful case of A¹.

6. *Ges* :—Some of these have cattle as well as agriculture (p. 288) but

in general the industrial arts are said to be low while the morals of the nation are high. (Martius, *Beitrage*, p. 295.)

7. *Batawana* :—A pastoral people that have lately taken to agriculture. Up to the beginning of the nineties they left all agricultural work to the subject races. They have been left in the first division of the Pastoral stage. (Passarge, *Z. Ethn.*, 37, p. 690.)

8. *Ba-Yaka* :—A case of an African people with rudimentary agriculture and sufficient advance in other arts to be classed, though with some doubt, as A 3.. Cultivation is by women and the hoe the only instrument, but manioc, maize, nuts and tobacco are grown, and they have cattle, though in a semi-wild state. The men weave palm cloth, the women make pottery, and though smelting is unknown there are hereditary smiths. Finally there is a regular trade in rubber, hay exported, and cattle imported. On this last ground we have placed them in the highest division. (Torday and Joyce, *J.A.I.*, 36, pp. 42-4.)

9. *Bahima* :—Classified as Pastoral 2 because, though themselves pure cattle breeders, they have serf-settlements in each district who till the soil and supply the smith's work. (Roscoe, *J.A.I.*, 37, p. 98.)

10. *Yonca and Boni* :—Two groups of negro refugees from Dutch Guiana settled in French Guiana, under a "Grandman" chosen for life and recognised by the French Government. (Coudreau, *La haute Guyane R.E.*, 7, p. 460.)

12. *Yaunde* :—Would be classed as A 1 but for their smiths (p. 63) and a certain amount of trade (p. 64) and the possession of goats and sheep (p. 40). Much the same considerations apply to the Fang in general, of whom the Yaundes are a branch. (Zenker, *Mitt. der deutschen Schutzgebieten*, Bd. 8.)

13. *Massai* :—The Massai people do not practise agriculture at all, subsisting mainly on cattle and war, but a division of them are agricultural and settled, and said by Sir H. H. Johnston to be more advanced in the arts. Their iron work appears to be the handiwork of a subject race or caste, this iron being purchased from the Swahili. We enter them both under Pastoral i and Agricultural ii. (Elliot, in *Introduction to Hollis*, Hollis, p. 330. H. H. Johnston in *Uganda Protectorate*.)

14. *Ba-Huana* :—A fairly typical case of A 3. Men clear the ground while the rest is done by the women. Domestic animals are goats, cats and fowls, and dogs used in hunting. This would correspond to A 2. But further they have smiths held in high esteem, tanning, weaving, and have a developed trade, use shell currency, and are regular middlemen. (Torday and Joyce, *J.A.I.*, 36, pp. 278-283.)

15. *Ba Yanzi* :—Said to be good agriculturists and therefore classed as A 2, though some of the interior tribes are said to be hunters. (Torday and Joyce, *J.A.I.*, 37, p. 138.)

16. *The Ainu of Japan* :—Agriculture is of a very elementary nature, consisting really of garden work attended to mainly by the women. The men are good herdmen, but so long as the women can procure sufficient food for the winter they do nothing. When the gardens fail they live by hunting, fishing, and gathering (p. 40). Their huts are insubstantial (p. 57). They have weaving looms (p. 80) and pounding mortars (p. 78) of their own, but metal adornments, cups, dishes and pots, are of Japanese manufacture (p. 49). They have been classed as A 1. (Batchelor.)

17. *Teleuts* :—Originally a Nomadic people, they are now settled and agricultural. As the transition is said to be now nearly completed, they are treated as belonging to A 2. (Radlov, vol. i, p. 334.)

18. *Abakan Tartars* :—Nomadic Pastoral. Some are beginning to settle and practise a little agriculture, but as even in their case the main occupation is cattle-rearing they are treated as P 1. The Abakan Tartars of the Western group are now agricultural. (Radlov, vol. i, pp. 376-377.)

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ABBREVIATIONS.

- B.A. British Association Reports.
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 J.A.I. Journal of the Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland.
 M.D.S. Mittheilungen aus den deutschen Schutzgebieten.
 Pet., Dr. Dr. Petermann's Mittheilungen aus Justus Perthes' Geographischer Anstalt.
 R.E. Revue d'Ethnographie.
 SMITHS. REP. Annual Report of the Smithsonian Institution; after 1881, Annual Report of the Bureau of Ethnology.
 Z.E. Zeitschrift für Ethnologie.
 Z. Erd. Zeitschrift für allgemeine Erdkunde.
 Z. Ges. Erd. Zeitschrift der Gesellschaft für Erdkunde.
 Z.V.R. Zeitschrift für vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft.

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